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SIR W. ROBERTSON NICOLL, M.A., LL.D.

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THE LORD'S SUPPER IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

The fact that the Fourth Gospel, when it comes to record the last hours of the life of Jesus, leaves out the institution of the Lord's Supper, is an idiosyncrasy which has repeatedly attracted attention. No real light is thrown on this striking difference from the three synoptic gospels by arguing that the latter simply follow the Pauline tradition, and that the supper was really never instituted at all, but rose out of post-resurrection meals at which visions of Christ were enjoyed. Still less can we accept such suggestions as (*a*) that the aged apostle forgot about it, or (*b*) that he assumed his readers would be sufficiently familiar with its origin as described in the earlier gospels, or (*c*) that the account of it was either excised by some later redactor of the Fourth Gospel or perhaps accidentally lost. It is more relevant to argue that the writer may have considered that he had discussed the Sacrament already at sufficient length in the sixth chapter. This theory is not adequate to the full data of the problem, but it has the merit of recognizing that the omission of the Lord's Supper in the thirteenth chapter is neither an isolated nor an accidental phenomenon. To deal with the matter satisfactorily we have to correlate three data in the structure of the gospel ; (i.) the institution of the supper is omitted just where it was natural to expect the mention of it, (ii.) the writer further substitutes for the Lord's Supper another supper of Jesus and His disciples, and (iii.) he inserts in an earlier dialogue what appears to be an interpretation of eucharistic language or a comment upon the significance of the rite.

In the Lucan tradition (xxii. 14 f.), after the eucharistic supper, a dispute arose among the disciples upon their relative positions of importance. Jesus settled the argument by pointing out that humble service ranks higher with God than any pretensions, adding, "I am among you as one who serves." The following eschatological paragraph (28–30) did not appeal to the writer of the Fourth Gospel, but he fixes on the previous section, and expands it into the acted parable of the foot-washing,[1] which leads up to the Lucan point that the example of lowly service shown by Jesus is to be the pattern and standard of Christian brotherhood.

Such is the Johannine equivalent for the Lord's Supper or eucharistic meal of the earlier tradition, the remarkable thing about it being that the writer replaces the primitive sacrament by a different feast. In view of the general character and attitude of the Gospel, it is impossible to doubt that this was done deliberately. Dr. Abbott, indeed, endeavours to account for the strange omission of the synoptic sacrament by suggesting that, while John knew the spirit of what Jesus had said at the last supper of the earlier tradition, he was ignorant of the exact words. "If he knew precisely what was really uttered, his silence would be—from any modern and logical point of view—unpardonable. We ought (I think) to do him the justice of assuming that he did not know precisely what the words were."[2] Now it may be difficult to lay one's hand on the specific motive which led the writer to differ at this crucial point from the synoptic tradition, but I do not think we are doing him any sort of

[1] A menial task. Cf. Plutarch's *Vit. Pompeii*, 73, where Faonius attends to Pompey, rendering him such services ὅσα δεσπόταις δοῦλος μέχρι νίψεως ποδῶν. If the foot-washing is to be connected with a sacrament, it symbolises baptism rather than the Lord's Supper, perhaps as an implicit protest against the idea of repeated religious lustrations as magically efficacious for salvation (Pfleiderer, *Primitive Christianity*, iv. pp. 232–233). But this aspect is subordinate, at the most.

[2] *The Son of Man*, 3437.

injustice in supposing that, here as elsewhere, he was moving with conscious freedom, and that he had some special reason for the change which he introduced. What that reason was, we can best hope to discover by analysing the passage in the light of the general texture and tendencies of the Fourth Gospel as a whole.

When the Fourth Gospel is connected with the contemporary development of the church's organisation in Asia Minor, it is an attractive hypothesis that the emphasis on the foot-washing, which leads up to the new commandment of brotherly love, was an implicit side-stroke against abuses on the part of prominent leaders and officials. On this view, the author, in chapter xiii., as elsewhere, is opposing the monarchical episcopate, which he regarded as tending to arrogance and mercenary practices. The bishop, as the responsible, paid superintendent of the Lord's Supper and the alms offered in connexion with the rite, is prefigured in the Judas of the Gospel and the Diotrephes of the third Johannine epistle; as against the assumption of supreme power by the financial and administrative official in any congregation, the author shows that what Jesus meant by His supper was to inculcate a spirit of humble brotherhood and a duty of hospitality among the members of the church, not to found a rite which permitted self-seeking officials to show pride and harshness at the eucharistic meal. He wanted to promote in the rising episcopate the duty of hospitality as the note of true apostolic succession, not any aggrandisement on the score of ecclesiastical function. In short, the thought uppermost in his mind was a development of such a warning against the mercenary spirit as Paul addressed to the presbyters at Miletus, or such as that conveyed in 1 Peter (v. 1–5); *tend the flock of God . . . not for filthy lucre, but willingly . . . yea, all of you, gird yourselves with the apron of humility, to serve one another.* In

this perspective the object of the fourth evangelist becomes clear. "He would put in the background the sacred meal which had become the scene of strife and display, and instead he would place an incident which would give the real idea and substance of the sacrament, and emphasise that duty of hospitality which was being neglected. . . . It is by hospitality and humbleness that we get the bread of God—not by partaking of sacred ordinances in a proud spirit. The essence of the Holy Communion is brotherhood and service, and where these are there is a true partaking of the body and blood of the Lord." [1]

But the anti-official motive in the Fourth Gospel is not prominent enough to bear the weight of this interpretation, nor does it explain the particular form of the Johannine account of the supper. Had this been all that the writer wished to convey, he could have done it as Luke has done it (or at least woven into the story of the eucharist a similar warning); there was no particular reason why he should have omitted entirely the institution of the eucharist. What we have, in the thirteenth chapter of the Fourth Gospel, is not a fresh interpretation of the Lord's Supper from a special, spiritual point of view; it is a different feast altogether. It is true, as we shall see in a moment, that brotherliness is the outstanding lesson of the Last Supper in the Fourth Gospel, but this would not have been of itself sufficient to lead the writer to give up the Lord's Supper altogether.

A more obvious explanation of the omission lies in the incongruity between the eschatological element of the Lord's Supper and the strongly marked tendency of the Fourth Gospel to eliminate or transmute the apocalyptic material of the primitive tradition. This also is a *vera causa*, but it does not cover all the data. The Last Supper

[1] H. T. Purchas: *Johannine Problems and Modern Needs*, pp. 30–31.

contained the promise of a future feast, when Jesus and the disciples would be together in the Messianic realm. "I tell you, I will never again drink of the fruit of the vine until that day when I drink it new with you in my Father's realm." These words breathe the high confidence of Jesus in the result of His sacrifice. The conception of the future bliss as a feast was familiar to rabbinic piety, and had naturally passed into some circles of apocalyptic faith; thus in Enoch (lxii. 14) the elect eat together with the Son of Man in the new age. It is in these terms that Jesus expresses His anticipation of the blissful reunion which, in spite of, or rather in consequence of, His death, the Son of Man and His followers are to enjoy in the immediate future. Probably it was owing to such a well-marked eschatological element in the tradition, that both Mark and Matthew omitted any reference to the repetition of the supper, although, as the traditions of Paul, Luke, and the Didachê prove, the repetition of the rite was not incompatible with its eschatological outlook. Had the author of the Fourth Gospel felt any difficulty over the latter, he could have surmounted it by leaving out the apocalyptic saying, as Justin does, and retaining the Lord's Supper in its proper place. Here again, we may argue, he could have got his effect without recourse to the daring step of dropping the Sacrament. The alternatives were not, omit it or retain it in an eschatological shape. Whatever led the writer to leave out the institution of the sacrament, it was not necessarily or primarily its eschatological setting in the primitive tradition.

Another solution of the problem, which lies closer to the Johannine pragmatism, is that the reference to the broken body of Jesus was unsuitable to the writer's theology. In the primitive tradition the broken bread symbolised the crucified body of the Lord, but the author of the Fourth Gospel saw a mystical significance in the fact that Jesus, the

true Paschal Lamb, was not mutilated ; His limbs were not broken (xix. 33, 36). This omission of any reference to the breaking of the bread is paralleled by the account of Justin, but Justin's account again shows that the institution of the Sacrament could have been described without any such reference as would have been incongruous with the Johannine pragmatism.

None of these solutions is adequate by itself. They need to be supplemented by a further consideration. It is in the writer's special conception of the death of Jesus that the clue to His treatment of the Supper is probably to be found. Upon the one hand, he dissociates it from the Jewish paschal meal. The last supper is eaten before the passover : Jesus crucified is the Christian paschal Lamb, inaugurating the redemption of God's people. How far the adoption of this view was due to the writer's anti-Jewish tendencies, and how far it was the result of the Quartodeciman movement in Asia, is irrelevant to our present purpose. The point is that his omission of the institution of the eucharist is deliberate. And if we ask why he could not have mentioned it as well as Paul did, who shared the same view about Jesus being the Paschal Lamb of the church, the answer must be that he intended to dissociate the rite not only from the Jewish passover, but from the Christian agapê. The latter was more to him than the eucharist.

This motive is of supreme importance for an appreciation of the Fourth Gsopel's sacramental position. The anti-Jewish motive was early noted. Thus Origen found a special significance in the fact that the passover was called *the passover of the Jews* (ii. 13, xi. 55), not the passover *of the Lord* as in the Law ; he saw in this the fulfilment of the Isaianic saying that God hated the Jewish feasts and disclaimed them (Isa. i. 13–14). The spirit of this interpretation is not untrue to the tendency of the Fourth Gospel,

with regard to the Lord's Supper, but it needs to be combined with a recognition of the fact that the writer also had probably in mind the primitive love-feast of the churches and that he connected this primarily with the Last Supper. I do not lay stress on the coincidence in the opening words : " Jesus, having loved his own within the world, loved them to the end," still less upon the possibility of connecting the alms of the agapê with the allusion to Judas giving something to the poor. The Johannine association of the Last Supper with a prototype of the agapê rather than of the eucharist is not rooted in such secondary traits. But in the foot-washing, which in the ancient world was the work of a slave, and in the consequent lesson on humility and brotherly love, we see pretty plainly what the writer meant—it was a sort of love-feast, inaugurating solemnly the new commandment of love. The last and supreme order of Jesus is not to eat bread and drink wine in memory of Him, but to wash one another's feet, after His example. So Christians have part and lot in His life. It is a higher form of the agapê-feast, a Johannine glorification of the religious significance attaching to this institution of the church.

The early history of the agapê is dim. Père Batiffol has recently denied its existence till the third century, but his arguments involve too arbitrary a treatment of some of the documents, and we may assume without much hesitation that it was connected with the eucharist in the early church, either as a prelude or as a sequel, down to the time of Ignatius at least. In Ignatius *agapê* (Smyrn. 8) means the love-feast and the eucharist together ; he forbids either baptism or the agapê being held apart from the presence of the presiding bishop, to avoid schism. The writer of the Fourth Gospel prefers to secure unity in the church by less ecclesiastical means ; his mystical inward spirit emphasised the love-feast as a symbol which expressed and realised the true unity of

Christians and Christ. He avoids the Pauline use of "the Body" of Christ, owing to its associations with the eucharist, and chooses the metaphors of the flock and the Vine to convey the same truth.

If this suggestion is well founded, we thus gain, in the Fourth Gospel, an important witness to the time and the reasons for the dissociation of the eucharist and the agapê. It is usual to date this separation from the edict of Pliny, and I think Batiffol [1] is right in holding that this edict did induce the Asiatic Christians to give up their second meeting or eucharist in Bithynia, whether they had an agapê or not. It is later dogmatic prejudice, I am afraid, which makes us disinclined to allow that any early Christians could sit loose to the eucharist. But the Fourth Gospel shows a tendency—we do not know how far it was typical or commanded sympathy—to concentrate upon the love-feast and ignore the eucharist, not so much for prudential reasons —to avoid suspicion of Thyestean banquets—as on grounds connected with a deeper and more spiritual view of communion—at any rate spontaneously, not in obedience to a Roman edict which was hostile to religious clubs.

Historians of the early church are fond of noticing that the agapê was not a universal practice, and that its forms varied. If our reading of the facts is accurate, the practice of the Lord's Supper, as a sacrament, was not universal either; the very formulas used in connexion with it were in a state of flux during the early centuries, and more than the formulas. If this inference sounds startling, it is because we are apt insensibly to read back modern notions of the sacraments into the early literature, and fail to do justice as historians to the gaps which the history of the primitive church reveals in this sphere of its praxis. The Fourth Gospel was indifferent to the Lord's Supper for much higher

[1] *Etudes d'Histoire et de Théologie Positive*, i. (third edition), pp. 298 f.

reasons than those which induced the Bithynian Christians to drop its observance, but in both cases the underlying motive was the frank conviction that communion with Christ did not depend essentially upon participation in such a rite. The Fourth Gospel points positively to the spirit of the agapê as the normal and healthy guarantee of such fellowship with the Lord.

But, we may ask, had the writer any place in his theology for the Lord's Supper? And if so, what? The answer to these queries lies in the eucharist-dialogue which is inserted at the close of the sixth chapter, in connexion with the story of the feeding of the five thousand, not as a substitute for or a counterpart of the synoptic institution, but independently. Whether that story had originally a eucharistic motive or not, is a problem which we may leave aside. Such a motive was found in it by the writer of the Fourth Gospel, though it was surely not the motive conjectured by Schweitzer [1] that Jesus, in feeding the crowd, consecrated them, in an eschatological sacrament, as partakers in the Messianic feast to come. The dialogue has three movements, in the third of which it reaches its climax: after describing the incarnate Christ as the bread of life, it insists upon the need of eating His flesh and drinking His blood, and then proceeds to give the explanation of this strange language.

The distinctive feature of the dialogue emerges as we read it in connexion with the faith and praxis of the early church. Roughly speaking, we may distinguish three cardinal elements in the primitive conception of the Supper, elements which varied in their relative prominence: (i.) the commemoration of the sacrificial death of Jesus, expressed in the words, *do this in memory of me*, (ii.) the social union of Christians in the Body of Christ, and (iii.) the communion of Christians with the living Christ. The first of these elements is present

[1] *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, pp. 374 f.

to the mind of the author, of course, but it is not prominent ; we cannot say that it is the leading thought in his argument. What interests him chiefly is the third, i.e. in his eucharist-dialogue of the sixth chapter. The second is prominent in the thirteenth chapter, with its account of the love-feast, but it is noticeably absent from the eucharist-dialogue. To the primitive church the eucharist had always been more than a memorial feast, such as was not uncommon throughout the Greek and Roman world, in honour of a society's founder or a family's departed head. It never suggested any idea of a reminder or memorial offered to God, but it did recall vividly by its very praxis the Lord's death till He returned in glory ; it was a δρώμενον, one of those actions of a symbolic character which flashed upon the imagination and faith of the worshipping church at every celebration the real presence of the Lord whose historical death lay underneath their fellowship with the Father and their hope for the future.

Now the remarkable feature of the Fourth Gospel's pragmatism is that the writer is only interested in the third of these aspects, as far as the sixth chapter goes. Whatever was his attitude to this sacrament, the importance he attaches to it here is primarily connected with the thought of the individual's personal communion with the risen Christ. Though this communion naturally implies the death of Christ, the stress does not fall upon the conception of that death as sacrificial. In this respect, the Johannine view approximates to that of the Didachê, although in the Didachê the absence of any reference to " showing the Lord's death " is accompanied, as it is not in the Fourth Gospel, by an eschatological outlook and a direct emphasis upon the unity of the church which is symbolised by the bread. Possibly the Johannine view, that participation in Christ as the Living Bread implies the resurrection, may have been a

contributory reason for the omission of the institution of the rite during his lifetime, as if the writer felt that while Christ was on earth, communion in this sense was unthinkable. "The Spirit did not yet exist for men," he says elsewhere, "because Jesus was not yet glorified." In his view, it was the Spirit which made the rite efficacious. "It is the Spirit which gives life; the flesh is of no use." At any rate, the stress on the spiritual communion of the individual believer with the risen Christ denotes an attitude towards the death [1] of Christ which is in accord with the general theology of the gospel. It is an attitude which is not wholly unexampled in the history of the church, particularly on the side of the mystically-minded. We get a curious parallel in Catherine of Genoa, for instance. Her devotion to the eucharist as the food of life eternal for the individual Christian led her to ignore not simply the death of Christ as a sacrifice but the death of Christ entirely in this connexion. Baron von Hügel points out how "her symbols and concepts are all suggested by the Fourth Gospel, in contrast to the Synoptists and St. Paul. For the eucharist is, with her, ever detached from any direct memory of the Last Supper, Passion, and Death, the original, historical, unique occasions which still form its setting in the pre-Johannine writings. And," he adds, "Catherine follows John in thinking predominantly of the single soul, when dwelling upon the Holy Eucharist." [2] I cite Catherine of Genoa as a partial, though rather morbid illustration of the effect which may be produced upon the conception of the death of Christ by the mystical temper, such as we find it in the Fourth Gospel; but there are two obvious qualifications to be made. The first is, that this testimony is derivative; it does not explain

[1] That is, the death and resurrection are viewed as completing the purpose of the incarnation.

[2] *The Mystical Element of Religion*, ii. pp. 87–88.

the origin of the attitude in the Fourth Gospel. The second is that it assumes—what I think is extremely hypothetical—that the Fourth Gospel, in its dialogue of the sixth chapter, makes communion with Christ culminate in the eucharistic feast.

With regard to the former point :—

The seedplot of the Johannine terminology is not far to seek. Apocalyptic piety in Judaism looked forward to a renewal of the celestial manna in the Messianic age ; thus in the apocalypse of Baruch (xxix. 8), " it will come to pass at that self-same time that the treasury of manna will again descend from on high, and they will eat of it in those years." The author of the Fourth Gospel, however, has no interest in such eschatological anticipations. His Christ, as incarnate and ascended, is the heavenly bread, here and now, for faith : he is not the giver of it in the remote future. Already in Paul, and in Philo before him, the manna had been interpreted in this sense : thus Philo (*De Leg. Alleg.*, iii. 59 f.) calls it the word and reason or Logos given by God to the soul. He explains how the verse, " man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God," means that the perfect soul is nourished by the whole of God's word ; only, he adds, with a characteristic touch, " we must be content to be nourished by a portion of it." The author of the Fourth Gospel has a better hope and promise. It is the entire Christ, the whole personality—flesh and blood—who is the bread of life for Christians. The writer mentions blood along with flesh, since according to the Hebrew conception the life of the flesh lay in the blood ; perhaps, too, he has a subtle antithesis in mind when he speaks of the Christ's flesh in connexion with the spiritual manna, for according to the old story in Numbers (xi. 12–13), Moses, at the giving of the manna, cried out in despair, " whence should I have flesh to give this people ? for they

cry to me, saying, Give us flesh, that we may eat." The Christ of the Fourth Gospel gives a manna which is real flesh, adequate nourishment for the soul.

All this is elaborated in the middle paragraph of the dialogue — a paragraph which is in striking contrast to the simple and beautiful language of the Didachê, but which is characteristic of the Fourth Gospel's style and thought. It is unnecessary to suppose that vi. 51*b*–56 (59) is an interpolation of the later church, in the interests of the realistic sacramentalism. The motive which has suggested this hypothesis is correct, viz., the perception that, literally, it is out of keeping with the context, and even repellent in its defiant realism. But it can be read as it stands, without dislocating the argument, if we bear in mind the writer's standpoint, instead of missing his point by reading into his words a Western literalism which, to do him justice, he has done his best to prevent. He is developing this dialogue, on the basis of the story about the feeding of the five thousand, for the purpose of expressing his cardinal convictions about faith and life in Christ. What these are we learn from passages like the following : " I am the bread of life ; he that cometh to me shall not hunger, and he that believeth on me shall never thirst " ; " This is the will of my Father, that every one who beholds the Son and believes on him, should have everlasting life, and I will raise him up at the last day." Down to verse 51 this line of thought is clear and simple. Spiritual faith in Christ as the Son of God is the bread and food of the soul. It is the middle section, with its abrupt and paradoxical language about " eating his flesh and drinking his blood," which is the difficulty. You can cut the Gordian knot by removing it as an interpolation, but interpolations ought to be the last resource of sanity, and it is worth while to see if the knot cannot be untied.

Which brings us to the second point. Does the language

of the dialogue disclose the author's estimate of the rite in question? The current view is that behind the Fourth Gospel, as already to some extent behind Paul, there shimmers the sacramental idea of participation, by means of a sacred feast, in the eternal nature of the Deity—the worshipper eating the bread and drinking the blood of the sacrifice, and thereby renewing the substance of his soul as his life blends with the immortal life of the Deity Himself. In the Fourth Gospel, it is held, this prevalent theory is put in terms of the Logos-theology, according to which Christianity is the religion of the Spirit or absolute Reality, mediated through Christ to a perishing world of flesh, and received by the Christian in the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper. There are various presentations of this view. According to Reinach and others, the writer accepted the notion of theophagy in a highly spiritualised form, analogous to that of the mystery-cults. The Christian eucharist would thus represent an anthropomorphic transformation of the periodic totem-sacrifice. More sensibly it has been suggested that he compromised between the realistic church-view and the higher mystical interpretation. He did not reconcile them; what he did was to protest against a mechanical and superstitious use of the sacraments. Still, he held that life eternal was infused, by the sacraments, as a hyperphysical force, into the personalities of the believing recipients, and that their fleshly nature was thus invested with divine vitality.

At first sight, this reading seems not only plausible but highly probable from more points of view than one.

It claims to place the Fourth Gospel in relation to the early church between Paul and Ignatius, and to do justice at once to its characteristic contribution and to the toll which, like all progressive thinkers, the writer had to pay to the contemporary conditions of his age. But, on closer study, the

theory appears to me open to serious challenge. The alleged instances of worshippers in the cults sharing the life of the deity by partaking of him in a meal are distant, late, and dubious. Even the appeal to Paul is uncertain; and, for another thing, the theory does not suit the exact aim and object of the Fourth Gospel. This particular section of the eucharist-dialogue is not an expression of the writer's essential doctrine in terms of a rite which he found existing in the church : it is neither his attempt to adjust his doctrine to it nor his whole-hearted statement of it. I should prefer to say that it is a use of realistic language, such as may have been current in some quarters, by one who used it just because he felt quite detached from the rite. He spoke in terms of it, as freely and aptly, for example, as Luther spoke to the reformed churches about the Cross. "The cross of Christ has been divided throughout the whole world," he wrote to an Augustinian prior, "every one meets with his own portion of it. Do not you therefore reject it, but rather accept it as the most holy relic, to be kept not in a gold or silver chest, but in a golden heart, that is, a heart imbued with gentle charity." Here Luther speaks vividly and frankly in terms of the mediæval worship of the cross, just because he had parted with that superstition. The higher reaches of religious interpretation afford repeated instances of this attitude ; it is characteristic especially of the mystical temper but not confined to it ; and we may fairly take the strong metaphors of this Johannine passage in this light.[1] As if to remove misconceptions, the author not only prefaces his paragraph with the words on faith which I have already quoted, but he goes on to add : "it is the Spirit that gives life, the flesh is

[1] I do not mean to suggest, of course, that the author of the Fourth Gospel regarded the eucharist as Luther regarded the cross-superstition. But his deliberate omission of the eucharist, together with his appropriation of eucharist-language in another connexion, may serve to indicate how independent he felt communion with the living Christ to be of any such rite.

of no use." "The words I have spoken to you, they are Spirit and life." It is in these words of verse 63, as most editors recognise, that we have the writer's characteristic mind. They are really his way of warning his readers that the foregoing language is not to be taken literally and misunderstood, any more than the psalmist's appeal to taste and see that the Lord is gracious. My point is that we are justified in interpreting the middle paragraph by the preceding and the following, where the writer speaks more in his own dialect; verse 63 is the climax to which all leads up; [1] taking the gospel as a whole, there is little doubt that the conception of faith and eternal life is bound up with a spiritual perception of the personality of Christ, which assimilates Him by trust and obedience. Unless there is strong reason to the contrary, it is unsymmetrical to find in this paragraph an awkward attempt to come to terms with the realistic view of the Supper. The Alexandrian background of the Logos, which is more dominant in the Fourth Gospel than the Hellenistic, did not require any recourse to the sacramentalism of the cults. Judaism cannot be described as a sacramental religion. It is staggering to find a critic like Pfleiderer committing himself to the assertion that "on the testimony of the History of Religion, no popular religion can subsist without sacramental ceremonies." Judaism, to say nothing of Islam, is certainly a testimony to the contrary, and the ethos of the Fourth Gospel, even in its exploitation of the Logos-theory, is Jewish rather than Hellenistic. I imagine the author of the Fourth Gospel would not have failed to

[1] The discussion, according to Wendt (*Teaching of Jesus*, ii. 335), implies "anything but the requirement of a mystical union of the disciples with His glorified heavenly nature"; it is rather "the energetic declaration of the fact that Jesus based the saving significance entirely upon the word of teaching which He, as a man, exercised upon earth." This interprets the Johannine theology too strictly in terms of the synoptic, and undervalues the "mystical union," but it is nearer the truth than the opposite view.

sympathise with Philo's passionate aversion to all mystery-religions.

His attitude to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper might be, so far as his language goes, one of (*a*) opposition to the church's doctrine, or of (*b*) interpretation in a higher sense, or (*c*) of indifference. The first view is held by Kreyenbühl (*Das Evangelium des Wahrheit*, ii. 25 ff.), who finds in the antithesis between manna and bread in chapter vi. Menander of Antioch's repudiation of the pagan magic on its first appearance within the sphere of the Christian sacrament. He also, with much more plausibility, notes the mystical emphasis upon the eternal presence of Christ, as opposed to the eschatological setting of the sacrament in the primitive communities and the realistic view which, he claims, was introduced by Ignatius. Even apart from the special Gnostic hypothesis which Kreyenbühl employs, however, it is not possible to accept such a view as adequate to the genesis of the Johannine theology; the realistic view was probably hovering round some circles earlier than Ignatius, and it is a modern definition of "spiritual" which finds any radical incongruity between a sacramental feast and the ideal worship of God in spirit and in truth. Where Kreyenbühl's theory is right is in its stress upon the critical attitude of the Fourth Gospel to the Lord's Supper. This attitude is interpreted by the majority of critics (*b*), however, as an attempt to correct a current view of the sacrament which was losing sight of the spiritual reality in a pre-occupation with the material rite. The writer brusquely reaffirms sacramental doctrine; he makes no attempt to conciliate pagan critics. At the same time he restates the doctrine of the Supper, in order to show Christians that external participation was of no avail apart from faith, and that the eternal life and spirit of God could only be mediated through the bread and wine of the rite to a receptive personal experience. "It is the Spirit

which gives life : the flesh is of no use." The writer, on this view, shared the contemporary idea of the sacramental cults, and held that the life of the Logos was imparted to Christians in the elements of the sacrament ; only, he wished to protest against the popular theory that the efficacy of the rite was mechanical and automatic.

Even this view, however, does not quite correspond to the full presuppositions of the gospel. To what has been already said on this point, I will simply add that if such an interpretation had been presented in the thirteenth chapter, at the institution of the sacrament, it might have been tenable, but the definite substitution of an agapê-feast there suggests that the eucharist-dialogue of the sixth chapter must be read in another light, as an expression of what may be called the writer's (*c*) indifference to the rite. If there is a sense in which he can be termed legitimately a mystic, he is the first of the mystics or quietists who attached no specific significance to the Supper as a means of communion with God. He is not embarrassed by the presence of sacraments in the church. He feels free, by his faith, to use their very language for his own ends. The paradoxical and defiant way in which the sacramental language is employed points to the serene freedom with which he regarded the sacrament itself, not as the sole or supreme means of enjoying communion, but, perhaps at most, as one traditional rite connected with the experience.

"I am the living Bread which came down from heaven ;
if any one eats of this bread, he shall live for ever ;
yea, and the bread I shall give is my flesh, for the life of the world.
Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you have not life in yourselves.
He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day.

He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me
and I in him."

It is not modern, it is consonant with the characteristic mysticism of the writer's faith, to say that the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper must have been for him symbols, at best, of the presence and benefits of Christ. Then, in answer to the feeling that this last is a hard saying—that language like this is staggering—the reply comes, that it is only intelligible in the light of the resurrection. If connected with a human Jesus who never died, it is incredible. But " it is the Spirit that gives life ; the flesh is of no use : the words I have spoken to you are spirit and life." This is the apex of the dialogue, and it determines the sense in which the writer intends the slope of the preceding argument to be viewed.

How difficult it was for the early church to maintain this position may be seen from the retrograde conceptions which Ignatius started but apparently failed to popularise, and the significant alteration in the Johannine text made afterwards by the Sinaitic Syriac, which boldly reads : " It is the Spirit which gives life to the body ; but you say, the body profits nothing." The most natural interpretation of this Syriac gloss is that it is directed against a depreciation of the eucharist ; probably it was due to an ecclesiastical feeling that verse 63 somehow failed to emphasise sufficiently the realistic significance of the Sacrament. The same mistake is repeated by moderns who persist in reading verse 63 as if it meant " the Spirit (i.e., as mediated through the cultus) gives life." This is to subordinate the last paragraph to a literal and realistic interpretation of the second, to isolate the latter from its context and the rest of the gospel, and to assume that for the Fourth Gospel the sensible media were essential to any participation in the spiritual Christ. That assumption is not justified by the available evidence. The aim of the writer, it seems to me, was exactly the reverse.

For him Christ is the food of the soul, the bread of life eternal which sustains the faith of man. Like a genuine mystic he has stated this truth in terms of daring realism, simply because these terms had no longer for him any vital connexion with the literal actions; communion for him was infinitely wider than eucharistic experiences. And finally, to prevent misconception, he adds the clue in the closing paragraph; "The Spirit gives life; the words I have spoken to you, they are Spirit and life."

One ingenious interpretation [1] of this verse as it stands may be set aside, I think, without much hesitation. It is proposed to take *ῥήματα* according to a well-known Hebraism as equivalent not to words but to things, the things just spoken of. When Jesus said, "*τὰ ῥήματα* which I have spoken to you are Spirit and life," what He meant, we are told, was, "The matters of which I have been speaking, the subject of my discourse, i.e. my flesh and blood, they are something more than mere flesh and blood, they are Spirit and life." But this rendering of *ῥήματα* is inconsistent with the Johannine usage. In the Fourth Gospel the *ῥήματα* of Christ, it is true, are something more than mere words, in our modern sense of the term, but that "something" is not what this interpretation claims. The Hebraism is Lucan, not Johannine. The Johannine *ῥήματα* have a special function; [2] they lie somewhere between mere words and the semi-metaphysical "logoi" or *δυναμεῖς* of the Philonic Logos. They are almost personified sometimes as living and active expressions of the Spirit of Christ, charged with His vitality for faith, i.e., their effect is not magical but conditioned by moral obedience and trust. Invariably in the Fourth Gospel the phrase means utterances: "Thou hast the *ῥήματα* of

[1] Loisy, *Le Quatrième Evangile*, p. 473; Gore, *Dissertations* (Note c.), *The Body of Christ*, pp. 290 f.

[2] Cf. M. Goguel, *La Notion Johannique de l'Esprit et ses Antécédents Historiques*, p. 102.

eternal life," "He whom God has sent speaks the ῥήματα of God," and so forth. It is in this sense alone that the words can be taken in the present passage. They refer, as the earliest patristic interpreters[1] saw, to the eating of the bread and the drinking of the blood; these, we are told, are *verbum visibile*. To adhere to the words and person of Christ, to inwardly digest the sayings of the Logos-Christ, that is the meaning of this highly figurative language and of the rite which it recalls. When we take the passage thus, we are not explain-in it away, we are explaining it as the writer intended us to explain it.

It may be objected to the interpretation I have outlined in this paper that it seems to leave the Fourth Gospel out of direct relation to what is supposed to have been one of the vital rites of the contemporary church. I have partly met this objection already, by anticipation, and here I shall only add a single word. If it is asked whether such a writer would be likely to pass over the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, when he was able to embrace baptism in his religious scheme, the answer is that so far as we can speak about "the sacrament," it means for the Fourth Gospel, not as it does for most of us, the Lord's Supper, but rather baptism; also, that even in the third chapter the allusion to water in the rite is incidental—we might almost say, accidental. The single mention of water, even if it is not a later gloss of the church, is in striking contrast to the reiterated emphasis upon the Spirit, just as in the sixth chapter. And, supposing that the Fourth Gospel ignored or stood aloof from the rite of the Lord's Supper, it would not be quite alone in the early Christian literature. For example, to take an almost contemporary instance, Ephesians deliberately omits it, even in recounting the media of unity in the church; no epistle is richer in its stress on the moral and mystic unity of

[1] From Tertullian (*De Carne Resurr.* 37) onwards.

Christians in the body of Christ, but " we have one faith, one Lord, one baptism "—not a syllable about the eucharist.[1] The same holds true of the later Shepherd of Hermas, with all its strong ecclesiastical and mystical leanings ; baptism is everywhere, the eucharist is nowhere. The significance of such data is not evaporated by warnings against pressing the argument from silence. It is a modern preconception which leads us to expect evidence in the early church for a widespread devotion to the eucharist as the centre of Christian worship and the indispensable rite of faith. There were evidently circles where it lay only on the circumference of piety, and these circles, sometimes, as in the case of the Johannine, of semi-mystical character, often voiced types of the finest piety native to the early church.

JAMES MOFFATT.

[1] Eph. iv. 5–6.

THE DIVINE NAMES IN GENESIS.

IV. The Hebrew Text.

It has already become apparent that the discussion in which we are engaged involves a conflict between two diametrically opposite points of view. Dahse, bringing to the investigation the prepossessions natural to a student of the LXX, is profoundly impressed with the instability of the textual tradition as regards the transmission of the divine names. In the LXX, fluctuation is indeed a conspicuous feature of the *apparatus criticus*; and it is perhaps true to say that in the Greek Pentateuch no element of the text is so liable to variation as the names for God. But Dahse seems to realise, more clearly than other writers of his school, that the diversity of the Greek text does not go far to prove the unreliability of the names as a whole, unless he can succeed somehow in drawing the Hebrew tradition into the vortex of confusion which exists in MSS. of the LXX. Hence he has laboured to show in the first place that the peculiarities of the Greek version are due not to accident or caprice, but to systematic alterations governed by a regard to the divisions of the Synagogue lectionary; and secondly, that its variations are based in part on different Hebrew recensions, which are entitled to quite as much consideration as the standard Massoretic recension. These positions of his have been examined at some length in the two preceding articles, where I venture to think I have shown that he is wrong all the time. If the arguments there adduced are conclusive, we might almost at this point wash our hands of the LXX altogether. It might safely be left, with its multiformity of text, in Dahse's hands to make what he can of it; and whether he discover a method in its madness or not is

henceforth of very little consequence to us. It is purely a matter of the internal condition of the Greek text, which in no degree affects the question of the stability and trustworthiness of the Hebrew tradition.

The view represented in these articles, on the contrary, is that the divine names are a remarkably stable element of the text. It is fair to admit that this impression rests in the first instance on the solidarity of the Hebrew text, although it is decidedly confirmed when we take into account the evidence of all versions other than the LXX. No one contends that the Hebrew text enjoys perfect immunity from error, or that it preserves with unfailing accuracy the names as they occurred in the original autographs of the sources of Genesis. The possibility of error in the Hebrew text must be recognised; all that is necessary for the justification of the critical use of that text as a guide to the separation of documents is evidence that the range of error is restricted within such narrow limits that it cannot seriously affect conclusions based on the assumption that the MT is correct. We shall see in another article that the versions, always excepting the LXX, differ so little from the MT as to confirm the impression that the divine names have been transmitted with peculiar fidelity. We may not be sure in regard to each particular name that it stands as it did in the primary document; but we may nevertheless find reason to believe that this must be the case in a sufficient number of instances to furnish a sound basis of induction, and to form the starting-point for a documentary theory of the Pentateuch. It will be the chief object of the remaining articles of this series to uphold the thesis that in the MT we have a recension of the divine names which possesses this character of stability in a remarkable degree, one which has undergone no material variation for more than 2,000 years, and which therefore may fairly claim to

represent, at least approximately, the names that stood in the original Genesis, or in the documents of which it was composed. The direct vindication of this position must, from the nature of the case, follow two lines of argument. We cannot hope to reach an absolute demonstration that the Hebrew text *never* varied in its transmission of the names of God, or that in the unknown earlier stages of its history it possessed the rigid uniformity which is observed in its more recent development. But (1) we can shew that the evidence adduced by Dahse and others in proof of its variability is of no value, because it ignores the fundamental canons of Massoretic criticism; and (2) we can point to facts which give a reasonable assurance that the present distribution of the divine names goes back in the main to a time not very much later than the final redaction and canonisation of the Pentateuch. In the first line of proof we are concerned with the evidence of Hebrew MSS.; in the second with the problem of the Samaritan Pentateuch.

1. Hebrew Manuscripts.

The received text of the Hebrew Bible lies before us in a considerable number of printed editions, and in some two thousand extant MSS. of the Old Testament in whole or in parts. All these exhibit substantially one and the same text. As regards the divine names of the Pentateuch, I do not know whether in the printed editions there are any variations at all. In the extant codices occasional variations do certainly occur; and it is the importance of these that we have now to consider. It is the unscholarly practice of writers like Wiener and Schlögl, unfortunately followed by Dahse, that while reproaching the higher critics for their neglect of MS. evidence, they cite MS. variants indiscriminately, without apparently having taken the least pains to inform themselves (and certainly no pains at all

to inform their readers) of the date and value of the codices in question, and without even considering the proportion of differences to agreements which are found amongst them as compared with the standard text. Now, in point of fact, there is some excuse for disregarding Hebrew MSS. entirely; but there is none for arguing as if one MS. were as good as another, or as if a single variant in one or two MSS. were enough of itself to throw doubt on the soundness of the received text. To make this clear it is necessary to explain at some length certain facts about the history of the Hebrew text which are constantly overlooked by the class of writers to whom Dahse adheres.

1. How, it may be asked, can it ever be right, or even excusable, to ignore the evidence of accessible manuscripts? A general answer to that question might be that the MSS. vary so slightly, and in such unimportant minutiae, that it is hardly worth while, except in special cases, to consult them or to investigate their differences. But that is not the main reason for assigning a relatively small importance to the variants found in codices of the Hebrew text.

(1) The leading fact is that for the last eighteen centuries at least there has existed a recognised *standard text*, which has been the norm by which the correctness of all MSS. has been judged. Of course the standard text is represented only by MSS. and (since the fifteenth century) in printed editions; but the consensus of MSS. does not constitute its sole or chief authority. Its transmission has been carefully guarded by a succession of official custodians, at first by the Sopherim or scribes, and later by those known as the Massoretes; and these authorities have sought to regulate it and maintain its purity, not merely by extreme care in the copying of MSS., but still more by the invention of the elaborate system of rules and observations which is called the *Massora* (= 'tradition'). Many of these observations go back to a

remote antiquity (some probably to pre-Christian times); most of them perhaps date from the flourishing period of the Massoretes from about the sixth to the tenth century; but the development and expansion of the system was not arrested till the introduction of printing towards the end of the fifteenth century. That the scheme was not entirely successful appears in the fact that in spite of it slight differences do occur in MSS.; that it was very nearly successful is shewn by their surprising unanimity. The result is that in countless cases we know quite certainly, apart from MSS. altogether, what was the text which was deemed correct by the authoritative exponents of the Jewish textual tradition; and since extant MSS. are all of later date than the great age of the Massora, we can be sure that where any MS. violates a Massoretic injunction it goes against the best Jewish professional opinion, and is therefore presumably a clerical mistake. Now this standard text, guaranteed by the Massora, is represented with substantial fidelity, and in the case of the divine names with perfect fidelity, in all printed Hebrew Bibles; so that whatever edition the student happens to use he may feel a practical certainty that he has before him the divine names in the most authoritative form of the Hebrew text which we can now by any possibility attain.[1]

[1] In illustration of the bearing of the Massora on the use of the divine names I may here instance two rules which Dahse quotes on p. 11, and which in his opinion should have prevented me from writing as I did in a brief note on the occurrences of אדני יהוה (*ICC.* p. 278). The first is, "In the Pentateuch and the Hagiographa the reading is always יהוה אלהים, only in 8 cases אדני יהוה" (Genesis xv. 2, 8; Dt. iii. 24, ix. 26; Ps. lxix. 7, lxxi. 5, 26, lxxiii. 28). The other is, "In the Prophets אדני יהוה is always to be written except in five passages, where the reading is יהוה אלהים." It is of course true that such rules tended to suppress variants in MSS.—that is what the Massora is for—and if amongst these variants there were one older than the standard recension it would be suppressed along with the rest. On the other hand it must be remembered that these regulations were not constructed by the Massoretes out of their own heads. They are based on the MSS. which seemed to the Massoretes most authoritative

(2) This standard text has existed in several forms which by courtesy are called "recensions," although their almost imperceptible divergences scarcely entitle them to that designation. First of all, nearest to our own time, we have the two divergent "recensions" of Ben Asher and Ben Naphtali, dating from the tenth century, the former of which is followed almost exclusively by European MSS. and in the printed editions. These, however, differ only in the vowels and accents, and agree in the consonantal text. Somewhat more important is the older rivalry between the Eastern (Babylonian) and Western (Palestinian and European) "recensions." Of the former, many MSS. have come to light during the last seventy years; but besides these we have ancient Massoretic lists of the readings in which the two differ. It is found that in the Pentateuch there are practically no consonantal variants: in Genesis, for example, the only discrepancy is in the spelling of Tubal-Kain as one word or as two (see Baer's *Genesis*, p. 81): there are of course none in the divine names. Thus from the unknown time when the Eastern and Western texts divided, there has been no authorised variation in the transmission of the names for God. In view of this astonishing uniformity, what weight can we attach to the aberrations of a few fourteenth or fifteenth century MSS. belonging to the Western "recension"? Is the presumption not overwhelmingly strong

as representing the standard text which they wished to propagate; and their object is to guard against the mistakes into which copyists were apt to fall because of the identical pronunciation of these two phrases (see below, p. 35). The selection of MSS. may not always have been judicious, or the standard text itself may be at fault; and therefore it is perfectly in order to argue (as Dahse here does—although I do not admit that he *proves*) that a different text from the Massoretic is to be preferred. But at present we are dealing simply with the evidence of Hebrew MSS.; and when it is a question between the deliberate judgment of the Massoretes on one side, and the variations of one or two MSS. on the other, there can be no doubt that the former is an infinitely better authority for the official Hebrew text than the latter.

that they are simply scribal errors, which have eluded the precautions taken by copyists, and escaped the vigilant eyes of the Massoretes ?

(3) But here a still more surprising and significant fact comes into consideration. The standard text contains stereotyped errors and defects which were recognised as such by those responsible for its maintenance ; and also eccentricities which, though not exactly errors, are purely accidental, and have no value in themselves apart from some traditional prejudice. There are words omitted which are necessary to the sense, and which were accordingly supplied in the reading ; and others inserted where they make nonsense, and omitted in reading ; words and letters marked by peculiar dots (*puncta extraordinaria*) ; letters written too large or too small, or suspended over the line ; vacant spaces in the text ; and so on.[1] Yet the scribes and Massoretes, though perfectly aware of these errors, nevertheless endeavoured to perpetuate them with the same assiduous fidelity as the essential elements of the text. How can this singular procedure be accounted for ? It is plain that the eccentric phenomena just described must have originated as accidental peculiarities of a single imperfect codex, which for some reason was regarded with such veneration that its very faults were canonised. We are thus driven to the conclusion that some one defective MS. has been adopted as an " archetype " by the authors of the standard Hebrew

[1] Thus (to take a few examples at random), in Jer. li. 3, the word for " bend " is erroneouly written twice in all Hebrew Bibles, and similarly the word for " five " in Ezek. xlviii. 16 : while in Jer. xxxi. 38 the word for " are coming " after " days " has been accidentally omitted : all such irregularities were rectified in the public reading, but the text itself was never corrected. In Gen. iv. 8 the official Hebrew text has an empty space in the middle of the verse, which several of the versions fill up with the words " let us go into the field " : this clause, which seems necessary to avoid a hiatus in the sense, has apparently been dropped from the Hebrew text. On the meaning of the extraordinary points, suspended letters, etc., see the next note.

recension, and that a persistent effort has been made to bring the whole MS. apparatus into mechanical conformity with it. Since the standard text can be traced back to the middle of the second century, it follows that the archetypal codex is at least of older date than that. Probably it was some highly venerated MS. which had survived the storm of the Roman wars and the rebellion of Bar Cochba, and was accepted on account of its antiquity as the best available norm for the sacred text at the time when the scribes were engaged in forming an official recension of the Old Testament scriptures.

From these facts many of the most distinguished of recent scholars have drawn the very plausible conclusion that all existing Hebrew MSS. have been produced by a succession of slavishly literal transcriptions from the original code which chance or necessity had elevated to the position of an archetype for the whole authorised recension.[1] Now, even if we do not accept the archetypal theory in this extreme form, it is of great importance, in view of its *partial* truth, to trace its consequences in the region of textual criticism. It is plain that, in so far as it is true, variations in existing Hebrew MSS. have arisen through mistakes in copying

[1] The following passage from Lagarde states the theory in its most complete and rigorous form : " Holding it probable, as I do, that peoples living in close contiguity, like the Greeks, Syrians and Jews of the first Christian centuries, had the same clerical usages, I am led to explain the graphic peculiarities which appear in Hebrew documents precisely as I should explain them if I encountered them in Greek or Syriac books. That is to say, I consider dotted words as deleted, letters standing over the line as inserted afterwards ; from empty spaces I conclude that a hole in the parchment or defective tanning had made the skin unfit to be written on, or else that the copyist had been unable to read his exemplar . . . If now *puncta extraordinaria* and *literae suspensae* in the Hebrew text prove that the copyists had made a slip, and if the *Pesak* (*lacuna*) is due to some accident that had befallen the scribe or the material on which he was writing, it follows that *all MSS. which show these points, suspended letters, and empty spaces in the same places, must necessarily be slavishly accurate transcriptions of the same original.*"

directly or mediately from the archetype. It follows further that in the best event we can never gain more from a comparison of Hebrew MSS. than the readings of a single imperfect codex, to whose authority all earlier types of Hebrew text have been ruthlessly sacrificed. It is conceivable, no doubt, that a minority of MSS. may in some cases have preserved the text of the archetype, while the majority have departed from it. But as regards the divine names that consideration hardly comes into play ; for here the variants are so feebly attested that it would be sheer perversity to assert their superiority to the immense preponderance of MS. authority.

For myself, however, I am free to confess that I am not so satisfied of the truth of the extreme form of the archetypal hypothesis as I was at one time. For reasons which need not here be gone into, I have come to think that, while the influence of a single archetype is undeniable, it has been brought to bear on the current text not solely by the way of slavish copying, but partly through the operation of a set of Massoretic rules taken from the archetype and applied in the writing and correcting of MSS. Hence we must allow for the *possibility* that some readings which are older than the official recension have survived as MS. variants ; and it is possible that some of these have managed to slip through the ever narrowing meshes of the Massora and appear in late codices. That must be admitted as a possibility. But on the other hand, there is usually a greater probability that the variations have come in through mistakes in transcription since the establishment of the standard recension. Unfortunately, in the case of the divine names, we rarely have any criterion by which the two kinds of variants can be distinguished. Apart from the occasional support of ancient versions—a point to be considered below—there is always a presumption (considering the general stability of the transmission of the names) that a difference is due

to the error of an individual scribe. Thus in this case we are for the most part shut up to one or other of two alternatives : either we must maintain the variant of an insignificant minority of MSS. as the original reading of the standard text, or we must dismiss it as of no importance whatever. Seeing that we very seldom have more than from one to five MSS. agreeing against the majority, there can be little hesitation in deciding on the latter as the only reasonable course.

2. After this lengthy but I hope not irrelevant disquisition on the general problems of the Massoretic text, we must now condescend to particulars. And to give my opponents the benefit of every possible doubt, I will first set out *all* the Hebrew variants noted by Dahse with the assistance of Wiener and Schlögl.[1] I do not guarantee the completeness of the list—Dahse is responsible for that—but I think I can vouch for its accuracy so far as it goes.[2] The references enclosed in square brackets are those which, for reasons stated in the foot-notes, ought not in my opinion to be counted at all. The last column gives the versional and other support that can be cited for the variant Hebrew reading ; and as that column is not likely to be examined except by those familiar with the subject, I need not occupy space in explaining the symbols and abbreviations there employed (see Dahse, p. 52 f.) In the Hebrew columns J = יהוה, E = אלהים, A = אדני.

[1] I have supplied the variants for ch. i.

[2] The material is drawn from the two great collections of Kennicott (Oxford, 1776–80), and de Rossi (Parma, 1784–88). These works were produced at a time when it was hoped that important results for the textual criticism of the Old Testament might accrue from the examination of Hebrew codices. The effect of the publications was to dispel all such expectations. It was found that the variations amongst MSS. were so few and insignificant as scarcely to reward the labour of collation.

Ref.	MT.	Variant.	Heb. MS. Evidence.	Supported by
1^{3}	E	Om.	K665	
1^{28a}	E	Om. להם א׳	K650B[2]	
		Rd. לאמר for ויאמר להם א׳	K125	LXX
1^{28b}	E	Om.	K2 109, 150, 650M[3]	
2^{16}	JE	J	K191	
		E	K89	ec_2 i.e. (O_2) Eus. h
2^{21}	JE	J	K69, 252	y Or-gr ; etc.
2^{22}	JE	J	K89	E ej v^{ms}. Luc.
3^{1b}	E	JE	K132	M^{text} rell Pal. Phil. Just. Chr. b
3^{22}	JE	E	K152	[? E *HP* 73, 74, 134 ?
3^{23}	JE	J	K80	
5^{22}	E	Om. verse	K151	
		Om. את האֱ	K191	*HP* 79][4]
6^{5}	J	E	K80	Vulg. *HP*. 76
[6^{13}	E	JE ?	K152][5]	D^{all} y ej clmort $qusv^{mg}c_2$ Arm. Sah. Eth. Syr.-Hex. Chr.
7^{1}	J	E	K601, 686	Sam. cw. Arm. (codd.)
7^{9}	E	J	K155	Sam. Vulg. E.
[7^{16a}	E	JE ?	K95][6]	
8^{15}	E	J	R266 primo	*HP* 19
15^{2}	AJ	JE	K95, 150, 152	
		E	K80	
		JA	K384	
15^{3}	AJ	JE	K80, 150, 384	Sah. Phil-codd.
		J	K6, 178	f
		JA	K9, 69	
15^{9}	—	J	K69, 109	
16^{11}	J	E	R669 pr.	bw OL
		[*El*	R754 pr. m][7]	
17^{15}	E	J	K189	OL
18^{3}	A	J	K155, 178, 189, 244, 387	
		JA	K9, 193	
18^{27}	A	J	K69, 89, 111, 132	
			R15, 16, 197, 251, 293, 296, 412, 419, 464, 611mg, 688, 766, 18pr., 592	
		JA	K136, 244, 686[8]	
			R6, 245, 467	

[2] Not a MS. at all : see last article, p. 512.

[4] See below, p. 39.

[5] See last month's EXPOSITOR, p. 508 *n.* [2].

[6] Wrongly cited by Dahse. The MS. substitutes יהוה for the אתו preceding אלהים. It is an obvious slip.

[7] אל corrected in marg. *prima manu* to יהוה : see below, p. 40.

[8] Kenn, but not de Rossi, adds here K109, which has יהו אדני,—probably an uncorrected *lapsus calami*.

Ref.	MT.	Variant.	Heb. MS. evidence.	Supported by
18^{31}	A	J	K11, 89, 227, 239 R18, 197, 251, 592, 766	
		JA	K109	
18^{33}	J	Om.	K80	c
19^{18}	A	JA	K108	
19^{29a}	E	J	K199	LXX
20^{4}	A	J	K9, 81, 132, 150, 152, 199, 227, 239, 601 R 419, 455, 507, 766, 248pr.	
		Om.	K111	
20^{11}	E	J	K18, 125, 159	
		JE	K109	
		Om.	K104	
22^{11}	J	E	K248, 601	Pesh.
30^{22b}	E	Om.	K170, 185	e n Chr.
30^{23}	E	J	K69, 80, 157	
31^{9}	E	J	K69[9]	Sam.
33^{11}	E	J	K189	
35^{9a}	E	Om.	K13	b
35^{10}	E	Om.	K13	D dfhtc$_2$=(c$_2$) Sah. Eth. Chr.
		EJ (!)	K5	
45^{5}	E	J	K128, 155	Georg.
45^{7}	E	J	K4, 128	

At first sight perhaps that looks an imposing list. But it will be observed that it is almost wholly made up from Kennicott's collations. Now Kennicott made it his business to register every variant in the MSS. at his disposal, whether good, bad, or indifferent. De Rossi, who had Kennicott's work before him and used it, proceeds on the principle of recording only those readings "quae gravioris aut ullius saltem momenti mihi visae sunt, quae sensum vel mutant, vel afficiunt, et praesidium aliquod habent non modo in MSS. cod. sed etiam in Sam. textu, et in vers. antiquis." Accordingly of the above passages de Rossi considers only seven to be worthy of mention, viz., vii. 1, viii. 15, xvi. 11, xviii. 27, 31, xx. 4. And it will be seen that of the seven

[9] Dahse adds "ras 229." Kenn.'s note is simply "ויצל אלהים [M T] sup ras 229," which certainly does not justify the assumption that יהוה was *under* the erasure! The mistake, whatever it was, must have affected the verb as well as the divine name that follows.

three are Adonay-readings, which were peculiarly liable to confusion, and which at any rate in no way affect the literary analysis.

But let us go back to the longer list. It gives 50 variants to 36 names. But of the 50, 30 are read only by a single MS. 10 by two MSS. 14 by three, and only 6 by four and upwards. Kennicott had collations of nearly 320 MSS. of Genesis in whole or in part (although little more than one-third of these had been *completely* collated). Even if we were to suppose that all the MSS. were fairly accurate, a reading supported by certainly less than 4 per cent. of all available codices is not entitled to serious consideration on MS. evidence alone.

Further, it will be noted that the only readings supported by so many as 5 MSS. are the variants to the three Adonay-passages (xviii. 27, 31, xx. 4): to these we may add the two Yahweh-Adonay readings of MT (xv. 2, 8), although the variants to these are not particularly well attested (never by more than 3 MSS.). There must be some reason for the preponderance of variants in these cases; and in the last article we have seen that the reason is the identical pronunciation of אדני and יהוה as *Adonay*, and of אדני יהוה and יהוה אלהים as *Adonay Elohim*.

But, once more, it is necessary to consider the *value* of the different MSS., as tested by their general accuracy and by their age. Now of the Kennicott MSS. in the above list, de Rossi affixes a stigma to the following: K9 (thirteenth century: "mendis et rasuris scatet"), 89 (fifteenth century: "multis scatet variationibus, multisque mendis"); and of his own MSS. to the following: R15 (fourteenth century: "scriptus indiligenter"), 18 (thirteenth or fourteenth century: "sed negligentissime scriptus"), 419 (thirteenth century: "sed negligenter admodum exaratus"), 669 (thirteenth century: "scatet tamen omissionibus nec

diligenter est scriptus"). K650 we have seen[1] to be simply a printed edition of the Talmud. I think that all these might fairly be ordered to stand down! On the other hand, de Rossi gives certificates of excellence to: K4 (twelfth century: "codex bonae notae"), K69 (fifteenth century: "pretiosus codex, etc."), K109 (fourteenth century: "insignis in re critica usus"), K150 (thirteenth century ex.: "in hoc solo vel fere solo codice servantur optimae nonnullae var. lect. Samar. T. vel antiquarum vers."), K155 (thirteenth century ex.: "melioris notae codex"), K170 (thirteenth century: "codex magni pretii"), K193 (twelfth century: "optim. et antiquus cod."), K248 (thirteenth century: "bonae notae"), K686 (thirteenth century. in.: "opt. cod. ac sing. . ."), R197 (fourteenth century: "diligentissime scriptus"), R592 (thirteenth century: "singularis in re critica usus. . ."), R469 (fifteenth century: "accuratus, nitidus"), R507 (thirteenth century: sat diligenter conscriptus"). On the great majority he makes no comment; and we are left to estimate their importance from their probable date. De Rossi (p. xv.) lays down the maxim that for a Hebrew codex to be accounted in any sense old it ought at latest to be of the end of the thirteenth or beginning of the fourteenth century. It might be interesting to see how matters would stand if we adopt it as a working rule to strike out of our list (1) all MSS. of whatever age against which De Rossi has placed a bad mark, and (2) all MSS. later than the beginning of the fourteenth century, unless specially certified as good. This would leave the panel of acceptable MSS. somewhat as follows: K4, 69, 80, 109, 150, 155, 157, 170, 185, 191, 193, 199, 227, 229, 239, 248, 252, 384, 601, 686: R16, 197, 245, 248, 251, 266, 296, 412, 464, 507, 592, 754, 766. If any reader should be at the trouble to revise the list of variants on these lines, he would find that it shrinks

[1] Expositor, June, p. 512.

to about two-thirds of its former dimensions; that if we take out omissions and the Adonay-passages (where the literary analysis cannot be affected) there remain but 16 confusions of J, E and JE; that of these 11 [1] are supported only by one MSS., and only one (xxx. 23) by so many as three. What the proportion of chaff to wheat might be in this sifted list we need not try to guess; but I can hardly believe that the most aggressive "textual" critic would claim the result as a signal refutation of the pretensions of the documentary theory. When we take into account the general considerations set forth in the preceding pages, we shall hardly be disposed to assign any weight whatever to the indiscriminate citation of variants in Hebrew MSS. in which the "textual" critics are wont to indulge.

3. But in justice to my opponents I must now go on to note that they rely not so much on the unsupported evidence of Hebrew MSS. as on the *agreements* of many of their variants with readings found in one or more of the ancient versions. This, they think, is a very strong proof that the readings in question are derived from a Hebrew original independent of the MT. Now in so far as the Samaritan Pentateuch and versions other than the LXX are concerned, the matter will be considered in the next article; and it is enough for the present to point out that corroborations from these quarters are very rare, (Sam. 3, Pesh. 1, Vulg. 2) and do not all told amount to a serious challenge to the soundness of the Massoretic text.

But in respect of the LXX, with its plethora of variants, the case is naturally different. If, indeed, we take only those readings which are supported by the bulk of LXX authority, we find that there are only two or at most three cases to consider (i. 28b, xix. 29a, iii. 22 ?)—a negligible quantity.

[1] ii. 18, iii. 23, vi. 5, vii. 9, viii. 15, xix. 29a, xx. 11 (bis), xxxi. 9, xlv. 5, xlv. 7.

It is of course admitted that in these cases it is a question whether the LXX, backed by Hebrew MSS., may not have the original text; but they are so few that even if in each case the MT should happen to be wrong its general authority as against isolated MS. divergences would not be impugned. But if we are to reckon up all the instances where a Hebrew variant has *some* support from LXX MSS. or daughter-versions or citations, no doubt the number is considerable. I have noted in the last column of the table the LXX evidence for the various readings,—not very carefully, but mostly trusting to the statistics furnished by Dahse. It will be seen that 24 Hebrew variants agree with some form of LXX text. But here the so-called "textual" critics seem to blunder egregiously. They argue that even a solitary Greek MS. acquires importance, as indicating an original Hebrew text, if it be in agreement with a single Hebrew MS.; and of course *a fortiori* if there be two or three on either side. To reason thus is to perpetrate a gross mathematical fallacy. The doctrine of probabilities comes into play. Our opponents overlook the fact that the limits of possible error are extremely narrow, while the chances that an accidental error in a Hebrew MS. will coincide with a reading in the apparatus of the LXX are remarkably good. That is to say, if a Hebrew scribe went astray from the MT in copying a divine name, he could only substitute E for J or J for E (in rare cases a JE might afford a wider choice of error); and in either event he would be pretty sure to find his mistake "confirmed" by some MS. of the LXX. I calculate roughly that in about two-fifths of the names contained in Dahse's tables *both* the alternative readings occur in LXX MSS. or daughter-versions, or citations; so that if a Hebrew MS. differs from the MT it has two good chances in five of finding some kind of support in the LXX. In all but two (i. 28, xviii. 15) of the 24 actual instances of agreement between Hebrew and Greek MSS.

the Massoretic reading is also represented in the LXX, and in the vast majority of cases far more strongly attested than the variant. In these circumstances it is mere pretence to speak of coincidence as corroboration, or to argue that a variant derives importance from the fact of its occurring in two unrelated series of documents. We can now measure the importance of Dahse's assertion (p. 51), "Die Varianten der LXX werden geschützt (a) *durch hebr. MSS.*"[1]

4. Lastly, it is alleged by textual critics that there are passages where the MT is *on internal grounds* "demonstrably" wrong in its use of the divine names, and where the true reading has been preserved in a small minority of Hebrew or Greek MSS. I reply that I do not believe any such case exists, and that certainly none of those that have been adduced will be found on examination to bear out the contention.

[1] I would here call attention to v. 22, which sheds a lurid light on the value of Hebrew "corroborations," and also on the incredible perfunctoriness with which such variants are cited by writers like Wiener and Dahse. (See the list, p. 34 above). The facts are these: (1) K151 omits the entire verse: I presume that Dahse will not defend *that* text. But his statement that "K151 stimmt mit E" is wholly erroneous. E (a Greek uncial) simply substitutes και εζησεν Ενωχ μετα κτλ. for ευηρεστησεν δε Ενωχ τω θεω μετα κτλ., in conformity with the stereotyped formula used throughout the chapter. If Dahse should maintain that this is the original text, I should not object; but that is neither here nor there: it is *not* the text of K151. (2) The Greek cursives *HP* 73, 74, 134 (= t) read practically as E (εζησε δε), and to cite them (as Dahse does) as simply omitting τω θεω is thoroughly inaccurate and misleading. (3) K191 omits את־האלהים, yielding the impossible sentence, "And Enoch walked after he begat, etc." The only LXX MS. that *appears* to confirm this nonsensical reading is *HP* 79, which has ευηρεστησε δε Ενωχ μετα κτλ., "And Enoch pleased after he begat, etc," which is just as absurd as the text of K191. But (*a*) it is to be observed that ευηρεστησε δε corresponds not to the bare ויתהלך but to ויתהלך את־, so that it does not agree with K191. (*b*) The agreement is not merely superficial, but clearly accidental. At least it is presumable that the peculiar reading of 79 was brought about by a secondary correction of the και εζησεν of E to the ευηρεστησε δε of the ordinary LXX, the copyist not perceiving that he was making nonsense of the verse by overlooking the τω θεω which followed. Many MSS. exhibit conflation of the two readings.

The passage most persistently cited in this connexion is Genesis xvi. 11. From the time of de Rossi at all events it has passed from hand to hand as a palpable proof that the MT cannot have preserved the original name. Dahse, supporting Wiener's philippic against the present writer, says (p. 32): "mit Recht . . . macht Wiener mit allem Nachdruck geltend, dass nicht bloss, wie Skinner as tue, die 49 Fälle der Abweichnungen, die Redpath und Eerdmans nach Swete anführen, zu berücksichtigen seien, sondern auch zahlreiche (?) andere Stellen, wie z.B. Genesis 16/11, wo die Handschriften bw (mit OL, arabs uterque, und hebr. MS.) *offensichtlich* mit ihrem ο θεος das Richtige böten." Let us then consider the import of xvi. 11. It gives an etymology of the name Yishma'-el (ישמעאל = 'may *El* hear') in the words "for *Yahweh* has heard, etc." (כי שמע יהוה וגו'). This, we are told, is a glaring and impossible contradiction. Wiener, with characteristic presumption, says that the name Yishma'-el *must* have been explained by a sentence containing Elohim, for if the explanation had contained the name Yahweh the name *must* have been Yishma'-yah! He seems to imagine that Ishmael is a fictitious name, whose form could be changed according to the taste and fancy of the speller. In reality it is the historic name of a tribe which no writer could alter from merely literary motives. That is a confusion of ideas which is extraordinary even in a mind untrained to exact philological thinking; and I have not observed that any other writer has put the matter quite so crudely. But they all alike labour under the illusion that *El* and *Elohim* are convertible terms. It is a wonder that none of them have thought of taking up a hint of the cautious de Rossi, who, after defending Elohim as "conformior" to the name Ishmael, says "huic affinis ac congruentior est lectio cod. mei 754 ex prima manu כי שמע אֵל עניך; although he adds "Sed Jeoah ipsa, ut videtur, primi

scriptoris manu ad marginem restitutum est." We must suppose that there was a time when the interpretation of such a name as Ishmael would have been expressed in a sentence like "*El* hears"; and the courage of our textual critics might well have proved equal to the advocacy of the claim of R754 to be the sole representative of that primitive etymology. However, they have not done so; and we have simply to insist, against their contention, that El is no more Elohim than it is Yahweh. It is an archaic name for the Deity which had ceased to form part of the ordinary spoken language [1] before these narratives were reduced to writing, and which had to be replaced by one of the two names for God current in common speech. There is absolutely no reason except usage why one of them should be used in preference to the other. If a writer habitually used Yahweh he would naturally say כי שמע יהוה; just as readily as another who habitually used Elohim would write כי שמע אלהים. The latter phrase actually appears in the parallel passage xxi. 17, where the Elohist is giving *his* etymology of the name Ishmael. So that instead of xvi. 11 weakening the evidence for the documentary theory, it furnishes in reality one of its most striking detailed confirmations.[2]

The case is on all fours with the explanation of the name Samuel (שמואל) in 1 Sam. i. 20, where the MT has כי מיהוה שאלתיו: "for from *Yahweh* I asked him." This reading is supported by all Hebrew MSS., by the Peshitta, the Vulgate,

[1] For details, see Driver, *Genesis*, p. 403.

[2] And because I knew all this before Wiener was ever heard of, and did not think fit to waste words in exposing his transparent incompetence, I have been denounced by him as a liar and impostor, engaged in a deliberate attempt to deceive the public! And further, because I have not sued him for libel in a court of law, he has the assurance to boast that his point is proved! Such are the controversial methods of this "English jurist," for whose accomplishments Dahse has conceived so strange an admiration. Perhaps he has heard of a Lord Chancellor of England who was supposed to know "a little of everything—even of law."

and even the LXX. For although a good many MSS. vary from the chief printed editions (Swete, after A, B: *παρα Κυριου θεου σαβαωθ*), there is not one which omits the *κυριου*).[1] Will the "textual" critics maintain, in the teeth of all textual evidence, that Yahweh is there an impossible reading, and must have been substituted for Elohim? If not, their argument in the parallel instance of Ishmael completely breaks down. And if they do, they so stultify their own method that we need no longer give heed to their opinion. At all events, I hope we shall hear no more of Genesis xvi. 11 as an instance where the MT is "demonstrably" wrong.

A very similar, but even weaker, instance cited by Dahse is the etymology of Reuben in xxix. 32 (p. 44). He says it is "allbekannt" that the name was originally *Rubel*; whence it follows that Yahweh in xxix. 32 ("Yahweh has seen my affliction") cannot be original. Well, one would like to hear what *was* original there. Dahse does not even tell us how he understands the name ראובל: he rather gives the impression that he holds the utterly impossible view that it is a compound of ראוב and אל. I will assume, however, that he takes its second component to be בל = בעל (Baal), used as a generic title of the Deity; and that its signification is "seen of Baal" (see *ICC.* p. 386). Supposing that to be the correct name, and the etymology intended, we must again assume that in early times the interpretation was expressed in that form, like the explanation of "Jerubbaal" in Jud. vi. 32. Now when Baal ceased to be used as an epithet of the national God and was appropriated to a strange deity, the name could be retained in Jud. vi. 32,

[1] The principal variants are the following: Κυριου σαβαωθ (9 MSS.); Κυριου σαβ. παντοκρατορος (4 MSS.); Κυριου σαβ. θεου παντ. (3 MSS.); Κυριου Κυριου σαβ. παντ. (1 MS.); Κυριου alone (1 MS.). Κυριου παντ. (Complutensian Polyglott).—παντοκρατωρ the usual rendering in the LXX of צבאות (=σαβαωθ), "Hosts."

because it implied in that connexion no recognition of the false god. But in Genesis xxix. 32 its retention would have attributed heathenish worship to the patriarchal family, and it was necessary to replace it either by Yahweh or by Elohim. And when it was exchanged for a name of the true God, it was just as legitimate and natural to replace it by Yahweh as by Elohim. There is therefore not the slightest *internal* ground for questioning the correctness of the Massoretic reading.

Amongst the passages where Dahse tries to shew that the Yahweh of the MT cannot possibly be right for internal reasons, there are two which he thinks are proved to have been originally Elohim-passages by independent tradition or by allusions in Hebrew literature. The first is the account of Jacob's wrestling at Peniel (Gen. xxxii. 24 ff.). This, he says, is known to be attributed to J. That is not quite so. It has also been attributed to E; and the drift of recent criticism has been to regard it as a composite narrative in which J and E have been amalgamated (see *ICC.*, p. 407). But however that may be, it is certain that the only divine name which occurs in the MT is Elohim (*vv.* 29, 31). What then is the sense of citing Hos. xii. 4 (with Elohim) and arguing that if Hosea had read it in a Yahwistic book he would certainly not have used Elohim here? We do not even know that Hosea read it in any book; if he did, there is no reason why it should not have been an Elohistic book; *but* even if his written source was our present Yahwistic document, he would surely use the divine name which occurs in that document, which, as we have seen, is Elohim. The argument thus turns round into a singular confirmation of the scrupulous accuracy of the tradition of the divine names in the Hebrew text. And Dahse might at least have mentioned that the critics who assign the passage to J are guided by something else than a slavish regard to the divine names of

the MT. The second example is the story of the overthrow of Sodom and Gomorrah in Gen. xix. (cf. xiii. 10). According to the MT this is a Yahwistic passage, and is therefore assigned by critics to J. But in three prophetic passages (Am. iv. 11, Isa. xiii. 19, Jer. l. 40) it is referred to as a destruction wrought by *Elohim*. Now, to begin with, the force of these three passages is neutralised by Deut. xxix. 33 and Ezek. xvi. 48 ff, where Yahweh is used. But the root of Dahse's error lies deeper. "If there was a version of the story which favoured a particular designation of the Deity . . it must have been an Elohistic narrative, and not the Yahwistic which we now find in the MT" (p. 42). No one denies that the oldest version of the story may have been Elohistic: indeed the whole point of the contention that it was so is that it was a foreign myth imported into Israel, in which the name Yahwe could not possibly have been used. But that is not the question that Dahse has to face. The question is not of how the narrative read in its primitive form, but of the literary shape into which it was cast by the author of the account we have in Genesis. If for the true God who was the author of the catastrophe, that writer habitually used the name Yahweh, why should he not do so in this instance as in every other? As for the prophetic allusions, Amos lived at a time when the primitive form of the myth may well have been a living memory, and there is no reason to suppose that he had no authority other than our present Yahwistic document. And if late prophets like the authors of Isa. xiii. 19 and Jer. l. 40 still continued to use Elohim in connexion with this incident, that does not mean that they read Elohim in the Genesis narrative. It is much more probable—it is, indeed, all but certain—that they had in their minds the unusual phrase of Amos,[1] which

[1] כמהפכת אלהים את סדם ואת עמרה, where the את shews that the noun טה' has the force of an infinitive.

they reproduce *verbatim et literatim*. Again the Massoretic reading in Genesis comes unscathed out of the text-critical ordeal; and the occasional Elohims of the LXX have no greater probability than they acquire from purely textual evidence (here sufficiently slender), as in all other cases.

JOHN SKINNER.

THE FORMS OF HEBREW POETRY.

II. PARALLELISM: A RE-STATEMENT—*continued.*

I PASS now by a different method to a more detailed examination of parallel lines, and of the degree and character of the correspondence between them. Irrespective of particles a line or section to which another line or section approximately corresponds, consists of two, three, four, five or six words, very seldom of more. *Complete parallelism* may be said to exist when every single term in one line is parallel to a term in the other, or when at least every term or group of terms in one line is paralleled by a corresponding term or group of terms in the other. *Incomplete parallelism* exists when only some of the terms in each of two corresponding lines are parallel to one another, while the remaining terms express something which is stated once only in the two lines. Incomplete parallelism is far more frequent than complete parallelism. Both complete parallelism and incomplete parallelism admit of many varieties; and this great variety and elasticity of parallelism may perhaps best be studied by means of symbols, even though it is difficult to reduce all the phenomena to rigidly constant and unambiguous symbolic formulæ. I have already elsewhere[1] suggested that the varieties of parallelism may be conveniently described by denoting

[1] *Isaiah* ("International Critical Comm."), p. lxvi.

the terms in the first line by letters—a . b . c, etc.—and those in the second line by the differentiated letters—a′ . b′ . c′, where the terms, without being identical (in which case a . b . c would be used for the second line as well as for the first), correspond, or by fresh letters—d . e . f, where fresh terms corresponding to nothing in the first line occur.

The simplest form of complete parallelism is represented by

a . b
a′ . b′ :

here each line consists of two terms each of which corresponds to a term in the corresponding position in the other line. Examples are—

אחלקם ביעקב
ואפיצם בישראל

I-will-divide-them [1] in-Jacob,
And-I-will-scatter-them in-Israel.—Gen. xlix. 7c.d.

משניח מן־החלנות
מציץ מן־החרכים

He-looketh-in at-the-windows,
He-glanceth through-the-lattice.
Cant. ii. 9 (the same chapter contains several other examples).

נעויתי משמוע
נבהלתי מראות

I-am-bent-with-pain at-what-I-hear,
I-am-dismayed at-what-I-see.—Isa. xxi. 3.

כי רבו פשעיהם
עצמו משבותיהם

For their-transgressions are-many,
Their-backturnings are-increased.—Jer. v. 6.

[1] Where the suffix in one line corresponds to a noun in the other it may sometimes be convenient to represent the suffix by an independent symbol. If both suffixes were so represented here the scheme would be

a . b . c
a′ . b′ . c′ .

Hear Thy-servant,
And-give-ear-to my-petition.—Apoc. Bar. xlviii. 12.

Complete parallelism between lines each containing three terms will be represented by—

a . b . c
a′ . b′ . c′

Examples are:—

חכלילי עינים מיין
ולבן שנים מחלב

Red-are his-eyes with-wine,
And-white-are his-teeth with-milk.—Gen. xlix. 12.

מנשמת אלוה יאבדו
ומרוח אפו יכלו

By-the-breath of-God they-perish,
And-by-the-blast of-his-anger are-they-consumed.—Job iv. 9.

כי־שמים כעשן נמלחו
והארץ כבגד תבלה

For the-heavens like-smoke shall-vanish-away (?),
And-the-earth like-a-garment shall-wax-old.—Isa. li. 6.

More frequent than the fundamental scheme as given above and just illustrated are variations upon it, of which examples will be given below.

Complete parallelism of lines with four terms each, the terms being symmetrically arranged, will be represented by—

a . b . c . d
a′ . b′ . c′ . d′

An example is—

מענה רך ישיב חמה
ודבר עצב יעלה אף

A-soft answer turneth-away wrath,
But-a-grievous word stirreth-up anger.—Prov. xv. 1.

This scheme occurs not infrequently in antithetic proverbs, and Proverbs xv. contains several other examples;

but it is rare elsewhere. Variations on this scheme also will be given below.

Where the parallel sections consist of more than four terms, and sometimes when they contain as few as four terms, each section tends to break up into two of those independent clauses which we have seen to be in part the necessary consequence of parallelism, and in part a common, even when not a necessary, accompaniment of the style distinguished from simple narrative. For example, Isaiah xlix. 2 is one of the nearest approximations to the scheme,

a . b . c . d . e . f
a′ . b′ . c′ . d′ . e′ . f′

but here the last two terms in each section stand independent of the foregoing; thus:—

And-he-made my mouth as-a-sharp sword : in-the-shadow
of-his-hand he-hid-me ;
And-he-made-me [1] into-a-polished arrow : in-his-quiver
he-concealed-me.

Such a combination of clauses is commonly termed "alternate parallelism" and is said to consist of four lines, of which the third is parallel to the first and the fourth to the second. This may be a convenient description: but the main point is that, within the main independent sections indicated by the parallelism, other almost equally independent breaks giving rise to subordinate independent clauses occur. This fact is emphasised in many specimens of Arabic "rhymed prose"; in the passage already cited from Ḥarîri, almost all the parallel sections fall into two independent clauses; and it is these independent, but, from the point of view of

[1] The suffix (b′) is here parallel to the independent term (b); and so is the suffix "his" in "his quiver" to the independent term "his hand": in this case, however, I have represented "shadow of his hand" under the single symbol (c′).

the parallelism, subordinate, sections that rhyme with one another; that is to say, similarity of rhyme connects, while emphasising their distinction, the shorter independent clauses which are commonly not parallel to one another, and change of rhyme marks off the well-defined longer sections which are regularly parallel to one another. It is interesting to observe that in the lines cited from Isaiah xlix. it is the entire parallel periods and not the subsections that rhyme with one another, though in view of the irregular use of rhyme in Hebrew this may be a mere accident—

וישם פי כחרב חדה בצל ידו החביאני
וישימני לחץ ברור באשפתו הסתירני

In the illustrations of parallelism which have been given so far not only has there been complete correspondence, term by term, between the parallel lines, but each corresponding term in the second line has occurred in the exactly corresponding position in the second line. But in any considerable passage Hebrew writers introduce in various ways great variety of effect, a far greater variety, I believe, than was commonly sought or obtained by Arabic writers. These varieties of parallelism can be readily and conveniently shown by a use such as I have suggested of symbols. I proceed to classify and illustrate some of the chief classes of variations on the fundamental schemes which have been already described and illustrated.

1. Variety is attained by varying the position of the corresponding terms in the two lines.

In the simplest form of parallelism, which consists of lines containing two terms only, only one variation is possible from the scheme

a . b
a′ . b′

of which several illustrations have already been given. This of course is

a . b
b′ . a′

and this variation occurs very frequently, e.g.—

אם תבקשנה ככסף
וכמטמנים תחפשנה

If thou-seek-her as-silver,
And-as-for-hid-treasures search-for-her.—Prov. ii. 4.

אל־תצאי השדה
ובדרך אל־תלכי

Go-not-forth into-the-field,
And-by-the-way walk-not.—Jer. vi. 25.

As the number of terms increases the greater becomes the possibility of variety and the number of actual variations, thus :—

a . b . c
a′ . b′ . c′

can alternate with—

a . b . c
a′ . c′ . b′

or any of the other four possible permutations. One or two-illustrations must suffice : of the variation just given, Proverbs ii. 2 is an example—

להקשיב לחכמה אזנך
תטה לבך לתבונה

So-that-thou-incline unto-wisdom thine-ear,
(And-) apply thine-heart to-understanding.

The tendency in poetry to give the verb its normal (prose) position at the beginning of the first line, but, in order to gain variety, to throw the verb to the end of the second line renders the scheme

a . b . c
b′ . c′ . a′

very frequent, though of course this same scheme may also arise from other causes (e.g. Job iv. 17). Examples are—

עַל־כֵּן הִכָּם אַרְיֵה מִיָּעַר
זְאֵב עַרְבוֹת יְשַׁדְּדֵם

Therefore shall-slay-them a-lion out-of-the-forest,
A-wolf of-the-steppes shall-spoil-them.—Jer. v. 6.

אַל־תִּתְהַדַּר לִפְנֵי מֶלֶךְ
וּבִמְקוֹם גְּדוֹלִים אַל־תַּעֲמֹד

Glorify-not-thyself in-the-presence of-the-king,
And-in-the-place of-great-men stand-not.—Prov. xxv. 6.

Four further examples may be found in Proverbs ii. 5, 8, 10, 20.

The *possible* variations on

a . b . c . d
a′ . b′ . c′ . d′

are of course much more numerous; the actual examples are far fewer, partly because *complete* parallelism over these longer periods is much rarer, partly because these parallelisms in four terms occur particularly in Proverbs, which as complete in themselves do not call for the variety which is naturally enough desired in a long continuous passage.

2. Another way of obtaining variety is to use in the second line two or more terms which, taken together, are parallel in sense to a corresponding number of terms in the first line, though the separate terms of the one combination are not parallel to the separate terms of the other combination. In its extreme form parallelism of this variety consists of two entire lines completely parallel in sense but with no two terms taken separately parallel to one another. Denoting correspondence as before by a . a′, etc., and the number of terms above one in which particular correspond-

ing ideas are expressed by a figure attached to the letters, the kind of schemes that occur are—

a2 . b
a′2 . b′

For example—

עדה וצלה שמען קולי
נשי למך האזנה אמרתי

Adah and-Zillah, hear my-voice,
Ye-wives of-Lamech give-ear-to my-word.—Gen. iv. 23.

Further variety is possible here again by varying the position of the corresponding terms or groups of terms, so that such schemes as—

a . b2
b′2 . a′

arise ; an example of this is Proverbs ii. 17.

העזבת אלוף נעוריה
ואת ברית אלהיה שכחה

Who-forsaketh the-friend of-her-youth,
And-forgetteth the-covenant of-her-God.

And another very effective variation arises when what is expressed by two terms in the first line is expressed by one in the second line, which in turn has two other terms corresponding to one in the first : for example—

a2 . b
a′ . b′2

which is exemplified by Genesis xlix. 24.

ותשב באיתן קשתו
ויפזו זרעי ידיו

And-his-bow abode firm,
And-the-arms of-his-hands were-agile—

where the two words ותשב באיתן taken together are parallel to ויפזו, and the single term קשתו to the terms זרעי ידיו

An example of

a . b . c2
a′ . c′ . b′2

is afforded by Job iii. 17,

שם רשעם חדלו רגז
ושם ינוחו יגיעי כח

where ינוחו, *are-at-rest*, corresponds to חדלו רגז, *cease-from-raging*, and the single term *wicked* to the phrase יגיעי כח, which is compound in Hebrew, though it is represented by the single word *weary* in E.V.

3. The third main method of introducing variety into parallelism and avoiding the monotonous repetition of the same scheme consists in the adoption of various forms of incomplete parallelism.

The variety of effect rendered possible by this method is immense, except in the shortest parallels consisting of two terms only: with these the fundamental variations are reduced to two, viz.—

a . b
b′ . c

and

a . b
a′ . c

Examples of these are—

מדוע קדמוני ברכים
ומה שדים כי־אינק

Wherefore did-the-knees receive-me,
And-why the-breasts that I-should-suck,—Job iii. 12.

and

צרה החזקתני
חיל כיולדה

Anguish hath-seized-me,
Pangs as-of-a-woman-in-travail,—Jer. vi. 24.

unless we prefer to treat the former of these examples on the ground of the differentiation of the interrogative particles as an example of

a . b . c
a′ . c′ . d

and the latter example as

a . b
a′2

The latter kind of ambiguity frequently arises.

Further variety is obtained when variations corresponding to those illustrated under (1) and (2) are combined with incomplete parallelism: this frequently happens especially when one at least of the parallel members contains more than two terms. But before giving illustrations of such variations it will be convenient to point out that incomplete parallelisms fall into two broad classes which may be distinguished as *incomplete parallelism with compensation* and *incomplete parallelism without compensation*. If one line contains a given number of terms and another line a smaller number of terms, the parallelism is necessarily incomplete and may be termed incomplete parallelism without compensation; but if the two lines contain the same number of terms, though only some of the terms in the two lines are parallel, the lines may be said to constitute incomplete parallelism with compensation. Thus such schemes as

a . b . c
a′ . b′

or

a . b . c
a′2

are incomplete without compensation; whereas such schemes as

a . b . c
a′ . d . c′

or

a . b . c
a′2 . b′

are incomplete parallelism with compensation.

I now give illustrations of different schemes of both types.

(*a*) Incomplete parallelism without compensation—

I-will-restore thy-judges as-at-the-first,
And-thy-counsellors as-at-the-beginning.—Isa. i. 26.

is

a b . c
b′ . c′

and so is Proverbs ii. 18, Canticles ii. 1, 14, Numbers xxiii. 19c.d., 24a.b., xxiv. 5a.b., Psalm vi. 2.

Who-rideth through-the-heavens as-they-help,
And-in-his-dignity through-the-skies.—Deut. xxxiii. 26.

is an example of

a . b . c
c′ . b′

(*b*) Incomplete parallelism with compensation.

Yahweh, when-thou-wentest-forth out-of-Seir,
When-thou-marchedst out-of-the-field of-Edom.—Jud. v. 4.

is an example of

a . b . c
b′ . c′2.

and other examples are Deuteronomy xxxiii. 23, Job iii. 11.

And-so-dwelt Israel securely,
By-itself the-fountain of-Jacob,—Deut. xxxiii. 28.

is an example of

a . b . c
c′ . b′2

and other examples are Proverbs ii. 1, 7, Job iii. 20. In

Judges v. 26a.b., Psalm xxi. 11 will be found examples of—

a . b . c
a′ . b′2

An example of compensation by means of a fresh term may be found in Deuteronomy xxxiii. 2.

Yahweh from-Sinai came,
And-beamed-forth from-Seir unto-them.

This is—

a . b . c
c′ . b′ . d.

Other examples of the same general principle with different arrangement of the terms, etc., will be found in Psalm xxi. 12 (11), Job iii. 21.

I will conclude with two illustrations of the value of a minuter analysis of parallelism than has hitherto been considered necessary, and of some such method as I have been suggesting of measuring or classifying the various types of parallelism.

An effective scheme of parallelism that occasionally occurs consists of two lines each containing three terms but held together by a single parallel term in each line, these parallel terms standing one at the end of the first line, and the other at the beginning of the second. The scheme is—

a . b . c
c′ . d . e.

Now, if the articulation of the parallelism is not observed, couplets of this type are reduced to ordinary prose, or even to nonsense, or at best feeble repetition; but if it is properly articulated, the couplet is an effective form of "synthetic parallelism" as Lowth would have called it, of

incomplete parallelism with compensation as I have proposed to term it. Examples of this type occurring in Genesis xlix. 9 (cf. Num. xxiv. 9) and Deuteronomy xxxiii. 11 are correctly articulated in the Revised Version :—

He-stooped-down, he-couched as-a-lion,
And-as-a-lioness ; who shall-rouse-him-up ?

Smite-through the-loins of-them-that-rise-up-against-him,
And-of-them-that-hate-him, that they-rise-not-again.

But if the parallelism is not correctly perceived, and the words otherwise articulated, how unsatisfactory does the former of these couplets become! "He stooped down, he couched as a lion and as lioness : who shall rouse him up ?" this suggests a comparison with two different beasts, whereas the parallelism really expresses comparison with the lion-class, which it denotes by the use of two synonymous terms. Yet this very mistaken articulation is found in Numbers xxiii. 23, both in the R.V. and, I regret to say, in my commentary on Numbers. If we articulate

Now shall it be said of Jacob and Israel,
What hath God wrought !

the natural suggestion is that Jacob and Israel are different entities, which they are not ; Jacob and Israel are here, as elsewhere in these poems (Num. xxiii. 7, 10, 21, 23 ; xxiv. 5, 17, 18 f.), synonymous terms belonging to different members of the parallelism. The proper articulation of the passage is—

Now shall it be said of Jacob,
And of Israel, What hath God wrought !

and it is interesting to observe that this not very common type of parallelism occurs twice (see also xxiv. 9) in the oracles of Balaam.

My second illustration of the advantages of some method that enables similarities and dissimilarities of parallelism

to be easily detected and presented is of a different character, and shows the bearing of these studies on textual criticism.

Psalm cxiv. consists of eight couplets, each of which, in the present text at all events, shows one form or another of incomplete parallelism, for the most part with compensation. The characteristic incompleteness of the parallelism rings through even a translation :—

1 When Israel went forth out of Egypt,
The house of Jacob from a barbaric people,
2 Judah became his sanctuary,
Israel his dominion.

3 The sea saw it and fled,
Jordan turned backward,
4 The mountains skipped like rams,
The hills like young sheep.

5 What aileth thee, O thou sea, that thou fleest,
Thou Jordan, that thou turnest back ?
6 Ye mountains that ye skip like rams,
Ye hills like young sheep ?

7 At the presence of the Lord tremble, O earth,
At the presence of the God of Jacob,
8 Which turned the rock into a pool of water,
The flint into a fountain of water.

The scheme is as follows :—

1 a . b . c	5 a . b . c
b′2 . c′2.	b′ . c′2.
2 a . b . c	6 a . b . c
b′ . c′.	a′ c′2.
3 a . b . c	7 a . b . c
a′ c′2.	a2.
4 a . b . c	8 a . b . c2
a′ c′2	b′ . c′2.

There seems to me strong ground for holding that this consistent use of incomplete parallelism was intentional,

or, at any rate, if not intentional, it is at least an unconscious expression of the writer's general preference—in a word, it is a stylistic characteristic; as such it ought not without good reason to be obliterated. For this reason Dr. Briggs's reconstruction of this Psalm in the *International Critical Commentary* is open to grave objection. The emendations proposed by Dr. Briggs and the effect of them on the parallelism is as follows: (1) he strikes out as glosses verses 2 and 8, though both verses show the characteristic incomplete parallelism; (2) in verse 7 he deletes חולי, *tremble*; then אדון becomes construct before ארץ, and the expression "Lord of the earth" becomes parallel to "God of Jacob," and the verse as a whole an example of complete parallelism

a . b . c
a . b′ . c′

(3) in verses 4 and 6 he inserts חָלוּ (of which חולי in verse 7 is supposed to be a misplaced corruption), thus again turning incomplete into regular complete parallelism

a . b . c
a′ . b′ . c′.

Thus merely by a study of the parallelism this reconstruction is rendered improbable quite apart from the question whether metre requires any such changes, or whether Dr. Briggs's is not a much more prosaic poem than that of the Hebrew text.

In the LXX Psalm cxiv. is united with Psalm cxv. This union has been very generally regarded as not representing the original text: in addition to the reasons commonly given for holding that the division between the two Psalms in the Hebrew text is correct, we may now add the difference in the type of parallelism. In cxv. 5–7 we find three successive examples of complete parallelism, and although

elsewhere in the Psalm there are examples of incomplete parallelism, these are mostly incomplete parallelisms of a different kind from those which occur in Psalm cxiv.

G. Buchanan Gray.

THE IRONY OF JESUS.

The irony of Socrates consisted in the fact that he always pretended to be on a level with, or even inferior to, those with whom he conversed. Himself the wisest man of his time, he gave himself out to be the most ignorant and foolish: of better life and manners than the vast majority of the Athenians, he associated with persons of loose morals, as though he were one of themselves: one of the ugliest of men, he drew attention to his ungainly features, and at the same time saved himself from the ridicule of others by claiming to be one of the most handsome.

Jesus never put Himself on a level even with the best of His contemporaries. The Jew of His day was, both in point of enlightenment and in point of morality, far superior to the citizen of Athens of the time of Socrates, yet Jesus consistently claimed to be superior to the best men of His nation, not merely of His own day, but of the best age in its history. He claimed to be a greater legislator than Moses, wiser than Solomon, and a preacher of more authority than Jonah. But although He never pretended to be on the level of those whose teacher He was, He not unfrequently made His hearers imagine that they were on a higher level than, in His opinion and in point of fact, they were. When He spoke of ninety and nine *righteous* persons (Luke. xv. 7, cf. on the other hand, Matt. xviii. 17: a *publican* and a Gentile), the Scribes and Pharisees whom He was addressing inevitably took the compliment to themselves and were doubtless intended to do so, however little in the eyes of Jesus they deserved it.

On another occasion He encouraged His disciples by making them believe that they had greater insight into "the mysteries of the Kingdom" than the rank and file of the crowds who came to hear Him, to whom the stories which He told them, and which have come down to us in the barest outline, were interesting tales and nothing more (Matt. xiii. 11 ff.). For it is impossible to suppose that those familiar parables, the longest of which could be spoken in a few seconds, could in their present form, have arrested and retained the attention of an eastern crowd. Such a fable as that of the Prodigal Son or that of the Labourers in the Vineyard would, no doubt, when delivered, be filled with such a wealth of detail and fulness of description that it would occupy, it may have been, an hour, or even more. It is only on this supposition that the mere story can have become an end in itself to the multitude, and have made them forget or neglect to look for a spiritual meaning. The sense to expect and the ability to perceive the inner meaning was, Jesus said, confined to the twelve most intimate disicples; but it must have humbled their pride and detracted from their satisfaction to discover that they were quite unequal to the task of reading the moral of such a simple fable as that of the Sower (Mark iv. 13), or of the Tares (Matt. xiii. 36), and could not understand how a person is to be considered unclean, not on account of what goes into his mouth, but on account of what comes out of it (Matt. xv. 15 f.; Mark vii. 17 f.).

It is a part of the irony of Jesus, too, that these parables were told to the multitude with the express purpose of withdrawing their attention from, rather than leading it to, the facts and laws of the spiritual *régime* whose inauguration He proclaimed. There was no reason why Jesus should not have spoken as plainly to the general crowd as He did to "His Twelve."[1] They were just as capable of

[1] So the Syriac.

understanding Him as these, and would have made as good use of their knowledge, but Jesus preferred that each one should find this kingdom for himself. The majority, indeed, never discovered it at all. They had listened to words that told of the relation of God and man, of the human soul, and of the meaning of life, and they had heard nothing but entrancing tales of things that happen every day. They seemed to be fulfilling the words of an ancient oracle : they " listened without hearing, and looked without seeing " (Matt. xiii. 14 ; Isaiah vi. 9).

Sometimes the fact that Jesus was making use of irony may have been apparent to those to whom He spoke, but as a rule it seems to have escaped their observation. When the Pharisees sought to account for His occult powers by saying that it was by the chief of the demons that He cast evil spirits out of men, His reply was—" Your own sons then —by what power do they cast them out ? " (Matt. xii. 27). Jesus would not have admitted that the sons of the Pharisees possessed such powers, and the form of the answer indicates that the Pharisees themselves were aware that the claim was unfounded, though in this instance they may not have seen that Jesus was ridiculing their pretensions. At other times there was no attempt to hide the irony. After exposing the illogical position of the strict Jews in such matters as that of washing the hands before meat and the observance of the rules of cleanliness generally, quite apart from inward purity and integrity, Jesus apostrophises them : How finely you frustrate the divine commandment by your tradition ! (Mark vii. 9 ; cf. v. 6, Finely has Isaiah prophesied of you, etc.).

The same weapon was used to curb the eagerness and still the excited feelings of His too zealous disciples. When the Seventy (or Seventy-two) returned from their first preaching expedition, somewhat elated by the unexpected success

of their mission, and most impressed by the fact that evil spirits had proved obedient to their powers of exorcism, Jesus rebuked their too great enthusiasm by saying in irony that no doubt they had dealt a final blow to the kingdom of darkness, that, in fact, He had seen Satan falling as fast as lightning from heaven, adding at the same time that the power to exorcise bewitched persons was after all a small matter (Luke x. 17 ff.).

At times the irony of Jesus takes the form of innuendo. When one "learned in the law" asked Him which was the principal commandment, Jesus not only answered his question, but added the second commandment also, about which the questioner had not asked, but of which he had much need to be reminded (Matt. xxii. 35 ff.). St. Luke adds that the Pharisee forthwith required a definition of the term "neighbour." In answer Jesus related the story of the "Good Samaritan," which does not supply the definition sought, but would certainly bring home to the listener the truth that, whoever obeyed the second commandment, it was not the class to which he belonged (Luke x. 30 ff.). In St. Mark's version of the incident the scribe adds a comment of his own upon the answer of Jesus which draws forth the remark, "Thou art not far from the Kingdom of God," the irony thus taking the form of *litotes* (Mark xii. 33 f.).

But the most common shape in which the irony of Jesus shows itself is that of sarcasm directed against his persecutors.

The Pharisee's prayer (Luke xviii. 11 f.) and the lurid description of the end of the rich (Luke xvi. 22 ff.) form a biting exposure of the life and fate of the average man of wealth of His day. In the latter passage the irony passes from one phase of bitterness to another, and the whole piece is only surpassed in intensity by the scathing invective of the twenty-third chapter of Matthew. In this outburst of passion Jesus presents a complete contrast to Socrates, who was always the

calm philosopher, who believes that all error is due to ignorance and that man requires only to be shown the good in order to follow it. To the Greek, life consisted largely of abstract thinking and the correct expression of thought, and the mainspring of his activity was the search for truth. Jesus was a Hebrew, and to the Hebrews, as to the Semites generally, the prevailing motive has always been an intense craving for justice, especially for justice for the poor. It was injustice to the poor, practised by those who were the acknowledged instructors and exemplars of the common people in religion and morals, which excited the irony and indignation of Jesus as nothing else did. In this He was only following in the footsteps of every one of the long line of the moralists and reformers of Israel. If there is nothing of this in Socrates, it is because the poor and the slave were nothing to him.

Sometimes, on the other hand, a personal note entered into irony of this intense sort. When His opponents corrupted one of His most intimate disciples and took advantage of His being in a lonely place, in which He appears to have concealed Himself during the last night or two of His life, He taunted them with not daring to arrest Him by daylight and in public (Matt. xxvi. 55). Yet to the three whose drowsiness permitted His enemies to approach unobserved, and even to the traitor himself, His irony was of the gentlest (Matt. xxvi. 40; Luke xxii. 48).

Finally, there is a considerable number of passages in which the irony is of the lightest, and might rather be called raillery or even banter. This is so in the familiar conclusion to a discourse, If any have ears to hear, let him listen! One incident which has nonplussed the apologists is that known as the "cursing of the fig-tree": No fruit be on thee again for ever! (Matt. xxi. 19). The most natural explanation is that Jesus spoke in jest, as any Syrian would do to-

day. It may be said that this does not account for the fig-tree immediately withering ; but neither does any explanation account for that. Only a few minutes later He crossed the Temple-priests in argument in a way that is supposed to be characteristically modern (Matt. xxi. 24 f.), and on the day before, when the same persons remonstrated with Him for disturbing the wonted solemnity of the Temple courts, he replied that were the children to hold their peace, " the stones would at once take up the cry " (Matt. xxi. 15 ; Luke xix. 40). Here, as in other places (Matt. xxiv. 2, and often), we have no doubt simply a hyperbole, but the irony of it consists in the fact that those whom He addressed doubtless took the words literally.

T. H. Weir.

THE QUESTION OF THE APOSTOLIC DECREE: A REPLY.

In view of the tendency, inaugurated and furthered by the painstaking labours of Professors Ramsay and Harnack, to assign a high decree of historical accuracy to the author of the Third Gospel and the Acts, any theory which tends to throw still further light on the historicity of the Lucan writings is deserving of careful consideration and discriminating criticism. Such a theory, it seems to us, is the view developed by G. Resch in his work *Das Apostoldekret nach seiner ausserkanonischen Textgestalt.*[1] Briefly stated, this theory assumes that the omission of the word πνικτῶν in the Western version of the Apostolic decree (Acts xv. 28) is original, and that the decision of the Council therefore resulted in a victory for the liberal or pro-Gentile party. The text, thus emended, reads as follows :

ἔδοξεν γὰρ τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἁγίῳ καὶ ἡμῖν μηδὲν πλέον ἐπιτίθεσθαι ὑμῖν βάρος πλὴν τούτων τῶν ἐπάναγκες, ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων καὶ αἵματος καὶ πορνείας [*πορνείας· ἐξ*] *ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτοὺς εὖ πράξετε.*

If this reading gain acceptance, what was a four-clause food law in the received text is converted into a three-clause moral law respecting idolatry, murder, and fornication.

In the March number of the Expositor appeared an article from the pen of the Rev. Maurice Jones, entitled "The Apostolic Decrees in Acts xv. : a Compromise or a Triumph ?" Mr. Jones began his article with a statement of the central importance of the story of the Apostolic Council in the criticism of the Acts, and proceeded thence to a summary of the views of eminent modern scholars. From this survey it became apparent that the question of the date

[1] *Texte und Untersuchungen*, N.F. xiii. 3, 1905.

of the decree has in recent years become less urgent than the more fundamental question of its contents. Mr. Jones then set about to sketch the history of the above-mentioned theory of Resch, showing that it had received the support of Wellhausen [1] and Harnack [2] in Germany, and of Professor Kirsopp Lake [3] among English scholars. For convenience we shall hereafter designate that theory the Resch-Harnack theory. Due credit must be given, however, to Hilgenfeld,[4] who advanced a similar view as early as 1896.

The main purpose of Mr. Jones's article was to point out what he considered to be fatal objections to such a reconstruction of the Apostolic decree. Upon purely textual grounds he admitted that "there would seem to be no insuperable objection to the adoption of the shortened version of the Western text as the original form in which the decree appeared." [5] He had reached this conclusion after a thoroughly impartial weighing of the textual variants, but he found it necessary to add the qualifying clause, "although it is a somewhat large order to give the preference to D in the matter of the omission of 'things strangled' as against the evidence of all the other Uncials." But, if the textual evidence was inconclusive, he found the difficulties of historical reconstruction on the basis of the new theory well-nigh insuperable. These difficulties were summed up under the following five heads: (1) that the theory renders the circumcision of Timothy by St. Paul after the Council "absolutely unthinkable"; (2) that it does not remove the difficulty connected with Galatians ii. 6; (3) that it leaves the Epistle to the Galatians entirely "in the air";

[1] Wellhausen, *Noten zur Apostelgeschichte*, iii. 19 f.

[2] Harnack, *The Acts of the Apostles*, pp. 249 f.

[3] Kirsopp Lake, *C.Q.R.*, January, 1911, pp. 353 ff. *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, pp. 48–60.

[4] *Zeitschrift für Wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1896, p. 625 ff.

[5] P. 248.

(4) that it destroys the relevancy of St. James' reference to the decrees in Acts xxi. 25; and (5) that it fails to account for the continued existence of the Judaistic controversy. The article concluded with a welcome plea for a saner estimate of the character of St. Paul and an adverse judgment against the Resch-Harnack theory.

To these five objections Mr. Jones might, we think, have added another, drawn from the Pauline discussion of εἰδωλόθυτα in 1 Corinthians viii. 1–xi. 1. This objection can be made very strong, if it is assumed that the received text is the genuine one and that the purpose of the decree was to facilitate social intercourse between Jewish and Gentile believers. According to that theory a *modus vivendi* was to be established by forbidding such minor Gentile practices as would be especially offensive to Jewish scruples. One such practice was the eating of εἰδωλόθυτα ("idol-meats"). Now the question had arisen in the Corinthian Church as to the essential validity of the prohibition of εἰδωλόθυτα. Clearly there was a feeling abroad that it was wrong to eat the idol-meats, though whether this feeling arose because of an injunction of St. Paul on the subject is not stated.[1] Clearly, too, there was a party in the church who were galled by this restriction. Confident in their γνῶσις that no idol was anything in the world, they felt the prohibition of idol-meats to be an encroachment on their freedom. This was their complaint to St. Paul. How does he meet it? Not, to be sure, by referring

[1] There is no reason, if the traditional theory of the decree be accepted, why this feeling cannot have been caused by a definite laying of the terms of the decree on the Corinthians by St. Paul. The local and provisional nature of the decree has been much exaggerated. It is true that only the Gentiles of Antioch and Syria and Cilicia are mentioned (Acts xv. 23); but we know that the decree was laid also upon the Churches of South Galatia (Acts xvi. 4), which was the only other region of St. Paul's missionary jurisdiction at the time. St. James in Acts xxi. 25 assumes the decree to be valid for all St. Paul's converts.

to the decree—on Mr. Jones's theory it may be said that it was the decree itself which caused the protest. What St. Paul actually does is to reaffirm the principle upon which the decree rests, the principle of foregoing minor rights for the sake of weaker brethren, Granting the abstract right of the Corinthians to eat εἰδωλόθυτα, he warns them to take heed lest this liberty of theirs become a stumblingblock to the weak (viii. 9). This principle he enforces by his own example in this (viii. 13) and other (ix. 5; ix. 12; ix. 19) matters, warns against spiritual pride (x. 1 ff.) and idolatry (x. 14 ff.) likely to be fostered by eating, but concludes by conceding that there is no need for the rule to be interpreted with too much literal rigour. It is not, however, always expedient to insist on abstract rights (x. 23 ff.); regard must be had for the consciences of others. And it must be observed that St. Paul is not here concerned only with the question of the relations of Gentiles one to another; the principle is expressly extended to the relations of Gentiles *and Jews* (x. 32).

It may plausibly be said by the advocates of the compromise theory that we have here a detailed statement by St. Paul of the philosophy which underlay his acceptance of the ceremonial restrictions of the decree. Certainly the passage cannot be held to contravene the received text. It harmonises equally well, however, with the view that the Council decided in favour of Gentile liberty, and in this connexion will come in for subsequent reference.

Now in considering the objections which Mr. Jones himself has raised it is a pleasure to be able to travel over the same road with him as regards the textual evidence. Even with his unwillingness to give the preference to D against the evidence of all the other Uncials we are inclined to sympathise. Nevertheless it seems to us that there are several phenomena which Mr. Jones has either minimised or over-

looked—phenomena which, taken together, have the effect of weakening, if not altogether removing, the objections to the Western form of the decree. At the risk of repeating what has been better said by others we take the liberty of enumerating these data as briefly as possible.

(1) Codex Bezae (D) omits the reference to "thing(s) strangled" not only in the text of the decree (Acts xv. 28) but also in xv. 20 and xxi. 25. *This threefold omission*, of course, *removes the shortened Western form from the sphere of the fortuitous or accidental.* But it is possible to go a step further. The Bezan Codex is notorious for its expansions of the received text of Acts, and *its omissions thereby obtain a double significance.* "Western non-interpolations" have long been a recognised phenomenon in the Gospels and Acts. One is at once reminded of the numerous cases occurring in the last three chapters of St. Luke's Gospel, which have been so thoroughly dealt with by Dr. Plummer.[1] The classic instance, of course, is the important omission of xxii. 19*b*, 20, which most recent scholars, following Westcott and Hort [2] and Plummer,[3] agree in considering an interpolation for the purpose of harmonising St. Luke's account of the institution of the Lord's Supper with St. Paul's account in 1 Corinthians xi. 24 f. Another example, which is perhaps more to the point because found in the Acts, has been treated by Sir William Ramsay.[4] In Acts xix. 28, where Codex Bezae reads *Μεγάλη Ἄρτεμις Ἐφεσίων* instead of the received *Μεγάλη ἡ Ἄρτεμις Ἐφεσίων*, thus converting a formal assertion into an invocation, the Bezan text coincides remarkably with numerous inscriptions in Asia Minor, while the received text might easily have grown up from the reduplication of the final *η* in *Μεγάλη*.

[1] Plummer, *St. Luke* (I.C.C.), p. 566 ff.
[2] Westcott and Hort, ii. App. p. 64.
[3] Plummer, *op cit.*, pp. 496–7.
[4] Ramsay, *The Church in the Roman Empire*, p. 139 f.

Arguing from the analogy of these striking "non-interpolations," we are surely justified in asserting that a certain presumption of originality is created in favour of the shortened Western text of the decree. This presumption rises to the pitch of certainty if no motive can be adduced for altering the received text into the Western text and if it can be further shown that the Western form of the decree is in more complete harmony with the context.

(2) *That Western dislike of food laws caused an original food-law text to be altered into one involving moral regulations only has been shown* by Harnack [1] and Lake [2] *to be extremely improbable.* Mr. Jones, in our opinion, gives too slight a recognition to their arguments. The silence of the Apostolic Fathers and Apologists as to the existence of such a Christian food-law is, in itself, of neutral value. On the other hand, Irenaeus unquestionably knew of a food-law concerning "blood" in the Gallican Church [3]; and Tertullian not only of, but laid stress upon, a food-law dealing with the prohibition of blood and of things strangled.[4] Yet neither Irenaeus nor Tertullian connects such laws with the decree of the Council of Jerusalem. On the contrary, they agree in interpreting that decree *as a moral or ethical rule.* The very ambiguity of the short form can well explain the origin of the expanded form of the decree in the received text, whereas, if the received text be original, it becomes impossible to explain the origin of the Western version. From this we conclude, in the words of Lake, "that the argument on purely textual grounds is against the four-clause text, and in favour of the shorter form." [5]

(3) This inference is strengthened when we discover that

[1] Harnack, *op. cit.* p. 258 f.
[2] Lake, *C.Q.R.*, Jan. 1911, p. 356.
[3] Epistle of the Churches of Lyons and Vienne.
[4] Tertullian, *Apol.* 9; *De Monog.* 5; *De Jejun.* 4.
[5] Lake, *Earlier Epp. of S. Paul*, p. 53.

the four-clause regulation of the received text is itself extremely difficult. It has always proved a puzzle to commentators and has never been satisfactorily explained. Hort, taking the received text for granted, despaired of a solution of the problem.[1] Rackham, whom we may take as typical of more recent commentators accepting the four-clause form, confesses that he is " startled to find joined with these purely ceremonial matters a fundamental moral command, abstinence from fornication," and embarks upon an unsatisfactory attempt to develop a close connexion between idolatry and fornication.[2] Moreover, the four-clause rule is tautologous. Not only are " things strangled " included in the prohibition of " blood," but both alike are implicitly included in the εἰδωλοθυτα, if that word be taken in its narrower sense of " idol-meats."

(4) *The interpretation of the three-clause moral law,* on the other hand, *is self-consistent and harmonises with the context in a way that the four-clause food-law does not.* At the opening of the Council there had been some disputing (ζητήσεως, xv. 7), obviously on the part of the party who upheld the Mosaic law ; but their contentions had been effectively silenced by St. Peter, who, recalling the Divine approval which had been manifested on the occasion of his own mission to Cornelius (Acts x. 44–48), rebukes those who were attempting to "put a yoke upon the neck of the disciples which neither our fathers nor we were able to bear (xv. 10)." The Divine approval had been no less manifest in the case of the labours of St. Paul and St. Barnabas, as was shown by their own testimony (vs. 12). If there were any doubt that the ζυγός against which St. Peter protested consisted of the regulations of the Law in general, and not

[1] Hort, *Judaistic Christianity,* p. 73.

[2] Rackham, *The Acts of the Apostles,* p. 264 f. Cf. Harnack, *op. cit.* note p. 256.

the ordinance of circumcision in particular, it is put at rest by the whole tenour of the speech of St. James which followed. How is his judgment "that we trouble not them that from among the Gentiles turn to God" (vs. 19) consistent with a regulation which enjoined the observance of a Judaic food-law? Where is the appropriateness of his remark, "For Moses from generations of old hath in every city them that preach him, being read in the synagogues every sabbath (vs. 21)"? Can we conceive of the adoption of a decree imposing upon Gentile converts certain ceremonial requirements as "necessary things," after such a policy had been deprecated by the great Apostle of the Circumcision and the head of the Jerusalem Church? In short, the theory that the decision of the Council resulted in a compromise and that the decree was designed to establish a *modus vivendi* can be sustained only by doing violence to the tone of the recorded speeches and at the cost of the historicity of the entire narrative. The three-clause version of the decree, on the contrary, not only appears the natural and logical outcome of the liberal policy recommended by St. James, but also adds a special significance to the rejoicing of the Antiochene Christians when they had received the decree (vs. 31).

Mr. Jones, we feel, has failed to appreciate the cumulative weight of these various considerations, all of which point to the adoption of a moral, rather than a ceremonial or food, law, by the Council of Jerusalem. He avoids the difficulties of his own interpretation, however, not by directing his attack against the textual and exegetical phenomena upon which the Resch-Harnack theory is founded, but by adducing what he feels to be insuperable historical difficulties. It now becomes our task to examine these difficulties in order.

(1) *The Case of Timothy.* Mr. Jones considers it "un-

thinkable" that St. Paul would have circumcised Timothy after the Council had decided altogether in favour of Gentile liberty. But he fails to make it clear how the Pauline acceptance of the food-law would explain the circumcision of Timothy by St. Paul. In either case St. Paul had won the point as regards circumcision of Gentile converts. If St. Paul then circumcised Timothy he must have done it on entirely other grounds, without reference to the conciliar decree. These grounds are not far to seek. St. Luke is careful to explain that Timothy's mother was a Jewess (Acts xvi. 1). His father, according to the Western text, was no longer alive, and this might be inferred from the received text. 2 Timothy iii. 15 seems to imply that Timothy had been brought up with careful regard for the Jewish faith. His uncircumcision is explicable by the fact that his father would not have acquiesced in the (to him) degrading rite; and there was no synagogue in Lystra. Now for St. Paul, wishing to take Timothy with him, it became a point of great practical importance whether Timothy was to be regarded as a Gentile or a Jew. In the words of Dr. Hort, "As a private person it might not be necessary to decide whether Timothy was to count as a Jewish or as a Gentile convert; as a missionary he must in practice choose, and the choice could not be doubtful. If by the side of the Pharisee of Tarsus he stood as a Gentile convert on the strength of being uncircumcised, he would throw away every chance of influencing Jews without any corresponding gain of the Gentiles, for his true history would be known. Yet, if he went forth to preach as a Jew without circumcision, he would scandalise the Jews even more: he would be regarded as the thin edge of a Pauline wedge for casting a slight on circumcision for Jews no less than for Gentiles." [1] That the author of Galatians v. circumcised Timothy is

[1] Hort, *op. cit.* p. 86.

proof enough that he considered Timothy not a Gentile but a Jew. We may contrast the case of Titus (Gal. ii. 3) whom St. Paul apparently refused to circumcise, even under pressure (vs.5), the explanation being that Titus was a Greek.

Timothy then, being a Jew, did not come within the purview of the conciliar regulations at all; and it is quite as easy to explain his circumcision if those regulations concerned morality as it is if they concerned food.

(2) *The Question of Galatians* ii. 6. There is, on the face of it, some difficulty in harmonising the account of Acts xv. with St. Paul's statement in Galatians ii. 6 that James and Cephas and John *imparted nothing to him*, but when they saw the grace which was given him, simply designated him for the Gentile work (vs. 9) with the *proviso* that he should remember the poor (vs. 10). But we cannot agree with Mr. Jones that the difficulty is greater if the moral law text of the decree be preferred to the food-law text. Under the latter we have, it is true, a compromise; but a compromise is not necessarily "ambiguous," as Mr. Jones assumes. Where the principle of *quid pro quo* is adopted,[1] a well defined *quid* is exchanged for an equally tangible *quo*. In this case the provisions concerning "idol-meats, blood, things strangled, and fornication" are clear and definite to the point of redundancy. So clear and definite are they that it is difficult to see how St. Paul could ignore them and say that nothing was imparted to him—especially since the whole argument of Galatians is about ceremonial regulations and about nothing else. If, on the other hand, no ceremonial regulations were imposed, there was no need to mention moral requirements which had never been called in question, and St. Paul could very properly say that nothing was imparted to him. In other words, St. Paul had completely won his case. What more could Mr. Jones have expected

[1] P. 247.

the Apostle to say? One feels that Mr. Jones is misled by the dictionary definitions of the terms *compromise* and *victory*, and reasons deductively from them rather than from the data of the problem.

(3) *The position of Galatians under the Resch-Harnack theory.* In the first part of this section Mr. Jones urges that there would have been no occasion for St. Paul to write to the Galatians if the Council had determined in his favour What he says under this head really falls under (5), the continued existence of the Judaistic controversy, and will be considered there. But some attention must be given to the strange actions of St. Peter as recorded in Galatians ii. 11 ff. Mr. Jones asks, "What justification can there be for his (i.e. St. Peter's) conduct if we believe that the Apostolic decrees had freed the Antiochene Christians from all restrictions whatsoever, and had deprived the Judaic party of every claim and demand upon them?" No justification whatever, if we can trust St. Paul, who resisted him to the face "because he stood condemned"! St. Peter had come to Antioch (vs. 11) and, under the influence of the spirit of freedom prevailing there, he and other Jewish Christians had eaten with Gentile Christians (vs. 12)—Gentile Christians, by the way, who obviously were not observing the food-law of our received text. All things went along blithely, it seems, until there appeared certain of the rigorous Judaic party from Jerusalem. St. Peter and his companions, knowing that their course would, if known, make them unpopular with the extreme party (whatever the decree of the Council), not only ceased eating with the Gentiles but pretended that they never had done so (vs. 13), and even began to join in the attempt to enforce the Law on the Gentiles (vs. 14). It was this that made St. Paul angry—so angry that he forgets even to finish the narrative of the episode. We have in the Gospels a classic instance of St.

Peter's sensitiveness to criticism, from whatever source (Mark xv. 66–72).

(4) *The Speech of St. James in Acts* xxi. 18 ff. Mr. Jones cannot understand the relevancy of St. James' reference to the decrees if they referred to the rudimentary principles of morality. The relevancy is perfectly clear if we realise, as Mr. Jones apparently does not, the exact nature of the charges brought against St. Paul to which St. James referred. The discussion was not "concerning his (i.e. St. Paul's) observance or non-observance of the provisions of the ceremonial law."[1] No one who knew the facts questioned St. Paul's own fidelity to the Law. The specific charge was that he was leading *Jews of the Diaspora* to forsake the Law, as is perfectly obvious from verse 21. This charge was totally false, and St. James recommends St. Paul to prove it so by assisting needy Jews to fulfil their Levitical vows. St. Paul had not been teaching *Jews* to forsake the Law, though he had been teaching *Gentiles* that they need not come under the Law. This, St. James goes on to say, is quite in accord with what had been decided. There is no irrelevancy about verse 25. A contrast is drawn between Jewish observance and Gentile non-observance. St. James then concludes: "All shall know that there is no truth in the things whereof they have been informed concerning thee [viz., that thou teachest all *the Jews who are among the Gentiles* to forsake Moses, telling them not to circumcise their children neither to walk after the customs (vs. 21)]; but that thou thyself also walkest orderly, keeping the Law. But as touching *the Gentiles that have believed*, we wrote, giving judgment that they should keep themselves from idolatry, and from bloodshed, and from fornication" (vs. 24*b*, 25). There appears nothing irrelevant here. Can it be that Mr. Jones is serious when he urges that insistence

[1] P. 252.

upon the observance of an elementary code of morality could no longer be necessary after the lapse of more than seven years ? [1]

(5) *The Continued Existence of the Judaistic Controversy.* Underlying all Mr. Jones's objections to the Resch-Harnack interpretation of the decree, there seems to be the assumption that, if a definite decision in favour of Gentile freedom had been arrived at in the Council, the spectre of Judaic legalism would for ever have been laid to rest. Therefore, we must conclude that no definite decision in favour of one side or the other could have been reached. This reasoning would be valid in a world of mechanics ; how valid it is in a whirl of bitter theological prejudices now falls to be examined.

It may be that an historical analogy will help us. Supposing, for the time being, that only one record of the great Council of Nicaea had come down to us, and that record were of such doubtful textual purity as to render it uncertain whether a thoroughly Trinitarian formula had been adopted, or the uncertain compromising formula submitted by Eusebius of Caesarea had won the day—what conclusion would the historian of a later day arrive at as to the decision of the Council ? In the first place, he would observe that the decision of the Council, whatever it was, was accepted with remarkable equanimity by the Church generally. A few extremists were deposed and banished, to be sure ; but even in spite of this there was no absolute breach in the Church. In view of the excited state of feeling that prevailed at the time, the fact that there was no breach, but simply an extension of the controversy, would form strong evidence that the Council did not result in the actual

[1] Cf. 1 Pet. ii. 1 ; iv. 3 ; 2 Pet. ii. 9–14 ; Rev. ix. 20, 21 ; xvii, 3–6 ; xxi. 8 ; xxii. 15, and the numerous extra-canonical passages recorded by Resch, *op. cit.* pp. 108–24.

triumph of the one party or the other. This conclusion our hypothetical historian might feel to be corroborated by the fact that the debated word ὁμοούσιος seldom occurs in the writings of St. Athanasius, whose party was alleged to have won the day. To crown all, the historian would discover that the Arian controversy continued to lead a strong and healthy existence for fifty-six years. One Council overturned the acts of another until 381, and the defeated party continued to be active long after that date. If our historian worked out his conclusions along the lines used by Mr. Jones in discussing the persistence of the Judaistic controversy, he would be forced to the conclusion that the Nicene Council could not have decided altogether in favour of either of the contending parties.

But the truth is that the victory at Jerusalem, as at Nicaea, was snatched by a determined and energetic minority with the aid of half-convinced allies. At Nicæa the majority of the bishops were, like Eusebius of Caesarea, conservatives, who would have preferred to accept a compromise creed, but were prevented by the vigorous insistence of the Athanasian party. So, too, the Council of Jerusalem was dominated by conservatives—men who were driven by the logic of circumstances to concede to the demand for Gentile liberty. In both cases a reaction was inevitable. The plots and intrigues of the Arianising party after the Council of Nicaea remind us that the decision of Jerusalem had hardly been made and communicated to the Gentiles before the Judaising party set in motion schemes to subvert St. Paul's mission and unsettle the minds of his converts. In both cases the hatred of the malcontents was directed against the men who had stood in the way of compromise. St. Athanasius vindicated himself in his *Apologia contra Arianos* and *De Synodis*. The insidious attacks against St. Paul elicited that masterly series of Epistles to the Galatians,

Corinthians and Romans. In both cases moral grandeur and dignity in the end prevailed. St. Athanasius lived to see the final triumph of the Homoousion assured. St. Paul survived long enough to see the Judaistic controversy dwindle to insignificance.

One feels that there is a great deal of truth in Mr. Jones's criticism of those who take an exclusively hard and inflexible view of St. Paul's character. We gladly acquiesce in the insistence upon "the most precious elements of his character, his wonderful tenderness, his unfailing tactfulness, and his readiness to sacrifice so many of his own cherished ideas for the sake of peace and to promote the general welfare of the Church." [1] Yet it seems to us that in making this criticism Mr. Jones is attributing to the advocates of the Resch-Harnack theory a view of the great Apostle which they would be the first to repudiate. In fact, Mr. Jones himself seems to us to fall unwittingly into this very error in his discussion of the circumcision of Timothy. We quote his words. "If the Apostolic Council ended in a complete triumph of the Antiochene party, the circumcision of Timothy by St. Paul, after the Council, becomes *absolutely unthinkable.*" [2] And again, "the event is nothing less than an anti-climax and it is impossible to imagine the Apostle being capable of such weakness or St. Luke recording it." Is this the gracious, gentle, magnanimous St. Paul for whom Mr. Jones pleads? Is this the same St. Paul who "was not above making an effort to conciliate opponents when the interests of peace and of the Church demanded it?" [3] In the case of Timothy, if ever, the Apostle would have the opportunity to illustrate his policy, as described by himself in 1 Corinthians ix. 20–22. But Mr. Jones has deprived us of the privilege of appropriating this side of St. Paul's character at all.

[1] P. 254. [2] P. 249. [3] P. 255.

We cannot agree with Mr. Jones that no deep question of principle was concerned in the decree. The Council was confronted with two alternatives. Must the Gentile, in order to become a Christian, observe the requirements of the Jewish Law, or would it suffice for him to observe the requirements of a fundamental morality? The Council decided once and for all in favour of Gentile liberty. Where this principle was called in question, as it had been by the Judaising envoys to the Galatians, St. Paul could be stern and severe (cf. Galatians v.). But where the same principle was abused, as it had been by the party of γνῶσις at Corinth, there emerged the tactful, conciliatory St. Paul to whom the harmony of Christians was before all things. This, it seems to us, is the true explanation of the apparently changed tone of 1 Corinthians as compared with Galatians. On the other hand, the Council had also promulgated a specific moral decree forbidding forms of sin which were only too common in the Gentile world, but which were inconsistent with the spirit of Christianity. The burden of enforcing its provisions fell largely upon the shoulders of St. Paul; and, when we discover in his Epistles numerous passages in which he strongly insists upon moral requirements,[1] we are surely justified in believing that they are reminiscent of the decree.

In conclusion, we believe it has been shown that the foregoing objections to the Resch-Harnack theory will not stand the test of a critical examination, and that the three-clause version of the Apostolic decree not only satisfies the conditions laid down by Professor Kirsopp Lake,[2] but furnishes the key to what has hitherto been an insoluble difficulty in the criticism of the Acts. If, in reconstructing the history of

[1] 1 Thess. iv. 3–6; Gal. v. 19–21; 1 Cor. v. 11; vi. 9–11; 2 Cor. xii. 20, 21; Rom. xiii. 13; Col. iii. 5–9; Eph. v. 3–5.

[2] *C.Q.R.*, Jan., 1911, p. 358.

Apostolic Christianity on the basis of this interpretation of Acts xv., "whole libraries of commentaries and investigations" are closed "as documents of the history of a gigantic error," surely we can joyfully accept the result without being ungrateful to those who have laboured for it in the past.

E. H. Eckel and S. A. Devan.

THE VALUE OF THE METHOD OF PRAGMATISM IN THEOLOGY.

PRAGMATISM has gained a distinct place in recent philosophical speculation. The purpose of this article is to consider Pragmatism in Theology, and, as Pragmatism, we hope to show later, is a method rather than a philosophy, a truer title might be "The value of the Method of Pragmatism in Theology." In considering this at large we shall illustrate its value from two points of view; (1) historically or objectively by reference to the theology of Ritschl and Herrmann; (2) experientially or subjectively by reference to the popular antithesis of faith and reason—the former being the characteristic faculty of Christian experience.

What, then, in general is Pragmatism? Mr. Chesterton, in his collection of essays called "Heretics," says: "There are some people—and I am one of them—who think that the most important thing about a man is still his view of the universe." Now Pragmatism is essentially a philosophical point of view, viz., the attitude of value, of utility. Whatever exists influences our practice, and that influence alone, says the pragmatist, is its meaning for us. Philosophy's whole purpose—its "ratio essendi"—then is, to find out what practical difference it will make to you or to me whether this world-formula or that be the true one. If materialism has more value for our experience than idealism, if it will work better in experience, then it is a truer point of view. So Professor James—the most famous exponent of pragmatism—wrote: "Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas in which we can rest." It is the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities, and looking towards last things, fruits, consequences." Truth in our ideas, then, is not some hard

stagnant property inherent in them. It is not that hidden core of reality, that "thing-in-itself" which stands over against our ideas which *ex hypothesi* we can never know and so can never compare our ideas with. Truth in our ideas, means, according to the Pragmatist, their power to work, their value for an experience. "Truth happens to an idea; it becomes true; is made true by events." The Rationalist insists that truth is fixed; it is complete and ready made from all eternity; it is there once for all and has nothing to do with our practical interests or personal reasons. The Pragmatist insists rather that truth is made; "it is still in the making and awaits part of its complexion from the future."

There is much truth in this objection of Pragmatism to a hard, abstract, indifferent Rationalism. We have surely got beyond that shallow and airy optimism of too much religious philosophy, which, like the Stoic of old, is content to picture an ideal world where the pain and suffering of actual existing human beings have no real place. When crimes and tragedies are common around us, it is too patent a mockery to say with the Rationalists that "the negatives which haunt our ideals here below must be themselves negated in the absolutely real." It is these "negatives" which have an all too real existence here and now; and this "eternal peace abiding at the heart of endless agitation" has little meaning or value for the agitated, storm-tossed, wind-driven hearts of men. The truth is that this universe is a thing with scarred and broken edges, but Rationalism makes systems and systems must be perfectly closed. The adherent of Pragmatism, says, however, of his theory, "It can remain religious like the Rationalists, but, at the same time, like the Empiricists, it can preserve the richest intimacy with facts." "Pragmatism may be a happy harmoniser of Empiricist ways of thinking with the more religious

demands of human beings." To come closer to our subject, then, "if theological ideas prove to have a value for concrete life, they will be so far true for Pragmatism." "God is no better than matter as a principle, unless He promise more." "On pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works satisfactorily, in the widest sense of the word it is true. Now, whatever the residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it certainly does work; and that the problem is to build it out and determine it so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the other working truths." We begin to see now how Pragmatism connects itself closely with theology. If a materialistic view would promise us success, if it was bound by its internal laws to lead our world on and ever on, ever nearer to perfection, any rational man would worship her. But what Mr. A. J. Balfour says in his *Foundations of Belief* is too true. According to scientific materialism "The energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness, which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. "Imperishable monuments" and "immortal deeds," "death itself and love stronger than death, will be as if they had not been. Nor will anything that is be better or worse for all that the labour, genius, devotion and suffering of man have striven through countless ages to effect." But this final wreck and annihilation of the scientific materialist can be no anchor for the soul of man with his ideal aspirations and needs. The need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs in man. The notion of God, then, on pragmatistic principles alone, has this practical superiority, that it guarantees an ideal order that shall

be permanently preserved; and so it responds to the deepest beat of the human heart. And the surest evidence and truest argument for God seems to us to lie in this inner personal experience. What has the deepest foundation in truth is what satisfies the deepest needs of actual human beings.

How, then, does this philosophy of Pragmatism connect itself with theology? It does so, it seems to us, because its *method* has unique value in theology. Christianity is an affair mostly of our own personal individual experience, and a Christian theology must primarily satisfy these religious needs. This is not the place to discuss, at length, Pragmatism as a final philosophy. We hope to bring out the inadequacy of Pragmatism, taken as final in theology, in the latter part of this article. All that we would note here is that the Pragmatists make their mistake when they transform this method into an ultimate philosophy. Even Professor James says somewhere, "It does not stand for any special results. *It is a method only.*" In dealing with sensations he says, "*That they are*, is undoubtedly beyond our control, but which we attend to, note, and make emphatic in our conclusions, depend on our own interests." That is where its truth as a *method* lies. But if we make it into a final explanation of things, then it becomes a mere form of Subjective Idealism. The Pragmatist, with the Rationalist, has to admit that "Reality is in general what truths have to take account of." The Pragmatist has to deal admittedly with a "situation" which is "given" and not "made," and this is the type of all objectivity. If it would be well with him there must be certain facts "given," and this is a reality independent of human thought or will. "Originality in philosophy is difficult of attainment," and the Pragmatist no more than the Rationalist can construct a universe out of his own head. But it is just here we see how

the method of Pragmatism is of such vital importance in *theology as such.* Here the *fact of Christ* is "given" once for all. We are always moving within the Fact, and here the Pragmatic method is all-essential, grounded as it is on the basis of Fact. Christian theology must circle round not the creation, but *Christ the Saviour*, and it must concern itself only with the speculative ideas which Christ as Saviour involves. It should never be forgotten that the main purpose—*the* purpose indeed—of Christianity, was *practical*, and that in theology, which ought to be an intellectual expression of Christianity, this practical character must be kept in the forefront. Professor Orr seems to us slightly in error when he says, "The theology which is raised on the basis of man's moral self-consciousness is a speculative construction as truly as that which proceeds from the ideas of existence and cause"; for, obviously, the former is much more closely related to our real interests and *needs.*

Theology, like the Christianity whose expression it is, must be connected with life rather than with ideas, with practical needs, interests and aspirations. This truth, then, is strongly emphasised when we examine in more detail how the method of Pragmatism may be illustrated historically in Ritschl and Herrmann, and experientially in the popular antithesis of Faith and Reason. For if Origen "platonised" the Gospels, we might say that Ritschl "pragmatised" them. Whenever we find men insisting upon the value of experience or conviction in theology they are influenced directly or indirectly by the writings of Ritschl and Herrmann, and, all unconsciously to themselves, perhaps, their viewpoint is identical with the method of Pragmatism.

It is important to note, then, that the Ritschlian school are agreed upon these two important points: (1) in their claim for the complete independence of theology from all

metaphysical tendencies (and by this they mean abstract speculations), and their consequent attempt to set Christian faith beyond the reach of criticism; (2) in their view that theology is thus *wholly practical.* Most of the readers of this magazine are doubtless familiar with Ritschl's division of judgments into two classes, (*a*) Theoretical judgments which predicate certain things of an object considered in its own nature, (*b*) Value-judgments in which its worth and value for the self is affirmed. Thus that "Jesus Christ died upon the Cross" is a judgment of fact upon which pure historical evidence must decide; "that we have redemption through His blood" is one of value, of personal feeling and conviction. Now the Ritschlian school of theologians would hold that theology ought to contain nothing but such statements of appreciation issuing with sincere conviction from the living faith of a Christian soul. This conception, then, of value-judgments plays the crucial part in their theology. So even "Christ has only the value of God for us" simply because theology, thus viewed, is not the science of God in Himself, but the knowledge of God as He affects us through Christ, or of our own mental states as thus affected. Ritschl would thus obtain a practical theology free from metaphysical speculations. The impressions produced are ultimate for us; "of Being, Essence and Substance we can know nothing." Hence all questions pertaining to the nature and substance of God are ruled out as irrelevant; and, so he removes at one bold stroke the great mass of past discussions. All theology which transcends his estimate of value is rejected, and large blocks of the old theology are thus cast into the lumber-room of the past. For the deep things of Christianity are offered to practical faith; and not to the hard static understanding. From all abstract questions we must turn away, as Herrmann says, "with hearts cold as ice." In his treatment of the Deity of Christ,

for example, Ritschl is as keen as any other to affirm it, but it means for him not a scientific proposition of cognition, but a judgment of value. "Hoc est Christum cognoscere, beneficia ejus cognoscere." This surely we may call the watchword of Pragmatism in theology. His Godhead consists in His subjective appeal to our minds, in the services He renders us, the benefits He bestows upon us, and the saving work He establishes in our souls. Such speculative questions as an ontological Trinity, or the κενῶσις of the Divine λόγος are, according to him, "pure mythology." From the Divine character of the work Jesus Christ achieved on earth and from that alone he argues to the Divine character of His Person; for He produces upon us the impression of an infinite spiritual value. To reach the "*worth*" of Christ, he starts from the "*work*" of Christ, and arrives in the end at the conclusion that He is one who has for us the religious value of God. Herrmann's method is the same. Spiritual truth can only be spiritually discerned. A true knowledge of Christ and of the Christian facts is only possible to him whose experience can appreciate them. Their certainty lies in their attesting themselves in conscience and in our inner experience as indubitable facts. They "*find*" us at the roots of our being, and we submit to their influence. So, says Herrmann, "It is not possible to prove to an unbeliever the truth of these things." "Should an opponent appear now with the objection that we are resolving Christianity into the subjective, we can only suppose that for him Christ is not objective." "We begin to be Christians when we find the footprints of God in our life in the fact that the Person of Jesus has come our way." When we thus come to see, with Herrmann, that religious faith is not a thing concerned with the establishment of eternal truths, but rather with the appeal of the great Christian facts to our religious needs, we no longer think of gaining the cer-

tainty of faith in any other way. "Some day," says Herrmann, "this emancipating knowledge will dawn on others also; meanwhile we rejoice in the thought of the joy which awaits them when God shall give them the strength to throw aside the monkish cowl of the scholastic theology."

Now it seems to us obvious that Ritschl and Herrmann emphasise here the true method in theology, what we have called the method of Pragmatism. Religious knowledge must be the knowledge of a religious man, for whom the Christian facts have an infinite value. It is never the abstract frigid inference of an impassive spectator who would coldly dissect the body of Christian truth. It is based upon the warmth of the impression which the historical Christ has made upon our experience.

It is this which makes the pragmatic method in theology (as employed by Ritschl and Herrmann) of so vast importance. We have here the *given fact* of the *historical Christ*. He is a fact. He is *there*. The question for us is His worth for *our* experience. In philosophy, Pragmatism has no such given fact. It is because, in theology, they are working within this fact of Christ that the theological method of Ritschl and Herrmann has been so productive of results. Their anti-scholastic spirit, their protest against the influence of an abstract metaphysic in Christian theology, is a deep truth. We have more to do in religion than worry our heads over mere speculations in which cunning brains use the Christian facts as mere dialectical squibs or fireworks to amuse their mental sublety. It is all too easy to thus lose oneself in smoke. Herrmann and Ritschl did well to emphasise the great spiritual and ethical truths which are essential to a correct Christian theology. For it has too often to be deplored in the past that even theologians seemed to delight in getting away from all real religious experience, and in picturing a God whose validity and worth

seem in direct proportion to His diversity from what we know of Him in the Christ of history. Under the guidance of their fine intellects they have too often made balloonist expeditions into the ether, but have never failed to lose themselves on the way. A tight hold of the rope of Christian experience would have saved them and alone can save us from such fruitless excursions into thin air. If we viewed life not from the religious standpoint, but as impartial spectators viewing a game of chance with no stake in the result, the above expeditions might be intelligible; but for the religious mind such is an impossible *attitude*. It is the practical value of the great fact of Christ as Saviour for our experience that must be the centre of true Christian theology. With Herrmann we must emphasise the essential truth that religion is not mere dogma, but actual life, and salvation does not depend upon a speculative opinion but upon an *active will*.

The value of this method of Pragmatism in theology, which we have illustrated historically in Ritschl and Herrmann, is further emphasised in the popular antithesis of faith and reason in our religious experience. Science, whose organ is reason, treats of the demonstrable, the universal, the material; whereas religion, whose organ is faith, deals essentially with the spiritual, the individual, the undemonstrable. This antithesis is founded, as has been indicated, upon the uniqueness of the Christian facts, which have value only for the really spiritual man. This has too often been misunderstood. It has led to the deification of mere faith as the enemy of reason. Again, reason being thought of as incapable of dealing with the highest interests of man's spiritual life, has led some to maintain the cause of religion on the basis of philosophical scepticism; while others, viewing faith as entirely opposed to reason rather than as another aspect of experience, infer that the problem is insolu-

ble by any method of science, and so conclude that the only rational method is *Agnosticism*—that unknown God of superficiality.

But the truth is that faith is much more than an assent to mere historical statements. It is in reality a deeper reason, for it enters a region where reason as such cannot dwell. It is an immediate consciousness of God, a grasping of His value for our religious needs. It is an experience which reason always seeks to grasp, but which fades " forever and forever " from its view. It needs a certain condition of the heart and even of the will to see even the truth of the Godhead of Christ and to appreciate the value of the Christian facts. " The natural man discerneth not the things of the spirit." The scientific type of mind is apt to look down upon the Christian viewpoint, because it seems to them unscientific. But faith is the peculiar type of Christian experience, and its secrets are known only to those who have faith. It is the worth of an experience, its value that counts for the Christian, and this only the Christian can experience. And the worth of the experience can have no value for him who has it not.

After this somewhat diffuse investigation, what are we to say of the true relation of Pragmatism and Theology ? Is Pragmatism a final theology or is it not ? In a sense it is, in another most obviously not. The *method of Pragmatism* seems to us final ; but to make it into a final theology is as *obviously* false. Ritschl, as has been shown, introduced a real method into theology, but he did not present an ultimate theology, because he made the fatal mistake of transforming a mere method into a theology as such. For if Ritschl and his school were entirely consistent, they would be to theology what Hume was to philosophy, and that because they would reduce it *entirely* to mere subjective particularism and emotional feeling. " By his insistence

upon the *operations* of an object he ignores the fact that it exists," says a critic of the system ; and such is the root-objection to Pragmatism taken as final. Theology can never thus become a mere Pragmatism or emotionalism, any more than a mere intellectualism. There can be an apotheosis of Reason and also of Will, and neither is the worship of the *true God.*

Professor Orr criticises Ritschl somewhat unfairly when he says of the system that in it " it is not objective truth we have to deal with in religion, but conceptions in the form adapted to satisfy our religious needs." Ritschl holds such truth to be as objective as any other ; and, if they satisfy our religious needs, it is the best criterion of their true *objectivity.* But Ritschl did err in confining Christian theology entirely to the practical motives. It is a mere concession to a false view of science to rule out altogether the rational element. We must found an ultimate Christian theology on the whole nature of man, emotional, volitional and rational. It is a mistake to separate wholly value-judgments and theoretic ; for to do so may be interpreted as an attempt to ground religious certainty on indifference to reason, if not on scepticism ; and all such foundations are of sand, for the underlying basis is the false assumption that whatever belongs to the sphere of religious faith cannot belong to the sphere of *assured fact.* The root fact, as has been seen, on which the extreme is based, is merely that the apprehension of religious truth is conditioned in a way in which the apprehension of other truths (e.g., the truths of physical science) is not. For the prime fact in religion is that they satisfy our religious *needs,* and, surely, of all certainties, this is the surest.

It is the great merit of Herrmann and Ritschl, then, that they have tried, and tried not in vain, to free Christian theology from the deadening weight of an abstract theology,

and they do so by emphasising the true method in theology —what we have called the method of Pragmatism. But it is one of their greatest defects that they have failed to recognise the need of at least an attempted Christian metaphysic, which will try to think things together and to think them out. It is a well-known historical fact that, at a time when the grandest empire of the ancient world was fighting for its very existence against rude barbarians on every frontier, the very sailors and fishermen on the quays and wharves of Alexandria fought and disputed over the eternal generation of the Son. And so will it be to the end of time. The Christ of history and of experience will ever be a figure to stimulate the hardest thought and will always transcend man's expression thereof, for, in the last analysis, He is God. And so a Christian theology, which must centre round this Figure, has as its ideal a final philosophy of the universe.

A theology, centring round the worth of Christ and the great Christian facts, must emphasise as vital the pragmatic method—the value of these facts in Christian experience—and here Ritschl and Herrmann are all-important. However, it must go beyond this and attempt to put forward a general view of the world, because, for the Christian, Christian theology becomes a final philosophy. Fortunately, we are not called upon here to enter upon this difficult region, and we would simply note the fact. Thus we have the endless progression of Christian truth, the ultimate theology being a *terminus ad quem* never a *terminus a quo*.

What, then, is the conclusion resulting from the above as to the value of the pragmatic method in theology ?

Faith and Reason, Knowledge and Will *would* become *one*. They stretch out ideal hands to clasp one another. Will they meet ? Never, on this earth. Hence the permanent place of the pragmatic attitude in our finite experience.

The value-judgment remains fundamental in religious truth. Theology must ever retain this element of mystery and requires faith, "the evidence of things not seen." It is not given to us in this mortal coil "to know even as we are known." In our finite experience we must accept the basal method of Pragmatism; we must have the faith, the trust that "all things work together for good to them that love God." That "only those who do the will shall know of the doctrine."

Reason craves perfect knowledge, completed insight; but such is forever impossible in theology, for the very nature of the subject-matter destroys the *Ideal*. The value-experience of the Pragmatist remains, then, ultimate for us. Our insight can never be on this earth the insight of the Intellectualist—complete knowledge, systematic perfection. Many Rationalists talk as if they were in the happy position of having no difficulties, as if the world contained no dark mysteries. But the science of God does not manifest itself thus simply. Reason has here to be supplemented by faith, which flows no doubt from reason, but yet is forever beyond it. God—the supreme object of theology—is *known* yet *unknown*—known in the pragmatic sense for the ends of our moral and religious life; unknown because incapable of complete intellectual apprehension, "the one signal example of how human knowledge may be real while the reality that is known passes out of knowledge." Faith, then, is man's highest form of reason. The value for an experience of such a final faith can be dispensed with only in the "omniscience which leaves no room for mystery or for incomplete knowledge." Faith, trust, authority—these are the final categories for us. We submit to the authority of the value-estimate of Pragmatism, the value of our spiritual experience. This final faith may be an implicit knowledge, but it is *our* human equivalent for

omniscience. The method of Pragmatism is here *final*. The power at the root of all science, of all morality, of all religion cannot obviously be itself scientifically deduced. Our truest and deepest truth here is a final faith in God as revealed in the value of Christ for our religious experience.

One day we shall know even as we are known. Then the method of Pragmatism in theology, which is final for our finite experience, will be transcended in something higher. Faith and reason shall have joined hands at last. Those who have done the will shall *know* the doctrine. Faith and reason shall together he swallowed up in real insight, in perfect communion, in living fellowship ; and in that final experience we may hope the value-judgment shall be forever equated with the theoretic.

WILLIAM JOHNSTONE.

THE DIVINE NAMES IN GENESIS.

IV. The Hebrew Text (*continued*).

2. The Samaritan Pentateuch.

The Samaritan Pentateuch is a recension in Hebrew of the books of Moses, as used by the schismatic community whose religious centre was and still is the temple on Mount Gerizim at Shechem. Its MSS. are written in the Samaritan script—a degraded form of the original Hebrew alphabet; but otherwise they are simply a special group of Hebrew codices, and are in fact often treated as such by writers on the Old Testament text. The characteristic features of the recension appear in a series of intentional alterations of the parent text, due to editorial motives and tendencies. The most striking of these are, of course, the few changes introduced in defence of the legitimacy of the Samaritan temple and worship, such as the command to build an altar on Mount Gerizim after Exodus xx. 17, Deuteronomy v. 18, and the substitution (or retention) of Gerizim for Ebal in Deuteronomy xxvii. 4.[1] Many alterations spring from the desire to produce a smoother, more intelligible and more consistent text: archaic or abnormal grammatical forms are eliminated, discords of gender and number are avoided, exegetical difficulties are removed by glosses and emendations, and inconsistencies are reconciled by corrections or short interpolations from other contexts. Besides these there are a number of lengthy insertions

[1] It is immaterial to the present discussion whether the Jews or the Samaritans have here kept the original text.

from parallel passages, which form one of the outstanding peculiarities of the Samaritan text. Some of these alterations are clearly of Samaritan origin; but in other cases it must remain uncertain whether they are the work of Samaritan editors or were found in the Jewish MSS. on which the Samaritan Pentateuch is based. Taken together, however, they impart a distinctive complexion to the Samaritan text, which is recognisable as far back as we can trace its history.

If now we set aside these characteristic differences, we find in Samaritan MSS. a consonantal text which very closely resembles the MT. The variants are for the most part of the same kind and the same order of magnitude as those found in extant Hebrew MSS., and the majority of them scarcely exceed in importance those which seem to have existed in Jewish MSS. of the Talmudic age. The interesting and perplexing fact is that where the Sam. does vary from the MT it often agrees with the LXX. The LXX never supports the Sam. in its polemical variations in defence of the Samaritan cult; nor does it reproduce the long harmonising supplements referred to above. But in minor interpolations, in glosses and emendations, as well as in many readings not due to any tendency, it often follows the Sam. The agreements are often in minutiae, and acquire importance from their very minuteness; but in certain cases the combined LXX and Sam. text is on internal grounds to be preferred to the MT as the superior and, therefore, the original reading.

These relations of the Sam. to the MT on the one hand and to the LXX on the other, constitute a textual problem of great intricacy, and have given rise to the most diverse theories of the probable connexion between the Samaritan and Greek recensions. Some scholars have gone so far as to maintain the opinion, now generally recognised as

untenable, that the LXX is a direct translation from the Sam.; while others have been driven to the most complicated hypotheses of correction and revision of one text by the others in order to account for the phenomena which confront us here. To enter upon such questions is quite beyond the scope of this article. In what follows I will adopt the view which seems most plausible in itself, and at the same time is most favourable to those who would use the Samaritan Pentateuch as a witness along with the LXX against the MT: viz., the theory of Richard Simon and Gesenius,[1] that Sam. and LXX are both derived from a group of Hebrew MSS. containing a text which, while not quite homogeneous, differed as a whole (and occasionally for the better) from the official Jewish recension which is the parent of our Massoretic text.[2]

In the light of these facts, we proceed to consider the evidence of the Samaritan Pentateuch as bearing on the transmission of the divine names. We have already seen (p. 405, May) to how slight an extent it differs from the MT in this respect in the book of Genesis. There are only at most nine passages where it has a different reading, viz., vii. 1, 9, xiv. 22,

[1] A good account of Gesenius's essay and arguments may be read in the art. SAMARITAN PENTATEUCH, by Emmanuel Deutsch, in Smith's *Dict. of the Bible*, vol. iii.

[2] Before entering on the somewhat involved discussion that lies before us, it is right to point out that a critical edition of the Samaritan Pentateuch does not as yet exist. It is understood that two are in contemplation: one by the English Text and Translation Society, and the other in Germany under the editorship of von Gall. It may be expected that when such an edition appears, its prolegomena will shed new light on some of the problems which at present beset the path of the inquirer. It is not improbable that a critically revised text will remove some uncertainties which cannot now be cleared up; and it is extremely probable that it will at least provide data for a more precise determination of the affinities between the LXX and the Sam. than we can yet formulate. We must therefore be prepared to find that the best solution of the problem that we can compass with our imperfect material may be upset or modified by the improved critical apparatus which will one day be at our disposal. But unfortunately we cannot wait for this. We must make the best of

xx. 18, xxviii. 4, xxxi. 7, 9, 16a, xxxv. 9b, the last being an Elohim supplied where MT has no name at all. We have also found that only three of these variants (vii. 1, 9, xxxi. 9) appear in Hebrew MSS., and we shall see later that only two (vii. 1, 9) find support in any of the younger versions (Pesh., Vulg.). How, then, does the case stand as between Sam. and LXX? In five out of its nine divergences from MT (xiv. 22, xxviii. 4, xxxi. 7, 9, 16a) the Sam. is unsupported by a single MS., citation, or daughter-version, of the LXX. In three (vii. 1, 9, xx. 18) it agrees with a slenderly represented Greek text.[1] Only in one passage is the Sam. backed against MT by the united authority of the LXX: viz. the addition of Elohim in xxxv. 9b; a difference by which the documentary analysis is in no way affected. Now it seems to me that in dealing with this matter our text-critical opponents show a singularly ill-balanced judgment. When they light upon a discrepancy between Sam. and MT they rejoice like men who find great spoil; but an agreement between these two appears to be in their eyes

an obscure situation, and be satisfied if we can exhaust all the reasonable probabilities that come within our view. The text that we have mainly to rely upon is that of Walton's Polyglot Bible, reprinted separately by Blayney in Hebrew square characters in 1790. This is anything but a critical edition. It is merely the text of the Paris Polyglot of 1645, freed from typographical errors; and that again was carelessly edited by Morinus from the first MS. of the Samaritan Pentateuch that came under the eyes of European scholars. Kennicott collated the text of the London Polyglot with 16 other MSS., whose readings of the divine names are identical with those of the printed edition, except in four places (ii. 5, iii. 14, xxvi. 24, xxxi. 16) where a Yahwe or Elohim is omitted by one or other of two MSS. (61 or 64). In 1868 Petermann published a list of variants from MT of the famous Torah-roll of the sanctuary at Nabulus, in which one Sam. variant to a divine name (Gen. vii. 1) does not appear. These are our accessible sources of information as to the text, and it is evident that for the purpose in hand it is needless to go beyond the London Polyglot.

[1] The details, as given in the apparatus of the Cambridge LXX, are: vii. 1, Sam. supported by cw Arm.-codd.; vii. 9, by E; xx. 18 by bejw Boh., Phil.-Arm.

of no significance. Especially are they delighted when they discover a coincidence of the Sam. with something else against the MT. When Dahse can point to a solitary correspondence in a divine name between one of his Greek recensions (**egj**) and the Sam., it is an "auffallende Erscheinung" (p. 106); but the 310 (or so) correspondences of Sam. and MT are not deemed worthy of mention. I have explained in the last article why I refuse to consider an isolated agreement between a Hebrew MS. and some form of the LXX as in the least surprising; and the same argument holds good as applied to a casual agreement of the Sam. with some form of the LXX. On the other hand, the agreement of the Sam. with the MT in more than 300 cases *is* a remarkable phenomenon,—perhaps, all things considered, the most remarkable phenomenon in the history of the Hebrew text. We shall see presently what that means. In the meantime let us be clear on this point, that just so far as a discrepancy between Sam. and MT throws doubt on the correctness of the latter, precisely to that extent does a correspondence of the two guarantee the soundness of the MT. And since there are over 300 agreements in the divine names to 9 differences, it is surely well within the mark to say that the Samaritan recension as a whole is on the side of the MT and immensely strengthens its claim on our confidence.

It would really be difficult to exaggerate the importance of this fact. It means that through two independent lines of descent the divine names in Genesis have been transmitted with practically no variation. That, in the first place, is a very strong confirmation of the view several times expressed in the course of these articles, that Jews as well as Samaritans exercised the most scrupulous care in the transcription of the name of God. But it implies, further, that at the time when the two texts became inde-

pendent of one another, the distribution of the divine names represented in each was already established. We may not assume that other distributions were not in existence in MSS. of that period; but we are sure that at all events *this* distribution must have been represented in MSS. of sufficient authority to be accepted as the basis of the two most important recensions of the Hebrew Pentateuch. The question now is, how far back does the point of divergence lie? In other words, what is the age of the Samaritan Pentateuch as a separate Law-book, distinct from the Jewish Pentateuch from which our present Massoretic text has descended? Since this is a matter on which some difference of opinion obtains, it may be well to state pretty fully the grounds for determining this date.

Amongst modern critical historians the prevalent view has been, and probably still is, that the Samaritans received the Pentateuch from the Jews in the time of Nehemiah, about 430 B.C. It would be extremely convenient for my present argument to accept that date; for it would carry back the testimony of the Samaritan Pentateuch to within a short interval of time from the final redaction and promulgation of the Law by Ezra (at the earliest, *c.* 444 B.C.). But it seems to me that the evidence points to a date about a century later. The conclusion of the critical historians is reached by combining a brief enigmatic notice in the book of Nehemiah with a circumstantial narrative found in the eleventh book of the *Antiquities* of Josephus (§§ 302–324). In Nehemiah xiii. 28 we read of the expulsion from Jerusalem of a grandson of the High Priest Eliashib, because of his marriage with a daughter of Sanballat the Horonite. Josephus also tells us of a priest (named Manasse), who was a *great*-grandson of Eliashib, and who was excluded from the succession to the high-priesthood because he refused to be separated from his wife, a daughter of

Sanballat the governor of Samaria. Thus far it certainly looks as if we had here two versions of the same story. But Josephus goes on to relate how Manasse seceded from the Jews, on the promise of Sanballat that he should be High Priest of the Samaritans, and that a temple should be built for him on Mount Gerizim, as soon as the permission of Darius, the last Persian monarch, could be procured. He adds the important statement that many disaffected priests and Levites in Jerusalem joined Manasse in his secession. In the meantime the Persian Empire was overthrown by Alexander the Great ; and it was he who granted the firman under which the temple was erected on Gerizim, and Manasse was installed as High Priest (*c.* 330 B.C.). The common opinion, then, has been that the notice of Nehemiah xiii. 28 is to be supplemented by the account of Josephus ; so that the building of the schismatic temple, the definite organisation of the Samaritan sect, and the establishment of a regular priesthood and cultus at Shechem are to be assigned to about 430 B.C., instead of a century later, as Josephus states. But this is obviously a very unsafe combination. Whatever may have taken place under Nehemiah, the names of Darius and Alexander are too closely and explicitly associated by Josephus with the building of the temple to be set aside as unchronological. While there may have been some confusion in the mind of that writer with events of Nehemiah's time, we have no right to transfer his narrative bodily to a date 100 years earlier ; and it is reasonable to allow that he was probably well informed in assigning the building of the Samaritan temple to the early reign of Alexander. If so, we must infer that the final constitution of the Samaritan community on a religious basis, with priesthood and ritual, belongs to that time.

It will be observed that neither Nehemiah nor Josephus says anything about the adoption of the Pentateuch by

the Samaritans. We are thrown back, therefore, on general considerations to decide whether its introduction is more probable at the earlier or the later date. Such considerations seem to point clearly to the latter alternative. For one thing, a Law-book such as the Samaritan Pentateuch is would have been a useless and inconvenient possession to the Samaritans in the absence of a Levitical priesthood and a regular sanctuary, and the latter at least they had not secured before 330. Another consideration, which must weigh with those who hold the critical theory of the Pentateuch, is that the redaction of the Law-book cannot be put earlier than the year 444 ; and a much longer time than fourteen years must be allowed for the rise of such variations of text as appear in the Jewish and Samaritan recensions. The time of Alexander, on the other hand, is the latest period to which the adoption of the Pentateuch by the Samaritans can with any plausibility be assigned. For if a separate Mosaic Law-book would have been an encumbrance to the Samaritans before the building of their temple, it would have been impossible for them *after* that event to maintain their sectarian position without a Law-book adapted to their separatist pretensions. This view appears to be gaining ground amongst the most recent writers on the subject, and it would be easy to quote the opinion of several scholars in favour of it. We will therefore accept the year 330 B.C. as the proximate date when the Pentateuch passed into the possession of the Samaritan community.

If this conclusion be correct, the Samaritan Pentateuch is still the oldest external witness we have to the state of the early Hebrew text. It takes us back to a date within a century of the final redaction of the Law. There is no doubt whatever that even at that early period errors had crept into the Hebrew text. Where the Sam. and MT

agree (as they not infrequently do) in a reading which is manifestly corrupt, we are sure that that corruption had taken place before the two texts had parted company, i.e., by about the middle of the fourth century.[1] It is, therefore, conceivable that mistakes had occurred in the transmission of the divine names before that time. What we know for certain is that the common element of the two texts, which includes the divine names in Genesis, goes back to the fourth century, and that from that time the exact distribution of the names which then obtained has been preserved with all but complete fidelity in two independent series of MSS. down to the fifteenth Christian century or later. And this, I repeat, is amongst the oldest facts that textual criticism has established in the history of the text. The LXX, which is our next oldest witness, only furnishes evidence of the state of things about the middle of the third century, when the Greek translation of the Pentateuch was made. When we consider how, in regard to the names for God, the value of the LXX is depreciated by the notorious confusion of its MSS., and the consequent impossibility of ascertaining (in many cases) its original readings, we cannot hesitate to assign a decisive importance for our present inquiry to the critical fact presented by the agreement of the Samaritan Pentateuch with the Massoretic text.

Thus far, however, I have argued on certain current assumptions which until quite recently hardly any one has ever thought of calling in question. The argument assumes for one thing that the Jewish and Samaritan Pentateuchs have been uninfluenced by each other from the day when they first parted company. It assumes further that the

[1] For while such frequent causes of error as confusion of ר and ד or ה and ח might occasionally produce an identical corruption in two texts independently, accidental coincidences of this kind cannot be numerous ; and there are cases of a more complex character where agreement in error cannot be ascribed to chance,

LXX, even in cases where its peculiar readings undoubtedly represent a Hebrew original, only yields information as to the text contemporary with the translation, i.e., for a text at least half a century younger than that which we reach by comparison of the Sam. and MT. It is necessary now, in view of some recent discussions, to test the validity of these and other assumptions. For it is not to be supposed that an experienced critic like Dahse has failed to consider the serious and indeed insurmountable objections which the ordinary view of the history of the text presents to his attitude towards the text in general, and in particular to several of his speculative constructions which have been dealt with in these articles; such as the elimination of *El Shaddai* in Exodus vi. 3 and elsewhere, the Sedarim-hypothesis in more than one aspect, and the theory of Hebrew recensions older than the MT. All these make shipwreck more or less completely on the fact of the Samaritan Pentateuch as usually understood. He must, therefore, have formed some conception of the relation of Sam. to MT which to his own mind justifies the very slight and unbalanced regard which he pays to its testimony. We may expect that in some future volume of his textual studies he will take his readers into his confidence, and tell them what he really thinks on this important matter. He has not done so as yet; and we are left to conjecture what his position is likely to be. So far as I can see there are just two courses open to him. He must either (1) believe that the *present* text of the Sam. has broken off from the Jewish stem at a much later point than the first adoption of a Law-book by the Samaritans, and later also than the LXX, or (2) accepting the common opinion as to the ages of the Sam. and the LXX, he must hold that the *Hebrew original* of the LXX is of greater antiquity than the Samaritan Pentateuch, although the translation into Greek was

not made till the time usually supposed. Both these theories have been actually put forward, and neither can be pronounced *prima facie* impossible. We must consider briefly how far they are defensible in themselves, and how far they affect the conclusions arrived at above.[1]

1. The first view has been advanced in a very definite form by Professor Kennett in the *Cambridge Biblical Studies* (1909, p. 126). He thinks it probable that all copies of the Samaritan scriptures were destroyed by the Jews at the capture of Samaria and the destruction of the Gerizim temple under John Hyrcanus (*c.* 107 B.C.), and that the Samaritans restored their law on the basis of Jewish MSS. of contemporary age. Thus the witness of the Sam. to the text of the Old Testament, instead of going back to the fourth century, goes back at the earliest to the last quarter of the second century. There is no doubt that that theory would invalidate most of the conclusions which we have drawn from the existence of the Samaritan Pentateuch. Is it an admissible theory? It seems to me improbable in a very high degree. It is admitted that the Samaritans possessed a Pentateuch from the time of Nehemiah. Now the entire destruction of a sacred book is at all times a difficult operation. In the case supposed it is an unlikely result of the conquest, and the replacement of it by a new Jewish Law-book is in the circumstances more unlikely still. We can hardly think that at a time of such hatred and resentment the Samaritans would have easily reconciled themselves to the adoption of a new code from their conquerors. They would rather have fallen

[1] It will be said that there is a third possibility: viz., a progressive assimilation of the Sam. text to the later Jewish, due to the friendly relations subsisting between the heads of the two communities. Of that position I can only say that in the first place it is too nebulous to admit of discussion; and in the second place that it seems so improbable that it could only be accepted as a last resource to relieve a problem otherwise insoluble. Either of the alternatives mentioned above would be preferable.

back on the most imperfect copy of their own scriptures than have started afresh from ground common to themselves and their foes. Nor can we readily suppose that no such copy was to be found. We must bear in mind that long before then there was a numerous Samaritan diaspora in Egypt, if not in other lands; and even if the Jews had succeeded in destroying all MSS. of the Pentateuch in Samaria itself, it must surely have been possible to procure one from the Egyptian colonists. These are only conjectures, but the theory itself is a conjecture; and I cannot think that the balance of evidence is in its favour.

2. The second theory demands a somewhat fuller examination, because it is more plausible in itself, and because it opens up questions which go to the roots of the textual problem of the Old Testament. It is that while the Samaritan Pentateuch is older than the Greek translation of the Law, yet the Hebrew original of the LXX had broken away from the Jewish line of transmission at an earlier period than the Sam. To put it more definitely, the LXX was translated from the last of a line of Hebrew MSS. which had had an independent circulation in Palestine or Egypt from a time anterior to the separation of the Samaritan text from the Jewish. This view has been advocated with considerable ability and unusual moderation of statement by Wiener in the Expositor of September, 1911; and if it were necessary to try conclusions with that irascible controversialist, it would not be difficult to show that with all his logical acumen he has contributed nothing of value to the elucidation of the question he has raised.[1]

[1] The article, it may be explained, is mainly devoted to a demonstration, on the narrow and inadequate basis of four short passages taken at random from the Pentateuch, that the Hebrew original of the LXX differed far more widely from MT and Sam. than these differ from one another. I cannot here discuss the variants *seriatim*; but after careful examination it is clear to me that their significance is constantly misunderstood and greatly exaggerated. I have found very few which really point to a

But it is unnecessary to do that in detail. The whole argument moves within this syllogism : (*a*) The agreement of Sam. with MT is greater than that of LXX with either ; now (*b*) the more divergent text is the more ancient ; therefore (*c*) LXX represents an earlier phase of Hebrew text than Sam. or MT. The minor premiss (*a*) will, I believe, be generally conceded ; but the major (*b*) only with the qualification that everything depends on the nature of the divergence ; and hence the conclusion (*c*) remains in suspense.

It is necessary to look very carefully at the presuppositions of this argument, because there are several points at which error is apt to creep in through imperfect realisation of the facts of the case. It can be best stated by attending to examples of *corrupt text* in the various recensions. The MT contains a few undoubted corruptions which are not in

different Hebrew from MT. Apart from cases of inner-Greek corruption, the great bulk of the differences registered are clearly due to the freedom of translators, who did not render word for word (after the manner of Aquila), but often adjusted their rendering to Greek idiom, assimilated expressions and grammatical forms to the context, substituted synonyms, and made slight explanatory additions. Moreover, in the few cases where a divergent Hebrew may reasonably be suspected, there is hardly one in which that Hebrew commends itself as superior to the MT ; while there are several where it is distinctly worse ; and this is true alike as regards the consonantal text and the vocalisation. Wiener overlooks the crucial consideration that only where the Hebrew basis of the LXX is obviously better than the Hebraeo-Samaritan does it count as evidence that the former is nearer to the original text than the latter. For if the original of the LXX is obviously inferior to the Hebrew, then, while it is certain that the corruption is of more recent date than the separation of the LXX Hebrew from the parent stem, it must always remain doubtful in such cases whether that separation was earlier or later than the severance of Sam. from MT. Hence, on my reading of the facts, Wiener's very restricted argument has failed to establish the thesis that the LXX has a higher Hebrew ancestry than the Sam. Of course I am aware that if even a few superior readings in the LXX can be produced, they are sufficient to prove that it depends in part on an older Hebrew than Sam. ; on the other hand the undoubted presence of inferior readings in its Hebrew basis means that we cannot predicate a higher antiquity of its text as a whole, or assume that in neutral readings (i.e., those to which no intrinsic test of value can be applied) the presumption of antiquity is in its favour.

the Sam., and the Sam. contains a greater number from which MT is free. These must be assumed to have crept into either text *after* the time when they went their separate ways ; and on the other hand corruptions which appear in both must have come in *before* that time. But in the same way, the joint MT and Sam. text has a few errors which the LXX does not share, just as the LXX contains a number of undoubted corruptions which are not found in the Heb.-Sam. ; and again we infer that both these classes of errors are later than the divergence of the Hebrew basis of the LXX from the parent stock of the MT and Sam. But that obviously means that the Hebrew basis of the LXX has branched off from the common stem at a point nearer the origin than the bifurcation of Sam. and MT. The assumed situation, then, may be represented graphically by the accompanying diagram ; where the continuous lines denote transmission in Hebrew MSS., and the dotted line the succession of Greek MSS. O stands for the common Hebrew original of all the texts, *a* for the problematical point of separation of the LXX from the Jewish texts ; *b* for the separation of MT and Sam. ; and *c* for the point at which the Greek translation was made.

Now, to the principle involved in this abstract reasoning it does not seem to me that any exception can be taken. But unless I am greatly mistaken, Wiener goes astray through over-simplification of the very complex phenomena we have to deal with. Divergences of the LXX from the joint Sam. and Jewish text may be of four kinds : (1) They may be readings of the original text which have been lost in the Heb.-Sam., but preserved by the LXX ; i.e., they may go back to the line O—*a* in the diagram. Where the LXX has clearly the better text we must assume that its reading falls under this head. (2) They may have originated in Heb. MSS. before the Greek translation was made (in the line *a*—*c*).

(3) They may have come in in the translation itself (at the point *c*), through actual errors, misreading of the Hebrew, non-literal renderings, explanatory additions, and so on. (4) In the subsequent history of the Greek text of the LXX (below *c*). I have pointed out in the last note that in my view Wiener makes no sufficient allowance for changes of the class (3). I have now to add that he does not seem to recognise at all the existence of class (2). He appears to fancy that, when he has proved that a reading of the LXX rests on a Hebrew variant, he has recovered a text which goes back to the point *a*, where the Hebrew of the LXX parted from the other line of descent; and thus identifies the text of a Hebrew MS. of say 250 B.C. with the text common to all MSS. at the unknown period when the LXX is believed to have broken away from the joint transmission. Whereas it is only where the LXX has preserved the intrinsically *superior* text that such inferences are legitimate. Perhaps the fallacy lies in thinking of the LXX as representing an *older text* than Sam., because its Hebrew basis started on its separate course at an earlier time. It is surely superfluous to remark that the Heb.-Sam. diverged from LXX just at the same time as LXX diverged from Heb.-Sam.; and that it is sheer inconsequence to think of the one text as



older than the other on this account. It would be nearer the purpose to consider that, properly speaking, all texts are of equal antiquity; that is to say, if we have three contemporary MSS., a Greek, a Samaritan, and a Jewish, the presumption is that each will have been the result of as many successive copyings as the others, and that consequently all have been equally liable to the accidents of transcription. As all living men trace their ancestry to Adam, so all MSS. of the Pentateuch descend alike from the edition of the Law promulgated in the fifth century; and the fact that the hypothetical original of the LXX dates from an earlier period than the original of the Sam. no more guarantees the superiority of the *actual* text of the LXX to the text of Sam. than a man's having an unknown ancestor in the time of the Conqueror would give him precedence over another man who had a known ancestor in the reign of Charles II. There is, in fact, no question of relative antiquity, but only of relative soundness, of text; and that can only be determined by internal considerations. If it were true that the LXX is on the whole a better text than the Heb.-Sam., and that the latter differs from it mainly in the way of explicable corruption, then we should certainly conclude that the LXX's text stands nearer to the original than that of Sam. or MT. But since the case is notoriously otherwise—the readings peculiar to the LXX being in most cases inferior to those common to Sam. and MT, and therefore corruptions of a text faithfully preserved by them—the inference is irresistible that the text of the LXX, whatever the age of its archetype, has undergone degeneration, either in Hebrew or Greek MSS., since it parted from the common tradition.

With that explanation, I think that the theory under discussion has a claim to consideration as a feasible solution of an intricate problem; though there are two reasons that

make one hesitate to accept it. One is that tradition and historical probability are against it. What history tells us is that the Samaritan Pentateuch is older than the Greek translation. If we dismiss the statements of the pseudo-Aristeas as unworthy of credence, there is still a probability that the Jews of Alexandria would not have been content with a version derived from any less authentic source than the official Palestinian text of the time. Still, if it should be found that the relations of the three recensions can only be explained by allowing a higher antiquity to the Hebrew archetype of the LXX, the historical presumption may be overridden by literary evidence, and the view we are considering may have to be adopted. But in the second place we may hesitate to decide that this is the only or the best solution of the textual problem. We should have to inquire whether the resources of the theory of Gesenius (see p. 99 above), are not adequate to the situation with which we have to deal. In other words, whether the history of the text is not more truly exhibited by *this* diagram than by the one already given : Sam. and LXX being both derived from an *unofficial* Hebrew recension (*a*–*b*), which had ramified into an indefinite variety of texts, of which the Sam. and the LXX are the only surviving representatives. The subject is too large to be investigated here ; but it is not clear to me that the textual facts might not be explained by some such hypothesis as this ; in which case the *common element* of the Sam. and LXX would take us back to a point consider-



ably nearer the original text than the actual adoption of the Pentateuch by the Samaritans. For the present, however, I will assume provisionally that the truth lies in the direction of the hypothesis we have been discussing. Let us see how this will affect the evidence drawn from the Samaritan Pentateuch for the original use of the divine names.

(1) It is obvious that the positive testimony of the combined Sam. and MT remains exactly as before. It remains certain that the names for God as they stand in MT (neglecting the nine variants of the Sam.) were found in authoritative Hebrew MSS. of the fourth century B.C. The only new element is the *assumed* existence of still earlier MSS. in which a different distribution of the names occurred. (2) We have just seen that this assumption only suggests a bare *possibility* that the LXX has preserved the divine names in a more original form than the MT. Undeniably variations have occurred in one line of transmission or the other, but whether these be due to accident or caprice or deliberate tendency, there is no presumption whatever that they are on the side of the MT. (3) From the point of separation of Sam. and MT, Jewish and Samaritan scribes were exceedingly careful in transcribing the names of God, while we have no evidence that the same accuracy obtained in the Hebrew ancestry of the LXX, as it certainly did not obtain in Greek MSS. Are we to suppose that this fidelity of Jewish scribes to the text dates only from the time when the Pentateuch was taken over by the Samaritans? Is it not a reasonable assumption that great care had been exercised in this respect from the beginning by the central authorities in Jerusalem? (4) It is a legitimate supposition —conceded in fact by Wiener, although we can have no absolute certainty on the point—that the Samaritan Pentateuch was derived from the canonical text of Palestinian

Judaism. On Wiener's theory we are bound to suppose that the MS. used by the LXX translators was not an officially guaranteed MS., but a private codex, distant (it may be) by many removes from the central stream of tradition, though it happened to conserve some readings superior to the standard text. Now it is only the official guardians of a canonised text who are in a position to exercise an effective control over its transmission. We know that the Jewish authorities did not succeed perfectly—although they succeeded much better than the copyists of the LXX—in maintaining a pure text; but it does not follow that their efforts were wholly in vain, or that in what they regarded as an important feature of the text—the divine names—they have not preserved the original readings. (5) The LXX, even in cases where we can be sure that its readings rest on a Hebrew original, would only give us the text of a Hebrew MS. extant at the time of translation. We have no proof that it was then an ancient MS., or that in readings like the divine names, whose intrinsic value cannot be judged of, it did not deviate widely from its assumed ancestor. (6) Finally we have to remember that the LXX in its best established text agrees with the MT in about *five-sixths* of the divine names of Genesis, that the remaining sixth may well be due either to the translators not attaching importance to literal exactness in their work, or to inadvertent changes natural to Greek copyists, and that there is not one which might not have been altered in Greek more readily than in Hebrew: when we consider all this we shall not be disposed to rate very highly the pretensions of the LXX, whatever be the age of its archetype, to have preserved a more reliable recension of the divine names than the MT or the Samaritan.

It is right to say before passing from the subject that neither this theory nor that of Dr. Kennett has been before the minds of critics in investigating the structure of the

Pentateuch: their task has been performed under the influence of a conception of the text springing from the common opinion as to the dates of the LXX and the Sam. So far as I know these theories are both recent arrivals. Now that they have arrived it will be necessary to examine them on their merits, and in the light of all the circumstances of the case. Such an examination is perhaps at the present moment premature. We shall do well to await the publication of a critical edition of the Sam. before committing ourselves to a final judgment upon them. The general acceptance of either view would certainly destroy or weaken the confidence hitherto felt in the Sam. as the earliest witness to the Hebrew text, and would to that extent affect the textual argument for the documentary theory. Even in that event, however, it seems to me that the considerations advanced above are sufficient to dispel the notion that by following the track of the LXX we shall get nearer the original distribution of the divine names than if we trust the Massoretic text.

JOHN SKINNER.

THE FORMS OF HEBREW POETRY.

III. Parallelism and Rhythm in the Book of Lamentations.

The Book of Lamentations has played a conspicuous part in the constantly renewed discussions of the subject of Hebrew rhythm. Apart from any analysis ef its cause, and without any exceptional degree of attention, the reader of the Hebrew text, or even indeed of the English version, of the Lamentations, perceives something in the rhythm or cast of the sentences that is common to practically the whole of the first four chapters of the book. This same something that brings these four poems into a common class, sharply marks them off from the fifth chapter or poem, and at the same time, too, from the greater quantity of the poetry of the Old Testament, though careful examination has discovered not a little in various books of the Old Testament that resembles the first four chapters of Lamentations in the peculiarity in question.

But though this striking peculiarity is common to the four poems constituting the first four chapters of Lamentations, there are other features that distinguish them one from another—the differing alphabetic sequences that are followed by the initial letters of successive divisions of the poems (פ preceding ע in ii., iii., and iv., following it in i.), the differing lengths of the divisions, the differing degrees of passion, spontaneity and vividness with which the subject, common to them all, is handled. These differences have attracted and received attention; but, so far as I am aware, the differences in the use of parallelism as between the four poems, have not yet been analysed: and, yet, such differences exist. Owing to uncertainties of text and interpretation, it does not seem to me easy or even practicable to give exact statistics of these differences; yet, by the

help of a more accurate measurement of parallelism, such as I suggested in the previous articles, it will, I hope, be possible to make manifest the existence and general character of the differences ; and, in any case, by an examination of these chapters, I hope to carry further my line of approach to rhythmical questions through parallelism.

Though I cannot undertake any comprehensive survey of the history of the study of rhythm in Lamentations, it will be worth while to refer to two discussions of the subject —that of Lowth, who was the first to point out and to attempt to analyse the rhythmical peculiarity of Lamentations i.–iv., and that of Budde, who, by a series of contributions to this subject, beginning with his fundamental article in the *Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft* for 1882, has profoundly influenced subsequent investigation and terminology.

Lowth devoted his 22nd and 23rd lectures to the Hebrew elegy, and he returned to some of the points then discussed in the preliminary dissertation to his *Isaiah* (vol. i., pp. xxxiv.–xliii. : ed. 3). The genius and origin of the Hebrew elegy, of the *ḳinah* or *nehi* as the Hebrews called it themselves, he traces to their manner of celebrating the funeral rites ; and in particular to the employment of professional mourners who sang dirges. The natural language of grief, he remarks, " consists of a plaintive, intermitted, concise form of expression " : and as in other arts, so in that of the Hebrew elegy, " perfection consisted in the exact imitation of nature. The funereal dirges were, therefore, composed in general upon the model of those complaints which flow naturally and spontaneously from the afflicted heart : the sentences were abrupt, mournful, pathetic, simple and unembellished. . . . They consisted of verse and were chanted to music." [1]

[1] *Lectures* . . . (ed. Lond. 1787), ii. 123, 127.

Lowth then points out the peculiarity of the first four poems in Lamentations, and remarks: "We are not to suppose this peculiar form of versification utterly without design or importance: on the contrary, I am persuaded, that the prophet adopted this kind of theme as being more diffuse, more copious, more tender, in all respects better adapted to melancholy subjects. I must add, that in all probability the funeral dirges, which were sung by mourners, were commonly composed in this kind of verse: for whenever, in the prophets, any funereal lamentations occur or any passages formed upon that plan, the versification is, if I am not mistaken, of this protracted kind. . . . However, the same kind of metre is sometimes, though rarely, employed upon other occasions. . . . There are, moreover, some poems manifestly of the elegiac kind, which are composed in the usual metre, and not in unconnected stanzas, according to the form of a funeral dirge." [1]

The peculiarities of this elegiac versification are best summarised in the *Isaiah*, as follows: "The closing pause of each line is generally very full and strong: and in each line commonly, towards the end, at least beyond the middle of it, there is a small rest, or interval, depending on the sense and grammatical construction, which I would call a half-pause. . . . The conjunction ו . . . seems to be frequently and studiously omitted at the half-pause: the remaining clause being added, to use a grammatical term, by apposition to some word preceding; or coming in as an adjunct, or circumstance depending on the former part, and completing the sentence." [2]

The parallelism accompanying the versification of this kind is, according to Lowth, for the most part of the constructive order, [3] which is, as we have previously seen,

[1] *Lectures*, ii. pp. 136, 137.

[2] *Isaiah*, ed. 3, p. xxxix. [3] *Ib.* p. xxxv.

Lowth's way of saying that strict parallelism is at best incomplete, and is more often entirely absent.

There is in the passages just cited or summarised a surprising amount of correct and acute observation or fruitful suggestion. Some subsequent scholars neglected this important part of Lowth's inquiries, and, in consequence, Ewald, for example, never clearly saw, as Lowth had seen, the sharp distinction between Lamentations i.–iv. and v.

For our present purpose it will suffice to refer much more briefly to Budde's important discussions. In the main his advance on Lowth consisted in the detailed working out of two important points: (1) the nature of the unequal division of the rhythmical periods; and (2) the extent to which the rhythm characteristic of Lamentations i.–iv. occurs elsewhere in the Old Testament. As to the division of the rhythmical periods, Budde's position may be stated thus:—(1) the *Kinah* rhythm rests on the division of the rhythmical period into two unequal parts of which the longer part precedes the shorter part; (2) the normal length of the longer part is three words, of the shorter two words: (3) but by legitimate variations a longer part consisting of four words may be followed by a shorter consisting of (a) three, or (b) two, words; (4) the period is never equally divided;[1] if, as sometimes happens, each part consists of two words, the two words of the first part are heavier and weightier than the two words of the second part: (5) between the two parts of the verse, there is no strict and constant rhythmical relation beyond the fundamental fact of inequality of length.

To some of these metrical questions I shall return: meantime I proceed to examine the parallelism of the poems, and I will begin with the isolated fifth chapter which happens to be an excellent storehouse of examples of the types of

[1] *Zeitschr. für die alttest. Wissenschaft*, 1882, pp. 4 f.

parallelism occurring in poetry that is free from the well-marked peculiarities of Lamentations i.–iv. By comparison with the more ordinary parallelism of Lamentations v., any peculiarities in the parallelism of Lamentations i.–iv. may be the better discerned.

The majority of the twenty-two verses of Lamentations v. may be treated as containing six terms *equally* divided among the two stichoi that compose each verse, i.e. each stichos normally contains three terms. Seventeen of these distichs shew strict parallelism between at least one term in each stichos; of the remaining five distichs, one (*v.* 5) is too uncertain to classify, and two (*vv.* 8, 16) are best regarded as lacking strict parallelism. In the two verses or distichs that still remain (*vv.* 9 and 10) the stichoi are certainly not parallel to one another: but these two verses in their entirety seem to be (incompletely) parallel to one another: for, disregarding the first half of *v.* 10, which may be corrupt, we may represent the parallelism between the two verses thus:—

a . b . c . d . e . f
. . . d′ . e′ . f′

If this parallelism of the last parts of these verses was intentional, it is likely enough that such naturally parallel terms as נפשנו, עורנו, which occur in the first parts of the verses, were originally more really parallel than they now are.

Of the twenty-two distichs, then, contained in Lamentations v., seventeen at least show parallelism between the stichoi. In five, or, on one interpretation of v. 12, in six, of these the parallelism is complete:[1] in the remaining twelve (or eleven) incomplete. The several examples may be classified thus:—

[1] Expositor, July 1913, pp. 45 ff.

I. Examples of Complete Parallelism.

Form.	Number of Occurrences.	Verses.
a . b . c a′. b′. c′	3	4, 13, (17)
a . b . c b′. a′. c′	(1)	12 (on one interpretation)
a . b2 a′2 . b′	1	15
a . b a′2 . b′2	1	22

II. Examples of Incomplete Parallelism.

(1) With compensation.

a . b . c a′2 . b′	4	1, 11, 12 (on one interpretation), 20
or similar types		
a . b . c a′ . d . e	2	6 . 7

(2) Without compensation.

a . b . c a′. b′	4	2, 3, 14, 18
or similar types		
a . b . c . d a′ c′2	1	19
a . b . c . d a′2 e	1	21

The occurrence in this poem of incomplete parallelisms without compensation raises questions that must be considered later.

In turning now to consider Lamentations i.–iv. we are faced with a difficulty of terminology. Lamentations iii., as is well known, consists of sixty-six Massoretic verses distinguished from one another by the occurrence, at the beginning of each, of the letter of the alphabet appropriate to the alphabetic scheme, so that each of the first three verses begins with א, each of the next three with ב, and so forth. Chapters i. and ii., though they number each but

twenty-two Massoretic verses, contained [1] each of them sixty-six sections of the same length as the Massoretic verse in iii., and these sections are still easily distinguishable, though the letters of the alphabetic scheme occur at the beginning of every fourth section only. Chapter iv. consists of forty-four similar sections. What is the proper term to apply to these sections: are they lines or couplets, stichoi or distichs? Are they, as compared with the stichoi of chapter v., "protracted lines," as Lowth described them, or, as compared with the distichs of chapter v., truncated couplets or distichs, as Budde considers them? These questions can best be considered later: I will, for the time being, use the neutral term section, meaning by that a Massoretic verse in chapter iii. and the equivalent sections of the remaining chapters, i.e. the third of a Massoretic verse in i. and ii., and the half of such a verse in iv. Similarly, for the two parts of these sections, the longer first and the shorter second part, I will use the term subsection.

As the normal number of terms in a verse of chapter v. is six, so the normal number of terms in each section of chapters i. and iv. is five. It follows from this at once that in chapters i.–iv., the common form of complete parallelism

a . b . c
a′. b′. c′

will not readily [2] occur in a normal section, and, as a matter of fact, it does not, I think, occur at all in any section, whether

[1] In the present text, owing to what is generally recognised as textual expansion (in i. 17, ii. 19), the number of sections is sixty-seven both in chaps. i. and ii. The R.V. for the most part distinguishes the sections correctly, but occasionally so divides the verses (e.g. i. 1, ii. 2 and even iv. 22) as to give them the appearance of consisting of four sections.

[2] The force of this qualifying adverb will become clear later. As a matter of fact though $\begin{matrix} a \\ a' \end{matrix} . \begin{matrix} b \\ b' \end{matrix} . \begin{matrix} c \\ c' \end{matrix}$ does not occur, a corresponding type of incomplete parallelism with compensation does occur: see iv. 11.

normal or abnormal. This, however, is not equivalent to saying that complete parallelism between the subsections is either impossible or actually non-existent in these poems; on the other hand complete parallelism actually occurs, though relatively with much less frequency than in chapter v. An example is ii. 11.

כלו בדמעות עיני | חמרמרו מעי

Consumed with tears are mine eyes, | in a ferment are my bowels.

The scheme is: a 2 . b | a′ . b′; and it is preferable to regard iii. 4

He hath worn out my flesh and my skin, | he hath broken my bones,

as an example of a . b . 2 | a′ . b′ rather than of the scheme a . b . c | a′ . b′.

Other examples of complete parallelism in chapters i.–iv. occurring in sections that are not perhaps strictly normal are

על־ההרים דלקנו | במדבר ארבו לנו

Upon the mountains they chased us, | in the wilderness they lay in wait for us.

השביעני במרורים | הרוני לענה

He hath filled me with bitterness, | he hath sated me with wormwood.

These will be found in iv. 19 and iii. 15; they are both examples of a . b . | a′ . b′; another example occurs in iv. 13, and there are perhaps a few others: but in the 242 sections of chapters i.–iv. there are but few, if any, more examples of complete parallelism than in the twenty-two distichs of chapter v.

If, however, the section of chapters i.–iv. be a "protracted line," we might expect to find complete parallelism occurring as between the sections rather than as between the subsections. As a matter of fact, incomplete parallelism between the sections is not uncommon in chapters i.–iv.; it is less common, indeed, than parallelism between the stichoi in chapter v.; it is, on the other hand, much

commoner than parallelism between whole verses, of which we noted but one example, in chapter v. And yet *complete* parallelism between sections is exceedingly rare, and in fact, I think, does not once occur. Probably the nearest approach to complete parallelism between sections is where four of the five terms correspond, as in ii. 2a, b, where the scheme is

a . b . c . d . e .
a′ . c′. d′. e′.

The Lord hath swallowed up unpityingly all the homesteads of Jacob,
He hath thrown down in his wrath the strongholds of the daughter of Sion.

A much greater relative amount of those forms of what Lowth called synthetic or constructive parallelism, in which there is a complete absence of strict parallelism, is another feature of Lamentations i.–iv. which sharply distinguishes these poems (with one exception) from Lamentations v. Other differences exist as between one or more of these poems and chapter v.; and these will appear when we turn, as we must now, to a closer examination of the parallelism in chapters i.–iv., and of the differences in this respect to be discerned as between these chapters considered severally.

Budde quotes with approval a remark of De Wette's that in Lamentations "merely rhythmical parallelism," another term for Lowth's constructive or synthetic parallelism, is most prominent, and that parallelism of thought, when it occurs, occurs mostly as between the subsections, i.e. between the clauses or sentences which consist alternately (as a rule) of three and two terms, not between the sections, which consist, as a rule, of five terms; put otherwise, this amounts to the assertion that parallelism in these poems is chiefly of the type

a . b . c
a′. b′

not of the type

a . b . c . d . e
a′. b′. c′. d′. e′

Budde's only criticism of this is that De Wette considerably underrates the extent of this sub-parallelism. But neither De Wette nor Budde carried the analysis of this feature sufficiently far; had they done so they would have seen that a general statement such as they make cannot be rightly made with reference to all the poems indiscriminately. I hope to shew that the statement that "merely rhythmical parallelism" is most prominent is substantially true of chapters i. and iii. and very misleading in reference to chapter ii., and in a less degree in reference to chapter iv.; and also that the statement that parallelism, when it occurs, occurs mostly between the subsections is the very opposite of the truth with regard to chapter ii., though substantially correct with regard to chapter iv.

I will examine chapter iii. first. In a certain sense the whole of the first eighteen verses or sections might be said to consist of eighteen parallel statements of the fact that Yahweh is chastening the speaker; the first person singular pronoun appears in each separate verse, and gives a certain degree of parallelism to them all; and similarly throughout the poem large groups of sections express, mainly by a succession of figurative statements, the same thought: but beyond this general repetition of thought there is seldom any real parallelism of individual terms or even of groups of terms. Moreover, there is a feature of this poem that suggests that some even of the apparent examples of parallel sections are due more to accident than design; I refer to the fact that the clearest apparent examples of sectional parallelism occur between the last sec-

tion beginning with one letter of the alphabet and the first section beginning with the next letter;[1] thus, there are throughout the poem no sections more parallel to one another than, and few as much so as, the following (*vv.* 12, 13; 48, 49; 60, 61).

He hath bent his bow and set me as a target for his arrow;
He hath caused to enter into my kidneys the shafts of his quiver.

In streams of water my eye runs down for the destruction of my people;
My eye hath poured down unceasingly, because there are no respites.

Thou hast seen all the vengeance they took, all their devices against me;
Thou hast heard all their reproaches (of me), O Yahweh, all their devices against me.

The first of these couplets consists of the last line beginning with ד and the first with ה, the second of the last line with פ and the first with ע, the third of the last with ר, and the first with ש.

There are not more than about a dozen[2] couplets of contiguous sections that are as parallel to one another as the foregoing, or indeed that are strictly parallel to one another at all.

In about one-third of the entire number of sections parallelism more or less clear and conspicuous between subsections[3] occurs; examples are *vv.* 10 (a . b . c 2 | a′ . b′) and 14 (a . b . c | b′ d):—

[1] The significance of this does not seem to me to be affected by the fact that in Pss. cxi., cxii. the alphabetic scheme distinguishes each stichos, not each distich, by successive letters of the alphabet, and therefore *regularly* and necessarily gives to parallel stichoi different initial letters.

[2] The sections that may most reasonably be regarded as more parallel (though whether always by the intention of the writer is doubtful) to one another than is almost any section of the poem to any other are: *12, 13*; 19 (pointing זְכֹר), 20; 28, 29, 30 (?); 34, 35, 36 (?); 40, 41; *48, 49*; *60, 61*; 64, 65. The italicised numbers are cited above.

[3] The clearest examples of subsectional parallelism occur in the following fifteen verses: 4, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, 25, 33, 47, 58, 60, 61.

As a bear lying in wait is he unto me, | a lion in secret places.
I am became a derision to all peoples, | their song all the day.

Clearly, then, since subsectional parallelism occurs in considerably less than half, and probably in not more than a third, of the sixty-six sections of the poem, and sectional parallelism, which might have occurred thirty-three times, actually occurs scarcely a dozen times at most, " merely rhythmical parallelism " is more conspicuous here than real parallelism of thought and terms; whether subsectional is much or any more relatively frequent than sectional parallelism depends on the view taken as to the real parallelism of the couples specified above and as to the character of the more doubtful examples of subsectional parallelism given in the footnote.

Chapter ii. differs greatly from chapter iii. The repetition in chapter iii. of the initial letter before each of the three sections belonging to it corresponds to a real independence, as a general rule,[1] of the sections in that poem. On the other hand, the three sections which belong to each letter of the alphabet in chapter ii., but of which the first section only is distinguished by beginning with that letter, are closely connected with one another; and this connexion is formally marked by the frequency with which *the entire sections* within the several alphabetic divisions *are parallel to one another*. The exact number of these sectional parallelisms depends on interpretation, and in some cases on textual questions: but I believe it may be safely asserted that in a large majority at least of the twenty-two alphabetic divisions two at least of the three sections are parallel to one another, and in several all three sections are so. I

The text of some even of these (e.g., 22, 23, 33) is open to question: but probably parallelism existed in the original text. Eleven more doubtful examples may be found in *vv.* 5, 7, 11, 16, 19, 30, 39, 43, 53, 56, 65.

[1] *Vv.* 34–36 form an exception.

should myself put the number of parallelisms between two, if not all three, sections as high as eighteen, if not higher.[1]

Over against this frequency of sectional parallelism we have to set the relative infrequency of subsectional parallelism: this latter kind of parallelism which might have occurred sixty-six times actually occurs only a dozen [2] times, more or less, according to the view taken of two or three doubtful cases.

Thus it is not true of chapter ii. that "merely rhythmical parallelism" is more frequent than real parallelism of thought and term, nor is it true that parallelism occurs mainly between the subsections; quite the reverse: we must, to be accurate, put the case thus: In chapter ii. real (though incomplete) parallelism is very frequent; the *fundamental* parallelism is between the sections; but this is *occasionally* reinforced by an additional and *secondary* parallelism between the subsections, much in the same way that the fundamental rhymes at the close of the lines of a quatrain are in some English poems occasionally reinforced by an additional rhyme in the middle of one or more lines, as often in Coleridge's "Ancient Mariner" e.g.—

> The sun came up upon the left,
> Out of the sea came he;
> And he shone bright, and on the right
> Went down into the sea.

The fact is, parallelism in Lamentations ii. is singularly intricate and skilfully varied. It is rarely complete either as between sections or subsections, but it is generally clear enough and sufficient to constitute a real formal connexion between the three sections of the several alphabetic divi-

[1] Absence of parallelism or a near approach to it will be found in *vv.* 4 17, 18, 22, but even this may be partly due to textual corruption. In most of the remaining verses parallelism is obvious, in all it was probably intended.

[2] See *vv.* 4a (?), 5b, 6a (?), 7a, 9a (read שָׁבְרוּ for אבד ושבר), 10b, 11a, (*not* 13a: A.V.), 15c (present text), 17ac, 18c, 20b, 21c.

sions, or at least between two of them, the remaining section being sometimes not parallel, as is frequently one stichos of a tristich in other poems. Since the nature of the parallelism in chapter ii., and consequently an important formal difference between chapters ii. and iv., have hitherto not been clearly observed, I give a few verses of this poem in translation with notes on the parallelism :—

1 How hath the Lord beclouded [1] in his anger | the daughter of Sion !
He hath cast down from heaven to earth | the ornament of Israel ;
And he hath not remembered his footstool | in the day of his anger.

Here all three sections are parallel : observe *the daughter of Sion* (d 2) || *the ornament of Israel* (d′ 2) || *his footstool* (d″ 2), and *beclouded* (a) || *cast down from heaven to earth* (a′ 3) || *hath not remembered* (a″). Moreover, the unity of the entire alphabetic division is emphasised by the additional parallelism *in his anger* (b) || *in the day of his anger* (b′ 2) in the first and last sections ; a similar effect is obtained in *v.* 13 which opens with לאמתם, *to their mothers*, and closes with אמתם, *their mothers*. Variety is obtained not only by varying the number of terms by means of which corresponding ideas are expressed, but also very effectively by bringing the object of the verb much nearer to the beginning in the third section than in the two that precede : a somewhat similar effect is obtained in *v.* 8 (cp. also i. 1).

There is no subsectional parallelism in any of these three sections.

2 The Lord hath destroyed unsparingly | all the homesteads of Jacob ;
He hath pulled down in his wrath | the strongholds of Judah ;
He hath brought to the ground, hath profaned | the realm and its princes.

[1] *Hath . . . beclouded* : read הֵישִׁיב for יָעִיב, *beclouds*.

Here, again, all three sections are parallel, but in none is there parallelism between the subsections. This time all the object-clauses stand at the end of their respective sections and, as in v. 1, the parallel verbs or verbal clauses בלע, הרס, הניע לארץ חלל at the beginning. The additional parallelism of terms is not as in verse 1 between the first and third, but between the first and second sections (*unsparingly* ‖ *in his wrath*), unless, indeed, with Löhr, we emend by transposing the clauses *He hath brought to the ground* and *in his wrath*; then, as before, the fuller parallelism will be between the first and third sections.

10 They sat on the ground dumb— | the elders of Sion;
Lifted up dust on their head, | were girded with sackcloth;
They lowered to the ground their head— | the virgins of Jerusalem.

Here in the second section we find subsectional parallelism; each clause in it mentions one sign of mourning and grief; parallel to each of these clauses and to one another are the first clauses of the first and third sections, but these sections contain no subsectional parallelism: on the other hand, the second parts of the first and third sections are very strictly parallel to one another (זקני ‖ בתולות ירושלם בת ציון). But there is still further and in part rather subtle verbal parallelism between the *sections:* note לארץ in the first and third sections: ראשם and ראשן in the second and third respectively; and the antithesis העלו and הורידו which is emphasised by the parallelism in a way which it is impossible to represent adequately in translation: what they lift up is dust, what they cast down is their heads! Very clearly, then, *sectional* parallelism is again primary; but here it is reinforced by subsectional parallelism in *one* of the three sections.

A correct appreciation of the main and secondary parallelism in this poem may set some questions of textual interpretation in a new light. Verse 3 reads—

He hewed off in fierce anger | all the horn of Israel ;
He turned backward his right hand | from the face of the foe ;
And he kindled in Jacob a flaming fire | which devoured round about.

Whose is the right hand here referred to, Israel's or Yahweh's ? It is commonly taken to be Yahweh's, and there is certainly much to be said for this view. But the parallelism of the sections, which certainly exists in any case, would become still clearer and more complete if the right hand be Israel's. Then, for the use of the pronoun only in the middle section corresponding to the two parallel proper names for the nation in the first and third sections, there are two exact parallels in this poem : see *vv.* 5 and 10.

In both 4a and 15c it is generally admitted that a word or more has intruded. But which word or words should we omit ? If subsectional parallelism was primary and frequent as in Lamentations iv. and Isaiah xiv., parallelism would furnish a strong argument for those who retain כצר, *as a foe* (parallel to *as an enemy*), in verse 4, and both the clauses *perfection of beauty* and *joy of the whole earth* in verse 15. But, since subsectional parallelism is merely secondary and not very frequent in this poem, such an argument has little if any weight : and it may certainly be doubted whether it is nearly strong enough to justify those who omit שיאמרו, with the characteristic ש, in verse 15, in order to retain both the parallel clauses at the end of the verse without at the same time keeping a section so long as the existing text presents.

Verse 8 is also interesting. Had subsectional parallelism been primary, the author would naturally have written—

Rampart and wall lament ; | together they languish ;

but to gain a closer parallelism with the two preceding *sections* he avoided what would have been a more perfect subsectional parallelism and wrote instead—

Rampart and wall he caused to lament ; together they languish.

By many who refrain from postulating unity of author-

ship for the book of Lamentations, chapters ii. and iv. at least are attributed to the same writer. Be this as it may, there is an appreciable difference, though it has hitherto been overlooked, in the use of parallelism in the two poems, just as there is a difference in the length of the alphabetic divisions. In chapter ii. sectional parallelism is fundamental and frequent, subsectional parallelism secondary and relatively rare: in chapter iv. subsectional parallelism is relatively more frequent, perhaps even considerably more frequent than sectional parallelism, though neither type is quite so unmistakeably primary or quite so persistent as the sectional parallelism in chapter ii. Subsectional parallelism occurs in nearly, if not quite, or even more than, a half[1] of the sections in chapter iv. as compared with a bare fifth in chapter ii.; on the other hand, less than half, perhaps scarcely a third, of the sections are parallel to one another,[2] and there is little or nothing of that subtle linking of the sections which occurs in chapter ii.

[1] The sections in Lamentations iv. number 44, of which two (*v.* 13) are through corruption very uncertain. Subsectional parallelism is clearest in these 16 sections—1a (see below), 2a,b, 3a,b, 7a,b, 8a,b, 11a,b, 12a, 13a, 16b, 18b, 19b, 21a. To these should be added the two similarly constructed sections, 6a, 9a, perhaps also 5ab (antithetical parallels), 6b, 14a, 15a, 21b, 22a,b. Subsectional parallelism is at all events sufficiently frequent to raise the question whether the text of verse 1 is correct; subsectional parallelism would indeed be perfect even in the present text if we ventured to divide the section equally (cp. R. V.): but rhythm, as we shall see later, forbids this, and if the text is sound Dr. Smith (*Jerusalem*, ii. 279) rightly arranges as follows:

How bedimmed is the gold, how changed
The best of the gold.

I suspect, however, that either (1) ישׁנא is a gloss (Aramaic ?) on יועם, or (2) that הטוב should be omitted, leaving כתם parallel to זהב as in Job xxxi. 24. Then we have either

How bedimmed is the gold,
Even the best fine gold,

or

How bedimmed is the gold,
Changed the fine gold.

[2] The most conspicuous sectional parallelisms will be found in *vv.* 4, 5, 8, 17, 22: see also *vv.* 1, 7, 19, but in these latter verses, as also in the anti-

In Lamentations i., in spite of the sustained and well varied parallelism of the first three sections, strict parallelism is decidedly less frequent than in either chapter ii. or chapter iv., or even than in chapter iii. Subsectional parallelism is perhaps rather more frequent [1] than in chapter ii., where it is infrequent and secondary: but sectional parallelism is very decidedly *less* frequent [2] than in chapter ii.: the result is that it is difficult to select either type of parallelism as primary; and the more important fact is that the form of the greater part of this poem is independent of strict parallelism.

It is not surprising that the Book of Lamentations has driven even unwilling scholars to the consideration or reconsideration of the question of metre or rhythm in Hebrew poetry. Budde, who, like many others, had in 1874, after an examination of existing theories in regard to Hebrew metre, rejected them all and expressed the most thoroughgoing scepticism with regard to any new theories that might arise, found himself eight years later, after a study of Lamentations, venturing, to quote his own phrase, "on the dangerous slippery ice"; and it has generally been admitted that he skated with considerable skill over the corner of the ice to which he confined himself.

The challenge lies here: there is a common and well-marked peculiarity in the 242 sections that make up the first four chapters of Lamentations; it is a rhythmical peculiarity, and yet a rhythmical peculiarity that cannot be explained by the parallelism. In putting it thus, I recog-

thetical sections of *vv.* 3 and 4, the sectional parallelism is much less conspicuous than the synonymous subsectional parallelism in one or, in most of the verses, in both sections.

[1] See *vv.* 1 (three antithetical parallels), 2a, c, 3a,b, 4b,c 5a, 7c,d, 13c, 16a,b, 18b, 20a,c, 22a; possibly also *vv.* 8a (omit עָלְכֵן?), b (omit כִּי?), c, 10b, 13a.

[2] See *vv.* 1, 10 a,b, 11 a,b, 12 b,c, 15, 20 a,b: perhaps also 2 b,c, 4 a,b, 5 a,c, 8.

nise, as I think we well may, that parallelism might create rhythm, and may even, as a matter of fact, in the remote past have created the dominant Semitic and Hebrew type of rhythm in particular: a habit of expressing a thought in a given number of terms, and then repeating it by a corresponding term would necessarily produce a certain rhythmical effect: thus, for example, the habit of expressing thought in the mould symbolised by

a . b . c
a′. b′. c′

would produce a *rhythm* which may be expressed by 3 : 3; and thought expressed in a mould symbolised by

a . b . c
a′ . b′

would produce a rhythm that may be expressed by 3 : 2.

But as soon as parallelism becomes incomplete, and still more when it becomes merely synthetic, i.e., strictly speaking, disappears, and yet the lines retain the same number of words or terms, obviously the rhythmical relation between the lines is no longer, even if it was originally, merely secondary: thus rhythm is no longer a mere result of parallelism, but an independent desire for rhythm is at least a contributory cause if with

a . b . c
a′. b′. c′

such schemes as

a . b . c
a′2 . c′
or
a . b . c
a′. d . e
or
a . b . c
d . e . f

constantly alternate, but schemes such as

a . b . c
a′2 . b′. c′
or
a . b . c
a′. b′ .c′. d

rarely or never; or, again, if with schemes such as

a . b . c . d . e
a′. b′ .c′. d′. e′

there alternate schemes such as

a . b . c . d . e
a′. b′2 . d′. e′.

but not such as

a . b . c . d . e
a′. b′2 . c′. d′. e′

or with schemes

a . b . c
a′. b′

schemes such as

a . b . c
a′ 2
or
a . b . c
a′ . d

but not such as

a . b . c
a′2 . b′

Now, if my analysis is even approximately correct, what, stated in general terms, are the facts of the Book of Lamentations, and the questions, which, once the facts are analysed and classified, almost necessarily arise? Lamentations iii. contains sixty-six sections unmistakeably marked off from one another by the alphabetic scheme: there is no *complete* parallelism between any two successive sections: there is incomplete parallelism between perhaps fifteen groups of two sections: there is none at all between the

rest. Why are these sections nevertheless of equal length, or at least even in the present text so closely approximated to equality of length? Again, these sections fall into subsections: in some twenty sections the two subsections are parallel to one another, though often only incompletely parallel; why alike in these twenty sections and in the remaining forty odd sections in which there is no parallelism between the subsections does the longer subsection precede the shorter: why is the ratio between the two subsections so constant?

Again, why are the twenty-two alphabetic divisions of Lamentations ii. each divided into three equal divisions marked off from one another by a strongly marked division of sense, each section again into subsections by a less strong but still clearly marked pause? Why do the sections so constantly consist of five terms, the subsections of three terms and two terms respectively, the shorter regularly following the longer? Why all this, though, while many of the sections are parallel to one another, *complete* parallelism between sections scarcely, if ever, occurs, and though in only about a dozen out of the sixty-six sections does even incomplete parallelism occur between the subsections?

The answer to all these questions and the similar questions which Lamentations i. (with a difference) and Lamentations iv. provoke has been increasingly found by admitting the play of a rhythmical principle; and what is called the *Ḳinah* rhythm has accordingly gained recognition amongst many who still remain sceptical of other Hebrew rhythms.

What, then, is really meant by the *Ḳinah* rhythm? A certain ambiguity seems to lurk in the usage of the term. Does it mean five terms forming a complete sentence with a well-marked pause after the third? or a *succession* of such sentences? If the first sentence of Genesis—בראשית ברא אלהים | את־השמים ואת־הארץ—occurred in any of the first

four chapters of Lamentations, every one would accept it as a rhythmically normal line. Is, then, the first sentence in Genesis an example of *Ḳinah* rhythm occurring sporadically in prose, as hexameters occur sporadically in the Authorised Version? Scarcely, for it is probable that those who define *Ḳinah* rhythm as verse unequally divided by a pause, and normally in the ratio 3 : 2, tacitly mean by *Ḳinah* rhythm a *succession* of such verses. And certainly it was the frequent repetition of such verses in Lamentations i.–iv. that first drew attention to the peculiarity of their style or rhythm.

Five words with a pause after the third is, even in Hebrew prose, too frequently occurring and too easily arising a phenomenon to possess by itself anything distinctive. An hexameter is a noteworthy phenomenon wherever it occurs; five words with a pause after the third are not; on the other hand, a dozen or twenty repetitions of five words with a pause after the third do constitute something as noteworthy as an hexameter.

Not the sporadic occurrence, but the regular recurrence of a particular type of word-combination is apart from, or in addition to, any parallelism that may accompany it, the peculiarity of Lamentations i.–iv. And yet, as soon as we frame the conclusion thus, it is necessary, if all the facts, especially of chapter i., are to be recognised, to add that the particular type of word-combination in question falls into two sub-types; and as soon as we define the sub-types as consisting respectively of combinations of five words with a pause occurring after the third, and combinations of four words equally divided by a pause, we may at first appear to destroy the whole theory of a *Ḳinah* rhythm which we were attempting to formulate. The actual fact is not quite so serious as this, for while the normal section of five accented words, unequally divided, may contract to

four words equally divided, it probably does not expand to six words equally divided.

However, whether the facts seriously weaken the theory or not, the main question at present is this: is Budde correct in denying that the sections in Lamentations were ever (in the original text) equally divided? And is his attempt to maintain the appearance of inequality by calling two words "heavy" as against two others that are to be called "light," any better than the attempt to cover up the absence of parallelism between two lines by speaking of them as synthetic parallels?

To this question we shall return. Meantime, I will only say that the theory of light and heavy groups of words seems to me to suffer shipwreck on the very first verse of the book: for it is very difficult to believe that if רבתי בגוים at the end of the second section is light, שרתי במדינות at the beginning of the third is heavy. The truth is rather that Lamentations i. 1b,c are both lines of four words equally divided: and Sievers is probably not far wrong in finding a full half of the entire number of lines in Lamentations i. to be of the same nature.[1] In any case, Lamentations i. is of crucial importance in the study of the *Ḳinah* rhythm: any one who has sufficient ingenuity to discover an unequal division in all its sections need have little fear of being able to do the same for the three succeeding chapters or any other passages where the occurrence of some unequally

[1] The sections treated by Sievers as containing four accented words and as being equally divided by the cæsura are, b,c, 2b, 4c, 5b,c, 6a,c, 7a (to ומרודיה) c, 8b,c, 9b, 10a,b, 11a, 12c, 13a,b,c, 14b,c, 15a,b, 17c, 18b,c, 19a,b,c, 22b,c; marked as less certain sections of the same kind are 2c, 3b,c, 4b, 15c. Sections of this kind are far less frequent in the remaining poems; those treated as such by Sievers are: ii. (12a,b) c, 14a,b,c. (19d); iii. 6, 10, 13, 15, 23, 24, 50 (58, 59, 60); iv. 3b, 5a,b, 6a, 13a,b (14a), (15a,b), 18a(b), 20(a)b, 21(a)b. Uncertain examples are enclosed in brackets.

divided lines suggests to him the "*Ḳinah*" rhythm. If, on the other hand, the occurrence in the present text of Lamentations i. of equally divided lines of four terms is too frequent to admit of doubt that *some* such lines occurred in the original text, then we may suspect that the same variations also occurred or may have occurred in other *Ḳinah* poems.

G. Buchanan Gray.

THE AIM AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

I. The Services of Philosophy to Theology.

This short series of articles is to deal with the aim and scope of philosophy of religion. The precise definition of this department of theological study shall be attempted later: in the present article, which may be regarded as in part introductory, I propose to describe some of the indispensable services which philosophy is capable of rendering to dogmatic theology, and to touch upon some of the general relations which necessarily subsist between these two departments of knowledge.

Any attempt, however unsystematic, to relate religious beliefs with a philosophic or scientific conception of the world might be called a philosophy of religion, or at least an endeavour in philosophy of religion—in the broadest sense of that phrase. And in this sense, which shall be adopted in the present article, philosophy of religion may be said to be as old as reflective thought. For from the earliest times philosophy has possessed a theological side. From the dawn of Greek science and metaphysic, philosophy has produced a very large amount of speculation concerning the existence and nature of God, His relation to the world

and to the individual soul, and a considerable volume of thought bearing more or less direct reference to problems of other kinds which may rightly be described as theological. Generally excluding the whole field of what is (necessarily somewhat vaguely) distinguished as revealed religion, philosophy has endeavoured, throughout its history, to attain by means of reflection upon the order of Nature and upon the religious experience of mankind, to a satisfactory theory of the world, its origin, its destiny, and its meaning. The greatest philosophical thinkers of all ages have dealt to some extent with theological problems; with many of them the interest in theological problems has been supreme: while in some cases, at least, it is from the side of religion that great thinkers have received the impulse towards philosophy. Thus it has come about that philosophers of various schools—idealists and materialists, atheists and pantheists, singularists and pluralists, agnostics and theists—have found room for religion in reasoned discussion, if not all have found room for it in practical life. The theological student of to-day accordingly finds himself confronted with theories of various kinds having more or less of connexion with the subject-matter of his own studies. He meets with "natural theology" and "rational theology," which have been called into being by consideration of Nature as presented to empirical observation and by the search for ultimate reality in the presuppositions of knowledge and the necessary implications of phenomenal existence. He is thus enabled to compare the deductions which dogmatic theology has drawn from the facts on which his "revealed religion" is based with those arrived at by philosophic thought; and to see how the requirements which philosophers have laid down with regard to the nature of an absolute, or a supreme, Being are met and satisfied by the Christian idea of God; and how far the essential implications of the

Christian revelation may be interpreted in terms of modern philosophy as they originally were interpreted, to some extent, in terms of the philosophy of ancient Greece. And what the theologian is thus enabled to do with regard to the cardinal concept of religion—the idea of God—can also be attempted with reference to other fundamental religious ideas, such as that of God's relation to the world and to its evil, or that of immortality.

But comparison, in this way, of doctrines reached, on the one hand, by the methods of dogmatic theology with doctrines attained, on the other hand, by the methods of pure philosophy, is by no means the only source of the interest which philosophy possesses, or should possess, for the Christian theologian.

I need scarcely remark—and I will only do so parenthetically—that theology and philosophy are largely identical in that theology is essentially metaphysics. Not a single theological statement of alleged fact—no statement that is really of theological interest—can be affirmed, that is not at the same time a metaphysical statement. That Jesus "suffered under Pontius Pilate," is, in its barest possible interpretation, a merely historical affirmation; but when it is intended to imply that Christ suffered, as well as "came down from heaven, for us men and for our salvation," the statement assumes a theological significance; and at the same time, in that it then involves reference to God and His dealings with mankind, it acquires metaphysical content.

Turning back now to the point of view from which philosophy and theology are seen to be distinct, we may first observe that philosophy assists theology in her work of *unification of knowledge*. Christian theology is concerned to connect its more or less isolated and independently elaborated doctrines into a coherent whole. Thus Origen, who laid the foundation of an ordered system of Christian dogma,

tells us in the preface to the *De Principiis* that the apostles delivered themselves with clearness on certain points necessary for all to understand, but that they left the grounds of their statements, the more precise determination and demonstration of many doctrines, to the more zealous of their successors who should be "lovers of wisdom"; and, after stating the fundamental articles of the apostolic teaching, Origen speaks of the desire to form a connected series of truths (agreeably to the reason of all these things) so that by clear and necessary statements the Christian may construct one body of doctrine. And such a scientific exposition has always been the goal of dogmatic theology. Theology wishes, for instance, to relate the doctrine of the Atonement with that of the Incarnation, the doctrine of Sin with that of Creation; and so on: nay, it desires, as far as is possible, to demonstrate a natural and necessary connexion between all aspects of the gospel of redemption: to point out how its several component doctrines rationally or logically hang together. The unification and systematization of knowledge, in theology as in the physical sciences, is a goal towards which men's minds will ever tend, though it may be that the goal will never here be indubitably or completely attained. But the pursuit of this ideal, necessarily gradual and tentative, requires not merely the exegetical and historical methods, but also the philosophical.

Indeed exegesis and the method of dogmatic theology themselves involve a certain amount of philosophising, conscious or unconscious. For interpretation is not the substitution, for one word, of another, coextensive in meaning. *Interpretation*—in which we may see a second function of philosophy within the sphere of theology—means introduction of new categories or conceptions, advance to further thoughts, development. Commentaries usually tell us at least as much about the way in

which things were conceived in the age in which the commentaries themselves were written, as about the content or original meaning of the Scriptures which they expound; and doctrines professing to be deduced from Scripture are sometimes less the outcome of strict exegesis than the result of speculation applied to such material as the current science and philosophy were able to afford. This certainly was the case with one widely accepted dogma. The doctrine of Original Sin is not contained in the Old Testament, and the only presentation of it which we find in the New Testament does not appear to have been the starting-point for the elaboration of traditional ecclesiastical teaching on the subject. Irenaeus set out from his doctrine of Recapitulation; Tertullian, from Stoic psychology; Origen, from the practice of infant baptism and from the Levitical law concerning purification after child-birth: and the views which these three pioneers thus lighted upon concerning hereditary sinfulness were read into, rather than extracted from, the Pauline teaching as to the solidarity of the race, and the Old Testament narrative of the loss of Paradise. It may be that the history of doctrine furnishes other instances similar to this: but one only is sufficient to show the possibility of exegesis being inspired and guided by ideas and beliefs derived elsewhere than from the scriptural context which it seeks to interpret.

Recourse to philosophy on the part of theology, again, has sometimes been deliberate. As theology has always been aware, many Christian doctrines cannot be comprehended—perhaps it may be said, cannot even be definitely and intelligibly stated—without the use of philosophical ideas and terms, and without familiarity with philosophical systems. The doctrine of the triune personality of God, or that of the union of the two natures, human and divine, in the Person of our Lord (involving an interpretation of what

is involved in the notion of a *Kenosis*) is a case in point; while the doctrines of Providence, of the actuality and revelation-value of miracle, of grace and the mode of its action on the human soul, of the Sacraments—and many others—call for treatment from the side of philosophy as well as from that of exegesis, history, or dogmatics. In this respect philosophy is the handmaid of theology, and theology must consciously accept the services of philosophy. It is to the philosophical culture of the Fathers that the Christian Church is largely indebted for the first beginnings of a systematised body of doctrine; while in the middle ages, when the union between theology and philosophy was more complete, it was expressly taught that philosophy is essential to the development of faith itself. The same truth had indeed been insisted upon long before by Clement of Alexandria, who asserted that we need the aid of philosophy in order to advance from faith to γνῶσις. The Christian who has attained to γνῶσις, says Clement, stands to him who merely believes without knowing, in a relation similar to that which subsists between the grown-up man and the child. Whoever would attain to γνῶσις without philosophy, logic, and science, is comparable to one who expects to gather grapes without cultivating the vine-tree. But Clement and, for the most part, the schoolmen also, were inclined to adopt agreement with Christian doctrine as the only criterion of truth in philosophy, and, accordingly, to choose from existing philosophies just such conclusions or opinions as could be directly appropriated by the Christian theologian. This eclecticism, from the pure philosopher's point of view, is hardly a philosophical procedure. It bespeaks a faulty and inadequate conception of the true relation of theology to philosophy; but we may let that pass.

The office of philosophy (within the sphere of theology) with which we are at present concerned, may be said to

be that of interpretation to the reason of the contents of religious experience and of the implications of facts significant for revealed religion. The philosophy of religion seeks to show how the fundamental ideas of religion, so far from being contrary to reason, are capable of receiving a rational justification in terms of philosophical principles. In claiming this office for philosophy, it is not assumed, of course, that the Christian must ground his deepest convictions upon the precarious basis of abstract thought, instead of upon objective historical facts. Philosophy is solely concerned, as Hegel says, with showing the rationality of religion: Philosophy simply meets the Christian's desire to interpret his faith to his reason: an exercise which is as much his duty as his privilege. "It seems to me a sign of negligence," wrote St. Anselm, "if, after we have been confirmed in the faith, we do not strive to understand that which we believe." These words emphasise the need of a function which it belongs very largely to dogmatic theology to fulfil; but it is a function which can only be adequately fulfilled by application of the methods of philosophy.

In philosophy, then, religion gets its justification from reason. Simple and naïve faith feels, indeed, no need of such justification; it receives the truth on authority, and it gains satisfaction through truth so received. But if the true content of religious belief be thus found, it yet lacks the form of thought. Reason, moreover, is the sole judge before whom faith must produce its credentials and attest its claims: and reasoned and reasonable faith is the only kind which can remain a permanent possession with rational beings.

Apart from the facts, upon which I have already touched, that theology must sometimes deliberately take over ready-fashioned concepts from philosophy, and that the theology of any particular generation can hardly avoid using, un-

consciously if not with full awareness, the ideas and beliefs of contemporary science, and allowing them to mould its exegesis and its doctrine, it is plain that the premises, principles, and categories, which are presupposed in thinking, whence and howsoever they may be derived, must make their influence felt in the process of explanation or interpretation. And among such premises and principles there may always lurk presuppositions or prejudices, the presence of which is unsuspected. For theology interprets the contents of faith to the reason partly in terms of the concepts and language of common sense—in terms of our ordinary speech and thought—which involve, it may well be, inadequate analogies and indefinite conceptions; and partly in terms of a philosophy which is much less exact than that which lies to hand to-day. This work of interpretation can now be carried further; and it needs to be carried further if theology is to be presented to the modern educated mind as effectually as it was, for instance, by the great Alexandrines to the cultured world of their time. The language and concepts which have grown up with the race, and which have been adopted solely for purposes of practical utility in ordinary converse and interchange of thought, without reference to the needs of scientific accuracy in matters lying beyond the sphere of every-day life, are but faulty implements from the point of view of the philosophic theologian. There is a function of philosophy in theology then, to quote another's words, which may be said to consist in the translation of "the necessarily inadequate language in which ordinary thought represents spiritual truth into that which is fitted to express it in its purely ideal reality." And this has sometimes been assumed to be the sole duty of philosophy to religion.

There are also others, however, of considerable importance, upon which something shall presently be said. Mean-

while it may be remarked that even the assistance offered by philsophy to the theologian, which has already been described, has sometimes been disallowed: now in the interests of a positivistic or naturalistic theory of the world, and now in the supposed interests of a timid religion. To take an example of objection from the latter of these sources: it is sometimes asserted that philosophy or reason has no jurisdiction in the field of religious experience, because faith, and not reason, is the organ of all religious knowledge; or, in other words, because recognition of religious truth is not so much an act of reason as of direct intuition, akin, let us say, to the perception of beauty. Now it is to be admitted, of course, that in the sphere of religious truth we begin with intuition. But so we do in all knowledge of the external world; yet our sensations of sight, sound, and touch, etc., out of which knowledge of the outer world is elaborated—even assuming that they be not abstractions from actual experience—do not in themselves constitute knowledge. They need to be systematised by the understanding, which indeed, is active from the first in all perception. Faith, in fact, is but implicit reason; reason working "intuitively," or rather, unconsciously, and therefore without reflection upon, or criticism of, its own operations. And inasmuch as certitude is often claimed for what, after all, only *seems* to be true, reason and understanding have obviously a function to perform which consists in the examination of the contents of religious consciousness, and in supplying a criterion of validity and truth as distinguished from illusion and error. Theology and philosophy do not wish to substitute systematised or scientific truth for religious life; but they seek to build upon so-called immediate knowledge and to bring it into relation with truth derived from other sources. There is a place, therefore, for rational investigation in the province of religious experience, the re-

nunciation of which would be a kind of intellectual suicide. That we must begin by faith, moreover, is no reason why we should not advance to science.

I pass on now to consider briefly a third general function of philosophy within the sphere of theology, neglect of which by the theologian will cause his theology to deserve the charge sometimes brought against it by the philosopher, of dogmatism—in the bad sense of the word: the charge, that is, of starting from assumptions that have not been proved to be valid. Theology needs a theory of knowledge suited to its subject-matter: *a rational justification of reasonable faith.* The history of philosophy before the time of Kant shows how futile rational theology must be without a previous analysis and criticism ascertaining the limits of our faculties and the bounds of possible knowledge. When Hume's sceptical inquiries roused Kant from what he himself called his "dogmatic slumber," the elaborate *a priori* systems of the schools in which he had been taught underwent collapse. From that time there has gradually been growing up a critical science concerned with the nature, the validity, and the limits of knowledge; and it is one of the most pressing needs of theology to foster a corresponding science of theological knowledge, and so to attain to as correct an idea as possible of the relations between knowledge and faith, and to an epistemological account of the nature of reasoned belief. Such a department of theology, or of philosophy of religion, calls for development and for study by theologians because, as history shows, the legitimate desire for completeness of knowledge and for definiteness of dogmatic expression easily passes over, in their sphere of study, into the wish to know more than can be known, and to know too definitely. We remember, for instance, how, in the days of the schoolmen, knowledge, which was then more ambitious than critical, laid claim to a fulness and a precision so complete that,

as a sympathetic historian has remarked, an agnostic reaction was almost necessary in the interests of reverence. And it will always be easy and natural for theologians to engage too exclusively in the drawing of inferences when more attention might be given with advantage to the critical sifting of premises. There is even now enough suspicion abroad that faith starts from somewhere in the air, and is wholly distinct, not only in degree but also in kind, from knowledge, to cause the orthodox theologian some anxiety. There is consequently a widespread distrust of dogmatic theology as requiring assent to propositions which are not self-evident and yet for which no adequate proof can be supplied. The demand, " prove all things " is very often felt even where it is not actually expressed ; this accounts perhaps, in part, for the silent alienation, which is so common in educated circles, from the Church's influence and faith. And yet this demand for proof, in the sense of critical sifting, this spirit of inquiry, is healthy and deserving of encouragement. It lays upon theology the responsibility of illuminating the processes by which her knowledge is obtained.

Further, a philosophical department of theology is not only necessary for her complete self-interpretation ; it is also needed, if the Greek as well as the barbarian is to be won to the Faith, for missionary purposes. A good instance of this use is to be found in the recent apologetics of theism as confronted with scientific naturalism. We do not hear much to-day, except from an occasional writer such as Haeckel, who represents an obsolete standpoint and a bygone generation, of the " conflict of science and religion " ; and this is largely because what, twenty years ago, were accounted the heavy guns of scientific materialism and agnosticism have been silenced. They have been silenced by the self-criticism of science itself, which in Germany and France is pursued largely by men equipped with philosophical

knowledge and deeply interested in the methods, the logical structure, and the limitations, of science, as well as in the accumulation of scientific facts and generalisations. Influenced largely by professed philosophers also, this epistemological adventure of science has yielded results which the theologian has now and again been quick to appropriate, thereby furnishing himself with defensive weapons more effectual than any that were used by his predecessors of the generation of Huxley and Lewes. It has of late years been established that from neither empirical science which consists of classified facts, nor from abstract or conceptual science which was till recently the starting-point for mechanical and practically materialistic theories of the world, has theology anything to fear. It has become recognised that mediation between science and theology is to be undertaken only on the common ground of philosophy; and that on this ground theology, in so far as the foe of scientific naturalism is concerned, occupies an impregnable position.

Scepticism as to the Christian type of theism is, however, at the present moment based on distrust of historical methods rather than on exaggerated confidence in those of physical science. And if the new intellectual revolt against traditional Christianity is to be coped with by theology as effectually as the opposition which until lately was rife in scientific circles, resort must again be made to philosophy as well as to historical criticism. For there can be little doubt that the prevalent tendency to doubt the historical foundations of Christian theology is due partly to the fact that historians have uncritically adopted the discarded ideas of worsted naturalism, and partly to presuppositions as to the insignificance of historical fact and the precariousness of the historical method: presuppositions which can only be shown to be invalid by resort to philosophical criticism. The apologetics that seems to be most urgently required for use

in the immediate future must, therefore, be well informed as to the partial identity of the historical method of establishing facts of past time with that which the physical sciences employ with confidence and with success for similar purposes; and also as to the fundamental difference which exists between the respective standpoints of science and history, and their entirely different modes of dealing with facts when once they have been established. The important philosophical work accomplished by Rickert and Windelband, and by numerous other philosophers who may agree with or who may differ from them, is as essential a foundation for the apologetics which is now being demanded, as the labour of French and German physicists has been, in the immediate past, for the defence of the Faith against scientific naturalism. Much of the present destructive historical criticism seems to merge the significance which belongs to the particular or individual and unrepeatable historical fact, in the elements which similar and recurring facts (such as are studied and manipulated by physical science) share in common. But if the interest of science centres in the common and the recurring, that of history—including historical theology such as Christianity has always professed to be—centres solely in the unique—the *einmalig* or unrepeatable. It will be as futile for theology to meet historial scepticism on its own self-chosen ground, and to accept its presuppositions and assumptions before engaging with it, as it was for theology to endeavour to repel attacks delivered in the name of science without a philosophical evaluation of the epistemological principles which such attacks presupposed. Philosophy freed theism from the tightening grasp of matter and inexorable law; and it is similarly philosophy that must rescue traditional Christianity from the hostile force that is now threatening it professedly from the side of history.

From what has previously been said concerning the part

played by philosophy in the interpretation of the Faith and the construction of doctrine, as well as from the few remarks made just now on the apologetic value of criticism, furnished by philosophy, of the presuppositions on which the most recent form of scepticism is based, it would appear that philosophy is capable of doing great service to dogmatic theology. It is the greatest mistake to suppose that philosophy is hostile to dogma, or that it necessarily seeks to set up empty abstractions in place of concrete existences and positive facts.

As there is a strong tendency, in some quarters, at the present time, to sublimate fact into idea and to evaporate dogma away, a little more shall be said in this connexion.

It is curious to find, as one reads Hegel's philosophy of religion, that in his day an anti-philosophical and anti-dogmatic spirit was abroad amongst theologians, such that the language in which he describes it might be borrowed for a description of the similar temper that is exhibited to-day. Hegel observes that in his time there were theologians who ventured to charge philosophy with a destructive tendency —" theologians who have no longer anything left of that substantial element which could possibly be destroyed." He remarks how these theologians have " done everything in their power to do away with what is definite in religion, in that they have (1) thrust dogmas into the background, or pronounced them to be unimportant; or (2) consider them only as extraneous definitions given by others and as mere phenomena of a past history. . . . There are very few dogmas of the earlier system of Church confessions left which have any longer the importance formerly attributed to them, and in their place no other dogmas have been set up." [1] He tells us that Christ's work of redemption had

[1] Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*, E. T. by Speirs and Burdon Sanderson, 1895, i. 37, 38.

received a very prosaic and merely psychological significance, so that although the edifying words were retained, the very thing that was essential in the old doctrine of the Church had been expunged; that the weighty doctrines of the Trinity and the Resurrection were neglected and matters of indifference, not only by the 'Enlightenment' philosophers, but even by pious theologians.

The spirit which is thus indicated by Hegel, and which we certainly encounter to-day, may be called by the title of 'the indefinite.' It is the antipodes of the dogmatic temper—in the evil sense of the word 'dogmatic.' It rejoices in distinctions—and even false antitheses—between "the kernel and the husk," 'the life' and 'the Creed.' In recoiling from dogmatism it distrusts precision of expression; knowledge about spiritual things seems, before its eyes, to stand self-condemned for the simple reason that it claims to be capable of being stated. Willingness to confess ignorance where knowledge is impossible has passed over into obstinate refusal to deduce what is necessarily involved in premisses. This temper is timid as to theological consequences, and therefore lives chiefly upon harmless platitudes. It takes refuge from difficulties in vagueness of belief and intellectual haziness. The true remedy for this morbid state, as for that of dogmatism, is philosophy. And so at the present time, as in Hegel's day, it is largely to philosophy that, as Hegel insisted, we must took for the rehabilitation of Christian dogma.

In affirming that philosophy is the remedy for the state of mind which I have been describing, I intend the following insinuations. Firstly, philosophy is aware, from her own experience, that pure thought without concrete facts of sensible experience, can attain to no knowledge; and she is therefore in a position to tell the advocates of an ideal or conceptual Christianity, or of any other kind of purely

rational religion, that they are seeking a chimaera. Secondly, she knows that facts have their implications as well as their similarities, their regular coexistences and sequences; and consequently that history, with its study of the unique and its implications, is for theology more important than science, with its generalisations and laws: science supplies but the stage-scenery, history the real drama, of revelation. Philosophy has learned to revere fact as fact, and will tolerate no theology which despises fact, which seeks to dispense with fact, or to evacuate fact of its implications. But the implication of fact is the nucleus of dogma. Thirdly, philosophy knows in detail how science is constructed; she can distinguish between its results and its presuppositions; she can precisely outline its inherent limitations: she can consequently declare to be beyond the pale of scientific knowledge the principles of rigid uniformity and necessary law, which the historical critic is wont uncritically to take over from the pseudo-science of a generation or two ago. Lastly, philosophy, while insisting with the modernist that any dogma, in so far as it only voices the experience or belief of bygone witnesses or councils, and has no meaning for, no living contact with, the individual mind of the present generation, is so far of merely historical value, insists equally firmly, as against the radical empiricism and subjectivism now rife in many quarters, that present experience, or experience in the making, is solely of biographical interest and devoid of access to objective truth unless the facts, the experience once and for all made in the past—the source of dogma—be actual and historical. For these reasons, then, we look to philosophy for the rehabilitation of threatened dogma.

So much has been said concerning the recent and perhaps future special services of philosophy to theology, in order to emphasise the importance which philosophy of religion, in

one or another of its numerous departments, has acquired as a branch of theological study. Much more might indeed be added ; but exhaustiveness of treatment is not my present object. It is enough, so far, if the indispensableness of philosophical learning to the elaboration of dogmatic and apologetic theology has been demonstrated. The necessary and intimate connexion of theology with philosophy having thus been illustrated from several sides, and some of the problems of philosophy of religion having been incidentally described, it is reserved for a future article to endeavour to define systematically the sphere of this department of theology (the scope and boundaries of which have hitherto been left very vaguely determined by authorities on the subject), to indicate its essential subdivisions, and so to present a survey of it as a distinctly outlined whole.

F. R. Tennant.

THE ZADOKITES

About a score of years ago the University of Cambridge was presented with the contents of a huge waste-paper basket, imported from Egypt, where such stores abound. The material contained in these repositories is almost always valueless, like the gods of the Gentiles unable to do good or harm, and so neither worth preserving nor worth destroying; and the first great product of the *Genizah* corresponded with this description. Of the "Original Hebrew of Ecclesiasticus" the *International Journal of the Apocrypha* now writes[1]: "Unfortunately, in defiance of every rule of philology and of every principle of historical development of the Hebrew language, these fragments have been accepted by a large number of scholars as being the very original of the hitherto lost book of Sirach." A bad mediæval retranslation made from texts already in our possession was neither worth preserving nor worth destroying; it was therefore thrown into the waste-paper basket, where it had best have been left.

In 1910 Dr. Schechter produced another of these treasures—"Fragments of a Zadokite Work," being some twenty pages of Hebrew text. The title "Zadokite" is rightly given by the editor, since we are told on p. 4 that the sons of Zadok are "the chosen of Israel who are to arise in the latter days." The matter is partly homiletic and partly legislative.

Who are the Zadokites? The editor in his Introduction cites for an account of them the "Book of Lights and High Beacons" by Kirkisani, "written about 637." Doubtless this is a misprint for 937; but it is an unfortunate misprint, since many a reader may be unaware

[1] January, 1913. Dr. Gaster's review of Oesterley's *Ecclesiasticus*.

of Kirkisani's date. This personage, who wrote in the tenth century in Arabic, belongs to the renaissance of Jewish literature, caused by the Islamic conquest of the East. Between the Fall of Jerusalem and the Foundation of Baghdad, i.e. from about 100 A.D. to about 750 A.D., the Jews had no written literature (other than letters and deeds) except the Old Testament ; this was supplemented by Oral Tradition, which when it was codified was found to be as vague and inconsistent as is regularly the case with matter so preserved. It is, however, from the Oral Tradition that Kirkisani gets his information about the Zadokites for the most part ; and with him Zadok is a disciple of Antigonus of Socho—clearly identical with the Sadducus whom Josephus places about the commencement of the Christian era. But the Zadok of Dr. Schechter's document is a very different personage—the priest who was contemporary with David !

Now though Dr. Schechter would have it that the Book of Zadok which Kirkisani quotes is identical with the text of these fragments or nearly so, the identification rests on no strong basis. According to Kirkisani the only matter whereon Zadok argued was the prohibition of marriage with a niece ; but the fragments also argue against polygamy, and the analogy whereby the former was proved unlawful is, as Dr. Schechter admits, a Karaite commonplace. We have to thank him further for a reference showing that polygamy was also disapproved by the Karaites. Now the Karaites and Rabbanites were the two divisions of Judaism which split after the Moslem conquest ; and though their official names with the Moslems were Ananites and Samat'ites (Traditionalists),[1] they called each other Pharisees [2] and Zadokites (Sadducees),[3] thus reviving the

[1] Tabari in Yakut's *Dictionary of Learned Men*, vi. 454 (in the Press).
[2] Yephet, *Comm. on Daniel*, ii. 15. [3] Ibn Ezra on Daniel xi. 30.

old names. Maimonides in the twelfth century naïvely says that the Sadducees of his time were called Karaites. He should have said that the Karaites were called Sadducees.

The probability is, then, that Kirkisani has confused the Karaites with the Sadducees, but he is unlikely to have confused the two Zadoks. According to Grätz the Karaites split into numerous sects, and their interpretation of the Bible was very defective. Since, as we shall see, the ignorance of Hebrew and of the Bible which is displayed by these documents is intolerable, we should *a priori* suppose that we had before us the remains of a Karaite essay, not earlier than the eighth century, which might well have been allowed to remain in its obscurity.

Probably it might be no exaggeration to say that continuous and satisfactory sense can be got out of very few lines ; and emendation, besides being of necessity unconvincing, is difficult. For a couple of pages there is an alternative text, varying very widely from the main document, and exhibiting erasures which seem the work of an author rather than of a scribe. If the document be an original draft, its date is fixed by the material and the nature of the script—apparently for the tenth century. Now where a text is unintelligible, the probability is that the author is composing in an unfamiliar language, or translating from one language into another, and doing so irresponsibly. Dr. Büchler has felicitously identified the original language as Arabic—the phrase for " others than they " to which he points leaves no doubt on this matter.[1] Although we cannot expect this key to open all the locks, we shall find that it opens many.

A passage which illustrates Dr. Büchler's theory exceedingly well occurs on p. 5, and is otherwise characteristic of

[1] זולתם = *siwāhum*.

the work. The author's object is to show that in spite of David's example polygamy was not permissible. "David did not read in the sealed Book of the Law which was in the Ark, for it was not opened in Israel from the day of the death of Elazar and Jehoshua and Josha and the Elders who worshipped the Ashtaroth, and it stored revealed until Zadok arose. And there went up the deeds of David except the blood of Uriah, and God left them to him." Here it is noticeable that the Arabic form for Joshua is Josha Yūshaʿ), whom the author evidently supposes to be a different person from Jehoshua. A precisely parallel blunder is committed by the Moslem savant Abū Ḥayyān Tauḥīdī, who died about 1009 A.D., in his treatise on friendship ;[1] "'Isā said to his disciple Yashūʿ, 'Thou shouldst love the Lord with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself'"; *ʿIsa* and *Yashuʿ* being both Arabic forms for the name Jesus. The Hebrew author is not much less at sea on the subject of the Elders ; they did not themselves worship the Ashtaroth, but their successors, as appears from Judges ii. 7 and 12. Moreover since these Elders "outlived Joshua," and indeed according to a more literal translation "lived long after" him,[2] it is exceedingly inaccurate to speak of them all dying on the same day. The expression "it stored revealed until Zadok arose"[3] is clearly a mistranslation of something or other ; in Arabic the active and passive are not distinguished in ordinary writing, whence "it stored" is easily explicable as a mistranslation of "it was stored" ; "revealed" appears to stand for "secretly," but it would require some ingenuity to restore the original. Zadok appears to be a mistake for Hilkiah ; and it is a mild one compared with the duplication of Joshua. "And there went up" may be easily explained as a mis-

[1] Constantinople, 1301, p. 64.
[2] Joshua xxiv. 31.
[3] ויטמון נגלה.

translation of the Arabic for "there were done,"[1] and the formula "the deeds were done" for "the crimes were committed" is familiar to the student of Arabic; in the Koran Pharaoh says to Moses, "Thou didst the deed which thou didst," meaning "thou didst murder the Egyptian,"[2] and later writers imitate the expression.[3] "Left" for "forgave" is also an Arabism, based on Syriac usage.[4]

One other specimen of this author's acquaintance with the Old Testament deserves quotation. P. 7, 9: "And all the despisers when God visits the land to render the requital of the wicked upon them (when there comes the word which is written in the words of Isaiah son of Amoz the prophet, who said, 'There shall come upon thee and upon thy people and upon thy father's house days which came from the day of the departing of Ephraem from Judah,' when the two houses of Israel separated, the prince of Ephraem from Judah), and all those who turned back were delivered to the sword and those who held fast escaped to the land of the north." As he said, "And I will reveal [!][5] the tabernacle of your king and the euphemisms of your images from the tents of Damascus."

The writer then explains that the Tabernacle means the Law, since the king stands for the congregation, and the "euphemisms of your images" means that for which "your images" are periphrases, i.e. the Books of the Prophets, who were *despised*.[6]

Now that the text of Isaiah vii. 17 and of Amos v. 26 is grossly misquoted in this passage is very clear; hence emendation is both useless and uncritical. What the author wishes to prove is that from "the north," i.e. from Damascus

[1] פעלת. [2] xxvi. 18. [3] Hariri, Makama 34.
[4] תרך=שבק, rendered עזב.
[5] והגליתי. The interpretation which follows shows that this is the meaning assigned.
[6] He connects צלם with the Syriac טלם.

or Syria—the Arabic *sha'm* expresses all three ideas—the true account of the Old Testament is to come ; and he adds that the "star" also mentioned in Amos is the interpreter of the Law who came to Damascus. At a time when the Israelites divided into two parties, one of them was delivered over to the sword, whereas the other fled to Damascus (or Syria or the north).

Now it is unfortunate that we possess no real history of the Jews under the Caliphate, but only occasional notices ; whence we learn of armed risings, which being speedily suppressed, fell into oblivion. The historian Dionysius of Tell Mahré gives us an account of such a rising in the year 734, when a pseudo-Messiah caused the destruction of a number of Israelites ; he was finally arrested, brought before the Umayyad Caliph Hisham, and crucified after being tortured.[1] According to the authorities cited by Grätz, the founder of the Jewish sect called by Moslems the 'Isawīs headed an armed rebellion, which was suppressed by the Caliph's forces ; and this event appears to have taken place under the second Abbasid, Mansur. Copious as is Tabari's chronicle of Mansur's reign, he appears to take no notice of such a rising. Yet we may be sure that to the people who actually took part therein it seemed an event of primary importance. It would seem clear that the Zadokite author is referring to an occasion of this kind, wherein there was a Jewish rising, followed or accompanied by a schism ; and the party favoured by the author escaped to Syria.

An allusion to the Moslem government of Syria is to be found in the provision "and if they shall settle in armies[2] after the fashion of the land." Syria was divided by the Moslems into *armies* (*ajnād*, plural of *jund*), five in number ;

[1] Dionysius ed. Chabot, p. 27.
[2] מחנות.

the word *jund*, "army," came in consequence to signify "provincial capital."

Doubtless all the Messiahs who arose aimed at recovering the Holy Land and especially Jerusalem for their people, and assumed that in the case of their succeeding the Temple with its sacrifices would be restored. The author of this document has besides some suggestions for the administration of the community, under a *M'baḳḳer*, whose name has been correctly identified with the Christian *episcopus* or bishop. He is to be learned in the *hagu*, i.e. alphabetical, script,[1] which may mean the Hebrew script; for it is remarkable that the Karaites at certain times and for certain purposes preferred to transliterate their Hebrew in Arabic characters. When the present writer was preparing a Karaite commentary for the press many years ago from a number of MSS. in the Hebrew character, numerous puzzles explained themselves when he came across, in the British Museum, certain fragments of the commentary in the Arabic character; for, as Hirschfeld remarked, Hebrew written as Arabic is far stranger in appearance than Arabic written like Hebrew.

Some of the methods of the Karaites reveal themselves if this text is studied. They were given to mutilating the names of the persons and things which displeased them, saying, e.g., *Pāsūl* (unlawful) for *Rasūl*, "the Prophet Mohammed"; *ḳālon* (shame) for *Kurān*. Similarly this author, speaking of his Rabbanite opponents, says (p. 1, 18) "they studied *ḥălāḳoth*, smooth things," for *hălāchōth*, "halachas," and "they chose *mahăthallōth*, "deceits," for *Mishnahs*. The following phrase, "they looked out for opportunities," contains a pure Arabic word[2] in Hebrew dress. What follows, "and they chose goodness of the

[1] See Arabic dictionary under הגו.

[2] פרצות.

neck," [1] offers a puzzle. Now the Arabic word for "neck" also means "expectation" [2]; whence "they chose the good of expectation" seems to mean much the same as the foregoing change, "they looked out for opportunities."

It would seem, then, that this document also might have slept in its obscurity without serious loss, except perhaps to specialists in the controversy between Rabbanites and Karaites. Translation from Arabic into Hebrew can scarcely have commenced before 750 A.D., and the discovery of a document which is later than that date does not affect the principle laid down above for the treatment of Jewish literature; a principle which should have condemned the paper document containing the Hebrew Sirach without the need for further investigation. The Biblical student is aware that the LXX is a Jewish document, and there is no reason for believing the Syriac Old Testament (at least in its original form) to be anything else; indeed it can be shown that the Syriac Old Testament lies in places behind the earliest form of our Gospels. How comes it, then, that these documents, like the Apocrypha and Josephus, are preserved by Christians, and only borrowed from the latter occasionally by the Jews? The answer is to be found in that rule which forbade the writing of any book that did not form part of the Old Testament, a rule faithfully observed until the Moslems had set the example of composing books other than their Koran. Hence any paper document containing non-Biblical Hebrew matter can contain nothing earlier than the use of paper—which even in the ninth century had acquired little popularity.

D. S. MARGOLIOUTH.

[1] טוב הצואר. [2] רקבה.

ALBERT SCHWEITZER.

On the twenty-fourth of March last, Dr. Albert Schweitzer sailed for the Congo as a missionary. That fact, I believe, has aroused a keener interest than anything else in his distinguished career; and this it is which has led the Editor of the Expositor to ask me to give a short account of him in these pages.

He was, of course, already a remarkable man. In addressing the readers of this magazine, it is not necessary to enlarge on his distinction in theology; those who are least in sympathy with his views will be quite ready to acknowledge the wideness of his learning, the acuteness of his criticism, the brilliancy of his style. But it is not, perhaps, equally well known in this country that he is a distinguished musician, being both a leading authority upon Bach and a brilliant performer on the organ; while in the last few years he has become a fully qualified Doctor of Medicine and has written ably upon medical subjects.

It is natural that a decisive act on the part of so interesting and versatile a thinker should arouse the desire to know something more about the man himself.

My qualifications as a biographer are slender, but as the translator of some of his books I have, of course, been in correspondence with him for a number of years; more recently I have met him in the flesh; and a good deal of information which lay outside my personal knowledge has been very kindly communicated by a friend of his in Strasburg.

Let us begin with the personal impression. It happened that in the spring of last year we were both in Paris at the same time, and were able to arrange a meeting. I found him, as to outward appearance, a tall, broad-shouldered

man in the late thirties, powerfully built, but, even according to English standards, not excessively stout. He has a pleasant dark eye, dark hair worn rather short, with no suggestion of the dilettante, features blunt but well cut, with the strong chin of the man of action; the whole personality keenly alive and magnetic.

He had not, he explained, a moment to sit still that day, but would I come with him in a taxi while he did some errands, and we could talk between times? So, for a couple of hours or more, we rushed over half Paris, stopping here to pick up a set of surgical instruments—which I understood some friend had presented to him for use abroad—at another place to visit a hospital—he was at this time taking a post-graduate course in Tropical Medicine—at another to make some arrangements for a forthcoming organ recital.

In the intervals he talked untiringly, about theology, English theologians—about whom he asked some shrewd questions—politics, his own plans, a Cambridge friend who had visited him in Strasburg, and so forth. (As regards international politics, by the way, he is personally Anglophil and would abhor the idea of war with England; but he cannot understand, on general grounds, why England "refuses to take Lord Roberts' advice and adopt compulsory service.") By the time we separated I felt that I knew more of him than one would get to know of many people in a week.

Another day he dined with us, and told a number of interesting stories, among them a little personal anecdote, which, slight as it is, I feel I must try to reproduce, for it is characteristic. One day, he said, he was sitting on the banks of the Rhine with some big historical tome open before him. As not infrequently happens when one tries to read in the open air, he had been feeling that there was more in life than could be got into print and paper. As he was

about to shut the book, a little insect of some kind fluttered in between the pages, and he checked the action of closing it just in time to avoid crushing the little creature. The incident struck him as symbolic. He said to himself, "I am like that poor little midge—in danger of being crushed under the weight of history!"

It was charmingly told, the German sentiment conveyed with the French lightness of touch—he was speaking French—which Schweitzer gets from his Alsatian blood. And it goes deep. Whatever scholars may be tempted to think sometimes, a knowledge of the past does not absolve a man from the responsibility for living his own life.

On another occasion we had the pleasure of hearing him play Bach on the organ. It was a rehearsal, and he took us up into the organ-loft, where we watched with interest and listened with delight while he played some of the Passion music. Workmen had been busy with the organ, and Schweitzer, who has himself an expert knowledge of organ building, was dissatisfied with something and had the foreman up to talk to him. His fault-finding was done, I noticed, not with (what always seems to us) the excessive excitement of the French artist, but with an unemotional, rather British thoroughness, with just a touch of additional energy. Leaving the concert-hall in his company, we had to negotiate one or two of those Paris crossings which make one think what a nice safe, quiet place London is, after all. It was after being piloted through one of these maelstroms with excellent judgment and coolness, and not a moment allowed for shivering on the brink, that a lady of our party—an Irishwoman—summed up her impression of Schweitzer thus: "You know, the heathen won't have a ghost of a chance with Herr Schweitzer; they'll just *have* to be converted!"

So much by way of direct impression of the man as he is

to-day. A glance at the upbuilding of this various and vivid personality will not be without interest.

His diversity of gifts finds some explanation in his ancestry. His mother's father, a clergyman, was very musical, and built an organ for himself without ever having had any technical training in that, one would suppose, highly technical art. Her brother, pastor of the church of St. Nicholas in Strasburg, was the editor of the earliest liberal Church paper, a man of high culture and attainments. His mother herself is described as a woman of fine abilities and still finer character; one of those whom the call of duty never finds waiting. His father, again, is a man of impressive personality, kindly and calm, and liberal in opinions. Those who read Dr. Schweitzer's earlier book (*Von Reimarus zu Wrede*) in the German, will remember that it is dedicated to his father, as one well versed in the subject.[1]

It is interesting to note—in view of the fact that his son has often been said to write more in the style of a novelist than of a theologian—that Herr Schweitzer has published a volume of short stories. The household, says the aforementioned Strasburg friend, is a delightful one to visit.

Albert Schweitzer had the advantage—from almost all points of view it is an advantage—of passing his early childhood in the country. He began his education at the village school, passing, however, before long to the Grammar School (*Gymnasium*) at Mülhausen, where he lived with an uncle. From an early age he had decided to enter the ministry, and passed in the usual course from the *Gymnasium* to the University. He was from the first a "serious student," and his Strasburg friend adds a touch of characterisation which is too good to lose. "He never spoke or judged about things or books without having read and

[1] The dedication runs: *Meinem Vater, Pfarrer Ludwig Schweitzer zu Günsbach, dem feinsinnigen Kenner der Leben-Jesu-Forschung.*

studied them himself. He likes to be quite independent, and will always defend his opinion without thinking of his own advantage, if he is convinced that it is right." It is interesting to know that the intellectual courage which was so marked a feature of his opinions and criticisms in the *Quest of the Historical Jesus* was so deeply rooted in his character. When that book appeared the author was often accused of a certain arrogance, but the more discerning critics saw that at least his confidence was the confidence of sincerity, not of pretension.

He studied philosophy and theology not only in Strasburg but also in Berlin and Paris, but of all his teachers the one who influenced him most was the veteran H. J. Holtzmann, of Strasburg. (Readers of *Paul and his Interpreters* will remember how he sets Holtzmann apart from all other critics, giving him a chapter to himself.)

In 1899 Schweitzer published a study of Kant's philosophy of religion, and in 1901 he became Privatdocent at the University of Strasburg, where he lived an extremely busy life, lecturing, coaching, organ-playing, preaching once every Sunday at the church of St. Nicholas, to which he was attached as curate, and, through it all, steadily working at his books.

In 1901, too, appeared the firstfruits of his theological studies, *Das Messianitäts- und Leidensgeheimnis. Eine Skizze des Lebens Jesu.* The sub-title, a Sketch of the Life of Jesus,[1] shows the direction which his thoughts were already taking. In 1906 appeared the work by which he is chiefly known, *Von Reimarus zu Wrede. Eine Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, translated under the title *The Quest of the Historical Jesus.*

Strong books, like strong men, are apt to make enemies, and there was hardly a German theologian of any eminence,

[1] This work has not been translated.

living or dead, of whom this book did not contain some trenchant criticism. It is hardly to be wondered at if its immediate effect was to produce more irritation against the author than sympathy with his ideas. It was easy, too, to show that the constructive part was by no means all of a convincing character. Still, the book won its way, and succeeded at least in making the eschatological theory a vital interest in theology, a question towards which scholars must take up a decided attitude. It is to the credit of English theology that one of the first critics of eminence to give the book a cordial recognition was Dr. Sanday, while a particularly thoroughgoing acceptance of its main ideas is seen in the relevant chapters of Tyrrel's *Christianity at the Cross-Roads*.

Meanwhile his musical studies had not been neglected. In 1905 appeared the earliest form of his great work on Bach. It was written in French at the request of Professor Widor of Paris,[1] who wished to have an exposition of the Chorales and Chorale Preludes for his pupils. This was re-written, on a much larger scale, in German in 1908, and in the same year Schweitzer attended a congress at Vienna in order to advocate certain improvements in organ-building, yet another subject in which he is an expert.[2] An excellent English translation of the German *Bach*, by E. Newman, incorporating important alterations and additions by the author, was published in 1911.[3]

Towards the close of the same year appeared his long-

[1] Under whom he had himself studied. Earlier, in Mülhausen, he had been a pupil of Eugène Münch.

[2] He has himself invented some mechanical device in connexion therewith, and has written on *Französische und Deutsche Orgelbaukunst und Orgelkunst* (Leipzig, 1905). Readers who are interested in organ-playing may be glad to have a reference which I have not had the opportunity of checking to technical contributions of his in *Die Musik*, 10th "Jahrgang," "Heft" 2 and 3, and *Die Orgel*, 1910 (with C. M. Widor, on the rendering of Bach's Preludes and Fugues).

[3] Breitkopf and Härtel, Leipzig and London.

expected *Geschichte der Paulinischen Forschung* (translated under the title of *Paul and his Interpreters*), the discussion of which will still be fresh in the minds of readers of the EXPOSITOR.

Since his departure there have appeared two other works, a revised and greatly extended edition of the *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*—the sub-title now figures alone, since *Von Reimarus zu Wrede* has ceased to be appropriate, for Wrede no longer forms the lower limit, the history having been brought down to date. Incidentally the English literature of the subject receives considerably more attention than in the former edition. And that, it may be interesting to note, is partly due to the fact that Dr. Schweitzer has in the interval not only improved his own reading-knowledge of English, but has married a lady who is an excellent English scholar, a daughter of Professor Bresslau, of Strasburg, who has recently retired from the Chair of History.

The second work is much slighter, but is of considerable interest and importance—*Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu*, a criticism and refutation of recent theories—which have obtained some notoriety in Germany—ascribing to Jesus some form of mental alienation. For this work Dr. Schweitzer is particularly well equipped, now that, to his critical acumen and historical insight, he has added a qualification in Medicine and some special study of mental pathology.[1]

Such is the man who is now at Lembaréné on the Ogowe, nearly under the equator, studying the language, I suppose—I have heard from him *en route*, but not since his actual arrival—and exercising his medical skill for the benefit of the natives.[2] His medical training was, of course, under-

[1] A translation of this little work is to appear in the pages of this Journal.

[2] Should any reader desire to help the work of this unusual missionary, Frau Professor Fischer, 15 Thomasgasse, Strassburg, Elsass, would gladly acknowledge and forward any sums sent to her. It is to this lady that I am indebted for much of my information.

taken as being almost indispensable for a missionary in those parts, and because, says my Strasburg correspondent, "he wished to continue the work of two friends of his who died out there." That quiet statement brings home to us something of what his action means. Some good people have expressed to me much concern as to what he is going to preach. When I hear that anxious question, two things come into my mind. One is the sense of a deep and simple piety underlying the whole of his various, forceful personality which one derives from personal contact with him, and the other is a passage from the close of his history of the great Quest: "He comes to us as One unknown, without a name, as of old, by the lake-side, He came to those men who knew Him not. He speaks to us the same word, 'Follow thou Me!' and sets us to the tasks which He has to fulfil for our time. He commands, and to those who obey Him, whether they be wise or simple, He will reveal Himself in the toils, the conflicts, the sufferings which they shall pass through in His fellowship, and, as an ineffable mystery, they shall learn in their own experience Who He is."

W. MONTGOMERY.

PSYCHOLOGY AND EXEGESIS.

Many aids to the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures are being offered to-day, textual, linguistic, critical and historical; and in Germany, especially, the endeavour is being made very confidently and diligently to take Christianity out of the isolation as a religion which the mistaken zeal of its exponents hitherto is supposed to have imposed upon it, and to prove its resemblances to, and dependences on, other faiths. One illustration of this movement in its extreme form is Drews' dissolution of the historical Jesus into a Christ-myth. Another less evident, and no more plausible, has been very effectively dealt with by the Rev. Professor Kennedy in the series of articles recently concluded in the pages of The Expositor on *St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions*. While the legitimacy of the method of comparison and correlation may be freely admitted, and the Christian thinker may even welcome every evidence of features common to the Christian and other faiths, and of relationships in history between the Christian and other religions, the student of this tendency, however sympathetic he may desire to be, cannot escape the impression of the externality of the whole procedure. In the interpretation of the religious life a knowledge of a multitude of data, and an ingenuity and even audacity in their manipulation and combination are not an adequate equipment for so delicate and difficult a task without a personal insight which only a personal experience can give. Here appearances of resemblance or dependence are generally deceptive; for the significance and value of religious beliefs or rites must be discovered from within by an apprehension and appreciation of the distinctive religious life of which these are the outward expression. When that religious life is under-

stood as an organic unity, the resemblances will be recognised as only apparent, and not real, because a new content has been given to what appears a common feature between two religions: and even when a historical dependence can be shown, the new context gives a new meaning to what has been borrowed. In the employment of this new method the standpoint of the objective observer of the phenomena of belief or rite must be supplemented by the point of view of the subjective participator in the noumena of the religious life itself. Psychology must be employed as an *organon* of exegesis.

I.

(1) In the modern study of religion this demand has been formally admitted. It is now recognised that as religion is neither an invention nor an imposture, but a distinctive, original and necessary function of mind in man, it must be as carefully analysed as any other such function, and the methods of the modern science of psychology are being applied both confidently and diligently to this new subject of so enthralling interest and of so commanding importance. It may be doubted, however, whether the science of psychology in its present stage of development is not still too much the superficial observer rather than the penetrative interpreter of the soul in its relation to God. Without at present turning aside from the immediate purpose into a discussion, less congenial to the pages of this magazine, of the defects inherent in the psychological method, as an attempt to treat mind as an object, when its distinctiveness is that it is a subject, this relevant consideration may be here insisted on, that the religious life, when it is an intimate and immediate relation to God, and not a formal and legal dependence on creeds or codes or sacraments, can be least adequately interpreted from the

still external standpoint of even the current religious psychology. This consideration, however, is not offered as a plea for an abandonment of psychology in exegesis, but for the development of the method of psychology toward a keener moral insight and a quicker spiritual discernment. It would be strange and lamentable indeed if, in the highest concerns and the deepest experiences of the soul, there were no prospect and no possibility of mutual understanding. The expositors of the Scriptures have not hitherto been altogether lacking in this qualification, the capacity to apprehend and appreciate in some measure the "inner life" of prophet or apostle, or even of the Lord Himself; and the value of any exposition of the Scriptures for religious thought and life has been determined by the degree in which such a capacity has been effectively exercised. When this moral insight or spiritual discernment has been developed and disciplined by the more exact methods of the science of psychology, we may hope to have in the hands of expositors a still fitter tool for their work.

(2) In a recently published volume, Dr. Tennant's *The Concept of Sin*, a distinction is made which is of crucial significance for the present purpose. "Any conscious process whatever," he says, "is capable of being regarded from two different standpoints. It is the distinctive characteristic of *conscious* process, that while taking place in an individual mind, it apprehends *itself*. Any particular conscious process, after it has taken place or been experienced by its subject, may, again, be apprehended by him in memory, and be made an object of contemplation at a later time; or it may be similarly apprehended by another subject or person and be reflected upon by him." This distinction has already been implied in the preceding discussion: it is the difference between the subjective experient and the objective observer, the actor and the spectator. "It

is only by scrupulously observing this all-important distinction," Dr. Tennant continues, " whenever it is relevant, that we can avoid what is called ' the psychologist's fallacy '—the fallacy, namely, which consists in regarding another subject's consciousness, *as it is for him while he is ' having ' it*, from the standpoint of one's own consciousness, so as to read into another's consciousness what is in one's own mind concerning it, and to identify the other's consciousness, as it is for him, with that consciousness as it appears, at second hand, to oneself." For these different standpoints Dr. Tennant suggests the use of two distinct terms. " A conscious process as it is apprehended by itself, then, shall be said to be regarded from the ' psychical ' standpoint ; the same process, as apprehended by another subject, or by the same subject contemplating it as another person might, shall be said to be regarded psychologically " (pp. 211–3). The mere statement of this distinction must recall many instances of the " psychological fallacy " in the exegesis of the Holy Scriptures. These are ingenuous theories " made in Germany " due to this author treating John, Paul or even Jesus Himself as a German theological professor with the qualifications, but also limitations of such a vocation. The plea here offered for the use of psychology in exegesis is conditioned by the constant and consistent recognition of this distinction.

(3) But it may be asked, can we escape the psychological and reach the psychical standpoint ; can we think and feel and work as John, Paul or James ? Does not this seem an impossible demand, and so make this attempt a forlorn hope ? There are three reasons why it need not be so regarded. *First of all*, word and deed are a revelation, and not a concealment of personality ; we can from what we know of a man judge what he would be likely to say or do. A capricious person, the sport of whims and fancies, may

surprise us ; but the more consistent and sincere a man is the better can we understand him, and the more fully can we trust that he will not disappoint our judgment of him. The prophets, the apostles and the Lord Himself revealed themselves in what they said and did ; and so what we know of the outer life enables us to judge of the inner.

Secondly, for mutual knowledge, especially of moral purpose or of religious aspiration, there must be affinity of spirit and of character ; a bad man cannot understand a good man, and would blunder badly if he tried to describe his dispositions, motives and aspirations ; a godless man cannot enter into the experience of the godly, so as rightly to conjecture its content and character. But if the expositor is a Christian, his own inner life is the clue to the inner life of other Christian men. Doubtless, there was in the relation of Jesus to God an immediacy and an intimacy, such as we do not know in ourselves ; and yet as we are called in the Son to sonship, the ideal of filial communion with God which inspires us surely reveals to us also the reality as it was in Jesus. The consistency and transparency of the personality of Jesus make the knowledge of Him more accessible than that of a life which shows less constantly its purpose, and less sincerely its motive. As the revealer of God surely Jesus so revealed His sonship to men, that it could be apprehended and appreciated not as appearance, but as reality. Difference in capacity or character is not an insurmountable barrier to a mutual understanding, so long as there is a common moral and religious life. Accordingly, we can hope to understand prophet or apostle in the life in God that we share with them.

Thirdly, we may note that our relation to Christ and the writers of the Scriptures is not merely one of affinity, but of dependence. It is through the life in God of those whom we are seeking to understand that our life in God

has been mediated; and it is not surely a fond fancy that, as the child can understand the mother's love, so our very dependence on prophet, evangelist or the Lord Himself is not a hindrance but a help to our moral insight and spiritual discernment. It follows then, from these considerations, that the Bible cannot be sounded in the depths by the plummet of a neutral scientific inquiry, a scholarship however exact, or a learning however extensive, which is indifferent to, or critical of, the moral duty or religious good which it discloses; but that for this penetration into the sanctuary of the "inner life" not only must the expositor be Christian, but his success will depend on the measure in which he is Christian.

II.

The writer has ventured to explain and vindicate this method because he is convinced that there are some problems presented in the New Testament, which, without its application, cannot be solved; and he hopes now to commend his conclusion to his readers by the discussion of a few instances. (1) In the treatment of the eschatological question in the Gospels there seems to have been too little attention given to the psychical process by the discovery of which the two aspects of the Kingdom of God, as presented in the teaching of Jesus, may have been harmonised for His own mind. It is too facile a solution to maintain that Jesus must have thought of the Kingdom as either a present, immanent, moral and religious process, or a future, transcendent, supernatural divine intervention in human history, but cannot have thought of it as both. It is neither an intelligible or credible solution to maintain that He held both views, unless we can show that their inconsistency or even contrariety is only apparent and disappears on a more penetrating scrutiny. When so many scholars are

at variance, it may seem a foolish audacity to suggest even that there is a way out of the seeming *impasse*. Is not the clue, not in Jewish apocalypse, or even in Apostolic eschatology, but rather in the distinctive quality of the inner life of Jesus? For a Christology which conceives Jesus as absolute deity only in the guise of humanity, the solution to be suggested will seem an offence; but such a Christology is imposed on, not derived from, the Gospels. Many years' constant familiarity with the Gospels has led the writer to the conviction that Christian theology does not lay sufficient emphasis on Jesus as the subject of faith towards God, as well as the object of faith to believers.

He is the author and finisher of faith, the most perfect example of faith. If faith be "the assurance of things hoped for, the proving of things not seen," then, for Jesus, not only was God as Father a present reality, but the Kingdom of God—the sovereignty of His truth and grace—was as present a reality. For Him with faith's insight and foresight—the future already present in God's eternity—the Kingdom of God did not, and could not appear, as it now does to us, as a distant consummation of a gradual progress of humanity, that "far-off divine event to which the whole Creation moves." He, indeed, saw all *sub specie æternitatis*. But then, on the other hand, He knew that the Kingdom could come to men only as they had faith; and when He turned, as He was forced by His painful experience in His ministry, from the eternal to the temporal, from God to man, He saw the hindrances and delays that lack of faith might impose. And yet, so sympathetic was His attitude to, and so generous His judgment of man, as well as so dominant His faith in God, that the coming of the Kingdom could not appear so far off. This does not profess to be a complete solution of the problem, as there are other questions to be answered, such as the extent to

which the eschatological beliefs of the apostolic Church may have affected the representation of the teaching of Jesus in the Gospels, and also the extent to which Jesus deliberately used figurative language, borrowed from the prophets, to picture forth for the minds of His disciples realities which for Him were ethical and spiritual, eternal and divine; but the possibility of Jesus thinking of the Kingdom as both present and future, as both imminent and delayed, at least seems made somewhat more credible and intelligible by the psychical process here described. As Jesus Himself professed ignorance of the hour, it is not irreverence to suppose that His mind thus wavered according as confidence in God or disappointment with man was the dominant mood.

(2) It is in the same direction that we must look for fresh light on the miracles of Jesus. The writer does not believe that literary or historical criticism has destroyed the evidence, as Mr. Thompson in his two recent books on the subject too easily assumes: nor is he dissatisfied with the view that the miracles can be regarded as constituents and not merely as credentials of the revelation of grace in Christ, as Dr. Bruce used to insist; but he has felt the need of connecting the miracles still more closely than this view even does with the person of Christ Himself: and there has recently come to him a thought about the miracles in that relation, which, to him at least, appears to offer another reason for them, completing the truth about them. Jesus was the revelation of the saving grace of God towards men: in Him the loving will of God to bless mankind found expression and exercise, but under the conditions and limitations of a true manhood, in this connexion specially through His personal faith claiming that grace in obedience to that loving will. The demand of faith in the recipients of, or intercessors on behalf of,

others for the benefits He could bestow, does not bring us so near to the core of the matter as His declaration, after the failure of His disciples to cure the epileptic boy, and His rebuke of the lack of faith of the father (Mark ix. 19, 23, 29). "This kind can come out by nothing, save by prayer," and His confession at the grave of Lazarus, which it is difficult to suppose could have been put on His lips by the evangelist without some reminiscence as its justification: "I thank Thee that Thou heardest me" (the verse that follows may possibly be the evangelist's reflection on this reminiscence, John xi. 41–42). The miracles were wrought in the exercise of faith with or without articulate prayer; but ever in the attitude of prayer. Had the miracles been impossible to Jesus, had His sympathy with and compassion for man been hindered in its expression in these healing and helping acts, would that not have involved for Him a strain on His absolute faith in God, His confidence and certainty that God was indeed saving man through Him? Not for others only, but for Himself also, the miracles were proofs of the authority of the Son of Man to forgive sins (Mark ii. 10). Meanwhile we need not raise the wider question, whether in the measure in which any man's vocation might approach in its significance and value for the Kingdom of God the function of Jesus Himself, and he, in the fulfilment of it, exercised a like faith in God, the power might be given to him also; but the thought here suggested at least opens out the wide prospect of the possibilities open to man in the measure of his faith in God.

(3) A third instance of the application of the "psychical" method to the New Testament may be offered as bearing on the problem of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. A complete discussion of the problem cannot be attempted, as only one aspect of it is relevant to the present purpose.

After considering all the data of the question for many years, the writer is forced to the conclusion that, on the one hand, there are in the Gospel reminiscences of an eye-witness, but that, on the other, there are reflections developing those reminiscences which belong to the thought and life of a much later age. Thus to give only the simplest illustration, the report of the conversation of Jesus with Nicodemus (John iii. 1–21) seems to be reminiscence, at least, as far as verse 10, but from verse 11 to the end there is reflection, although some scholars would put the transition from the one to the other at verses 15 and 16. How a writer desiring to bear his personal witness allowed himself this blending of reminiscence and reflection, without any feeling of incongruity, is a problem which can be solved only as we can get a look into his mind.

(*a*) *First of all,* it may be remarked that an active mind cannot merely retain, but in occupying itself with its remembrances, spontaneously transforms them : a verbatim report of a conversation is more likely to be given by a dull than a quick mind. The very quality of mind in the beloved disciple, which led Jesus to trust him as a confidant for deeper truths than the company of disciples generally could receive, would evoke a quicker activity on what he received than those who have handed down the Synoptic record were capable of. In old age reminiscences are often vivid, but at the same time they present themselves in an alien context. By much meditation this disciple had gathered around his recollections the thoughts that, in his own mind, had grown out of the sayings of Jesus ; and it is altogether probable that he could not have himself distinguished where reminiscence ended and reflection began. Especially, if we have in the Fourth Gospel not the writing of the " beloved disciple " himself, but the record of his teaching about the Lord's teaching, which one of his disciples has given, is

the probability of such a blending without any intention or even consciousness of misleading increased.

(*b*) *Secondly*, this development cannot be regarded as without any historical occasion or stimulus. The "beloved disciple's" environment would raise questions, and offer objections, which, by his meditation on his recollections of the Lord's life, he would try to meet. It is not likely that even in Jerusalem Jesus ever adopted so polemic a tone as prevails in some of the discourses, or was so insistent in urging His own claims, or so vehement in denouncing those who would not acknowledge them. It does relieve a difficulty that the Fourth Gospel presents to us in its controversies not the self-assertion of Jesus, but the "godly zeal" of the disciple for his Lord.

(*c*) *Thirdly*, the sayings of Jesus regarding the gift of the Spirit, and the view of the function of the Spirit to unfold the further meaning of the things of Jesus, which we find in the Fourth Gospel, throws light on its composition. Even if, and when the "beloved disciple" was aware that reminiscence was passing into reflection, he had the confidence that he was under the Spirit's guidance, and so, what he offered in his teaching was not an alien addition to the teaching of Jesus, but the Spirit's unfolding of that teaching.

(4) A fourth instance of the application of the "psychical" method may be taken from the letters of Paul. (*a*) The writer holds, and the opinion seems to be gaining ground with scholars, that the Epistle to the Galatians is to be regarded as the first of the letters. The view that it must be placed after 1 and 2 Thessalonians rests on the assumption, forced on and not derived from the data, that there must have been in the interval between these letters a development of the Apostle's own theology. The view that because of its

resemblances to the Epistle to the Romans it must have been written about the same time, ignores the fact that the contents of these letters were determined by their historical occasions and consequent special purposes, and are no evidence as to the total content of the mind of the Apostle at the time. The Thessalonians did not need the instruction already given to the Galatians, nor did the Corinthians need the repetition of that instruction, which was necessary for the Romans. If we trace the "psychical process" in the apostle after his conversion as a clue to his consciousness of being called to be the Apostle to the Gentiles, we are forced to the conclusion that his previous development and present experience alike would lead him very surely and speedily to the Gospel of free grace through faith apart from the law, which he unfolded as soon as the circumstances of any church demanded it. And historically, it seems more probable that the problem of the intercourse of Jew and Gentile within the church, involving the problem of the authority of the law over Jew and Gentile, would very quickly, and not only after a lapse of years, emerge when once Jew and Gentile had been thrown together in the Christian community.

(*b*) Although the writer is not yet fully persuaded that the Pastoral Epistles are to be regarded as Paul's, yet he would find a confirmation of the method here advocated in Dr. Bartlet's statement. "Paul the doctrinaire theologian, or at least the prophet of a one-sided Gospel, repeated with fanatical uniformity of emphasis under all conditions, has largely given place to Paul the *missionary*, full indeed of inspired insight on the basis of a unique experience, but full also of practical instinct, the offspring of sympathy with living men of other types of training" (THE EXPOSITOR, January, 1913, p. 30).

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

HISTORY AND MYSTICISM.

Lord Leighton used to tell how once when he was painting one of his Autumn pictures in the Scottish Highlands a countryman came beside him and looked on in silence for a while. At last he spoke. "Man," he said, "did ye never try photography?"

"No," said Lord Leighton, "I can't say I have ever tried it."

"It's a hantle quicker," said the man, and then as a parting shot he added, "And it's mair like the place."

The story may serve to illustrate the contrast between the standpoints of the photographer and the painter, the mathematician and the poet, and, what is more important for the subject of this article, it illustrates two different ways of regarding history. Is it the function of the true historian merely to register facts as a photograph registers the position of leaves and branches at a particular moment, or is he to be allowed the freedom of the painter to depict what no photograph can reflect but what the inner eye can see? Are the highest ends of truth better served by the methods of the photographer or by the methods of the painter?

Let us take an illustration. The great painters often represent the Infant Christ with His little hand raised in benediction. Would a photograph—if there had been photographs in those days—ever have obtained such a result? Yet would any realistic picture of a Jewish infant "taken from life" express with anything like the same truthfulness the purpose and meaning of the incarnate Life?

Or again, think of Raphael's great picture of the Transfiguration, in which with true prophetic insight he blends in one canvas the scene of wonder and heavenly stillness and

beauty upon the Holy Mount with the anxiety, distraction and misery of the scene below. No photograph could have produced that result, but the painter was great enough to know when to sacrifice realism to reality and history to truth.

The contrast between the standpoint of Lord Leighton and that of his rustic critic is seen again in the comparison of the pictures of the Nativity by the great Italian Masters with the treatment of the same subject in some modern realistic pictures.

These latter are based on the Scottish countryman's conception of reality. The painter gets some young Jewish mother to sit for his picture and paints just what any ordinary eye can see. He produces a result "mair like the place" than the earlier painters achieved. In their pictures the Heaven world is breaking through, angel wings are hovering above, and the transitory world is seen for a moment in the glow of that "light that never was on sea or land."

But which pictures reveal most fully the truth of what really took place? And what are prophets for unless to reveal with their higher faculties that which the ordinary man with his lower faculties would *not* see?

I have more than once tried to get an artist to paint a picture of what a man would look like as seen by a mole, but I have failed, as the artist seemed—quite wrongly—to discern in the request not a compliment to his power of imagination but some sinister reflection on his powers of vision. It is not difficult, however, to conceive what it might be like. A portion of a pair of boots shading into mist and darkness and far distances would represent the similitude of "the beauty of the world, the paragon of animals." Certainly it would not be like a man as we know him, but the mole would have as much right as the realist

to maintain that that picture represented what was actually there apart from "fanciful nonsense." We might even let our imagination take a higher flight and wonder what a man would be like as seen by an Angel. He would be visible, we should fancy, not so much in the lines and curves and colours of face and figure as in the nature, quality, and intensity of his desires and thoughts. Any one who compares Doré's coarse pictures of the Paolo and Francesca of Dante's Vision driven before the storm blasts of Hell with the noble painting of the same subject by G. F. Watts will recognise the different points of view referred to.

The realist fancies that he is limiting his picture to what is there. As a matter of fact he is only revealing how little he can see. His realism and that of the mole differ only in degree.

Now is it not possible to imagine that the great prophet-historians of the Hebrew race have treated history much as Raphael treated the story of the Transfiguration and as the Italian Masters treated the Nativity? They have helped history to give birth to truth. For history is the reflection of the eternal in the transitory. It is truth striving in spite of difficulties to express itself in action. It is the medium in which God's parables are written. Yes, but the medium is inadequate for its work—as inadequate to be the vehicle of truth as the length and breadth of a picture canvas to express the three dimensional events which it portrays. Line and curve, light and shadow, have to be brought in to help the deficiency and to suggest to the imagination what cannot be depicted, and thus all the painter's art contributes to the expression of truth.

In a similar way history from, let us say, an angel's point of view is a useful but quite inadequate medium for the working out of God's parables, for the reflection under conditions of time and space of His eternal truths.

Our consciousness is centred in a world where—if we could only realise it—all is shadow and where nothing lasts. We are like children looking at trees reflected in the still waters of a lake. So clear they seem that we can scarcely help asking, Can you deny their reality ? A storm comes, and we almost wonder, Did they ever exist ? Then we look up to the trees which threw the reflection and *they* remain in storm and sunshine alike. Even so the things of creation, as Plato taught us long ago, are just the projection of God's thoughts upon the ever-changing ocean of matter. They are reflections in three dimensions indeed, but not less reflections for that. They form and break; they arise from and return to the ocean of matter. The real permancy is not in the reflections but in that which they reflect.

The value of art is not in the finite things which it portrays but in the infinite which it suggests. That at least would be the opinion of the painter though not of the man who preferred photography.

Similarly, are we not right in saying that the purpose of history is not so much to register facts as to reveal truth ? Its value is that in it are reflected the purposes and the parables of God, and God's parables are written in history.

Of course one anticipates the obvious objection that this theory of the true function of the historian would seem to justify every enthusiast in writing history "to order" so to speak. But history, like painting, is an art, and real history can only be written by great seers just as real paintings can only be produced by great artists. Any schoolboy can mess a canvas with oil paints and call it a picture, as any enthusiast can distort facts and call it history, but such "pictures" and such "history" soon sink into the obscurity which their merits demand.

We may say that the drama is to history what history is

to truth. The drama reflects history vividly but inadequately and with obvious and inevitable limitations. It crowds a lifetime into an hour but it reveals the salient points of the life. It needs amplification and supplementing if it is to represent history.

Now let us imagine a race of people who only know history as it is represented in the drama. The stage is their world. Its events are to them the only realities, and they are quite unconscious of its limitations. Let us suppose that they are familiar with the play of Richard III. and know intimately every scene and every saying. Then a professor of history appears who knows the life as it took place, and lectures to them on the subject. He has to supplement the stage account, to fill in its bald outlines, to round off with the story of years its abrupt transitions, to modify some vivid scene, to expand here, to contract there, to supply what is lacking somewhere else.

At once protests arise. The professor is destroying their world. He tells them that theirs is not the real world but only its reflection. His own account is the true record. Then why, they ask, was it not so reflected ? Because of the nature of the case, he answers, because of the limitations of the drama as a reflector.

Now every argument that the historian can use against the imagined people of the stage-world, the mystic can use to the realistic historian and the painter to the believer in photography.

" All the world's a stage," as Jacques says, and history, like the drama and like photography, tells all it can. Prophets and seers, poets and painters exist in order to fill in their imperfections.

Now this is just what we seem to catch St. Paul in the very act of doing. He tells us that the things which happened to the Hebrews in their Exodus " happened unto them for

our ensamples," and he amplifies the Mosaic account by stating that "they drank of that spiritual rock that followed them, and that rock was Christ."

The great Apostle seems here to be assisting history in the interests of truth. To one who regards the Bible as the inspired revelation to man of the realities of the spiritual world, it could not seem an extravagant thought that the great unseen Beings who under God direct and control the progress of the world—the true "Kings of the Earth"—use history as far as it can be used to work out in parable His great age-long truths.

How important, for example, that men should have before them vividly and in concrete form the tremendous age-long drama of the deliverance of humanity from the sordid bondage of materialism into the glorious liberty of its true home in the spiritual world! In order that this parable might be written in history we see a race most carefully selected, separated and prepared. It is driven into Egypt by famine and suffers bondage until its great prophet and leader arises, and then follows its deliverance, guidance and sustenance in the wilderness, its battles, failures and triumphs, until at length the Jordan is crossed and the promised land attained.

What the exact incidents of that Exodus were as they might have appeared to a Scottish photographer or been described by a modern newspaper correspondent seems perhaps to be a matter of secondary importance. The great Hebrew prophet-historians saw the realities of which the events in the physical world were the inadequate reflection. Again and again both in the Old Testament and in the New the world-wide, age-long significance of Hebrew history was strongly emphasised. "All these things happened unto them for our ensamples," and "They were written for our admonition." The grand description of

the guidance of the host by the pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night is in the deepest sense a statement of real truth. Whether or not that cloud would have made any impression on the film of a modern camera we do not know and we need not care. God's purposes and men's spiritual history were wonderfully made manifest and carefully worked out in the history of this selected race in so far as history could lend itself to the purpose ; but where history breaks down the vision of the seer comes to its aid. The truth with which St. Paul was concerned in the passage quoted above was the deliverance of man from " the bondage of corruption " and mortality into the promised land of the spiritual life. He dealt with the fact rather than the reflection and he assisted the reflection to give expression to the fact.

It is surely at least as difficult to work out this theme in history as it would be for us to translate " Paradise Lost " into the language of the Australian aborigines. Doubtless, it could be done, but how terribly the sublimity, the glory, and the mystery would be stripped from it by the limitations of that miserable vocabulary ! How the translator would long to call in the aid of art to amplify by line and colour the poverty-stricken reflection of mighty thoughts and scenes ! How he would sympathise with St. Paul's bold endeavour to bring Hebrew history into still closer approximation to revealed truth ! Historical " facts " are the lines and pigments of the Divine Artist, and are meant less to register what is seen by the bodily eye than to suggest the great spiritual realities which are invisible to it. The prophet will not be confined to what the world calls " facts." He spends his life in trying to break through them and get behind them.

" To find their meaning is his meat and drink."

Now it is just here that the remarkable revival of Mysti-

cism in our own times is coming to our aid. It does not quarrel with "facts" but it puts them in their right place. It raises no protest against the ascertained results of Higher Criticism, though it smilingly points out that many critics take themselves far too seriously. It insists that men should come to a clear understanding as to what is meant by reality. To most men the transitory is the real world, and hence its events and facts assume an absurdly exaggerated importance. To the mystic, on the other hand, the real world is the spiritual, and nothing that happens under conditions of time and space can be anything but reflections. For example, he would not say that the salvation of the world depended on what happened on Calvary, but that what happened on Calvary made manifest once for all the eternal Sacrifice on which the salvation of the world depends. He does not think of the Virgin Birth at Bethlehem as the coming of the eternal Christ into the world, but as the manifestation to the world that He is there all the time. That surely is the lifting up of the Son of Man "out of the earth" which will draw all men unto Him.

H. Erskine Hill.

THE DATE OF THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

THERE is no problem of New Testament criticism which has been more fully discussed than that of the date of the Epistle to the Galatians, and certainly none which has given rise to a wider range of opinion. The letter has been associated by one scholar or another with practically every phase of the Apostle's missionary activity, some placing it as early as the close of the first Missionary Journey, others relegating it to the days of the Roman captivity, while every intermediate stage between these two extremes has been called into requisition. The question has again become one of serious import in the domain of New Testament criticism because of the increasing tendency among scholars to regard it not only as the earliest of all the Pauline Epistles but to demand that it must have been written before the Apostolic Council described in Acts xv. It is hardly necessary to state that this early dating of the Epistle is not new or even modern. It was suggested many centuries ago by Calvin and Beza, and the theory has been again revived and now receives the support of scholars like Valentin Weber,[1] Douglass Round,[2] C. W. Emmet,[3] Vernon Bartlet,[4] and, last but not least, Kirsopp Lake [5] and Sir W. Ramsay,[6] all of whom place the writing of the Epistle either at Syrian Antioch, just before St. Paul left for Jerusalem to take part

[1] Weber, *Die Abfassung des Galaterbriefs vor dem Apostel-Konzil*, p. 15.
[2] Douglass Round, *The Date of Galatians*, *passim*.
[3] C. W. Emmet, EXPOSITOR, viii. 9, p. 242 f.
[4] Vernon Bartlet, *Apostolic Age*, p. 84.
[5] K. Lake, *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 253 f.
[6] Ramsay, EXPOSITOR, viii. 5, p. 127 f.

in the Council, or on the journey between Antioch and Jerusalem. When we find Pauline authorities of the rank of Lake and Ramsay advocating this date, it is quite clear that we are confronted with a theory for which there must be much to be said, and which demands our very earnest consideration. The question is discussed with great fulness by Kirsopp Lake in his illuminating book on *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul,* and we shall find it convenient to follow the argument as set forth by him.

He contends that the Epistle was written after St. Paul's return from the first Missionary journey and shortly before the Apostolic Council. He departs, however, from most of his predecessors in placing the writing of the Epistle not at Antioch, but at some point on the journey between Antioch and Jerusalem, because the manner in which both Antioch and Jerusalem are mentioned in the letter suggests that the Apostle was neither in the one or the other when he wrote it.[1] On this point he agrees with Vernon Bartlet.

It is generally conceded that in coming to a decision concerning the date of Galatians there are four main factors which have to be considered. These may briefly be summarised as follows.

1. Who were the Galatians to whom the Epistle is addressed ?

2. How much is implied in the word πρότερον in Galatians iv. 13 ?

3. What is the true historical interpretation of Galatians ii. ?

4. What weight is to be attached to the undoubted affinities of this Epistle in language, style, and thought with other Pauline Epistles, notably that to the Romans ?

It will be useful to mark how Professor Lake deals with these four conditions for determining the date of the Epistle.

[1] K. Lake, Op. cit. p. 301.

1. The fact that he is an advocate of an early date for the Epistle necessarily ranges him on the side of those who hold the "South Galatian" theory. The "North Galatian" theory renders inadmissible a date earlier than the Second Missionary journey. I may at this point be allowed to state that, in spite of Dr. Moffatt's [1] very forcible arguments to the contrary, I am of opinion that the South Galatian theory best meets the needs of the situation and may be said at present to hold the field.

2. Following Blass [2] he denies that it is necessary to give to τὸ πρότερον the sense of "the former of two occasions," [3] and maintains that it can be used equally well with no comparative sense, and need mean nothing more than "originally." He strengthens his contention by pointing out that in "koine" Greek this is the more common sense of the word, and that it is also its meaning in all the other New Testament passages where the word is found. This exegesis relieves him of the necessity of postulating a second journey to Galatia on the part of St. Paul before he wrote the Epistle, and makes any date subsequent to the first Missionary journey possible.

3. The visit to Jerusalem described in Galatians ii. 1–10, he identifies [4] with that mentioned in Acts xi. 29, 30, and xii. 25, while the incident at Antioch related in Galatians ii. 11 ff. he places [5] immediately after the return of Paul and Barnabas from South Galatia, and before the Apostolic Council.

4. He acknowledges the closeness of the relationship between Galatians and Romans,[6] and if the traditional date of the latter has to be accepted he is prepared to allow that

[1] Moffatt, Op. cit. pp. 93, 101.
[2] Blass, *Grammar of N. T Greek*, p. 34.
[3] Op. cit. p. 266.
[4] Op. cit. p. 290.
[5] Op. cit. p. 296.
[6] Op. cit. pp. 299–302.

the affinity between the Epistles provides a very strong argument for a late date for Galatians, e.g., sometime during the latter portion of the third Missionary journey.

In this case he has to choose between accepting a late date in accordance with the literary conditions of the problem, or an early date which satisfies the historical situation. He is, however, of opinion that the literary difficulties are more easily explained than the historical, and, therefore, selects the earlier date. But he has another solution of the problem associated with the literary affinities between Galatians and Romans,[1] and his treatment of this question forms one of the most valuable elements in the book.

It is now widely acknowledged that there existed from the second or third century two recensions of the Epistle to the Romans, a long and a short one, although there is no MS. copy of the latter extant. The long recension contained the Epistle as it appears in our Greek Testament to-day, but the shorter form stopped at Romans xiv. 23, with or without the doxology (Rom. xvi. 25–27), and contained no reference to Rome in Romans i. 7.

The existence of these two forms of the Epistle has been explained in various ways, but it will be sufficient here to indicate two main theories on the subject.

1. That St. Paul wrote the long recension, and that later on some one else issued the short one.

2. That St. Paul himself wrote both, publishing the letter in two forms either simultaneously or successively.

At the present time the former of these two theories commands the more respect, and it is generally supposed that the short recension was made by Marcion for dogmatic reasons.

Bishop Lightfoot[2] was, however, of opinion that St. Paul

[1] Op. cit. pp. 335–370.

[2] Lightfoot, *Biblical Essays*, pp. 287–374.

himself may have made a short recension of the Epistle in order to give a general account of his position in the Judaistic controversy.

Professor Lake promulgates a third solution, and his position is that the short recension was the original form in which the letter was issued by St. Paul in connexion with the question of Jewish and Gentile Christianity, for the general instruction of Churches which he had not yet visited, and that it had nothing to do with Rome. Later on, however, St. Paul sent a copy to Rome containing the reference in chapter i. 7, with the addition of chapters xvi. and xvii. to serve as a covering letter.

Now the relevance of all this in connexion with the problem of the date of the Galatians lies in the fact that it is only in chapters xv. and xvi. that we find any materials for determining the date of Romans. If, therefore, we accept the possibility that the short recension was the original form of the Epistle, it contained no evidence of any particular date, and might well have been written at an early period when the Judaistic controversy was at its height. If the Epistle to the Galatians was also written at this period, as Professor Lake contends was the case, it would explain the literary and doctrinal affinities between the two Epistles. In justice to Professor Lake it is right to mention that he goes no further than to suggest that this is a *possible* solution of the literary problem. The conclusion he arrives at, after a most exhaustive inquiry, supported by all the wealth of scholarship at his disposal, is that which I have quoted above, viz., that the Epistle was written on the journey between Antioch and Jerusalem, just before the Apostolic Council.

At the root of this theory lies the anxiety to remove the well-known difficulty raised by the silence of St. Paul in Galatians ii. 1–10 concerning the Apostolic Council and its

outcome, if the Epistle was really written after the Council had been held.

Now if we had nothing more than the Epistle to the Galatians to consider I am not disposed to say that this early date is altogether inadmissible, although the Epistle itself seems to me to contain much evidence pointing to a fuller development of Pauline doctrine and organisation than is consistent with the pre-conciliar period. Unfortunately, however, the Acts has an equal claim to be heard on this point, and I cannot help feeling that the student of Paulinism, when brought face to face with this theory, is placed in a position of the greatest difficulty. If he adopts this early date of Galatians he will find it impossible any longer to credit the author of the Acts with any historical accuracy whatsoever, much less regard him as a historian of first rank. In this connexion it should be noted that Professor K. Lake [1] accepts the Lucan authorship of the Acts, and that he rates St. Luke as a historian of high character, while Sir William Ramsay is the strongest living advocate of the historical value of the Acts. How they can reconcile their estimate of St. Luke as a historian with the repudiation of his plain statements which this date of the Galatians implies is a problem that I am unable to solve. I will now proceed to formulate some of the difficulties which this theory is called upon to face, and which seem to me to render the early date for the Epistle quite impossible.

(*a*) *The question of time.*

The sequence of events demanded by the theory that we are discussing may be thus described. Paul and Barnabas returned to Antioch at the close of the first Missionary tour and announced to the Antiochene Church the success of their mission in the cities of South Galatia. The effect of this announcement is to rouse the Judaistic party in Antioch

[1] Op. cit. p. 30.

to immediate action, with the result that emissaries are sent to South Galatia with the deliberate view of counteracting the Pauline doctrines and tendencies. The Judaisers made a tour of the whole district, followed the footsteps of the Apostles in every city, and accomplished their purpose with such thoroughness that the Galatians were soon in danger of being completely perverted from the Christian Gospel as preached by St. Paul, were on the point of repudiating his Apostolic standing and authority, and were in considerable danger of making an absolute shipwreck of their faith. Tidings of the disastrous effect of this Judaising propaganda are brought to the Apostle either at Antioch itself, or when he is already on his way to Jersualem to be present at the Apostolic Council, whereupon he immediately writes the Epistle under discussion. *And all this happens within the space of four or five months*! All the systems of New Testament Chronology that I am acquainted with, Harnack's, Ramsay's, Turner's, and countless others, wh le they vary as to the particular year perhaps which saw the return of the Apostles to Syrian Antioch, at the close of the first Missionary journey, are absolutely at one in this, that six months is the extreme limit which you can allow between the arrival of Paul and Barnabas at Antioch and their arrival at Jerusalem prior to the holding of the Council. Again, St. Luke places the origin of the Judaistic controversy at Antioch itself. Antioch is the storm centre, and it is most improbable that the Judaistic propaganda should have at this period, and within less than six months of the Apostles' return, not only originated at Antioch, but also spread to the field of the first Missionary tour, and have worked such havoc there. Travel and communication within the Roman Empire were doubtless much more expeditious than we are apt to consider them, but even in our own day six months is an utterly inadequate period wherein to produce the

situation and events which the Epistle to the Galatians imply.

(*b*) *How are we to reconcile this date with Acts* xv. 3 ?

St. Luke in Acts xv. 3, describing the progress of Paul and Barnabas, and their companions, from Antioch to Jerusalem, tells us that "they passed through both Phoenicia and Samaria, declaring the conversion of the Gentiles, and they caused great joy unto all the brethren." There can be no possible doubt that St. Luke, when he speaks of "the conversion of the Gentiles," is referring to the evangelisation of the cities of South Galatia, and there has been no suggestion, as far as I am aware, of any other exegesis of the passage. Now let us consider for a moment the significance of the proposed date of the letter when faced with this statement of St. Luke's. Paul and Barnabas had, less than six months before, returned from a missionary tour which had been attended by unqualified success, and had resulted in Christianity being apparently firmly planted in the cities of the southern district of the province of Galatia. Meanwhile, according to this theory, a counter-movement, in the shape of a Judaistic and anti-Pauline mission, had been set on foot in this identical district, and the second movement seems to have been no less successful than the original mission of the Apostles ; for, within the space of three or four months at the most, the Galatians were almost entirely weaned from the Gospel preached by St. Paul, and were prepared to accept the yoke of Judaism, and to repudiate the authority of the Apostle. News of this defection reached him at Antioch, and, either just before he started for Jerusalem, or while on the journey itself, he wrote to his erstwhile converts the Epistle to the Galatians, with its sustained severity, its indignant remonstrances, in which every line is charged with the deepest emotion. The momentous gravity of the situation in Galatia, which meant nothing less than the

entire shipwreck of the Apostle's dearest hopes, the ruin of his spiritual children, as well as the warmth of the Apostle's indignation and the intensity of his disappointment, are manifest on the very surface of the Epistle. And yet St. Luke has not a word to say of all this, although the Judaistic controversy is the one question which engrosses his attention in this section of the Acts. The importance with which he invests the mission to South Galatia is evident to every reader of the Acts, and yet he passes over this paralysing crisis in complete silence. Nay, more. Far from realising that there was any crisis at all, he describes St. Paul proceeding joyfully up to Jerusalem, relating to every Christian community that he meets on his way the wonderful progress of the gospel of Christ in Galatia, filling the hearts of the brethren in the cities of Phoenicia and Samaria with joy because of the rich promise of Gentile Christianity. And this at the very time when, according to this theory, information had just been received which filled his heart with despair lest the whole of his work among them should be irreparably destroyed! If the Epistle to the Galatians was written at this period, then St. Luke must have entirely misconceived the situation, and he ceases to have any claim on our respect as a serious historian. It has been suggested that this is only another instance of the "argument from silence" and is therefore of little value.[1] If we had found no reference at all to Galatian affairs in Acts xv. much might be said in favour of this contention, but inasmuch as there is an allusion in the chapter, and that of the most definite character, implying at the very least a satisfactory outlook in Galatia, it is difficult to see where St. Luke's "silence" comes in. If the Galatians were in a state of open revolt against St. Paul's teaching and authority before the events recorded in Acts xv. 3 took place, then St. Luke is only silent when

[1] C. W. Emmet, *Expository Times*, vol. 24, p. 475.

he is faced with a disagreeable situation, and can be expressive enough when it comes to recording facts that suit his own purpose. Now this means nothing less than a return to the old Tübingen position which saw in Acts a mere "tendency" document in which every difficulty was smoothed over, and every divergence and want of success were ignored in the interests of a particular theory. I have still some respect for St. Luke as a trustworthy historian, and I prefer to believe that Acts xv. 3 is a true representation of things as they really were, and not an attempt on his part "to cry peace where there was no peace" as this theory seems to demand.

(c) *How is St. Paul's attitude at the Council to be explained if the Galatians were in open rebellion and this Epistle had already been written?*

When St. Paul arrived in Jerusalem a Council was held, composed of the Apostles then resident in the Holy City, the elders of the local Church, and the deputation of Gentile Christians from Antioch headed by Paul and Barnabas. The matter to be discussed by this assembly was the very question which lies at the heart of the Epistle to the Galatians, viz., whether the Gentile could become a Christian without first becoming a Jew. The only part taken by St. Paul in the deliberations is to quote the undoubted success of his Mission among the cities of South Galatia as proof incontrovertible that all the blessings of Christianity were available for the Gentile world, and that without the medium of Judaism. Could St. Paul have honestly used such an argument if he had known, as he must have known according to this theory, that, at that very time and in those very Churches that he had quoted, there had been such a "set back" as to imperil their Christianity, and that these identical Gentiles whom he mentions with such pride as having received Christianity in all the fulness of its blessings,

without any Judaic conditions, were now drifting with dangerous rapidity in the contrary direction, and were evincing every desire to become Jews as a necessary prelude to their becoming Christians? What has happened to the Apostle we know so well, what of his zeal, his burning indignation, that, even in the presence of those who had initiated the movement which bid fair to destroy the fruit of his labour, he has no word of remonstrance? Where is the courage which dared to rebuke St. Peter to his face because he sought to tamper with the freedom of the Gentile Christian, but now allows him to sit silent and meek when brought face to face with the very men whose one object is to bring his children in the faith into absolute bondage? To attribute to the Apostle conduct so pusillanimous in the face of conditions like these is wilfully to misread his character. The situation is impossible. Here again, then, St. Luke is entirely at fault if the Epistle to the Galatians was written a few weeks before the Council, and if we accept this theory it becomes quite impossible to attach any historical value to this section of the Acts.

(*d*) *Could Timothy have been circumcised by St Paul after the Epistle to the Galatians had been written?*

If the circumcision of Timothy, related in Acts. xvi. 3, took place after the Apostle's language concerning "circumcision" in Galatians, it is no longer open to us to credit him with any consistency whatsoever. Scholars like Professor McGiffert,[1] who do not hold the historical value of the Acts in any very high esteem, dispose of the difficulty by describing the incident as unhistorical, but this solution, in view of their express statements as to the accuracy of St. Luke, is not possible for Professor Lake or Sir William Ramsay. A few quotations from the Epistle will enable us to realise the strength and intensity of the Apostle's

[1] McGiffert, *Apostolic Age*, pp. 232–233.

language concerning "circumcision" and Jewish legalism.

Gal. ii. 16, "By the works of the law no flesh can be justified."

Gal. iii. 10, "For as many as are of the works of the law are under a curse."

Gal. iv. 9, "Weak and beggarly rudiments."

Gal. v. 2, "If ye receive circumcision Christ will profit you nothing."

Now the early dating of the Galatians asks us to believe that in the very district of South Galatia to which this letter, with its uncompromising denunciation of circumcision and of any approach to subjection to the Mosaic law, is addressed, and very soon after the receipt of the letter, the Apostle actually circumcised one of his own followers who was already well known to the South Galatian Christians, and took him afterwards as his companion on his journey through the cities of this district. Place the incident of the circumcision before the Epistle, regard it as contributing in some measure to the success of the Judaistic propaganda and as explaining some of the cryptic references in the Epistle to a charge of "preaching circumcision" which seems to have been brought against St. Paul, and the event becomes intelligible. That the Apostle should have stultified himself by circumcising Timothy in the district of South Galatia within a few months after he had written the Galatian Epistle is unthinkable.

Sir W. Ramsay had in many of his earlier works laid considerable stress on the use made of the circumcision of Timothy by the Judaisers in their efforts to persuade the Galatians that St. Paul himself had preached and practised circumcision. If the Epistle was written before the Apostolic Council, and *a fortiori* before Timothy was circumcised, the argument based on this incident by Ramsay is no longer legitimate. He meets this difficulty, however, by putting

the circumcision of Titus in place of that of Timothy as the incident which was quoted by the Judaisers in support of their contention. In this matter again he turns his back upon his earlier conclusions, in which he strenuously denied that Titus was ever circumcised,[1] and is content to follow the lead of Kirsopp Lake here as he has done in the matter of the date of the Epistle. He does not tell us, however, whether he accepts the reading of D in Galatians ii. 5, which omits οἷς οὐδὲ, as Lake does.[2] He supports his contention by claiming that in translating Galatians ii. 3 οὐδὲ Τίτος . . . ἠναγκάσθη περιτμηθῆναι the emphasis is to be placed on ἠναγκάσθη, and that the verse can only mean that " not even Titus was *compelled* to be circumcised " but accepted circumcision as a purely voluntary act on his part. It is, therefore, Titus' circumcision and not Timothy's that now explains the allusions in Galatians i. 8–10 and v. 11. We have seen that a great deal of suspicion is attached to the historicity of the circumcision of Timothy, but he was at least half a Jew, and it will require a great deal stronger argument than this of Ramsay's to convince me that St. Paul ever allowed the circumcision of a full-blooded Gentile, highly as I rate the Apostle's tact and diplomacy where the peace of the Church was concerned. Here again, as in the case of Acts xv. 3, I prefer to pin my faith to St. Luke rather than accept this early date for Galatians.

Evidence of date in the Epistle itself.

It is not only the Acts of the Apostles that makes the early date improbable. The contents of the Epistle itself would seem to offer considerable evidence of a date later than the Apostolic Council. I will content myself with calling attention to two factors only which seem to point in this direction.

[1] Ramsay, *St. Paul the Traveller*, p. 55 f., *and Hist. Commentary on Gal.*, p. 297 f. [2] K. Lake, Expositor, VII. i. p. 236 f.

(*a*) *The identification of the visit described in Galatians* ii. 1–10. There is much to be said in favour of the identification of Galatians ii. 1–10 with Acts xi. 29, 30, and it removes some of the main difficulties connected with the question of the relationship of the Epistle to the Acts. I have myself advocated[1] the identification elsewhere, but I have recently come to hesitate whether it can be maintained. The greatest of all the difficulties connected with it, it appears to me, consists in the fact that the position claimed for himself by St. Paul in the autobiographical narrative in the Epistle is inconsistent, if not irreconcilable, with the position accorded to him in the Acts at this particular period. In the Epistle Barnabas is associated with Paul in the mission to Jerusalem, but the impression that the narrative leaves on one's mind is that he was only of very secondary importance, and that in spite of the occasional use of the plural "we." Paul himself is the important personage. It is *his* figure that fills the foreground of the picture. The Apostles imparted nothing to *him*. *He* had been entrusted with the gospel of the uncircumcision. The Apostles perceived that grace was given unto *him*. It was *he* who was zealous in remembering the poor (Gal. ii. 6, 7, 9, 10).

Now this is a perfectly correct description of the situation at the time of the Apostolic Council. Paul is now beyond question the leader, the commanding figure in the group of those who were fighting for the freedom of Gentile Christianity, and Barnabas, although still of importance and associated with Paul, is certainly only of secondary consideration. But at the period of the earlier visit described in Acts xi. 29, 30 and xii. 25, Barnabas is unquestionably the leader, and the relationship between him and Paul is in some way that of patron and client. Barnabas is the delegate of the Church of Jerusalem to the Church of Antioch,

[1] Maurice Jones, *St. Paul the Orator*, p. 113 f.

and he is now returning to the Mother Church to give an account of his mission, bringing with him as an earnest of the loyalty and devotion of the daughter Church a contribution to the saints in Jerusalem. He is accompanied by Paul, his companion and assistant, whom he had brought from Tarsus and had found of extreme value in the mission to the Hellenists at Antioch. Now in any meeting or conclave called together in Jerusalem for deliberation and discussion with the Apostles it is quite evident that Barnabas, whom they knew, Barnabas the delegate of the Church, must take the leading part, while Paul, of necessity, falls into the background. Barnabas would report and describe the mission to the Hellenists, and it would be to Barnabas, and not to Paul, that the Apostles would grant permission to proceed with the work which had been initiated with so much success. The primacy of Barnabas continues until the power of Paul's personality and the force of circumstances bring the great Apostle to his own in the early days of the first Missionary tour. But this was not yet, and if the visit of Galatians ii. 1–10 is the second visit of the Acts, it is difficult to avoid the inference that Paul has misrepresented the situation, and has credited himself with an importance and preëminence which were not his at the time. This appears to me to militate strongly against this identification. If we reject it and, with the majority of scholars, regard the visit in Galatians ii. 1–10, as coincident with that during which the Council was held the pre-conciliar date of the Epistle must also be abandoned.

(*b*) *Gal.* vi. 17, "*I bear in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus.*" The "stigmata" are now universally acknowledged to have been the marks on the Apostle's body, the result of persecution and ill usage, of stoning and scourging. Now at the period at which the Epistle was written, according to this theory, only one such punishment had been inflicted

upon him, the stoning at Lystra, but it was of a sufficiently severe character to have left its impress upon him for the remainder of his life. Professor Ramsay [1] would also add to this punishments by Roman lictors at Pisidian Antioch and Iconium, although there is no evidence in the Acts that he was made the subject of official ill-treatment when he was driven out of these cities. The tone of the verse and the intensity of the appeal appear to me, however, to speak of one who is worn and weary with suffering and persecution, to whom life is wellnigh an insupportable burden. The impression that this section of the Epistle leaves on my mind does not accord with the image of the Apostle as we picture him at the time of the Apostolic Council, in the heyday of his career, flushed with success, buoyant, hopeful, prepared to meet any emergency, willing to bear any burden. It is the St. Paul of the Corinthian letters that we have here, a Paul wearied and worn with persecution and disappointment, burdened with the care of all the Churches, bearing in his body not the marks of one stoning only, but of all the suffering and cruelty that he enumerates in 2 Corinthians xi. 23–28.

I have no desire to attach too much weight to the two preceding arguments derived from the Epistle itself, but, combined with the enormous difficulties of reconciling this theory with the Acts, they form a body of proof of the strongest character against the preconciliar date of the Epistle to the Galatians.

MAURICE JONES.

[1] Ramsay, *St Paul the Traveller*, p 107.

THE INTERPRETATION OF ISAIAH XLI. 8–20 AND LI. 1–8.

A PRELIMINARY statement regarding the date and literary character of Isaiah chapters xl.–lv. will clear the way for the special discussions that follow. It seems to the present writer that this book (Isa. xl.–lv.), like the books of the other prophets, is a collection of prophetical utterances or compositions which belong, for the most part, to one period or to one author, but were neither composed nor arranged as a literary unity. The difficulty of tracing any thread of connexion between the successive portions of the book has always been felt by those expositors who have assumed its literary unity. The alternative view that the successive sections were originally independent compositions has the analogy of the other prophetical books in its favour, and is decisively established when it is shown, as it may be, that the historical background varies, if only slightly, from paragraph to paragraph, and so implies composition over a series of years. It follows that the isolation of any passage from its immediate context can no longer be regarded as evidence of interpolation, except, possibly, when the alien element separates parts that obviously once stood together. As a rule, the successive passages are not connected in a literary sense, except in so far as they are the work of one author or of one period. Even where there has been dislocation of connected pieces the intruded element may simply have been displaced in the course of textual transmission, and thus may not be entirely alien to the original collection. For example, the Servant passage xlii. 1–7 certainly breaks into the unity of another passage which is constituted by xli. 21–29 + xlii. 8–9. But it is less likely that the former passage was thrust unskilfully

into its present position than that xlii. 8–9 have strayed from their rightful position following xli. 29.

As to the date of these chapters, a thorough analysis leaves no doubt that, with the possible exception of the Servant passages, they belong to the middle period of the career of Cyrus (fl. 559–530 B.C.). In particular they reflect the situation just before and just after his occupation of Babylon in October, 539 B.C. The author was a spokesman and spiritual leader of the Jewish community in Babylon at this crisis in their history. The greater part of the book consists of the utterances in which he cheered and counselled his fellow-exiles and inspired them with the hope that Cyrus would restore them to their native land. His activity almost certainly commenced some years before the occupation of Babylon, and it continued at least some months after the fall of the city.

If the date and circumstances of these prophecies have now been correctly given, we cannot fail to ask what evidence they supply regarding Cyrus' treatment of the Jews when he became king of Babylon. Can any utterance be dated after the question of the return to Judah had been decided, favourably or unfavourably? Did the activity of the "Babylonian Isaiah" cease just at this most critical point of all? If there was a return of the Jews to the land of their fathers, did this prophet not accompany them? A passage of crucial importance in connexion with these and similar questions is xli. 8–20. The writer of this article believes that it can be shown to have been composed by the prophet in Judah after the return from exile.

The second investigation here undertaken is a contribution to the problem of the Servant passages. These were first grouped together by Bernhard Duhm, in 1875, as follows: xlii. 1–7, xlix. 1–6, l. 4–9, lii. 13–liii. 12. The identity of the Servant, the literary relationship of the

passages to the surrounding chapters and the question of their authorship, are still problems which seriously divide the opinions of Old Testament scholars. But all recognise that the passages form a group, marked off, in some measure, from the contents of the surrounding chapters. It is to be noted that on the view that Isaiah chapters xl.–lv. are a collection of "occasional pieces," without systematic arrangement, the isolation of the passages from the supposed course of the argument of the book ceases to be a criterion of their special character. But their common theme, the way in which they treat it, in some measure their phraseology and the absence (or almost entire absence) of reference to the situation of the Jews in Babylon constitute them a group whose relationship to the person and work of the Babylonian Isaiah is very variously judged. The thesis which the present writer desires to establish is of a supplementary character, viz., that chapter l. 4–6 is also a Servant passage. Without any assumption as to the questions still at issue it may be maintained that the same features which distinguish the four Servant passages occur in this also; which, therefore, should be associated with them.

I. Isaiah Chapter xli. 8–20.

It cannot, of course, be assumed without discussion that this passage is one of the "units" of the prophetical collection in which it stands. It is evidently marked off from what precedes by the address of the opening words to Israel. This address continues as far as verse 16, and there, on a first reading, it might reasonably be supposed that the passage ends. Verses 17–20 are not too short to be taken as a separate utterance, and are quite intelligible as such. They are certainly separated from what follows by the rhetorical climax of verse 20, and they are not formally united to what precedes by the second person

singular of address (characteristic of ver. 8 ff.). It appears, accordingly, that verse 8 marks a commencement and verse 20 a conclusion, but that the union of verse 17 ff. to what precedes, and ultimately, of course, the coherence of the whole passage, must be tested by an examination of the contents of the verses.

In what follows the attempt will be made to show in three successive paragraphs that verses 8–10, 11–16, and 17–20 are most simply interpreted as being addressed to Jews in Palestine, who have just returned from exile in Babylon, and that this understanding of them removes certain difficulties which have been felt in their interpretation.

The inevitable translation of verse 8 ff. represents Israel as having been laid hold of by Jehovah and called and brought from a remote part of the earth, and also as having been declared to be Jehovah's servant, whom He had chosen and not rejected. Is not the reference to the deliverance from exile in Babylon and to the triumphant proof which this supplied that Israel had been chosen by Jehovah *and not rejected?* No other interpretation is so easy. The call of Isreal is generally understood to be Abraham's call from Mesopotamia. But the equivalence of the call of Abraham to the call of the people of Israel is not so lightly to be assumed, and the mention of Abraham in verse 8 makes the identification more difficult rather than easier. Besides, if the reference is to the personal history of Abraham, what is the force of " whom I have not rejected " ? Karl Marti, in his commentary, points out the difficulty of the current interpretation and finds himself driven to strike out the whole of verse 9 except the words " I have chosen thee and not rejected thee." He says that the words omitted apply to Abraham and cannot apply to the Israelites. It is here suggested that the words do apply to Israel,

if we may suppose that there was a return of the Jews to Palestine in the reign of Cyrus and if the "Babylonian Isaiah" lived to share in that return.

Verses 11–16 describe a situation which was not that of the Jews in Babylon during the exile, and which is not that presupposed, in general, by the author of the prophecies in Isaiah xl.–lv. Israel is struggling with her enemies (ver. 11 f.), she is weak and feeble (ver. 14, "thou worm Jacob, puny Israel"), she is promised, in figurative language, victory over her enemies (ver. 15 ff.). Now in Babylon the Jews were engaged in no contest with their enemies nor does the author of these chapters ever promise them victory over the Babylonians. The situation, therefore, seems again to be that of the Jews just after the return, when they had adversaries to contend with (cf. Zech. viii. 10) and when, if they were ever to be a nation again, they themselves had once more to win national victories. It is obvious how strikingly appropriate the language of verse 14 is to the poor remnant of the ancient people that was settled in Jerusalem and its neighbourhood after the return. Of recent commentators Marti, once more, has felt the difficulties which attach themselves to the currently accepted date. He understands verses 11–16 as an eschatological passage, alien to its context and possibly belonging to a time much later than the Babylonian exile. Against this view it need only be observed that verse 11 is a very smooth continuation of verse 10, that a preference may reasonably be given to an interpretation which decisively preserves the passage for the Babylonian Isaiah and that all the difficulties that Marti feels seem to be met by the interpretation here suggested. The assertion that verses 11–16 are distinguished from their context by a different metre may be true of verses 11–14, but does not seem to hold good of verses 15–16.

Verses 17–20 have had a very strained interpretation imposed upon them by the commentators. After what is understood to be an exhortation to the exiles not to fear or be discouraged in their present circumstances, the prophet is supposed to transport himself suddenly into the future and to describe, without any indication of transition, the journey home to Judah, through the desert, and the miraculous help which the people will receive from Jehovah on the way. If the verses are to be joined to their immediate context it is not extravagant to call such an interpretation the last refuge of despair. Besides, the (commentators') conception of a road miraculously planted for the occasion with trees, along the line of march, does seem fantastic. Either the language is purely figurative—which it might be, although this is not the usual interpretation—or the prophet is promising to the people in God's name a sheer impossibility. These difficulties disappear if the situation is again understood to be that of Palestine after the return of the exiles. Verse 17 seems to describe an actual experience of the moment, the community is suffering from lack of water. Apparently the land is parched and treeless (vers. 18–19). We may well suppose that it was to a land of choked wells and springs, of devastated gardens and scantily planted woods that the Jews returned, if they did return, in 537 B.C. Addressed to such a situation, verses 18–19 declare that the water and the wood, at present so deficient, will yet by Jehovah's providence be abundantly supplied. So understood, the language is, indeed, rhetorical, but no longer the vehicle of an impossible and fantastic promise.

To sum up, so far, it seems that different phases of one and the same post-exilic situation are distinctly expressed throughout this passage. It is not important to decide whether we have in it one prophetic utterance (vers. 8–20) or two (vers. 8–16 and vers. 17–20). The first view

is at least possible, and may be preferred, since the verses stand so solitary in these chapters, and because the rolling rhetoric of verse 20 is more effective and appropriate at the end of a somewhat lengthy passage, longer at least than verses 17–20 by themselves would be.

On the view set forth above of the literary character of chapters xl.–lv., it is clear that the dates of the prophecies they contain are not inconsistent with that now proposed for this passage. It might have happened that the Babylonian Isaiah uttered no prophetical word to his people after the capture of Babylon by Cyrus, or that the latest utterance of his that posterity preserved fell in the first year of Cyrus' reign as king of Babylon. But the mere fact that there is no other prophecy in the collection of quite so late a date as the year 537 B.C.—if that be so—is not seriously to be weighed against the strong internal evidence of xli. 8–20 in favour of such a date. Of course, those who have sought to establish that there was no return of the Jews from Babylon in the reign of Cyrus will be seriously prejudiced against the arguments that have been advanced and are entitled to scrutinize them closely. But in regard to this aspect of the question it must be maintained that we have here an important piece of evidence from a contemporary writer thrown into the scale on behalf of the Chronicler's story of the return (Ezra ch. i.). The contribution that the passage, as now interpreted, makes to the controversy regarding the return of the Babylonian exiles to Palestine is by far the most striking result that flows from that interpretation. It will not do to decide the question of the return negatively on other evidence and then approach the question of the date of Isaiah xli. 8–20. On the contrary, the simple and consistent meaning of the passage, as now expounded, has a claim to be heard before the verdict against the return can be sustained.

II. Isaiah Chapter li. 1–8.

The resemblance between the Servant passages and certain elements in these verses has been recognised by writers of all shades of opinion in recent years. Some have deduced from it an argument in favour of identifying the author of the Servant passages with the "Babylonian Isaiah"; others have sought to prove thereby the dependence of one of these authors upon the other. Some have struck out as interpolations the phrases which most resemble the language of the Servant passages. Henri Roy has boldly argued that the whole passage (vers. 1–8) is to be treated as a Servant passage.[1] Gerhard Füllkrug concludes that verses 4–6 must have been composed by the author of the Servant passages, whom he distinguishes from the Babylonian Isaiah.[2]

In the following discussion no assumption is made regarding the date and authorship of the Servant passages. They may or may not be the work of the Babylonian Isaiah. But provisionally, to allow of clearer statement, they are distinguished from the work of that prophet as a group with characteristics which place them in some measure apart. On this understanding, the thesis here maintained is that a fifth Servant passage, li. 4–6, is embedded in the verses under consideration, and that when separated from their context they leave verses 1–3 + 7–8 as a connected utterance of the Babylonian Isaiah, with the usual implicit reference to the circumstances of the exile.[3]

The textual criticism of the passage demands a brief

[1] *Israel und die Welt in Jesaja 40–55.* Leipzig, 1903.

[2] *Der Gottesknecht des Deuterojesaja.* Göttingen. 1899. The author does not elaborate his argument, and does not say how he interprets the passage. Evidently, however, he does not regard it as contributing to its author's portrait of the Servant of Jehovah.

[3] This view has been maintained by the writer in class-lectures since the academic session, 1903–4.

reference at the outset. In verse 4, instead of עמי and לאומי the Peshitta and some Hebrew MSS. read עמים and לאומים. The appropriateness of these readings and the possibility of error in MT are obvious. But there is very little in the way of positive proof on either side. The chief consideration, possibly, is that לאומים occurs seven times in these chapters in the plural and only here, if at all, in the singular. It is no serious objection to the plural reading that in verse 4b the peoples are spoken of in the third person and the elimination of לאומי altogether, as "against the metre" seems to be unjustified. It will afterwards appear that the plurals are the more probable reading if verses 4–6 constitute a Servant passage; meantime it may, at least, be assumed that no argument can be securely based upon the Massoretic reading עמי. The wrong division between verses 4 and 5 in MT and the textual errors in verse 5 do not affect the present discussion.[1]

It will probably not be seriously contested that verses 4–6, *once they are isolated from their context*, are so strikingly similar to the Servant passages in tone and contents that they may properly be reckoned one of them. The Servant himself must be the speaker, just as he is in xlix. 1–6 and l. 4–9. The utterance, though brief, is a perfect whole, with an appropriate commencement and ending. The phraseology is strikingly similar to that of the (other) Servant passages. In particular xlii. 1–7 speaks of the hopeful expectation of the "coast-lands" (ver. 4) and of the *mishpat* of the Servant as a boon to the world (vers. 1 and 4). The same ideas in almost identical language are expressed in this passage (vers. 4–5). In xlii. 6 and xlix. 6 the Servant is spoken of as אור גוים, here the speaker's *mishpat* is

[1] Possibly the text should run as follows:

ארניע אקריב צדקי וזרעי עמים ישפטו
אלי איים יקוו ואל־ישעי ייחלון:

described as אור עמים. The form of address, also, in li. 3, is perfectly appropriate in the mouth of the Servant (cf. xlix. 1), especially since we have the alternative readings עמים and לאומים at our choice. Most important of all, although impossible of proof in this article, is the harmony between the portrait of the Servant in the other passages and what the speaker here says of his own position and destiny.

On the other hand, it is to be admitted that the identity of the speaker in li. 4–6 with the Servant is plausible and obvious only when the verses are taken in isolation. Clearly in the adjoining verses (certainly in ver. 2) Jehovah is the speaker, and if verses 1–8 be taken as a coherent unit he is the speaker throughout, and there can be no reference to the Servant at any point. No argument based on mere phraseology can controvert this position.[1] Henri Roy reaches his conclusion by assuming that li. 1–8 were originally a sequel to l. 4–9 and by, at the same time, identifying the Servant with Israel. It is unnecessary to examine these premisses of his argument since the hypothesis breaks down completely at another point. It is supposed, necessarily, that the Servant is addressed in the expressions "ye that pursue righteousness" (ver. 1) and "my people" (ver. 4). Now one of the outstanding peculiarities of the Servant passages is that the Servant (whether he be Israel or not) speaks, and is spoken of, always as an individual. These very forms of address, therefore, decisively exclude the passage, as a whole, from the Servant group.

The question under consideration now resolves itself into this: What reasons are there for isolating verses 4–6

[1] Granting that the simile in ch. l. 9b is an original part of the Servant passage, l. 4–9, it is not so vital an element in the phraseology as to constitute a link with li. 8. Still the language of li. 7 f. does resemble that of the Servant passages, although in a lesser degree than in the case of li. 4–6.

from their context? There is, in the first place, the fact, already established, that unlike their context they exhibit all the marks of a Servant passage. But that is not all. The theme of verse 4 ff. is the relation of the speaker to the Gentile peoples. This follows an address by Jehovah to the Jews—or to a section of them—in which they are encouraged with promises of blessing. It is not quite impossible to regard verse 4 ff. as a further promise to the Jews, but certainly they do not explicitly follow the line of thought initiated in verse 1, and they appear all the more alien to their context when we consider that verse 7 resumes explicitly the thread of connexion which verse 4 has dropped. Further corroboration of the conclusion to which these facts point is to be found in the awkward repetition of the phraseology of 6c in 8b, when these verses are regarded as parts of the same passage. Such a repetition by the same author, in separate prophecies, or the use of such similar phraseology by two authors, is not very remarkable. But in the same utterance, since it is not a refrain, it may fairly be termed evidence of surprising poverty of expression. It is, of course, conceivable that there has been textual error in 6c or 8b. but taking the text as it stands the coincidence may be regarded as further evidence that verses 4–6 were originally separate from verses 1–3 and 7 f.

This conclusion must, of course, be tested by a consideration of whether verses 1–3 and 7 f. can together, but apart from verses 4–6, be held to constitute a prophetic utterance. The answer seems to be that the connexion of the re-united parts is excellent, and that the whole thus formed is in no way wanting in completeness or literary finish. If it be asked whether the dislocation which is postulated is textually admissible, perhaps the best answer is to refer to the parallel of xlii. 1–7, also a Servant passage, which separates

in a similar manner the two parts of a continuous utterance (xli. 21–29 + xlii. 8–9).

The following critical remarks on the connexion of verse 2 with its context were at first made without reference to the main thesis of this discussion. For that reason, and in order not to complicate the argument, they have been reserved to this point. Verse 2 is understood by the commentators to be a reminder of the small beginnings of the Hebrew people and thus implicitly to be an encouragement to them in their present depressed condition. God multiplied Abraham so that he became a great nation, and He will act similarly in His treatment (of the small band) of the Jewish exiles (who are faithful to Him). But here an essential part of the comparison has been supplied by the interpreter. The construction of verse 3 does not allow of its being taken as the prophet's application of, or parallel to, the history of verse 2. Verse 2 thus stands apart in a somewhat isolated and unexpressed relation to its context. Is it not, then, an interpolation, originally a marginal note ? Verses 1 and 3 join excellently, if we take the rock from which the people were hewn to be *Zion*. " Consider the city of your origin," the prophet says, " Jehovah has taken compassion upon its ruins, and joy and gladness shall again be found in it." On this view some one has wrongly supposed that the " rock from which you were hewn " was Abraham and his gloss has become part of the text. The secondary character of verse 2 is, perhaps, confirmed by the irrelevant introduction of the words " and Sarah your mother," which give a spurious parallelism but further spoil the logic of the verse.

The previous analysis of verses 1–8 must now be reconsidered in the light of the foregoing criticism. By the omission of verse 2 the words that most clearly prove Jehovah to be the speaker in verse 1 ff. disappear. Indeed,

the initial presumption is now rather against His being the speaker, since He is referred to several times in the third person. It may, therefore, be asked whether verses 1–8 (omitting ver. 2) are not, after all, a Servant passage with the Servant as the speaker throughout. On this hypothesis the Servant addresses the Jews and refers unmistakably to the coming restoration of the people, quite in the manner of the Babylonian Isaiah. In spite of xlix. 6, such a feature is so unlikely to occur in a Servant passage that probably its presence is by itself sufficient to negative the supposition. Some parts of the previous argument for the division of the passage, slightly restated, are also still relevant. The conclusion, therefore, remains that only verses 4–6 constitute the Servant passage and that the adjoining verses are an utterance of the Babylonian Isaiah in which Jehovah is the speaker, although He refers to Himself in the third person.

WILLIAM B. STEVENSON.

THE FORMS OF HEBREW POETRY.

IV. THE ELEMENTS OF HEBREW RHYTHM.

THE study of parallelism must lead, if I have so far observed and interpreted correctly, to the conclusion that parallelism is but one law or form of Hebrew poetry, and that it leaves much to be explained by some other law or form of its being. Complete and exact correspondence of all the terms in two parallel lines necessarily produces the effect of exact or approximate rhythmical balance. But such complete parallelism is relatively rare in Hebrew poetry; the parallelism is more often incomplete; and, moreover, along with lines completely parallel and lines incompletely parallel there frequently occur also lines unconnected by the presence in them of any parallel terms. And yet, alike in the incompletely parallel, and in the non-parallel couplets,

there will often be found, consistently maintained, the same kind of rhythm as in those that are completely parallel. We are thus driven back behind parallelism in search of an independent rhythmical principle in Hebrew poetry which will account for the presence of balance, or other rhythmical relation, as between two lines in which the parallelism is not such as necessarily to involve this balance or other rhythmical relation.

Some such rhythmical principle, whether or not its nature can ever be exactly and fully explained, seems to govern much of the present text of the Old Testament, sometimes for long consecutive passages, as for example in Lamentations and many parts of Job and Isaiah xl.–lv., sometimes for a few lines only, and then to be rudely interrupted by what neither accommodates itself to any rhythmical principle that can be easily seized, nor produces any rhythmical impression that can be readily or gratefully received.

The difficulties in the way of discovering and giving any clear and full account of this principle are considerable. In the first place, as was pointed out in the first article, no clear tradition or account of the rhythmical or other laws of Hebrew poetry has descended to us from the age when that poetry was still being written. The remarks of Josephus are interesting, but in themselves anything but illuminating. Then we are faced with serious textual uncertainties in all the so-called poetical books and in the prophetical books, and in the ancient poems, such as the song of Deborah, and the blessing of Jacob, embodied in some of the narrative books. Feeling, as in my opinion we ought to do, that much of the poetical contents of the Old Testament has suffered serious textual corruption, we might well view with suspicion any metrical theory that found all parts of the existing text equally metrical; for though a textual corruption may accidentally at times

have the same metrical value as the original reading, this is the kind of accident that cannot happen regularly. On the other hand, a metrical theory which finds innumerable passages corrupt, though they show, metre apart, no sign of corruption, has this disadvantage: given the right to make an equal number of emendations purely in the interests of his theory, another theoriser might produce an equally attractive theory; and we should be left with the uncertainty of choice between two alternatives both of which could not be right, but both of which might be wrong. A sound metrical theory, then, must neither entirely fit, nor too indiscriminately refuse to fit, the present text of the Old Testament. A third serious difficulty lies in our imperfect knowledge of the vowels with which the texts were originally intended to be read. This last difficulty may, perhaps, always leave a considerable degree of detail ambiguous, even if the broader principles of rhythm become clear.

In spite of these difficulties, how far is it possible in the first instance to determine the exact *rhythmical* relations between, let us say, the several examples or types of two sections, sentences, lines, call them what we will, that are associated with one another by some degree of parallelism of terms or at least by some similarity of structure, by being, if not parallel, yet parallelistic? Parallelism both associates and dissociates; it associates two lines by the correspondence of ideas which it implies; it dissociates them by the differentiation of the terms by means of which the corresponding ideas are expressed as well as by the fact that the one parallel line is fundamentally a repetition of the other. The effect of dissociation is a constant occurrence of breaks or pauses, or rather a constant recurrence of two different types of breaks or pauses: (1) the break between the two parallel and corresponding lines; and (2) the greater break at the end of the second line before the

thought is resumed and carried forward in another combination of parallel lines. And even when strict parallelism disappears, the regular recurrence of these two types of pauses is maintained. Thus there are in Hebrew parallelistic poetry no long flowing verse-paragraphs as in Shakespearian or Miltonic blank verse, but a succession of short clearly defined periods as in much English rhymed verse and in most pre-Shakespearian blank verse. Rhyme in English and parallelism in Hebrew alike serve to define the rhythmical periods; but the relation between rhyme and sense is much less close than between parallelism and sense, and consequently rhyme in English has nothing like the same power as parallelism in Hebrew to produce coincidence between the rhythmical periods and the sense-divisions; accordingly, though rhyme very naturally goes with "stopped-line" verse, as it is called, it is also compatible with non-stop lines; so that non-stop lines and verse paragraphs that disregard the line divisions almost as freely as Shakespearian or Miltonic blank verse are by no means unknown in English rhymed poetry. On the other hand, parallelism is, broadly speaking, incompatible with anything but "stopped-line" poetry. Whether or not there may be in Hebrew a non-parallelistic poetry in which rhythmical and sense divisions do not coincide is not, for the moment, the question; it is rather this: parallelism, even incomplete parallelism in its various types, offers a very large number of couplets in which we can be perfectly certain of the limits of the constituent lines; how strict, how constant, of what precise nature is the rhythmical relation between these lines which are thus so clearly defined? If we can determine this question satisfactorily, we may obtain a measure to determine whether the same rhythmical periods occur elswehere without coinciding with sense divisions.

I have referred to two types of English verse; but the closest analogy in English to Hebrew poetry is probably to be found neither in blank verse nor in rhymed verse, but in the old Anglo-Saxon poetry, and its revival (with a difference) in Chaucer's contemporary, the author of Piers Ploughman. That poetry has one feature which is no regular, nor even a particularly common, feature of Hebrew poetry, viz., alliteration; but that feature, though a most convenient indication of the rhythm, is absolutely unessential to it. Apart from the references to this alliteration how admirably does Professor Saintsbury's description of this type of English poetry correspond, *mutatis mutandis*, to the *rhythmical* impressions left by many pages of Hebrew psalms or prophecy. "The staple line of this verse consists of two halves or sections, each containing two 'long,' 'strong,' 'stressed,' 'accented' syllables, these same syllables being, to the extent of three out of four, alliterated. At the first casting of the eye on a page of Anglo-Saxon poetry no common *resemblances* except these seem to emerge. But we see on some pages an altogether extraordinary *difference* in the lengths of the lines, or, in other words, of the number of 'short,' 'weak,' 'unstressed,' 'unaccented' syllables which are allowed to group themselves round the pivots or posts of the rhythm. Yet attempts have been made, not without fair success, to divide the sections or half-lines into groups or types of rhythm, more or less capable of being represented by the ordinary marks of metrical scansion. . . . A sort of monotone or hum . . . will indeed disengage itself for the attentive reader . . . but nothing more . . . the sharp and uncompromising section, the accents, the alliteration—these are all that the poet has to trust to in the way of rules *sine queis non*. But before long the said careful reader becomes aware that there is a 'lucky license,' which is as a rule,

and much more also; and that this license . . . concerns the allowance of unaccented and unalliterated syllables. The range of it is so great that at a single page-opening, taken at random, you might find the lines varying from nine to fifteen syllables, and, seeking a little further, come to a variation between eight and twenty-one." [1] In Piers Ploughman the verse still consists of "a pair of sharply-separated halves which never on any consideration run syllabically into each other, and are much more often than not divided by an actual stop, if only a brief one, of sense" [2]; but there is a greater approximation, though only an approximation to regularity in the length of the lines: and the first hemistich (measured of course syllabically not by its stressed syllables, which are always equal in number) is generally longer than the second.[3]

As between Anglo-Saxon poetry or "Piers Ploughman"

[1] G. Saintsbury, *A History of English Prosody*, i. 13 f.

[2] Ibid. i. 182.

[3] Cp. ibid. i. 184. Prof. Saintsbury gives the well-known opening lines of the poem as an illustration. A briefer specimen from elsewhere (ed. Wright, i. 6442–6457) may serve for the comparison with Hebrew poetry made above.

On Good Friday I fynde · a felon was y-saved,
That hadde lyved al his life · with lesynges and with thefte;
And for he beknede to the cros, · and to Christ shrof him,
He was sonner y-saved · than seint Johan the Baptist;
And or Adam or Ysaye, · or any of the prophetes,
That hadde y-leyen with Lucifer · many longe yeres,
A robbere was y-raunsoned · rather than thei alle,
Withouten any penaunce of purgatorie, · to perpetuel blisse.

The most famous example in later English literature of rhythm resting on equality in the number of accented syllables accompanied by great inequality in the total number of the syllables is Coleridge's "Christabel." The accented syllables in the lines are always four; the total number of syllables commonly varies, as Coleridge himself puts it, from seven to twelve, and in the third line of the poem drops down to four. For reference I cite the five opening lines:—

'Tis the middle of night by the castle clock,
And the owls have awakened the crowing cock;
Tu-whit!—Tu-whoo!
And hark, again! the crowing cock,
How drowsily it crew.

and Hebrew parallelistic poetry these resemblances are certain: (1) the isolated verse in Anglo-Saxon corresponds to the parallel distich in Hebrew; (2) the strong internal pause in Anglo-Saxon to the end of the first parallel period of the Hebrew distich; (3) there is a correspondingly great irregularity in the number of the syllables in successive lines of Anglo-Saxon, and in successive distichs of Hebrew. Yet whether the two poetical materials, the Anglo-Saxon and the Hebrew, agree in what is after all most fundamental in Anglo-Saxon, viz., the constant quantity of stressed syllables in a verse, and the constant ratio of the stressed syllables in the two parts of a verse to one another remains for consideration; the answer is not immediately obvious, for Hebrew does not so unambiguously and conveniently indicate what are the stressed syllables in a line as does Anglo-Saxon by its alliterative system. In many Hebrew lines we cannot immediately see for certain either which, or how many, are the stressed syllables: what means exist for ultimately determining these uncertainties in part or entirely I will consider later. But first I return to a point already reached in the last article.

Even parallelism suggests a division of Hebrew distichs into two broad types of rhythm: in one of these two types the two parallel lines balance one another, whereas in the other the second comes short of and echoes the first. No great attention is required in reading Lamentations v., or Job xxviii., or many other passages in Job or the Deutero-Isaiah, or many Psalms, such as, e.g., li., in order to become aware of the dominance and, in some cases, of the almost uninterrupted recurrence of balance between the successive couplets of mostly parallel lines; nor, again, in reading Lamentations ii., iii., iv. to become aware of the different rhythm produced when a shorter line constantly succeeds to a longer one. So far we can get without any theory as to

the correct method, if there be one, whereby these rhythms should be more accurately measured or described, or as to the best nomenclature wherewith to distinguish these differences when we wish to refer to them. But if we get thus far, it further becomes clear that, if we admit the prevalence in Lamentations iv. of a clearly defined rhythm fit to receive a name of its own, whether or not the name *ḳinah* by which this rhythm commonly goes be the best term to define it, then Lamentations v. and Job xxviii. also have, though a different, yet a no less clearly defined rhythm whether we give it a name or not; and of course, if we wish to discuss the subject, we must find some convenient way of referring to this rhythm no less than to the other.

To distinguish these two broad classes of clearly distinguished types of rhythm I have suggested the terms *balancing rhythm* and *echoing rhythm*.[1] This terminology seems to me free from some of the objections which attach to the term *ḳinah* as a term for the echoing rhythm, even if we could discover a good companion term to *ḳinah* to describe the other type. As I pointed out in the last article, *ḳinah* rhythm is really a rather ambiguous term, meaning either the total rhythmical effect of a poem in which a particular echoing rhythm is prevalent, or that particular echoing rhythm even though it be confined to a single line or period. And one serious disadvantage of the term *ḳinah* rhythm lies in the ease with which it obscures the fact that within the same elegy or other rhythmically similar poem more than one type of rhythm as a matter of fact occurs.

But whether even *echoing rhythm* and *balancing rhythm* be a satisfactory terminology for the two broad classes of Hebrew rhythm under which sub-classes may be found, this broad

[1] *Isaiah* ("International Critical Commentary"), i. p. lxiii.

fundamental distinction itself is nevertheless worth keeping clear; it forms a comfortable piece of solid ground from which to set out and to which to return from excursions into the shaking bog or into the treacherous quagmire that certainly needs to be traversed before the innermost secrets of Hebrew metre can be wrested and laid bare.

In Lamentations v. a balancing rhythm, in Lamentations iv. an echoing rhythm prevails; a rapid reading of the two chapters will suffice to verify this general statement. But, if the reader will re-read the chapters with closer attention to details, he will probably feel that Lamentations v. 2—

נחלתנו נהפכה לזרים
בתינו לנכרים

Our inheritance is turned unto strangers,
Our houses unto aliens,

differs not only in respect of its parallelism but also of its rhythm from most of the other verses in the same chapter, and also that, while it is rhythmically unlike most of chap. v., it is rhythmically like most of Lamentations iv.; it is, for example, rhythmically unlike Lamentations v. 13—

בחורים טחון נשאו
ונערים בעץ כשלו

it is, on the other hand, rhythmically like, e.g., Lamentations iv. 8.

זכו נזיריה משלג
צחו מחלב

Her nobles were purer than snow,
Whiter than milk.

One or two other verses in Lamentations v. may at first seem ambiguous: are verses 3 and 14, for example, in balancing or echoing rhythm? Again, in Lamentations iv., where the echoing rhythm clearly and greatly prevails, a few verses disengage themselves as exceptions; e.g., ver. 13—

מחטאות נביאיה
עונות כהניה

For the sins of her prophets,
The iniquities of her priests,

gives the impression of balance rather than echo, though the entire rhythmical impression is not quite that which is left by the balancing rhythm of Lamentations v.

Thus, without any more detailed examination or exacter measurement of lines, we reach the important conclusion, which a close study of Lamentations i. abundantly confirms, that the same poem may contain distichs of different metrical character.

But within what limits may or do these and other differences occur within the same poem? If that question is to be answered we must discover some principle of measurement which will enable us to determine in less simple cases than those just cited when the rhythm remains constant and when it changes, and how.

Is balance, then, due to (1) equality in the *number* of syllables in the two lines, and echo to inequality in the number of syllables? If this be so, then Lamentations v. 3,

יתומים היינו אין אב
אמותינו כאלמנות

is in balancing rhythm, the number of syllables in each line being eight.

Or (2) is balance due to the sum of the metrical values of all syllables in each line being the same, even though the number of the syllables differs? The number of syllables in a Latin hexameter varies; but the sum of the metrical values of the syllables must always be equivalent to six spondees. If this were the true account of Hebrew rhythm, it would become necessary to determine what syllables are metrically long, what short.

Or (3) is balance due to equality in the number of stressed or accented words or syllables in the two lines, echo to the presence of a greater number of stressed syllables in the first line, and a smaller number in the second? If so, is there *no* limit to the number of unstressed syllables that each stressed syllable can carry with it? If there is a limit, what is it? Is it no wider than in "Christabel"? or is it as wide as, or wider than, in Anglo-Saxon poetry?

Of these three possibilities, the first two seem to me to have been ruled out in the course of discussion and investigation concerning Hebrew metre. I confine myself to some discussion of the third.

It is just possible that some of the ancients had analysed the laws of Hebrew poetry sufficiently to detect the essential character of the stressed syllables. The interesting suggestion has been thrown out [1] that the author of Wisdom, who certainly attempted to naturalise parallelism in Greek, also attempted a new Greek rhythm on the model of the Hebrew by making the parallel periods in Greek contain the same number of accented syllables. Then again in the opinion of some the difficult passage in Origen which refers to the subject of Hebrew metre implies an appreciation of the stressed syllables.[2]

Be this as it may there has certainly been an increasing

[1] *Encyclopædia Biblica*, col. 5344.

[2] Origen's scholion has already been cited (May, 1913, p. 427, *n.* 4). The subject of the scholion is Psalm cxix. 1—

אשרי תמי דרך
ההלכים בתורת יהוה

which contains six fully stressed words and is rendered in the LXX—

Μακάριοι οἱ ἄμωμοι ἐν ὁδῷ,
οἱ πορευόμενοι ἐν νόμῳ κυρίου,

which contains six accents. Ley (*Zeitschr. für die A. T. Wissenschaft*, 1892, pp. 212 ff.) argues that one of the things which Origen is struggling to express is that in this particular verse we find the unusual phenomenon of text and translation containing the same number of stressed words and consequently the same rhythm.

agreement among modern students of this subject, particularly under the influence of Ley, to find in the stressed words or syllables the "pivots or posts," to use Professor Saintsbury's phrase, of the Hebrew rhythm.

But allowing this, what is the limit—for there surely must be some limit—to the number of unstressed syllables that may accompany each or any of the stressed syllables? Again, is there any law governing the position of the stressed syllable in relation to the unstressed syllables that go with it?

Taking the first of these two questions first:—Does a single word extending beyond a certain given number of syllables *necessarily* contain more than one stress? or is such a word ambiguous, capable of receiving two, but capable also of receiving only one stress? And is the actual number of unstressed syllables that may accompany a stressed syllable neither less nor more than the number of syllables in the longest Hebrew word with inseparable attachments such as a preposition at the beginning and a suffix at the close? In other words, is the general rule: one word, one stress, to which words of more than a certain number of syllables, say four, so far form an exception that they *may* receive a second stress? Or, to put it otherwise, in such longer words may the counter-tone as well as the tone count as a full stress? I incline to the opinion that by the rule that words of a certain length may, but do not necessarily, receive a double stress, we at least approximate closely to an actual law of Hebrew rhythm. But there is a second question: does every single word receive a stress, or, as in several lines of "Christabel," may we in Hebrew poetry have not only several syllables but also more words than one to each stress?

We obtain some light on both these questions from certain characteristics of the Massoretic punctuation, and on the

second of them from Assyrian analogy also. The effect of *makkeph* in the Massoretic system is to render vowelless any word which is thus joined to a succeeding word. We may believe that the principle of the Massoretic *makkeph* corresponds to a principle in the ancient language without accepting every particular use of *makkeph* in the Massoretic text as corresponding to the intention of the original writers. Nothing is more probable than that the negative particle לא, conjunctions like כי, and other particles were frequently toneless: but were they so regularly? If not, and if also we cannot unquestioningly follow the Massoretic punctuation, then an element of uncertainty arises as to the number of stressed syllables in a given line; for example, do the two lines in Isaiah i. 3,

ישראל לא ידע
עמי לא התבונן

contain each three stresses (as in MT), or each but two? We cannot determine this off-hand. If, indeed, we lay down the principle that two stressed syllables must not immediately follow one another, then the two לא's must be makkephed, for in each line the syllable that precedes לא is stressed; but it is decidedly dangerous to lay this down as a rigid principle, in spite of the strong tendency in MT to use *makkeph* in order to avoid such concurrences. Modern Palestinian popular songs, which have much that is analogous to Hebrew poetry, according to the express testimony of Dalman,[1] admit the concurrence of two tone-syllables. And the importance of לא in the two lines above cited rather strongly indicates that it there received the stress in each line.

But there are other combinations of words that are frequently makkephed in the Massoretic text; for example,

[1] "Zuweilen stossen auch zwei betonte Silben unmittelbar auf einander," *Palästinischer Diwân*, p. xxiii.

constructs and genitives. Again the question arises: were such combinations regularly read with a single stress? if not, has the MT always preserved a correct tradition of the intention of the original writer? We are thus faced with another group of uncertainties. These can perhaps be reduced by observing that in MT there is a far greater tendency to makkeph construct and genitive if the construct case is free from prefixed inseparable particles such as prepositions or the copula; so, e.g., in Lamentations iv. 9 we find חללי־חרב, but מחללי הרב is without *makkeph*.

The Massoretic punctuation rests partly on an ancient tradition, partly on an exegetical theory, partly on an accommodation of the text to a recent mode of reading it. It is valuable, therefore, to have such principles as that the negative particles are normally, and construct cases often, toneless, supported by Assyrian analogy.

In the *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* for 1895 (pp. 11 ff.) Zimmern published an interesting Assyrian poem, as it appeared to be, though Dr. Langdon tells me that neither Zimmern himself nor any one else has yet succeeded in making a consecutive translation of it, and that it may be in reality a succession of disconnected verses written out in illustration of scansion. In any case the interesting point is that here we seem to have visualised a mode of scansion that throws light on the composition of the feet or rhythmical units in Assyrian, for these verses are divided by longitudinal lines into four sections, and by latitudinal lines into groups of eleven. The longitudinal lines mark off into separate compartments the four-stressed syllables or words with their accompanying unstressed syllables, which here, as in most Assyrian and Babylonian poetry, compose the line.

I will briefly summarise the statements made by Zimmern at the time based on his first examination of this

document ; these were amplified in a later article, to which reference will be made below. According to Zimmern, then, the following metrical facts are attested by these scansion tablets :—

(1) Normally there is to one word, one stress ; but (2) the relative pronoun (monosyllabic in Assyrian), the copula, prepositions, the negative particles *la* and *ul*, and the optative particle *lu* receive no stress, but go with the following word to form a single-stress group of syllables ; so also (3) the status constructus and the genitive generally receive but one stress ; on the other hand, if the second substantive has a pronominal suffix they receive two ; (4) two particles and a word, or one particle and a word with a pronominal suffix, form single-stress groups ; (5) two words expressing closely related ideas form a single-stress group ; e.g., *abi u banti* ; (6) a vocative may be inserted without being reckoned in any of the four stress-groups that compose the line.

Though we make the most of the suggestions from both sources, the Massoretic punctuation of the Hebrew text and the scansion of the Assyrian tablets, we shall still be left with a fair range of uncertainty, and many lines of Hebrew poetry will occur in which, judged by themselves, the number of stresses will remain ambiguous. And that ambiguity will be still further increased when we attempt to determine what single words, if any, may receive two stresses ; here again some light is cast on the possibility of such double stress by the Massoretic punctuation ; for as the effect of *makkeph* is to bring two or more words under one tone, so the effect of *metheg* is to indicate the presence in the same word of two tones, of a countertone in addition to the main tone. But there is no probability that all the countertones marked by *metheg*, such, for example, as the first syllable in forms like קָטְלוּ, really received a

stress; and for this theory of double-stressed words we receive, I think, no very helpful analogy from Assyrian.

The question, then, arises: Can we discover a more accurate method of determining the limits of what may accompany a stressed syllable? It is the attempt to answer this question that occupies in the main the attention of recent theorisers on Hebrew metre, and it is in the attempt to answer it that they diverge from one another.

The popularity which for a time was enjoyed by Bickell's system has waned in favour of that of Sievers, which has the advantage of being very much more elaborately and systematically worked out. I propose very briefly to summarise some of the chief points in Sievers' system, premising at the outset that if it could be held to be established it would (1) greatly reduce, though not entirely eliminate, lines of ambiguous measurement; and (2) give for every line, regarded by itself independently of its association with any other line, a clear rhythmical definition.

In connexion with the present discussion the two fundamental laws of Sievers' system can, perhaps, best be stated thus: (1) the number of unstressed syllables that may accompany a stressed syllable must never exceed four, and only in a particular type of cases may it exceed three. Corollary: every word containing more than five syllables must have two stresses. (2) The stressed syllable regularly *follows* the unstressed syllables that accompany it; and more than a single unstressed syllable may never follow the stressed syllable that it accompanies.

Using the term anapaest not of course of a combination of two short followed by a long syllable, but of two unstressed syllables followed by one that is stressed, Sievers claims that the Hebrew rhythm rests on an anapaestic basis, and that the normal foot is

examples of such feet being עַל־בְּנֵי, יִקְטְלוּ, דְּרָכִים. Possibly variations of the normal foot are—

(1) × × × ⏑
(2) × ⏑, and even
(3) ⏑

Moreover since the stress may fall on a syllable which with an additional and secondary short syllable corresponds to an original single syllable, as in the segholates, further variations are × ×⏑×, × × ×⏑×, etc., an example of such feet being לִפְנֵי־הַמֶּלֶךְ.[1]

If this theory be entirely sound, or even if it closely approximates to the truth, it will considerably diminish the range of uncertainty that must remain so long as we leave entirely undetermined the limits of the unstressed syllables that may accompany a stressed syllable. This may be illustrated by an example: how many stressed syllables are there in each of these lines in Psalm i. 1—

ובדרך חטאים לא עמד
ובמושב לצים לא ישב ?

The question turns on the treatment of לא; was it stressed or unstressed? The Massoretic punctuation leaves the negative in each line disunited from the rest and therefore capable at least of being stressed; and Dr. Briggs[2] in

[1] After Sievers had indicated his theory in outline, Zimmern (*Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*, xii. 382–392) returned to the examination of the scansion tablets referred to above and found that between two stressed syllables at least one, generally two, and not rarely three unstressed syllables occurred, but never or quite rarely more than three.

It may be worth while adding here that Dalman (*Palästinischer Diwân*, p. xxiii. with footnote) has found that, in the modern Palestinian (Arabic) poems that follow not a quantitative but an accentual system, one to three and occasionally four, unstressed syllables occur between the stressed syllables. The value of these Palestinian analogies lies in the fact that we are dealing not with speculations as to how a written poem was or could be pronounced, but with the manner in which hitherto unwritten poems were actually read to the editor who committed them to writing.

[2] Since these articles were written and the earlier ones published Biblical scholarship has suffered a heavy loss through the lamented

calling the lines tetrameters certainly allows a stress to each לֹא. I think it may be urged against this that לֹא has nothing like the need of emphasis and stress here that it has in the lines previously cited from Isaiah i. 3, where לֹא יָדַע is antithetic to יָדַע in the previous distich. I should therefore think it most probable that the lines were three-stressed and not four-stressed; but apart from the bearing of the rest of the Psalm on the question we cannot determine the point unless we are justified in calling in such a theory as that of Sievers. Now it is perfectly true that even on that system monosyllabic feet are possible, and that לֹא in particular at times, as in Isaiah i. 3, stands by itself as a foot; but if the anapæst is the basis of the rhythm, we cannot naturally divide each of the two perfectly normal anapæsts לֹא־יָדַע and לֹא־יָשַׁב into a monosyllabic and a dissyllabic foot; on Sievers' theory the only natural way of reading the two lines is with three stresses; they are, to use Dr. Briggs' terminology, trimeters, not tetrameters.

Sievers' theory, then, if established, would reduce the number of lines which, measured with exclusive reference to the stressed words or syllables only, are ambiguous. Is the theory, then, as a matter of fact, so firmly established on perfectly certain data that it does actually diminish the number of uncertainties that are left when we attempt to count stressed syllables simply without very closely defining either the position which such stressed syllables must occupy, or the number of unstressed syllables which may accompany them? I doubt it. I cannot here undertake any examination or criticism of Sievers' long and

death of Dr. Briggs. It so happens that I have mainly referred to details in Dr. Briggs' work with which I disagree; I therefore seize this opportunity of recalling the fact that in the subject with which I am now dealing Dr. Briggs was a true pioneer, and that he was one of the first writers in English to insist on the fundamental importance in Hebrew prosody of the stressed syllable.

exhaustive exposition of his theory ; nor can I examine his arguments, worthy as most of them are of the closest attention, by which he supports certain theories of vocalisation on which his metrical system rests. But these theories, however much may be said for some of them, are not all of them as yet so certainly established as to allow the metrical system, which in part suggests them, but which also certainly rests upon them, to furnish a sufficiently sure instrument for eliminating the uncertainties that arise when we measure a Hebrew text by the stressed syllables only. The degree of uncertainty which the theory would remove is largely counterbalanced by the insecurity of the basis on which it rests.

In illustration of what I have just said it must suffice to refer to a few classes of the conjectural vocalisation adopted by Sievers, all of which are more or less essential to the smooth working out of his system.

(1) Partly on general phonetic grounds, partly from actual features of the Massoretic vocalisation, such as the alternative forms of the type לַמְּלָכִים and לַמַּלָכִים, and the complete abandonment of the reduplication and also of the following syllable in such inflexions as זְכָרֹן from זֵכֶר, שְׁנָיוֹן from שֵׁנִית, Sievers infers that *regularly* when, owing to inflexion, the full vowel after a reduplicated consonant is lost, the reduplication and also the vowel that followed it were entirely lost also ; and that for example, למלכים was always pronounced *lamlachim* in three syllables, never *lamm^{e}lachim* in four, and ויהי always *waihi* (cp. מִידֵי not מִיֵּדִי) and never *way^{e}hi*.

(2) Certain classes of verbal forms were always, according to the theory, a syllable shorter than in MT ; e.g. תָּבֹא not תָּבוֹא. Again, the two forms of the second masc. sing. perfect were not, as in MT, pronounced alike ; קָטַלְתָּה was trissyllabic—*kaṭalta*, but the far more frequent form

קָטַלְתְּ was dissyllabic—*kaṭalt*; so in the second sing. fem. קָטַלְתְּי was trissyllabic—*kaṭalti*, קָטַלְתְּ dissyllabic—*kaṭalt*.

(3) Certain pronominal forms were originally pronounced with a syllable less than in MT; thus MT יְדֵךְ, pausal יָדֶךָ, has replaced יְדָךְ; cp. such forms in Origen's *Hexapla* as ηχαλαχ=הֵיכָלֵךְ, βαχ = בְּךָ, and in Jerome *goolathach*= גְּאֻלָּתֵךְ. And it is also argued that the endings ־ָה, ־ֶה were once monosyllabic.

It will be seen from the foregoing examples that the tendency of Sievers' vocalisation is to reduce the number of syllables below the number produced by the received system. Consequently what I stated as the first fundamental law of his metrical system, viz. that not more than four unstressed syllables may under any circumstances accompany one stressed syllable, often means not more than five stressed syllables counted according to the received system.

One other of Sievers' theories with regard to the pronunciation of Hebrew poetry must also be noted; it works in an opposite direction, and is designed to supply unstressed syllables when their absence would be too keenly felt. Sievers admits monosyllabic feet, but he abhors the concurrence of two stressed syllables; he calls to his aid the analogy of singing: as in singing a single syllable is sung to more than one note by virtually repeating the vowel sound, so Sievers postulates that when tone-syllables appear to follow one another immediately the long tone-syllable was broken up into two in pronunciation; e.g. in such circumstances לֹא was pronounced not *lō*, but *lŏ-ō*, and קוֹל not *kōl*, but *kŏ-ōl*, and the metrical foot is in each case not ⏑ – but × ⏑ –.

Two things seem to me to gain probability from Sievers' exhaustive discussion, even though the elaborated system rests on too much that is still uncertain or insecure: (1)

the natural basis of Hebrew rhythm is anapæstic rather than dactylic; this is really an obvious corollary from the regularity with which the Hebrew accent falls on the last syllable of words, and the infrequency of detached monosyllables, and earlier metrists also have for the most part detected a prevalence of anapæstic or iambic rhythm in Hebrew; (2) in the union of two or more words under one stress, and in the distribution of long words among two stress groups we should be guided by the principle that the stress groups within the same period are likely to be not too dissimilar in size and character; and in general it is safer to proceed on the assumption that particles like בְּ, עַל, etc., rarely receive the stress unless for some reason an actual sense-emphasis falls upon them.

The sum of the whole matter is that we are left with an instrument of measurement capable of doing some service, but much less delicately accurate, or much less clearly read, than we could wish. With this instrument we must work at the difficult question, which I have so far but indicated, but which I shall examine more closely in the next article: What limits, if any, are set to the number of different rhythms that may be introduced into the same poem?

In concluding the present article I will consider one further possible, and even probable, service which it appears to me that parallelism may render in reducing the element of uncertainty in determining the rhythm of particular lines. In Anglo-Saxon, alliteration clearly distinguishes three of the stressed syllables in a line leaving only the fourth outwardly undistinguished; Hebrew has no such outward indication of this all-important element in the rhythm; in particular all particles, all construct cases and some other types of words are rhythmically ambiguous; in a given line they may be stressed or they may not. What

I suggest is that parallel verses tended at least to receive the same treatment in respect of stress or non-stress. I will give one or two illustrations of the value of this law if its probability be admitted. If we take by itself the line (Isa. i. 10)

שמעו דבר יהוה קציני סדם

we may certainly be in doubt whether דבר יהוה received one stress or two, and whether the whole line was read with four stresses or five. Sievers gives it but four, and thereby in its context, as I believe, treats it wrongly. I suggest that דבר ought to receive the same metrical value as its parallel term in the completely and symmetrically parallel line or period that follows, and that we should read both periods alike with five stresses—

שמעו דבר יהוה קציני סדם
האזינו תורת אלהינו עם עמרה

A more troublesome example is Isaiah i. 4—

הוי גוי חוטא
עם כבד עון

This Sievers reads thus—

הוי גוי־חוטא
עם־כבד עון

and so far observes the rule which I am suggesting that he leaves both the parallel terms גוי and עם unstressed; on the other hand, חוטא and its parallel כבד עון do not receive the same treatment, though they are quite capable of so doing. A more probable reading of the lines will be either—

הוי־גוי חוטא
עם כבד־עון

or

הוי | גוי חוטא
עם כבד־עון

I take as a last example an *apparent* exception to the law. Lamentations i. 1 reads—

איכה ישבה בדד | העיר רבתי עם
היתה כאלמנה | רבתי בגוים
שרתי במדינות | היתה למס

Budde suspected העיר in the first line on the ground that at present the second half of the first line contains three stresses, whereas it should only contain two. Sievers removes the ground for suspicion by treating רבתי־עם together as a single stress. At first this seems, by making רבתי unstressed, to give a term in the first line a metrically different character from that of corresponding terms, רבתי and שרתי, in the second and third lines. But the parallelism of רבתי in the first line with רבתי in the second and שרתי in the third is, as a matter of fact, not complete; the real parallel in the first line to רבתי in the second line and שרתי in the third is not רבתי by itself but רבתי עם, which, so taken together, is also an antithetic parallel to the single stressed word בדד in the first half of the line; it is only when taken together that the words רבתי עם express the idea in the mind of the writer, viz., the populousness of the city, whereas רבתי in the second and שרתי in the third line sufficiently express by themselves the ideas of the "great lady" (in antithesis to "the widow") and "the princess"; בגוים and במדינות respectively serve merely to amplify the two ideas. The distinction between רבתי עם and רבתי בגוים is shown grammatically by the difference in construction; and the writer probably allowed himself to repeat the same word רבתי in the two lines instead of using two different and synonymous terms on the same kind of principle as that of the well-known law of Arabic poetry that the same word may be repeated in the course of a poem as the rhyme word, provided that the word is used on the two occasions with some difference of meaning.

Thus, perhaps, a close examination of Lamentations i. 1 confirms, rather than reveals an exception to, the law which I have suggested, and incidentally shows that העיר is not merely metrically possible, which Budde had denied and which is all that Sievers claimed, but metrically required.

G. Buchanan Gray.

THE NEW TESTAMENT LANGUAGE OF ENDEARMENT TO THE LORD JESUS CHRIST.

I.

No term of endearment to Christ in N.T. by the disciples.

Although the New Testament enshrines for us the ardent devotion of the disciples to their Lord, it does not contain in all the varied range of its writings one single expression of endearment which is applied either directly or indirectly to Him. In the present day we are familiar with such expressions as "precious Saviour," "dear Jesus," "my Jesus." A well-known hymn contains the lines:

> "To Thee, O dear, dear Saviour,
> My spirit turns for rest."

In a justly valued book of devotion, an eminent divine writes: "In this, as in all things, Jesus left us an example that we should follow His dear and worshipped steps." But familiar as this usage is to-day it has no parallel in the whole of the New Testament.

Not because first disciples were cold.

It was not that the first disciples were cold, formal or impassive. The mere memory of the names of Peter, John, Paul, Mary, and even Judas, puts such an idea at once to flight. Nor was it that the first disciples were deficient in the phraseology of endearment. In the Pauline letters, Amplias, Stachys, Persis, Timotheus, Philemon, Tychicus, Luke, Onesimus, are among those referred to as "beloved" (*ἀγαπητοί*). In the Petrine

letters Paul as well as the recipients are referred to by the same term. In the Johannine letters "beloved" is the constant form of address. Again, we have the occurrence in the Gospels of such diminutives as *παιδίον*, "little child; *κοράσιον*, "little girl"; *παιδίσκη*, "little maid"; *παιδάριον*, "little boy." All these are indications of an atmosphere of emotion which is the native air of terms of endearment. Nor is it possible to read the Epistle to the Philippians, with its chafing torrent of affection, and to doubt that the passionate enthusiasm which it reveals was rich in the expletives of love. The fourth chapter of the Epistle supplies us with an example in the first verse: *ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοὶ καὶ ἐπιπόθητοι χαρὰ καὶ στέφανός μου, οὕτω στήκετε ἐν Κυρίῳ, ἀγαπητοί.* The *χαρὰ καὶ στέφανός μου* is sufficient evidence of the capacity of New Testament emotion to provide itself with a vehicle of endearing expression when occasion demanded. But apparently for Christ occasion did not demand. For opulent as the New Testament is in the experience and the expression of love, tracing as it does that marvellous river to its fountain-head in Christ, nevertheless for Christ Himself it has not one fond word, not one endearing phrase. Neither Paul nor Peter refers to Christ or addresses Him as *ἀγαπητός*. Charles Kingsley who loved to acknowledge the debt he owed to Frederick Denison Maurice, addresses him in one of his letters as "My dearest master." But Paul, though he loved to call himself the *δοῦλος Χριστοῦ*, never referred to Christ as his *Κύριος ἀγαπητός*. The nearest approach Paul ever makes to the widespread modern usage of endearment is in Philippians iii. 8, where by the possessive *μου* he betrays something of the same attitude. But that is all.

Three instances of term of endearment used of Christ.

It is true that there are three instances in the New Testament in which the term *ἀγαπητός* or its cognate *ἠγαπημένος* is applied to Christ. First, at the Baptism, "And lo, a voice from

heaven saying, This is my beloved (ἀγαπητός) Son in whom I am well pleased." Secondly, at the Transfiguration—a repetition of the same voice. Thirdly, in Ephesians i. 6, "grace . . . which he freely bestowed on us in the beloved, (ἠγαπημένῳ). But it is to be observed that in each of these cases the word "beloved" is used to express the heart of the Father towards the Son, and not the heart of the disciple towards the Lord. Paul greets Stachys as "beloved," and Timotheus as his "beloved son," and Paul himself is referred to as "our beloved brother." But neither Paul, nor Peter, nor James, nor even John, apply to Christ the term "beloved."

But not by disciples.

II.

The modern usage, then, is not derived from the New Testament stratum of Christian life. It probably dates from a later age, which has been coloured by the allegorical interpretation of the Song of Songs. It is at least evident from what has been said that the modern usage is foreign to the New Testament.

Why?

But when we have said so much, we are still left with an interesting and suggestive problem. It is this. If New Testament emotion flowed so easily into expressions of endearment when referring to the disciples, why was it that it never took that direction when referring to the Lord? The attempt to solve the problem fastens attention upon the attitude of the disciples towards the Lord. If our inquiry reveals some new element in their attitude to Him, it will reveal at the same time some new aspect of His Person, or at least re-emphasise one that is familiar.

"No love felt."

The first hypothesis is, obviously, that because we find no language of love applied to the name of Christ, therefore there was no love, as we understand love,

felt towards Him. He excited respect, reverence, awe—but not love. He was continually zoned about with the air of the Jericho road when He went before His disciples and they were amazed. They were always aware of the latent light of the Transfiguration. They were drawn to Him as to a portent. They were fascinated as sea-birds which dash themselves upon the brilliance of the lighthouse windows at night. But such a hypothesis as this will not bear the weight of the recorded facts. Mary took her costliest possession and in a moment lavished its wealth upon Him as though it were a little thing. When Peter had denied Him it was no prudential self-accusation that he felt. He went out and wept bitterly. Even Judas, when he found that Jesus was condemned, threw down his ill-gotten gain in a passion of remorse, and went and hanged himself. Joseph of Arimathaea begged His body. Mary Magdalene wept when she could not find it. The two heavy-hearted disciples on their way to Emmaus were showing such outward signs of grief that a stranger could remark upon the fact without exciting their comment. Stephen was stoned for Him. Paul, who in all his epistles utters not one word of endearment towards Him, yet suffered the loss of all things for Him, and was so inflamed with love for Him that He counted all things but as stable-sweepings that He might win Him. This is not awe or reverence or fascination only. It is love.

Impossible.

A more likely line of solution is that the disciples were conscious of a relationship with Christ which was something quite above and apart from their relation with their fellows. Their love for one another found its origin in Him. In Jesus the disciples were aware of a passion towards them of such a quality that they lost sight of their derivative passion towards Him, just as when the sun rises the stars pale their

An altogether new relation.

Sun and stars.

ineffectual fires and disappear. The love He manifested towards them was of such a quality as to leave them without a name for the extraordinary response it awakened in their own hearts. To have attempted to express it by the ordinary terms would have been to belittle it. "Dear," "beloved," "dearly beloved," "precious"—such terms would be but thimbles to take up the sea. Adjectives always limit and define. But here was something indefinable and limitless, and so they leave the infinite length and depth and breadth and height of the love undescribed by any word because they felt instinctively that no word can describe it. Hence we find that while the apostles readily applied their expressions of endearment to one another, yet with a fine reticence they refrained from applying them to Him. They spoke of Him as "Jesus" or "Jesus Christ" or "our Lord Jesus Christ" or as "our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ." The book of modern devotion says: "in His dear and worshipped steps." But the New Testament says quite simply: "in His steps."

Adjectives belittle.

The simplicity of N.T. reference to Christ.

There was an occasion when a courtier lavished upon Him the adjective "good," but he found himself checked, and the prodigal adjectival mood challenged by the question, "Why callest thou me good?"

It was not failure to appreciate Christ that made these apostles chary of expression. It was the very depth of their emotion that made them dumb. "The love of Christ constraineth us," says Paul—not our love to Christ but His love to us. That is the motive power of the apostolic life. The apostles are but as vessels swept onwards to their haven by an irresistible tide of unfailing love.

Depth makes dumb.

Let us challenge the position we have taken. Is the argument valid that there is no expression of love because

the love is so deep ? The answer is that there is a deeper manner of expression than by words. In the bereaved home there is something harder to bear than the sound of weeping and the sight of tears, and that is the spectacle of sorrow that is tearless and inarticulate. The deepest sorrow is silent.

> "The Wye is hush'd nor moved along
> And hush'd my deepest grief of all,
> When fill'd with tears that cannot fall
> I brim with sorrow drowning song.
>
> The tide flows down, the wave again
> Is vocal in its wooded walls ;
> My deeper anguish also falls
> And I can speak a little then."

It is when the river runs shallow that it is vocal. It is still waters that run deep.

Si monumentum quaeris circumspice.

Although St. Paul's Cathedral has many noble monuments to the illustrious dead that are interred in its precincts it has no monument to the architect. But on the stones are engraved the words : *si monumentum quaeris, circumspice.* It is even so with Christ. For others there are words of endearment in plenty. But for the Architect of Love Himself there is no endearing word. And yet the whole community of loving souls, "fitly framed together, and growing unto an holy Temple," is the great New Testament language of endearment and the glossary of love ; the lives of the saints in all lands and in all ages are the catholic expression of their response to Him who loved them and gave Himself for them. Love so amazing, so divine has claimed far more than the homage of their lips. It has claimed their soul, their life, their all. The humble and obedient life of serious devotion to the will of God is the true New Testament language of endearment to the Lord. "Not every one that saith unto me, 'Lord,

Lord,' shall enter into the kingdom of heaven: but he that doeth the will of my Father which is in heaven"; and "if ye love me, keep my commandments."

Even in this conclusion there are still implications to be worked out and suggestions to be traced, but if these have been made plain the object of this article is attained.

CUTHBERT MCEVOY.

THE AIM AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

II. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION AS AN AUTONOMOUS SUBJECT.

IN the preceding article of this series I dwelt upon the close connexion which necessarily exists between theology and philosophy, and used the phrase 'philosophy of religion' in the broad and indeterminate sense of describing this general connexion. But this phrase has now come to possess a narrower and more definite meaning. Since the first half of the nineteenth century philosophy of religion has been distinguished as a special department of study, with a subject-matter of its own. In the time of Hegel works began to appear bearing the title of *Religionsphilosophie*, and that philosopher was the first writer of importance to give a systematic and comprehensive treatment of the subject thus described. Philosophy of religion, in this sense, is therefore one of the younger or more recently constituted departments of theology. Whereas knowledge of God is the result of philosophy, such knowledge, Hegel said, is made the beginning, and becomes the special object, of philosophy of religion. Philosophy of religion thus ceased to be merely a collection of utterances of philosophers, ranging from *obiter dicta* to lengthy reasonings, upon theological questions: it became something more systematic

and autonomous. It does not disregard, but, on its historical side, embraces the study of these utterances; but such study by no means constitutes the whole field of philosophy of religion. Nor does it renounce connexion with general philosophy. Metaphysical speculation presents us, it is true, with no single coherent and established philosophy of God and man, comparable in universality of acceptance with our empirical science of Nature; it has yielded, rather, a system of systems, in whose continuous evolution we see logical process and historical development largely identified. But a system comprising even partially incompatible systems is not a chaos of conflicting elements from which no intellectual 'results' can be collected; in the tissue of classic philosophical thought we are now able to distinguish assumptions that have been proved to be impossible, lines of tentative reasoning and research which have been found to lead nowhere, and at least some truths established beyond reasonable question. Such results lie to hand for application by the young science, the characteristics of which I am about to attempt to describe. As was remarked in the preceding article, the Christian theologian thus finds in existence various forms of rational theology based on other foundations, and deduced by partially different methods, from those which he, as an interpreter of a revealed religion, has been accustomed chiefly to employ. Not, indeed, that the Christian first encounters philosophical theology when he turns from his own traditional inheritance to contemplate the thought of Spinoza, Kant, or Hegel. The symbols which define the outlines of his Christian belief are themselves partly expressed in language whose use, as we have seen, is due to the familiarity of the Fathers with the best philosophic speculation of antiquity. I mean, rather, that in the contributions of pure philosophers—more especially those of the modern period, for ancient philosophy, apart

from its historical import, is practically superseded—towards the scientific definition of theological concepts and the solution of numerous problems of theological import, the Christian teacher finds a body of thought which has passed through the fire of open and competent criticism, and such as is relevant to his own science, although it has for the most part professedly been elaborated in the absence of any reference to the historical facts on which Christianity is grounded.

This body of thought, let it be repeated, is not identical with what we are to call philosophy of religion, though the study of it is indispensable to the student of philosophy of religion. The pursuit which bears this title, in its stricter sense, is something more than the history of philosophical speculation in so far as it happens to have concerned itself with isolated religious problems, and something partly different from it. Nor is philosophy of religion to be identified with religiously inclined philosophising such as we meet with in neo-Platonism. It is not to be restricted, again, to the dogmatic theology of any particular positive religion, such as Christianity, when it has pressed philosophical concepts and methods into its service—as was the case with scholasticism. Philosophy of religion presupposes no one system of philosophy, nor any one distinct type of religion. It is not philosophical thinking prompted by a particular religion and pursued exclusively in the interests of that religion, but philosophical thinking which makes religion —religion in the broadest or most comprehensive sense— its object. It has to bear in mind, too, that the religious consciousness is only a part of human consciousness, and to endeavour to discover the significance of religion by obtaining a view of all aspects of human experience together. And it is one of the characteristics of the recent attitude of philosophy towards religion that religion is not dismissed

on the ground of its being either a human, not to say a priestly, invention, or a supernatural revelation ; but rather is investigated as a normal factor in human life which philosophy must take account of and interpret. Lastly, let it be remarked that philosophy of religion is not to be looked upon as a department of literature to which may be relegated all discussions which are too indefinite, too idle, too rhetorical, or too obviously characterised by dilettantism, to gain recognition or footing in any of the better-known branches of theology or science. In no branch of research is long, patient, and thorough preparation more essential, and strenuous intellectual effort more imperatively required.

I have so far indicated that philosophy of religion has become a separate branch of knowledge with an individuality of its own, and have distinguished between the newer and the older, the narrower and the broader, senses in which the phrase which forms its title has been used. I would now remark that in spite of its acquired independence, this field of study is still very vaguely defined. The term philosophy of religion is employed, by writers of books upon the subject, with considerable elasticity ; and there seems to be divergence of opinion as to how much, and as to what, should be denoted by it. The matter is not entirely one of words and convenient terminology.

Diversity of usage in this case implies difference of philosophical creed, and partly has its source also in the arbitrary selection of subject-matter for consideration which is naturally indulged in by individual writers in the absence of any universally accepted or logically acquired definition. A glance at some of the best-known works dealing with philosophy of religion will serve to verify this statement. One is devoted chiefly to empirical facts and generalisations concerning the origin, development, and

essential nature of religion, and to the connexion between religious belief and moral postulates; another treats almost exclusively of psychological questions, and the motives to belief; questions which seem, from the space allotted to them, to be thought by one author to be of paramount importance, will be almost ignored by another who equally professes to cover the whole ground. A lack of comprehensiveness of treatment, of system, of proportion and balance, and even of agreement as to what subjects should be included and what should be omitted from a treatise on philosophy of religion, prevails up to the present amongst those who have taken in hand to guide the student. This state of things, in so far as it is due to mere lack of definition, can be remedied when once the scope of the science has been objectively defined. As for differences of philosophical creed, they only lead indirectly to variety in the definition of the functions and scope of philosophy of religion; i.e., through having produced diversity of views as to what are the true functions and the scope of philosophy in general. So we may for the moment postpone the difficulty in the way of finding an universally acceptable definition of the philosophy of religion, attaching it to the word philosophy, which we provisionally take over with all its as yet unresolved ambiguity. We can then proceed to suggest that the most natural and obvious definition of philosophy of religion would be to philosophy in so far as it is concerned with religion. Whatever is meant, or should be meant, by the term 'philosophy,' as it stands alone, that (and nothing else, such as 'science'), should be understood by it when it forms part of the expression 'philosophy of religion.' Whatever be the functions of philosophy as a whole towards the special sciences and towards knowledge in general, the same should be the functions of philosophy of religion towards the particular science called the science of religion,

and towards theology in general. Whatever subdivisions, or separate studies, there are in philosophy, there should be the same number, corresponding each to each, in philosophy of religion. If philosophy be the queen of the sciences, and exercise functions towards the other sciences such as none of them can exercise on its own behalf or for another, philosophy of religion is the same royal personage, but regarded in the capacity of governor of a single province, rather than as supreme over the whole of her kingdom. The extent of the regal rights which she enjoys in the sub-kingdom will depend on the degree in which her monarchy is absolute or limited. In other words, the functions of philosophy of religion should be identical with those of philosophy, but exercised over a limited area; and the scope of philosophy of religion should be determined by the capacities with which we credit philosophy and by the boundaries which we assign to the territory of religion. In short, philosophy of religion is philosophy in so far as it makes religion its subject-matter; it belongs to philosophy but relates to religion.

Such is the definition, and the mode of determining the scope and content, of philosophy of religion which seems to me at once the most natural and the most scientific. It would seem hitherto to have escaped attention through its unobtrusive obviousness. Its employment would certainly have served to introduce clearness of treatment into a subject which to this day has remained without either internal order or external delimitation; and for this reason I shall henceforth adopt it.

But the difficulty attaching to its use, which I just now postponed, must be removed before we can profitably apply it. That difficulty consists in the lack of an universal consensus among philosophers in consequence of which the teacher in this field must generally use a provisional rather

than a categorical mode of statement, and which obliges him to present arguments for and against controverted questions rather than cut and dried answers to problems. Philosophy is indeed often disparaged because it so seldom furnishes us, as science does, with a body of results as to which experts are unanimously agreed. Certainly it can boast of no *Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.* Still, there are worse states than that of 'learned ignorance.' And there is positive value in the study of the *attempts* of the best human intellects to attain to truth such as, from its very nature, is immensely more difficult of access than other kinds, if only for the reason that we are thereby helped to state the problems with less confusion of thought and fewer unconscious prepossessions, to avoid paths which have been found to lead astray, and pitfalls into which the unlearned immediately stumble. This character of philosophy, which gives it the appearance of a pursuit rather than of a system of knowledge, forces itself upon us at the outset of our present task. For we are confronted with conflicting opinions as to what should be signified by the word 'philosophy.'

As to one function of philosophy, indeed, all its teachers may be said to be agreed, in that they bestow upon philosophy the title *scientia scientiarum.* Philosophy is universally allowed to be the science of the sciences at least in the sense that it correlates, systematises, and unifies their results, combining them into a general knowledge of a cosmos. Just as it is the duty of each of the special sciences to generalise, within its sphere, the facts of which it makes an inventory and a classification, so is it the duty of the *scientia scientiarum* to transcend the limits of each and all of those specific groups of facts and laws, and to combine them under higher laws, under universal principles. This is one of the relations in which philosophy stands to the

special sciences, such as the physical and biological sciences, or empirical psychology. If this were its only relation to empirical knowledge, philosophy would not differ in kind from any of the positive sciences themselves; it would possess wider scope, but identical functions. And this is precisely what one school of philosophers, by no means without influence on current theological thought, has maintained. The positivists will only credit philosophy with the methods and the results of the positive sciences, and deny to it all other alleged functions. Thus philosophy is banished from much of her ancient domain; or rather the rest of her domain is declared to be non-existent dream-land. According to this view of philosophy, our subject, philosophy of religion, would be narrowed down to the merely empirical sciences of the psychology of religious emotion, comparative study of religious rites, and theological mythology. Metaphysics, or the inquiry into the nature of ultimate reality and the latent conditions of knowledge, being renounced by the positivist as a futile search for the unknowable, his philosophy of religion could be expected to throw no light on the invisible and eternal.

On the other hand, most philosophers who are not positivists or phenomenalists believe that the phenomenal implies the noumenal and partially reveals it; that the existence of knowledge involves implications: and that these preconditions of knowledge and of phenomenal existence—the subject-matter of epistemology or science of knowledge, and ontology or science of being, respectively—are capable of being scientifically studied and of yielding knowledge.

It is not necessary for our purpose to attempt to refute the one of these views and to prove the other. As the futility of metaphysics could only be demonstrated by metaphysical arguments—the success of positive methods

being in itself no proof of the necessary failure of others—it must be assumed that at least so much of metaphysic must be admitted into philosophy as is essential to prove the barrenness of all the rest. And indeed there are few or no philosophers at the present day who, if they repudiate ontology, are unwilling to recognise in the study of knowledge itself, its nature and validity, a genuine science or an essential department of philosophy. For in seeking the preconditions and implications of the very existence and possibility of knowledge, philosophy does not part company with experience, as the extremer, and perhaps now extinct, positivism asserted. It is not the case that positive science, since it has come to know itself, appeals solely to 'experience,' or that metaphysics while seeking to transcend experience is all the time necessarily severed from it. The implicates of experience which metaphysic seeks to unfold, though 'beyond' experience in the sense that they are not given in sensible experience, are not necessarily 'beyond' experience in the sense that they are undiscoverable by reflecti ve thought.

If this contention be valid, there are two departments of philosophy, which together constitute metaphysics, the inquiry into the nature and structure, the validity and the limits, of knowledge in general, and the inquiry as to the nature of ultimate reality. These problems obviously lie outside any of the natural sciences and indeed outside all the empirical sciences put together. And though perhaps they never may be solved, yet inquiry concerning them ought not to be foreclosed because one particular school of philosophers has come to the conclusion that they are insoluble. This would savour of sectarian intolerance. Until the positivist has succeeded in convincing all his brother philosophers of the tenability of his position and has shown precisely how epistemology and ontology may

be known to be but imaginary sciences, we must continue provisionally to place them in the domain of philosophy, which, by common consent, takes all knowledge for her sphere.

Philosophy, in this case, would not be the *scientia scientiarum* solely because her function is to relate the particular sciences and to weave their more important conclusions into a coherent whole, thereby bringing to light, perhaps, truth not discoverable by any single science. She would enjoy that title rather in virtue of her function of examining the latent presuppositions of these sciences, and of raising problems with which they are not concerned, but the solution of which they tacitly and unreflectingly assume. Philosophy and science are not so much distinguished by their method, as by what they respectively take for granted. Science can presuppose, without injury to herself, anything which furthers her work, and can be satisfied with truth that is relative, abstract, departmental. Philosophy, however, can start from no untested assumptions ; if she cannot be presuppositionless, she will at least be fully aware of what her presuppositions are and how much they mean. Science takes facts as she finds them, and proceeds to generalise them ; philosophy—when metaphysical—rather fixes her attention on what is implied in the very existence of facts at all. Philosophy, as Professor William James put it, is only " an unusually obstinate attempt to think clearly and consistently."

I observed just now that in so far as that department of metaphysics which makes knowledge, or the knowing relation, its object of study can be distinguished from that which concerns itself with ultimate being, the former of these is not so commonly refused the right to exist as is the latter. Ancient and medieval philosophy consisted largely of ontology of a naïve and dogmatic kind. For Wolff, to

whom the term ontology owes its currency, this branch of metaphysic included the study of being in general and the supposed theoretic knowledge of the three fundamental types of known being, God, the finite soul, and the world. This partly scholastic and partly modern system, composed of rational theology, rational psychology, and rational cosmology, Kant undertook to demolish by means of his critical, epistemological philosophy; and since his day ontology has commonly been used as a term of reproach. If indeed ontology were what the positivist has asserted it to be, viz., the search for knowledge of ultimate reality altogether apart from its appearance in sensible experience, there would be little ground for including the discussion of its problems in the sphere of philosophy. But there is an ontology which professes to escape this condemnation, and to study reality in so far as it can be determined from the *implicates* of knowledge and phenomenal existence. Such metaphysic deals with reality as known, and, *prima facie* at least, seems justified in its claim to be a genuine department of philosophy.

I have dwelt in some detail upon the rival views as to whether or not metaphysics in the form of either or both of its two subdivisions, epistemology and ontology, should be included in the meaning of the word philosophy, partly because the discussion may have served to make clear, to such as are not students of philosophy, what is the nature of the subject-matter with which philosophy proper undertakes to deal, and partly because the divergence in question seemed to place an obstacle in the way of our attempt at a definition of philosophy of religion. I may now say that this apparent obstacle is at once removed if we can all agree to define philosophy *in terms of the questions or problems with which it professes to deal*, without prejudice as to the conclusions that may be reached. The demurrer of

positivism, being based on a conclusion, thus falls. And surely, philosophy being a pursuit rather than a system of attained knowledge, this is the only way in which it can rightly and fairly be defined. It is in this way that Professor Sidgwick sought for its definition, in a work entitled *Philosophy, its Scope and Relations*, a book which may be strongly recommended to any who wish to pursue further studies in this connexion. Of course conclusions as to what philosophy can and cannot know, when reached, must colour the views of individuals or of particular schools as to what the legitimate scope of philosophy is; but as the quest for conclusions is also philosophy, and as different philosophers have arrived at different conclusions on the issue, it would seem impossible to define philosophy, in so far as it is an unaccomplished quest, otherwise than as Sidgwick recommended.

Our preliminary difficulty being, then, removed, we may consider that in defining philosophy of religion to be philosophy dealing with religion, or with theological questions, we may have found a definition which (1) does no violence to generally received terminology; (2) begs no disputed questions; (3) marks off the province of philosophy of religion from those of adjacent or cognate departments of knowledge (such as comparative study of religions, or psychology of religion) as distinctly as possible; and (4) designates a coherent body of problems.

From this definition it will follow that philosophy of religion will naturally and necessarily be capable of subdivision into the same number of main departments as go to constitute philosophy as a whole. What these are may be briefly indicated. The first main division is that which separates theoretical from practical philosophy. The former province is concerned with the existential, and with knowledge cognitively determined. Practical

philosophy, on the other hand, deals with values. As religion has its 'practical' side—in the technical sense of the word—there will therefore be a practical, as well as a theoretic, province of philosophy of religion. The ethical systems of the various religions would fall into this practical province. And inasmuch as the supreme synthesis which philosophy is required to make is the co-ordination of its theoretical and practical divisions, or the transcending of the difference between what is and what ought to be, it will be in the capacity of philosophy of religion that she must alter her final word. Theoretical philosophy is capable of further subdivision, on lines at which we have already hinted. There is a department of philosophy which is concerned with generalising and unifying the laws and generalisations of the special sciences. As this function is discharged by carrying out the methods of the empirical and positive sciences, we may call this province of philosophy the positive. The corresponding province of philosophy of religion will similarly be concerned with unifying the more philosophically significant results of the various types of empirical investigation of religion, such as the psychology of religious experience, and the comparative study of actual religions as they are presented in beliefs, rites, and customs. It will further comprise all attempts to find a way from Nature to God, and much of the theology usually called 'natural theology,' which is derived from the study of Nature regarded as containing a revelation of God.

Distinct from all such positive philosophy, we have metaphysics. This word is sometimes employed as if it were synonymous with ontology: a practice which makes one of the two terms a superfluity, while it deprives us of a word which is most useful for designating as an unitary whole the province of theoretic philosophy usually called metaphysics, and which embraces the two more or less

distinguishable, but not wholly separable, studies, ontology and epistemology. The subdivision of theoretic philosophy of religion will similarly be completed, so far as the broadest outlines go, when we have placed theological metaphysics over against positive philosophy of religion, and have marked out within the former of these provinces the closely related pursuits of ontology and epistemology as concerned with theological interests.

This systematic arrangement of our subject into its natural departments may thus be expressed in tabular form :



It now only remains to clothe this skeleton by enumerating the more important specific problems belonging to each subdivision of philosophy of religion which has been indicated.

The field of Practical philosophy, in so far as it possesses theological interest, will include religious ethics, and in the particular case of Christian ethics will deal with the ethical elements in the Christian conception of God and His relation to the world. It will discuss the moral postulates and their place in theistic arguments such as the moral proof of God's existence. The investigation of the metaphysical principles presupposed in religious ethics, and of the validity of arguments based on deliverances of the practical reason, however, belongs, notwithstanding ' practical ' aspects, to the theoretical department of philosophy.

Turning to this other of the two main divisions into which

philosophy of religion falls, I may first make somewhat more complete the partial enumeration of the problems encountered in the secondary department which has been called by the name of positive. Here we are in the region of empirical generalisations. The chief questions, interesting to philosophy, supplied by the empirical sciences, psychological and sociological, which investigate religious experience and its manifestations, are those as to the origin, the developement, and the essential nature or distinguishing characteristics, of religion. The first two of these problems are at present largely matters of conjecture; the last is largely a question of logical definition. But psychology, in its study of the various forms of religious experience, is yielding results which may aid the complete characterisation of distinctively religious experience.

As empirical investigation of religion can only discover the human side of revelation—the aspect of it which may be called discovery—it can only be when knowledge of the metaphysical kind has been substantiated that positive philosophy, returning enriched with such knowledge to its own task, is able to assign a definite meaning to 'revelation,' and to measure the worth and significance of the distinction usually drawn between natural and revealed religion, or reason and revelation. Lastly, the relation of the physical sciences to theology, their harmony or conflict with theological dogmas, their capacity to supply any basis for arguments for or against the existence of God—these and cognate questions fall largely within the scope of the 'positive' section of philosophy of religion.

Metaphysics, as we have seen, comprises ontology and epistemology, though scarcely any problem belonging to the sphere of the one of these sub-departments can be discussed without crossing the line which roughly separates it from the other. But, however they may be approached

and handled, the problems of the being and nature of God, of Creation, of the finite soul and its relation to God, of immortality, of God's relation to the world, of the nature of evil, of theodicy, are all instances of the subject-matter which constitutes theological ontology. I do not intend to imply that the list just given is exhaustive.

On its epistemological side, theological metaphysic is concerned with the nature and validity of knowledge. It distinguishes clearly between the several types of truth and knowledge such as are illustrated respectively by the immediate perception, here and now, of the individual subject; the necessary truth of pure sciences like mathematics and formal logic; and knowledge such as confronts us in the natural sciences. It studies these types of knowledge, compares and contrasts what claims to be theological knowledge with each of them, and in so doing attempts to investigate the claims of mystical intuition to yield objective truth, and to define precisely what should be meant by reasonable belief; it estimates the relation between faith and knowledge, criticises the claim of science to be the only possible kind of demonstrable knowledge, and the contention of agnosticism and scepticism that knowledge is unattainable: finally, it seeks to set forth the validity of the inferences drawn from historical facts. Epistemological philosophy, in a word, investigates the truth of religion, and may therefore be said to be the most fundamental department of the whole subject. Indeed every student will be aware that it is within this department of philosophy of religion that the burning questions of the present time chiefly lie; and for apologetic and dogmatic theology epistemological questions are at the present moment all-important.

F. R. Tennant.

THE DIVINE NAMES IN GENESIS.

V. The Limits of Textual Uncertainty.

It is now time to gather up the threads of this protracted and sometimes, I am afraid, intricate discussion, and to consider with unprejudiced minds how it fares with the documentary theory of the Pentateuch, after the most elaborate assault that has yet been made under the banner of "textual" criticism. I have pointed out, in the opening article of this series, that Dahse, like others of his school, greatly exaggerates the importance of the divine names for the analysis of the Pentateuch; but no one will deny that they have a certain importance, or that if, as regards the names for God, the text with which critics have operated could be shewn to be either demonstrably wrong or hopelessly uncertain, the evidence for the documentary hypothesis would at some points (at least in the analysis of J and E) be sensibly weakened. In succeeding articles I have examined at great length the new and positive suggestions that Dahse has brought to bear on the problem, and hope I have convinced my readers that he has failed to substantiate any one of them. I have called attention incidentally to certain fallacious assumptions, errors in reasoning, and misstatements of fact, which detract from his argument, and seem to me to reveal a bias in favour of anything that makes for the strengthening of his own speculations. If it were a mere matter of repelling a particular attack, it would hardly be necessary to add anything to what has already been said. But the controversy raises a wider issue than that. It will doubtless have left on the minds of some of my readers an impression that after all said and done the situation does not remain exactly as it was before. It will be felt that even if every specific argument has been fairly met and success-

fully refuted—and I do not assume that this will be universally granted—yet the general precariousness of the textual data is so much greater than has hitherto been realised that confidence in the results of critical analysis must be seriously shaken. I apprehend, in short, that the real effect of Dahse's work will be rather the diffusion of a vague uncertainty as regards the Hebrew text in general, than the solution of any problem by the light of new constructive principles. I will therefore endeavour, in this concluding paper, to sum up the arguments for and against the trustworthiness of the Massoretic text, and to shew that within the margin of uncertainty which admittedly exists, there is a solid and sufficient working basis for the literary analysis of the Pentateuch, and for such use of the divine names in that analysis as a reasonable criticism requires to make.

1.

Textual criticism, as practised by Dahse, is a combination of three processes : *first* the determination of the oldest text by documentary evidence ; *second* the attempt to establish the original reading by internal considerations ; and *third* the formation of hypotheses to explain the variations which the text has undergone in the course of its transmission. The second method, we have seen, is inapplicable to the case of the divine names ; and the third, although a perfectly legitimate process in itself, has so far proved illusory even in the skilful hands of Dahse. It remains to consider whether by the first method alone we can compass a solution of our problem, or whether it leaves us in such uncertainty as to render abortive *ab initio* any attempt to recover the original readings of the sources of the Pentateuch.

(1) It is a sound critical maxim that the correctness or originality of a reading is not to be questioned when it

presents no inherent difficulty, and when all documentary evidence is united in its support. It has already been shewn that there is no case where a reading of the divine name can be either accepted or rejected on *internal* grounds ; it must now be added that a considerable number of readings cannot rightly be challenged on *external* or documentary grounds. In all such cases the true text must be regarded as established. But this principle is set at nought, if not by Dahse himself, at least by his allies Wiener and Schlögl. The former, it appears, is of opinion that only in the rarest instances can it be ascertained whether the original text of Genesis read Yahwe or Elohim (Dahse, p. 32 f.),—just enough instances, I suppose, to prove that the MT is not to be trusted ! Schlögl carries his scepticism so far that he feels himself at liberty to change every J in Genesis into E, even in cases—some thirty in number—where E is not read by a single text (see April Expositor, p. 312 *note*). If the range of uncertainty were really as great as these two writers imagine, there might be some excuse for this drastic procedure ; but their uncritical handling of the material leads them to overestimate the extent of the divergence. In any case, it is surely the abnegation of textual criticism to set aside the unanimous testimony of MSS. and versions to a particular reading, merely because the documents are at variance in a certain number of other places.

(2) The area of uncertainty with which we have to reckon is pretty nearly measured by the divergence between the MT and the LXX. No doubt the Sam. and the younger versions deviate in a few cases (about fifteen in all) from MT and LXX, where these two are in agreement. But these are mere family differences, which need not be taken into account until we have settled the much bigger question of the relation of the LXX to the Hebrew text as a whole. Now the " textual " critics seem to me to go astray by not

observing that the LXX counts only as a single witness (whether for or against the MT), that its original text must be recovered before it can be cited as evidence against the MT, and that when recovered it cancels all the variants in its MSS. and daughter-versions. That *we* are uncertain in many cases what the original LXX was, does not alter the fact that it must have been either one thing or another, and not two things at once, or three. It is the first business of the textual critic to ascertain what the best reading of the LXX is: if that reading turns out to be the same as the MT, he must obviously forego the liberty of appealing to the weaker reading as evidence of the uncertainty of the MT. If, on the other hand, the true LXX proves to be irrecoverable, he must remember that that result neutralises the testimony of the LXX, and does not directly affect the credit of the MT.

(3) Here, however, we are confronted by the supreme difficulty of ascertaining in many cases what the reading of the original LXX was. But in this investigation the advocates of "textual" criticism deliberately adopt principles which can only be characterised as a loading of the dice against the MT. Dahse (p. 31) quotes with strong approval four rules laid down by Wiener for determining the value of LXX variants. We will examine them. (*a*) The first is to the effect that where all LXX authorities agree *in opposition to the MT*, we may be certain that they preserve the original reading of the LXX. I venture to think that the unanimous reading of all LXX authorities must be accepted as the original LXX *whether it differs from MT or not.*[1] Thus, we find in Dahse's tables over eighty divine names (about one quarter of the whole number) to which

[1] It is true that there are cases where all LXX MSS. agree in what is manifestly a Greek corruption, and therefore not the reading of the original LXX. But if that has happened in any of the divine names, we should never be able to find it out. The documentary evidence is the final authority in this case.

no internal variants of the LXX are recorded; and it is important to observe that there are only five of these cases where the LXX goes against the MT (iv. 4, iv. 26, xiii. 10a, 10b, xxx. 27). By Wiener's rule the original LXX would be established only for these five names. I maintain, on the contrary, that in all the eighty odd places the original LXX is as well established as in the nature of the case it can ever be.—(*b*) We are told that where some LXX authorities support the Hebrew, while the variant is supported by "strong" LXX authority, the variant will be the original reading of the LXX. On this I remark again that the variant will be the original LXX reading, if the authorities in favour of it are sufficiently "strong" to be decisive. But the maxim involves, besides, a plausible abuse of a critical canon which is valid only when it is clear that the Greek variant rests on a Hebrew basis different from the MT. If of two LXX readings one comes under that description, and the other is a close rendering of the existing Hebrew, so that the former cannot have arisen through Greek corruption from the latter, then it is obvious that the first retains the true text of the LXX, and the second is a later accommodation to the received Hebrew text. (It is, of course, a further question which of the two *Hebrew* readings is the original). But the rule cannot be applied at all in cases (such as the divine names) where we can never be sure that the variant presupposes a divergent Hebrew, and where the liability to inner-Greek corruption is at least as probable an explanation as the tendency to assimilate to the later Hebrew.—(*c*) The third rule, that where Origen is known to have altered the text in conformity with the Hebrew, the unaltered text will be the original reading, even if all or most other LXX authorities support the Hebrew, is a truism, and therefore correct in substance; although it is not easy to see how we can know of an Origenic

alteration except through "other" LXX authorities[1]—(*d*) The last rule, that where Lucian alone goes against the MT his text represents an original Hebrew variant, though not necessarily the original text of the LXX, is simply an unfounded and ill-informed assertion. So much for the four critical principles to which Dahse has pinned his faith, and which in his opinion vindicate Wiener's claim to be taken seriously as an authority in textual criticism. As for "other canons" which were to emerge in the course of Wiener's inquiry, Dahse does not refer to them; and as I am not now dealing with Wiener, but with Dahse's estimate of Wiener, I will leave them unnoticed.

(4) In the present state of LXX criticism, we have no more satisfactory means of discovering the divine names in the original LXX than the old-fashioned method of consulting the oldest and best MSS. The study of minor recensions may conceivably in the future bring us nearer to a determination of the true LXX than we are at present; but the results of such study are as yet too problematical to help us in dealing with so variable an element of the text

[1] What Wiener is capable of meaning by such a statement may perhaps be gathered from a flagrant example of his carelessness and ignorance on p. 26 of his *Essays*. That page is occupied with a list of "those readings in Genesis ii. iii. for which Hexaplar information is available." In the last line he boldly states, on the authority of Field's Hexapla, that in iii. 23 LORD was added to the text (by Origen), although he cannot cite a single MS. to that effect. A glance at Field's additional note to ch. iii. reveals the source of Wiener's error. There, sure enough, Field marks the κυριος of iii. 23 as a Hexaplar addition; and gives his MS. authority for so doing. But unfortunately Field follows a different numbering of the verses from Wiener; and what is there correctly said of iii. 23 is simply what Wiener has already given in the line before, under iii. 22! The merest tyro might have seen that he was on a false scent when he failed to find an important reference of Field confirmed by Brooke and M'Lean. I will add that if Wiener had read the Greek before him he could not have made this colossal blunder, for the word ειπεν would have showed him that our *v.* 22, not *v.* 23, was referred to. Let us hope that his fall will teach him more sobriety of judgment when next he is tempted to set down his opponents' resistance to his own short-sighted conclusion to dishonest and fraudulent motives.

as the divine names of the LXX undoubtedly are. And while Dahse's researches in this direction are no doubt important, they would be more promising if he did not allow them to be 'side-tracked' by his too facile and improbable assumption of separate Hebrew originals. In the meantime, at all events, if we are to make any practical use of the LXX at all for the text of the divine names, we must be content to work mainly on the basis of existing MSS. (whether of the original Greek or of daughter-versions), carefully eliminating those readings which are marked as Hexaplaric alterations, and for the rest following the guidance of the oldest and most carefully written codices. Now, I fully admit that this rule about the best MSS. imposes a task of the utmost delicacy on the investigator; and I have no pretension to speak on such a question otherwise than with great diffidence. Nevertheless, after the best examination I am competent to make of the MS. evidence supplied by Dahse, I will express the belief that the readings of the divine names in the Sixtine and Cambridge editions (which seldom differ) represent in the great majority of instances the consensus of the best MSS. Making allowance for some doubtful cases, I find that there are about sixty passages where the Cambridge edition reads a different name from the MT. The number of relevant occurrences of one or other of the divine names in the MT of Genesis is about 320 (in the LXX nearly 330); hence the cases in which the standard LXX throws any doubt on the accuracy of the MT number three-sixteenths of the whole. Roughly speaking, we may take it that that fraction expresses the extent of the "margin of uncertainty" with which criticism has to reckon in the divine names of Genesis.

(5) On general grounds, the MT has substantial claims to be preferred to a variant of the LXX in all doubtful cases. (*a*) The MT is the result of successive transcriptions in one and the same language; the LXX is a translation from one

language into another. It is not denied that a version *may* represent a purer text than a recension in the original language ; but in the absence of proof that this is the case, the presumption is all in favour of the original, because it is not subject to the uncertainty which inevitably attends the mental process of translation ; especially when, as is abundantly clear in the case of the LXX, word-for-word translation was not aimed at.—(*b*) The MT is the lineal descendant of the official Palestinian recension of the OT ; the LXX represents at best an Alexandrian recension whose text was certainly not transmitted with the same scrupulous fidelity as that of Palestine. For (*c*) as regards the divine names, the Samaritan Pantateuch shows that the Palestinian text has undergone practically no change from a time prior to (or at all events not much later than) the separation of the Palestinian and Egyptian recensions. The LXX text, on the contrary, has been in a state of perpetual flux as far back as its history can be traced. It makes no difference whether this be due to accident or (as Dahse has tried to shew) to deliberate revision : on either view the fact remains that the names of God have been handled with a freedom which was not allowed to Jewish scribes.—(*d*) While the LXX contains particular readings which are shewn by internal evidence to be superior to the Hebrew, yet an examination of its general text proves that on the whole it is inferior to the Massoretic Hebrew. I do not think that this will be disputed by any competent Old Testament scholar. The MT is often emended from the LXX, but practically never except for some superiority, real or supposed, attaching to the reading presupposed by LXX, in particular cases. —(*e*) The liability to error is far greater in Greek than in Hebrew. In the original text we have the distinction, not easily overlooked, between a proper name יהוה and a generic name אלהים. In Greek we have only the difference of

two appellatives κυριος and θεος (often contracted in MSS. to κς. and θς.), a difference without much significance to a Greek-speaking writer, and therefore apt to be effaced through the natural predilection for θεος.

(6) From these observations we may now deduce the principles to be chiefly applied in using the LXX as an instrument of textual criticism. They are succinctly stated by Driver as follows (see his *Genesis, Addenda* II, p. xlv f.).[1] It must be shown (1) "that the (LXX) variant is not due to a paraphrase or loose rendering on the part of the translator, but really depends upon a various reading in the Hebrew MS. used by him; and (2) that this variant reading in the Hebrew has substantial claims to be preferred to the Massoretic text as being the original reading of the Hebrew," by "its yielding a better sense and its being preferable for philological or grammatical reasons." Now in the case of the divine names neither of these conditions can be completely fulfilled. If, indeed, the LXX is unanimous, or nearly so, in reading a different name from the MT, there is some slight presumption that its Hebrew original was different, and so far the first condition is complied with; though even then we cannot be sure that the variation is not due to the translator's indifference to the distinction between the two Hebrew names for God (comp. the case of Job below), or to scribal or editorial changes of older standing than the earliest extant witnesses to the LXX text. But the second condition can never, in the case of a divine name, be realised, for the simple reason that neither sense nor grammar is ever affected by the substitution of one name for another; and I hesitate to admit (with Driver) even an isolated instance here and there in which the LXX reading is to be preferred on such grounds. If, therefore, a textual critic gives the preference to LXX readings, as such, he

[1] Comp., to the same effect but more fully, Swete, *Introduction to the O.T. in Greek*, p. 444 f.

must be prepared to maintain the *general superiority of its text*; and he is bound in consistency to carry out his principle in his treatment of the text as a whole. But if he essays this he will speedily land himself in a *reductio ad absurdum* of the critical axiom with which he starts. It is notorious that the LXX contains many readings which presuppose a Hebrew text, not only inferior to the MT, but absolutely inadmissible; i.e. one which no commentator with a regard for the meaning of the passage could possibly accept. Yet if the divine names of the LXX are to be adopted in preference to MT, merely because they are in the LXX, upon what principle can the rejection of these other impossible LXX variants be defended? There cannot be one law for the names of God, and another for other variants; and a rule that leads to absurd consequences in the latter case must be wrong from the first.

2.

The initial mistake of the Higher Criticism, according to Dahse, was that its founders took no pains to verify the text of the divine names before using them as a clue to the structure of the Pentateuch. We can now judge from the result of our previous discussions what progress they would have been likely to make if they had laid that caution to heart. "He that observeth the wind shall not sow"; and it is just possible that if the pioneers of the critical movement had known all that Dahse and Wiener could now tell them about the uncertainty of the MT, they would have been deterred from an enterprise which has done more to vitalise the study of the Old Testament than any other contribution that has ever been made. And I think that Dahse, and especially Wiener, would find life very uninteresting if they had to pursue the barren round of textual studies without the joy of battle against the imposing edifice which has been built on the foundation laid by those rash and misguided men.

Be that as it may, the question for us to consider is not whether textual criticism ought to have strangled the documentary theory at its birth, but whether it is able to destroy it now,—in other words, whether the proved uncertainty of the MT makes the use of the divine names valueless as a criterion of diverse authorship.

I remark, in the first place, that apart altogether from the soundness of the MT, the germ of the documentary theory is contained in Dahse's admission that the original (or at least the earliest accessible) text of Genesis had a mixed distribution of the names for God: i.e., there was an alternation of Yahwe and Elohim. This, he says, is the conclusion at which all recent textual critics—Redpath, Eerdmans, Wiener, as well as himself—have independently arrived (p. 41). To be quite fair, I do not know whether Dahse conceives the *original* text to have been mixed in the sense indicated; but he certainly admits it of the oldest text we can now imagine, and he cannot get his own theories under way on any other supposition. And indeed it would be very difficult to account for textual heterogeneity of this kind arising out of a primary simplicity; and we are entitled to infer that the alternation of the names for God was in the documents from the beginning. Now I have already pointed out that this leaves open a distinct *possibility* that the mixed distribution may be an index to mixed authorship. But we can go further, and say that it is not only possible but *certain* that at least two writers are concerned in the composition of Genesis. That is an inevitable inference—granted the alternation of the original names—from the express statement of Exodus vi. 2, 3. It was a wise precaution on Dahse's part to try to clear his path of this obstacle at the outset; but if there be any section of his book which has failure written over it more legibly than another it is his treatment of the text of these verses. I have dealt with this matter at length in the first article, and argued

that the writer of Exodus vi. 2 f. could neither have recorded previous revelations of the Deity under the name Yahwe, nor have put the name into the mouth of any of the patriarchs: It is true that Dahse eliminates the name Yahwe from the earlier self-disclosures of God; but he has never suggested that it ought always to be removed where it occurs in human speech before Moses. We see that such passages cannot have come from the same source as Exodus vi. 2 f. Therefore, to put it at the very lowest, there are at least two writers in Genesis: one who could not use the name Yahwe under given circumstances, and another who could and did. But really that is an absurdly narrow restriction of the inference. The natural conclusion is that one writer will have been consistently Elohistic and the other consistently Yahwistic, however many more writers there may be of either class. And with that conclusion we are well on our way to a documentary theory of the Pentateuch. What is to prevent us from following up the clue? Is it not worth while to make the experiment, whether with the Massoretic text or any other? It is playing King Canute over again for any school of critics to interpose their veto, and say that the attempt should never have been made, and must not be made now.

The next point to be emphasised is that the acceptance of the MT as a basis of operations by no means implies the assumption of its infallibility. No critic of standing has ever imagined that it is immaculate, even in the matter of the divine names. Criticism has gone to work on the presumption that it is substantially accurate, but at the same time with a clear understanding that errors may occur here and there. It is alleged no doubt, that while critics acknowledge the abstract possibility of mistakes in the text, they take no account of it in practice, but proceed to carve out their documents with a solemn mechanical precision which would only be justified if the authenticity of the divine names were absolutely guaranteed. Now it need not be denied

that critics are under a temptation to push their analysis to an extreme in this direction. It is perfectly natural that, having found the distinction of the divine names in the MT a useful clue to the separation of sources, and having no reason to question its correctness in any particular instance, they should follow it out to its last consequences. But there are few, if any, cases where a generally accepted division of documents rests on the divine names alone ; and critics would be the first to admit that if any such case existed the uncertainty of the text would be a consideration of serious importance. The truth is that this objection springs from that exaggeration of the dependence of the documentary theory on the divine names which seems ineradicable from the militant " text critical " mind. It is never realised that the divine names have served their purpose when they have put criticism *on the track* of a distinction of sources which approves itself by many other characteristic differences, and which would have no critical value if such differences did not exist. When this is understood there will be no disposition to cavil at the notion that a true theory may be extracted from an imperfect text.

But it will be asked, Is it credible that the MT has preserved the original names with even the substantial fidelity which is the necessary condition of successful analysis ? Granted that it is the best text available, it is still a stupendous assumption that any text can have retained even approximately the names as they stood in the hypothetical primary documents of Genesis ! It would certainly be a very remarkable phenomenon. But before we pronounce it incredible, we must reflect that the divine names have in fact been transmitted with only the slightest variation since the fourth century B.C. A century more brings us to the redaction and promulgation of the Pentateuch ; and it is only reasonable to suppose that during that century the preservation of the canonical text was as carefully attended

to by the Temple authorities in Jerusalem as in the ages that followed. The danger zone is undoubtedly the period from the seventh to the fifth century, when the oldest Yahwistic and Elohistic documents had been amalgamated, but were not (so far as we know) under ecclesiastical control. That confusion of the divine names might have arisen under these circumstances cannot be denied, but that it was probable is more than we have any right to affirm. We do not know what precautions were taken to safeguard the integrity of the text ; and we do know that Jewish scribes were capable of an astonishing degree of accuracy in transcribing the names for God. From the examples given below, it will be seen that it is by no means an extravagant assumption to hold that in the MT we have a substantially correct reproduction of the divine names as they stood in the original documents.[1]

[1] An interesting and, if I mistake not, convincing illustration of fidelity of the MT to an original autograph comes to hand as I write, in a paper by Joh. Herrmann on " The divine names in the text of Ezekiel " (*Alttestamentliche Studien, Rudolf Kittel zum* 60 *Geburtstag dargebracht*, pp. 70–87). It is all the more surprising because the MT of Ezekiel as a whole is often very corrupt ; and because several of the most recent scholars had come to the conclusion that the divine names in particular had been so tossed about by transcribers that it was impossible to tell what the original names were, while Cornill was of opinion that the LXX is much nearer the original than the MT. The question is as to the distinction between the names אדני יהוה and יהוה אלהים is used by Ezekiel only in a generic sense). Herrmann shews in a conclusive manner that Ezekiel's usage can be reduced to a few simple and easily intelligible rules, and that with insignificant exceptions these rules are strictly observed in the MT. (1) The double name אדני יהוה is used only in three connexions, viz (*a*) the introductory formula כה אמר אדני יהוה; (*b*) in the concluding formula, נאם אדני יהוה; and (*c*) in addressing the Almighty by name. Now in the MT אדני יהוה occurs 217 times, and of these all but 9 are covered by the three conditions just stated. In the formula (*a*) the double name appears 122 times, against 4 instances of כה אמר יהוה. In (*b*) we have 81 times אדני יהוה and only 4 times נאם יהוה. Of (*c*) there are only 5 examples, and no exceptions. (2) יהוה alone occurs 218 times, and regularly in the following cases (*a*) in the phrase אני יהוה (87 times, against 4 examples of אני אדני יהוה; (*b*) after a construct state (excluding נאם) (94 times, against 4 exceptional occurrences of אדני יהוה in this connexion); (*c*) יהוה also occurs 37 times in other connexions. The bare אדני is used only 4 times, and that in a proverb quoted from the mouth of the people (xviii. 25, 29, xxxiii. 17, 20). It is impossible to resist the inference that Ezekiel's own practice

The final proof of the essential soundness of the MT, as a guide to documentary analysis, is—the documentary theory itself. Dahse on p. 14 quotes a sentence from De Wette to

was regulated by the principles here indicated; and that the few exceptions noted represent the amount of error that has crept into the transmission of the Hebrew text. Turning to the LXX, Herrmann finds that in its best text (that of B) יי, except in xx. 38, is invariably rendered by κυριος: on the other hand, יהוה is represented 58 times by κς κς, twice by αδωναι κς (but this may be a Hexaplar correction), 143 times by κς, 7 times by θς ο θς, and 9 times by κς θς. A few LXX variants comply with the rules given above, and are therefore to be regarded as original; but it can no longer be maintained that the LXX is the better text, or that it rests on a Hebrew basis differing from the MT. We need not here enter into the question raised by the peculiar distribution of the various renderings in the LXX; but on this and other points Herrmann's essay deserves careful perusal.

A more familiar case is the indiscriminate use of the divine names in the LXX of Job. It is well known that the scene of that book is laid outside the land of Israel, and that the problem of retribution is supposed to be discussed on a basis of what we may call natural religion. Hence in the Dialogue the name Yahwe is carefully avoided (it occurs only in xii. 9, in a passage which is obviously interpolated); and archaic names for God are almost exclusively used: viz. *El* (55 times), *Eloah* (41 times), and *Shaddai* (31 times); (*Elohim* only six times). In the prose Introduction and Epilogue, on the other hand, as well as in headings of speeches, Yahwe is freely employed (30 times), along with 12 cases of Elohim, mostly in connexions where the general name of God is alone suitable. It is again impossible to doubt that here the MT has in the main preserved the names used by the author, and that the translators of the LXX have failed to reproduce the original readings. Thus, if we take the B text of Swete, we find from Hatch's Concordance that in the Prologue and Epilogue, while Yahwe is regularly rendered by κυριος (once κς ο θς), Elohim is represented 3 times by κς and 4 times by θς: in the Speeches, *Elohim* is rendered once by θεος, 4 times by κυριος, and once by κυριος ο θς; *El* 37 times by κς and twice by θς; *Eloah* 19 times by κς and 8 times by θς; and *Shaddai* 9 times by κς, and 16 times by παντοκρατωρ (once κς παντ.) (I omit the cases where *El* is rendered by ισχυρος and *Shaddai* by ικανος, because these are peculiar to the text of Theodotion, from which Origen supplemented the genuine LXX. It is possible that some of the other renderings given were also Theodotion's; but enough will remain to prove the indiscriminateness of the original LXX). —Dahse will hardly maintain that here the LXX has a purer text of the divine names than MT, or that the book of Job must have existed in several Hebrew recensions. He says that in regard to the originality of the divine names each book must be considered by itself. I agree. But that does not at all affect the general principle here insisted on, that Hebrew copyists were capable of a degree of exactness in handling the names of God which was not attained by Greek translators and copyists, because they lacked the instinctive sense of difference which was native to the Hebrew mind.

the effect that the correctness of the MT is vouched for by its careful retention of "the characteristic features of the various authors, and of the separate pieces of which many books are composed"; and comments on it as follows: "Thus the very point in dispute—the originality of the MT—is taken for granted, and the possibility is overlooked that what are called characteristic features of the various authors may be merely peculiarities of the MT." That seems to me a very hasty and inept criticism. Amongst the distinctive characteristics which De Wette had in mind there are many which no version could obscure, and which cannot possibly be regarded as peculiar to the MT. I will shew this immediately; and it will be found that De Wette's statement is perfectly unimpeachable. What it means is simply this: that the names of God in the MT have been accepted as a tentative clue to the literary structure of the Pentateuch, that this clue has led to the discovery of many characteristic differences between different strata of the history and legislation, and that these results by their coherence and mutual compatibility furnish convincing proof that the initial assumption was well founded.

Now to illustrate this proposition in detail would be to write a critical commentary on Genesis. At the close of an article already too long, it is not possible to exhibit the full strength of the argument. But without attempting a demonstration we may look briefly at a few selected examples which will at least vindicate the principle of the argument and shew that it is not one to be contemptuously dismissed as a mere *petitio principii*. I believe they will also make it clear that no theory based on the synagogue lectionary can explain the distribution of divine names in Genesis.

i. One of the earliest, and now most familiar, results of documentary analysis was the recognition of two separate accounts of the creation in Genesis i., ii. They are distinguished not only by material differences of representation—as

in the order of the creative works—but by stylistic differences of the most penetrating kind, as well as by a few technical characteristics in expression, such as ברא in chapter i. and יצר in chapter ii. No one who has once had the contrast pointed out to him, and is gifted with a feeling for literature, can fail to perceive that in passing from one narrative to the other we enter a new world of thought, or to have conveyed to him an irresistible impression of diversity of authorship. Moreover the transition from the one account to the other is clearly and even abruptly marked. It comes in the middle of *v.* 4 of chapter ii.; and just there in the MT the name of God is changed: instead of Elohim we have Yahwe Elohim. Is this to be set down as an accidental circumstance? No, replies Dahse, but it is due to the fact that just at this point a new Seder commences. Well, let us see. It is certain that the new Seder does not explain the other and deeper differences that are observed—differences of conception, of tone and atmosphere, of language. These must have been in the record before the Seder-division was made; and why not the distinctive use of the divine names as well? What is the use of a pericope-theory which deals only with a single feature of the text, and leaves so many other characteristics utterly unexplained? Has it never occurred to Dahse that instead of the divine names being determined by the Sedarim, the Sedarim may have been in part determined by the divine names? That is the obvious explanation in this case. Or, to state it more accurately, the lectionary is arranged in large measure in accordance with the sense. The scribes saw that there was a break at ii. 4, and therefore they chose that as the place where a new lesson should begin.

That this is the true explanation appears when we look at the end of the second Seder at iii. 21. There we have an instance of unintelligent division, for it is clear that the story of Eden is continued to the end of the chapter. But we frequently find throughout Genesis that in the Seder-

division a regard to the sense is interfered with by a marked tendency to commence a lesson with a divine utterance; and that is why Seder 3 begins unnaturally at iii. 22. Now in the MT the double name for God is continued, past the Seder-division, to the close of the Paradise-story. It is evident, therefore, that in this case the use of the divine names does not follow the lectionary, but the literary affinities of the composition; and there is thus good reason to suppose that it was established in the text before the latter was divided into separate sections.

ii. Chapter iv. is a section uniformly Yahwistic, with the exception of Elohim in *v.* 25. I cannot here enter on the discussion of the relation of this chapter to chapters ii., iii, or the significance for criticism of the double name in the latter. If the reader will refer to any good commentary on Genesis he will learn that there is reason to think that the facts of the MT, down even to the isolated E of iv. 25, furnish a key to the literary composition of the sources. But I cannot adduce that as evidence here.

iii. At the beginning of chapter v. we come upon reminiscences of the style of chapter i. ('create,' 'likeness of God'); [1] and again the change to Elohim marks the transition. The genealogy thus introduced extends to the end of the chapter, as does the use of E, except the one J in *v.* 29, where again it has a critical significance for the finer shades of analysis which cannot be expounded here. In vi. 1–8 we have a section of entirely different character, commencing with a fragment of ancient mythology, in which the name J alone appears. Now in the fourth Seder these verses are included along with chapter v.; and the change from E to J at v. 29 is inexplicable by any plausible modification of the pericope-hypothesis. On the other hand, it is explained by the hypothesis of different documents.

[1] And, it should be added, a great many other characteristics of the Priestly Code.

iv. We come to the story of the Flood (Parasha II.=vi. 9–ix.17), which is a crucial passage as between the documentary and pericope theories. On the one hand we have an alternation of J and E in which the Sedarim-division is completely ignored.[1] On the other hand, it is certain that in this section there is a dovetailing of two flood-narratives, which can be separated with remarkable precision. They are distinguished by a great variety of characteristic differences : they assign different physical causes for the flood (one a forty days' rain, the other a breaking up of the fountains of the great deep); in one the flood begins to subside after 40 days, in the other the waters continue to rise for 150 days ; one distinguishes clean and unclean animals and brings the former by sevens, the latter in pairs, into the ark, while the other admits only one pair of each species without ceremonial distinction ; one speaks of the sexes as " man and his wife," the other more prosaically as " male and female " ; and so on. Again, portions of the story are duplicated (e.g. vi. 17–22‖ vii. 1–5 ; vii. 7‖ vii. 13 ; and many more). Now the analysis which has resulted in the discovery of all these distinctions started from the alternation of the names J and E ; and from first to last it has never found occasion to discard that clue as misleading; that is to say, there is no case where the use of J or E conflicts with the other indications of authorship which have emerged during the investigation. I do not say that there may not be cases where the analysis is determined solely by the divine names, and where therefore a mistake in the transmission of the name vitiating the analysis is a possible contingency. But if there be any such case it is only where the other indications are indecisive,[2] and admit of

[1] In Seder 6 (viii. 1–14) no doubt we have a uniform use of E ; but there are only two instances ! In Seder 5 (vi. 9–vii. 24) the names are : EEEEE JJEEJ ; and in S. 7 (viii. 15–ix. 17) : EJJJEEEEEE,—a distribution which from *that* point of view is promiscuous, and irreducible to any principle or rule.

[2] Thus in vii. 9 the indications are so conflicting that it is difficult to say

two equally (or almost equally) feasible solutions of the literary problem. That in every crucial instance the various lines of evidence converge, and lead to the isolation of two independent and almost continuous narratives, is a strong proof that J and E are distinctive of two primary documents, and that the MT has preserved the peculiarities of these documents with singular fidelity.

v. In chapters x.–xvi. the only distinctive divine name that occurs in the MT is J ;[1] and consequently these chapters afford no illustration of our immediate theme. But in chapter xvii. we come suddenly on an E section interposed between two J sections. This chapter forms a Seder by itself—another example of intelligent division of the Law, assisted perhaps by the abrupt change from J to E in the fundamental text. At first sight it seems open to Dahse to claim that his hypothesis gives at least as good an account of the names as the documentary theory. But that claim cannot be allowed. It is not at all clear why the authors of the lectionary, or those who manipulated the divine manes in accordance with its divisions, should have kept up the monotonous use of J through nearly six Sedarim, or a Parasha and a half, and then all at once have resolved to introduce a little variety. Besides, the diversity of authorship is a fact. Chapter xvii. abounds in expressions which critics have learned to recognise as peculiar to the Priestly Code, and which on any view do not occur even singly, not to say in such profusion as here, in any of the passages marked by J. Unless the pericope-hypothesis is prepared to face the explanation of this phenomenon (which of course it cannot do), it is idle to pretend that it is the last word on the problem of the divine names. It is true that the first name in the section is J, and that its presence is not explained by the critical hypothesis. But may it not fairly be set down as the exception which proves the rule ?

whether the אלהים of MT, etc., or the יהוה of Sam., Vulg. etc., is the true reading.

[1] אל in ch. xiv., xvi. 13 does not count.

vi. The alternate use of J and E is resumed at chapter xx. That chapter (= Seder 17) is itself in MT Elohistic (except *v.* 18); chapters xxi. (S. 18) and xxii., xxiii. (S. 19) are mainly so (except xxi. 1a, b, 33; xxii. 11, 14a, b, 15, 16). Can the facts here be explained on the theory of Elohistic authorship, varied by occasional insertions from Yahwistic sources? The answer is that criticism, still following the guidance of the divine names of the MT, finds no reason to distrust it, but, on the contrary, discovers that it is frequently confirmed by independent considerations. The detailed proof of this assertion, however, cannot be given here; and I content myself with citing in conclusion one or two instances of *parallel narration*; i.e., the occurrence of two (or three) different versions of what is obviously a single incident or legend, which have been kept separate without any attempt to weld them (as in the story of the Flood) into a connected composition. We will take three examples.

(*a*) The account of Abraham's denial of his true relation to Sarah in order to save his life in a foreign country. This is first told in xii. 10–20 in a thoroughly Yahwistic connexion (cf. J in xii. 17); then with characteristic variations in chapter xx., which is Elohistic except in the explanatory addition of *v.* 18. A third version of the incident, with Isaac and Rebekah in place of Abraham and Sarah, is given in a Yahwistic dress in xxvi. 7–11.

(*b*) The story of the flight or expulsion of Hagar and birth of Ishmael in chapter xvi: (Yahwistic) and xxi. 8–21 (Elohistic).

(*c*) The patriarchal treaty with Abimelech of Gerar and naming of Beersheba, xxi. 22–31 (*mainly* Elohistic) and xxvi. 26–33 (Yahwistic).

Now we do not for a moment dispute the contention that a writer, especially a collector of old traditions, might record two or more versions of the same incident without perceiving their original identity. But what is not very credible is that a writer should invariably distinguish his parallels by

using J in the one and E in the other. Yet this is done in the three cases before us. In the first (*a*) there are two J narratives, a fact which points to the existence of two strata within the Yahwistic document, but does not in the least obscure the significance of the parallelism between the documents J and E where it occurs. In (*c*) we have two versions of a single episode; though there are grounds for thinking that in xxi. 22–31 two narratives are interwoven: one (22–24, 27, 31) marked by Elohim, and the other (25, 26, 28–30) containing no divine names, but *probably* Yahwistic (see *ICC*, p. 325). We no not really need to trouble ourselves here with this refinement of analysis: the fact remains that we have at least two parallel narratives, one Elohistic and the other (xxvi. 26 ff.) Yahwistic. The important point is that the book of Genesis contains examples of dual narration, and that the names J and E closely follow the line of cleavage marked out by the parallelism. The mere existence of duplicates is itself a strong indication of composite structure; and when this is reinforced by a distinctive use of the divine names it surely counts as evidence that J and E are characteristic of two main documents, and can safely be employed as a criterion of authorship.

We cannot pursue this subject further. If we were to extend our survey to all the cases where two narratives have been worked into one, we should find much additional ground for confidence in the substantial soundness of the MT in its transmission of the divine names. But I venture to think that even the few illustrations that I have been able to give are sufficient to shew that the Massoretic recension has led criticism on the right track in its effort to disentangle the sources of Genesis. It is difficult to imagine that any one who has fairly and carefully considered them will endorse the confidently reiterated assertion of Dahse, that the names of God in Genesis have nothing whatever to do with the variety of documents of which the book is composed.

Meanwhile, at all events, my task is finished. I do not

suppose for a moment that what I have written will convince my able and resolute, but always courteous opponent; although I hope I may have succeeded in shewing why he has failed to convince me. Nor do I imagine that I have brought any new facts under his notice, as I gladly acknowledge that he has brought a good many under mine. It is true that I have been unable to see that these facts are of a kind to justify the revolutionary conclusions which Dahse deduces from them; and I cannot but think that his critical attitude is determined, not so much by any new facts he has brought to light, as by speculative constructions, resting on precarious combinations, and carried through in defiance of facts of a much larger order which are the common property of all Old Testament scholars. I believe also that I have shewn he has sometimes mistaken the facts, as all men are liable to do. At the same time it is impossible to lay down his book without a profound respect for the painstaking spirit of research to which every page testifies, and warm appreciation of the service which the author has rendered, and is still capable of rendering, to the scientific study of the Pentateuchal text. While I still believe that the documentary theory of the Pentateuch is in its essential elements unassailable by textual criticism, and hold that even its traditional textual basis has not been seriously unsettled, I am far from thinking that the last word has been said about the problem of the LXX and its bearing on the history of the Hebrew text. Dahse's work has made it impossible for critics to treat that problem lightly, and has set a high standard of accuracy and thoroughness to those who shall attempt it. My reply will have served its purpose if it has made clear that continued adherence to the critical theory is compatible, not only (as he will readily admit) with honesty of purpose, but also with some intelligent apprehension of the issues raised by the newest type of what is called textual criticism.

JOHN SKINNER.

THE TEXT OF THE APOSTOLIC DECREE.

(Acts xv. 29.)

Two recent articles in The Expositor for March and July of this year help to bring home to us that there is one important and in some respects fundamental group of readings in the Book of Acts in regard to which, in this country at least, opinion is still wholly unsettled. And, as it happens that in regard to this particular group of readings my own opinion is clear, I will venture to re-state the case as it seems to me at the present moment. I speak of "re-statement" because I have once before set forth at some length my views on the subject, but in a volume which is not likely to be in the hands of many in England. I had the honour of contributing to the volume of essays presented to the veteran scholar Dr. Theodor Zahn on his seventieth birthday, *Theologische Studien, Theodor Zahn, zum* 10. *Oktober* 1908 *dargebracht.* (Leipzig, 1908.) The subject which I took was "The Apostolic Decree"; but the essay, though known to Professor Kirsopp Lake (see *The Church Quarterly Review* for Jan. 1911, pp. 345-370, and *The Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, pp. 48-60), has not, so far as I know, attracted the attention of others of my countrymen. And I cannot help just asking myself whether Professor Lake—although he has discussed fully and satisfactorily a single point in the case as I presented it—has considered as carefully as I should like him to do the effect of that case as a whole. At the same time I quite admit that in the article and the appendix to which I have referred he has covered the whole ground and offered an alternative construction which by inference excludes mine.

I shall not attempt to repeat the substance of all that I have already written, but will confine myself mainly to the text of the decree (Acts xv. 29) and the two connected verses (xv. 20 and xxi. 25), with a few further remarks pointing backwards and forwards. For the sake of clearness I will divide what I have to say into separate heads.

1. *The Present Situation.*—I had in view more especially, on the one side Zahn, *Einleitung* (ed. 3), ii. 344–346, 349, 353 f.; and on the other, Harnack, *Beiträge zur Einleitung in d. N.T.* III. (Leipzig, 1908), and Gotthold Resch, *Das Apostel-dekret nach seiner ausserkanonischen Textgestalt untersucht* (Leipzig, 1905; *Texte und Untersuchungen*, Neue Folge, XIII. 3). Since that time I observe that things have taken a rather different course in this country and in Germany. On this side the North Sea, there has been something like a drawn battle, with the honours rather on the side of Harnack and Resch than otherwise. On this side, besides the article in the July Expositor, must be set Dean Furneaux's edition of the Acts (Oxford, 1912)[1] and the two writings already referred to by Professor Lake. These may be set against the older works of Rackham, Knowling (that best of all English Commentaries on the Acts) and Bartlet (in the *Century Bible*). In Germany, on the other hand, all the recent books that I can think of are against Resch and Harnack; so (e.g.) Wendt, in the new edition of his Commentary; Rudolf Knopf (in the series edited by Joh. Weiss); Erwin Preuschen (in Lietz-

[1] In referring to this book I cannot help regretting that Dr. Furneaux should write so dogmatically and on such very imperfect data ("Harnack has shown conclusively that three things are forbidden, all of them moral—idolatry, fornication and murder. . . The words 'and from what is strangled' are an early gloss written in the margin by some one who misunderstood the 'blood,' etc."). Dr. Furneaux has command of a clear and vigorous style, and might have done good service in helping to make the Acts more generally understood; but, to say the truth, his book required at least three times the work and thought that have been actually given to it. It is much to be hoped that readers will not be carried away by his confident assertions.

mann's *Handbuch zum N.T.*—though he places in square brackets "things strangled" in the text of xv. 20, 29, and the whole verse xxi. 25); and above all, Freiherr Hermann von Soden in his new text (Göttingen, 1913). The last-named should carry special weight with Professor Lake, as he is not only a specialist of great experience (should we not say, in view of his *magnum opus* now completed, *the* leading specialist?) in textual criticism, but also shares with him the general principle "that our most famous uncials only represent an Alexandrian recension of the third or fourth century." Taking the two countries together and considering all the circumstances, I think I may claim that the balance of authority is in favour of the older view. I would not, however, lay stress upon authority, but should wish the question to be decided strictly on its merits.

2. *The Problem at issue.*—And yet I cannot be surprised that Professor Lake's book, and in particular his statement of this question, should have attracted the attention that it has both on other points and on this; he writes with such bright intelligence and in such a genuinely scientific spirit that his views deserve full discussion. For several reasons I should be glad to be allowed to state the problem in his words. It cannot be better stated—either with less of pedantry or with more lucidity—and I should be glad to mark the point up to which we can travel together. It should be said that Professor Lake writes (by inference) collectively of the three related verses, but primarily of the actual text of the Decree (Acts xv. 29). He opens his case as follows:

> "The text of all the manuscripts which represent the dominant Greek tradition ℵA B C P, etc.—supported by the Alexandrian Fathers Clement and Origen, states that the Apostles told the Gentile converts to keep themselves from things offered to idols, from blood, from things strangled, and from fornication. Thus there is a

four-clause text of which the first three clauses seem, when united in this way, to give a food law, to fix, as it were, the conditions of intercourse between Jewish and Gentile Christians, while the last clause—against fornication—seems to have nothing to do with food, but to belong to a different category altogether.

"Over against this reading is the evidence of D, the Latin version, Irenaeus (in Greek as well as in the Latin translation), Tertullian, Cyprian, and other Latin writers, who omit 'things strangled,' generally insert after the reference to fornication, 'and do not do to others what you would not that they should do to you,' and at the end of all add, 'Ye shall do well, being carried along by the Holy Spirit.' Thus it is plain that a widely received text of the decrees ran somewhat as follows: *ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων καὶ αἵματος καὶ πορνείας, καὶ ὅσα μὴ θέλετε ἑαυτοῖς γίνεσθαι ἑτέρῳ μὴ ποιεῖν· ἀφ' ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτοὺς εὖ πράξετε* [or *πράξατε* ?] *φερόμενοι ἐν τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι*, and was opposed, ultimately successfully, by a rival form which ran *ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλόθυτων καὶ αἵματος καὶ πνικτῶν καὶ πορνείας· ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτοὺς εὖ πράξετε.*

"Now, the evidence of Irenaeus and Tertullian on the one hand, and of Clement on the other, shows that both these readings are very old. Moreover, the history of exegesis confirms them. For in Alexandria the Apostolic Decrees were always interpreted as a food law, but in Africa (up to the time of Augustine) and in Europe as referring to the three deadly sins. Irenaeus and Tertullian were, it is true, acquainted with a food law, but they did not connect it with the Apostolic Decrees.

"Nevertheless, the three-clause text, in its entirety, cannot be maintained. Among modern critics there is

an almost complete agreement that the additions of the negative form of the golden rule, and the reference to the Spirit cannot be original : partly because the former introduces a very harsh parenthesis or change of thought but chiefly because, if the golden rule had been in the text from the beginning, the interpretation of the decrees as a food law would have been impossible."

Down to this point my critic and I are in complete agreement, and I shall venture to use the statement thus made as if it had been my own. But from this point onwards there is usually some little change that I should like to see made in most of the paragraphs which affects the inference that I should draw from them. It will, however, be better just to indicate these changes as we go on, and then to endeavour to draw the threads of the evidence together.

Professor Lake continues :

" This consensus of opinion had prejudiced critics against the omission of ' things strangled,' which is supported by much the same witnesses, and Dr. Sanday in particular has argued that as D and Irenaeus have made a mistake in adding the golden rule, they ought not to be trusted where they omit ' things strangled.' His view is that the same people left out ' things strangled ' and inserted the golden rule [not to do to others what one would not have done to oneself] in order to change a food law into a moral enactment.

" Against this argument serious objections can be brought. In the first place, it is not the case that the evidence for the golden rule is quite the same as that for the omission of ' things strangled ' ; Tertullian omits ' things strangled ' but does not insert the golden rule. There is, therefore, important if not extensive evidence that the two readings are independent of each other. In the second place, there is no historical evidence whatever

that the circles which can be shown to have read a text which omitted 'things strangled' had any objection to a food law."

It was not so much the modern consensus of opinion that led me to my conclusion as the common elements that ran through the ancient authorities for the text. Nor did I at all slur over the difference in regard to the "golden rule" in Tertullian's version of it. I will come back to this in more detail when we have the evidence more fully before us. In regard to the omission of "things strangled," I would not say that the circles responsible for that omission "had any objection to a food law." I do not dispute the evidence which Professor Lake brings forward to show that they had no such objection. I will explain later just what I believe to have been their attitude on the subject. The sentences that follow are an argument in favour of looking for a reading which will explain the divergences on either side. That is no doubt quite in order as a rule of critical procedure. But it is another thing to say that "such a text would be excellently provided by the reading of Tertullian, which omits 'things strangled,' but does not insert the golden rule." I understand the reasons which have led to this remark; but we must reserve the discussion of them until we come to speak of the evidence of Tertullian as a whole. Before we do this it will be well to have before us a concise statement of the critical attestation of the different clauses.

3. *The Textual Phenomena.*—The alternatives lie between two connected groups of what are technically known as "Western" and "Eastern" readings. It will be enough to set out in full the evidence for the first of these (the Western group). It may be assumed that the mass of the other authorities, including the leading Greek MSS. and the Versions, is on the other side. I shall not hesitate to use the recognised critical symbols; because to do so makes the

statement much more compact and it is easier to get a synoptic view of the whole. It is not important that all the symbols should be understood. They may be simply taken as so many pawns in the game; the main point on which we have to fix our attention is their tendency to recur.

I proceed then to give the commonly accepted texts, with the Western readings represented as variants. I omit a few secondary details of evidences, that would only confuse.

Acts xv. 20: *ἀλλὰ ἐπιστεῖλαι αὐτοις τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλισγημάτων τῶν εἰδώλων καὶ τῆς πορνείας καὶ τοῦ πνικτοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἵματος* ("but that we write unto them that they abstain from the pollutions of idols, and from fornication, and from what is strangled, and from blood").

Omit καὶ τοῦ πνικτοῦ ("and from what is strangled"). D, g, Latin Irenaeus, *add at end καὶ ὅσα μὴ θέλουσιν ἑαυτοῖς γίνεσθαι ἑτέροις μὴ ποιεῖν* or the like ("and what they would not have done to themselves not to do to others"), D, Sahidic (Egyptian) version, Latin Irenaeus, Eusebius.

xv. 29: *ἀπέχεσθαι εἰδωλοθύτων, καὶ αἵματος, καὶ πνικτῶν, καὶ πορνείας· ἐξ ὧν διατηροῦντες ἑαυτοὺς εὖ πράξετε* ("that ye abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication; from which, if ye keep yourselves, ye shall prosper").

Omit πνικτῶν ("things strangled"), D, Latin Irenaeus, Cyprian, Pacian, Ambrosiaster, Jerome, Fulgentius.

Insert (after *πορνείας*, "fornication") *καὶ ὅσα μὴ θέλετε ἑαυτοῖς γίνεσθαι ἑτέρῳ μὴ ποιεῖν or the like*, D, Harclean (Syriac) version with an asterisk, Sahidic (Egyptian) version, Ethiopic, Latin Irenaeus, Cyprian, Eusebius, Ambrosiaster (nearly) and others.

Add at end, φερόμενοι ἐν [*τῷ*] *ἁγίῳ πνέυματι*, D, Latin Irenaeus, Tertullian.

xxi. 25: *φυλάσσεσθαι αὐτοὺς τό, τε εἰδωλόθυτον καὶ αἷμα καὶ πνικτὸν καὶ πορνείαν* ("that they should keep themselves from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from what is strangled, and from fornication").

Omit καὶ πνικτὸν, D *g*, Ambrosiaster (nearly), Augustine.

We observe that D (Codex Bezæ, the leading authority for the Western text) enters into the testimony for every one of these readings; the Latin Irenaeus also enters into every one where the verse is quoted by Irenaeus. A single verse is quoted by Tertullian; and there Tertullian agrees with Irenaeus except in the insertion of the golden rule. This one reading (with the corresponding insertion in xv. 20) stands rather by itself, and must be considered separately. It too is Western, resting primarily upon D, Iren. The other readings are not only Western, but belong definitely to the Latin branch of the Western Text. In regard to the golden rule, we note (i) that the absence of Tertullian and the presence of a small group of early versions gives the reading a rather special character. The "Harclean Syriac with an asterisk" requires a word of explanation. Thomas of Harkhel (Heraclea) in the year 616 published a revised form of an earlier version of 508 A.D., as he expressly tells us, with a careful collation of two (or three) "accurate Greek manuscripts." This edition was made in a monastery nine miles from Alexandria. The Greek MSS. referred to were remarkable, and contained a number of very ancient readings. This (the insertion of the golden rule) was one of them, and the asterisk in the MSS. denoted that the reading was an addition to the current text. Strictly, this authority was Greek rather than Syriac; but it is Greek that was closely bound up with the Syriac tradition. The readings of this witness are characteristically Western, and it is in close alliance with D. Its presence here, along with two other

ancient versions, also Western in character, shows that the reading which they attest had a wider diffusion and was earlier in date than those for which the authorities are purely Latin. It must have originated before the point at which the Latin branched off from the Syrian (primitive Western Greek) and Egyptian.

(ii) I should therefore regard it as practically certain that, whether Tertullian had or had not in his copy the reading "do not do to others what you would not have done to you," that reading is at least of considerably older date than his own. To my mind the probabilities are that he had it before him, because in any case he had the other admittedly secondary reading *vectante vos spiritu sancto*. But it would not follow that, because he had it in his text, he would therefore include it in his quotation. It has always, in modern times as well as in ancient, been held to be permissible to drop a clause of the original that was not directly relevant to the purpose for which it was quoted. Tertullian could not, even if he had wished, have quoted this clause, because it would have made havoc of the rest of the quotation: *a quibus observando recte agitis* (the authenticated text, Reifferscheid's reconstruction is certainly wrong, but does not affect the point), links on naturally to *a quibus necesse est abstineri, a sacrificiis et a fornicationibus et sanguine*, but would make nonsense if preceded by the golden rule. A careful modern writer would call attention to the omission by printing . . . where the clause should occur, but the ancients did not adopt these niceties.

(iii) If we do not follow this reasoning, then we can only say that through some accident of transmission Tertullian has in this verse two readings of his group but not the third. Anomalies of this kind are frequent: for instance, of the seven Western non-interpolations in Luke xxiv. the Old Syriac (apparently) supports three, does not support three, and has part of one.

For these reasons it seems to me that Tertullian is at best a precarious foundation to build on, as Professor Lake builds upon him. But I would waive this point, if there were not weightier considerations in the background.

4. *Antecedent Probabilities.*—We may follow the example of Professor Lake in propounding to ourselves the question which is more likely to have been the decision of the Council —the three-clause group (in the main of moral precepts) or the four-clause group (of ceremonial observances).

In any case neither group is strictly homogeneous. On the one hand, "things sacrificed to idols"—i.e. meat from a victim portions of which had been sacrificed on an idol altar —must be ceremonial. On the other hand, "fornication" is no less clearly moral. But the leading aspect in which it is regarded in this context is as presenting a contrast between Jew and Gentile. To the Gentile it was a thing indifferent; by the Jew it was to be avoided at all costs. But that condition does not apply to "homicide." The prohibition of homicide was really common to Jew and Gentile. In this context it is a moral commonplace, which is flat and pointless; it is indeed so pointless as to be incredible.[1]

It is otherwise with what is called the "food-law." In regard to this we are not left to vague possibilities; we have the best of evidence to show that discussions precisely of this kind were actively going on at the time and place indicated. It is rather surprising to me that more has not been made of this point, and that I myself did not make more of it. The scene at Antioch in Galatians ii. 11-14 presents a graphic picture of the urgency of such questions and the sharp controversy to which they were liable to give rise.

"But when Cephas came to Antioch, I resisted him to

[1] This would not exclude the possibility that αἷματος was in some sense ceremonial; but that sense is much clearer in conjunction with πνικτοῦ -τῶν).

> the face, because he stood condemned. For before that certain came from James, he did eat with the Gentiles; but when they came, he drew back and separated himself, fearing them that were of the circumcision. And the rest of the Jews dissembled likewise with him; insomuch that even Barnabas was carried away with their dissimulation. But when I saw that they walked not uprightly according to the truth of the gospel, I said unto Cephas before them all, If thou, being a Jew, livest as do the Gentiles, and not as do the Jews, how compellest thou the Gentiles to live as do the Jews?"

For those who identify (as I am still disposed to do) the Council with the events referred to in the preceding verses, the scene thus described would be in near proximity to it and would naturally throw back a light upon the circumstances which led up to it. It will be remembered that some scholars, including Mr. C. H. Turner,[1] have raised the question whether it is necessary to suppose that the events alluded to in the two paragraphs of Galatians ii. are in strict chronological order, and whether the events of the second paragraph may not have really preceded those of the first, or (in other words) fall before the Council rather than after it. It would simplify the whole story to suppose that they did; and I too lean to the same hypothesis, which however, of course, cannot be verified. But whether the relation of this incident to the Council is nearer or more remote, in any case it illustrates aptly the nature of the controversy between the Judaising party and their opponents. With this scene in our minds the debating of questions of food loses any semblance of inappropriateness. In fact such questions were really among the burning practical issues of the day; and practical issues are apt to take precedence of theoretical.

All that is to be said on the other side is contained in the

[1] Hastings, *DB*, i. 424.

argument that if " the Council enacted a food law, it would be hard for St. Paul to say that the Apostles had made no additions to his gospel."[1] But what reason is there to suppose that St. Paul would ever have thought of connecting such things with " his gospel " ? That was surely concerned with very different matters.

There is one small confirmation of the view just taken that may easily be overlooked. Preuschen has rightly pointed out that *ἀλίσγημα* in *v.* 20 is properly used of defilement through food. The word is not classical, and the noun does not occur in the LXX, but the cognate verb occurs there four times and always in connexion with pollution by food.

Daniel i. 8. Daniel would not defile himself with the king's meat.

Malachi i. 7. Ye offer polluted bread.

Malachi i. 12. The table of the Lord is polluted.

Ecclesiasticus xl. 29. He will pollute his soul with another man's meat.

This shows at least that the writer of this chapter had the idea of pollution through food strongly before his mind.

It is interesting to notice that the Latin translator of Irenaeus misses this point, where the bilingual MSS. retain it. Irenaeus renders *ἀλισγημάτων* by *vanitatibus*, *d*, *e* (Latin columns of D and E), with *g* (cod. *gigas*), by *contaminationibus*.

5. *Origin of the Readings.*—It is then, I submit, proved that in the near neighbourhood of the time and place to which the decree is assigned there was a real interest in questions relating to food, due to the prominent part which such matters played in the Mosaic Law and in Jewish practice. It was an incident in the inevitable controversy as to the terms of intercourse and communion between Jewish and Gentile Christians. It comes in most naturally when that contro-

[1] *Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*, p. 54.

versy was at its height. And it certainly was at its height in the first age of the Gospel, in what we may call the Pauline period. We know how rapidly the controversy subsided, not so much through the victory of St. Paul in argument—though we have no doubt that he was victorious in argument—as through the shifting of the balance between the Jewish and Gentile parties, the one contracting and drawing into its shell, while the other was as fast expanding in growth and increasing in influence. As this process went on, and as the old controversy receded into the distance, the points on which it turned became less intelligible. Professor Lake seems to me rather to miss the mark here. He speaks of the circle which omitted "things strangled" as not having "any objection to a food law" (p. 50), and again of such a law becoming "repugnant or obsolete" (p. 59). He has indeed proved (and we welcome the proof) that a food law was recognised by Tertullian and in the churches of Vienne and Lyons which were under the government of Irenaeus. If I were merely arguing for a thesis, I might quote the two leading supporters of the Western text as witnessing to the Eastern readings in spite of themselves. But I do not think that they really do this. The evidence really points, not to the continued influence of the Apostolic Decree, but to the survival down to this date in the churches of Africa and Gaul of practices derived from the Levitical Law. When Tertullian refers to the abstention of Christians from things strangled and from the flesh of dead beasts, he is clearly thinking of Leviticus xvii. 13–16. "Whatsoever man there be . . . which taketh in hunting any beast or fowl that may be eaten, he shall pour out the blood thereof and cover it with dust . . . And every soul that eateth that which dieth of itself or that is torn off beasts . . . he shall wash his clothes, etc." This rule was obviously regarded as still unrepealed. Tertullian knew his Bible, and the martyr Biblis also knew

her Bible, but the rule came by degrees to be more or less ignored. From the first the special abstention form "things strangled" must have been a puzzle in the West, where no such usage existed; and it is not strange that among the scribes to whom we owe the origin of the Latin branch of the Western Text there should have been one or more to whom allusions to such a practice were a stumblingblock. That is all we have to assume in order to account for the Western readings. Nothing could be more simple, or more natural in view of the course of historical development. The Eastern readings are really Eastern, and reflect a condition of things that we know to have existed in the middle of the first century. The Western readings reflect, no less naturally, conditions which obtained away from Syria and Palestine (or from the districts where Jewish Christians were thickest) in the first half of the second century.

There is clearly a close interconnexion between all the members of the two groups of reading; but it is not necessary to suppose that they all came in at once. For me, the Eastern readings represent the genuine text; and therefore the *onus* on my side is to explain the origin of the Western. For the advocates of the Western text, this relation is inverted. And here I cannot help thinking that the task is beyond what they are able to perform. It is never a very serious matter to explain an easy reading out of a difficult one; but the reverse process is likely to prove troublesome. I will give my sketch of what I conceive to have been the origin of the Western readings first.

I have argued above, from the distribution of the authorities, that the first link in the chain was the insertion of the negative form of the golden rule. This was probably in the first instance a gloss written in the margin. Some scribe who was interested in the substance of what he was writing, took the decree as containing the essentials of Christian practice.

From this point of view it seemed to him somewhat external and deficient, and he jotted down by the side a current summary of duty to one's neighbour. Then came a copy in which by accident the clause about "things strangled" was omitted. Such accidents are very common, especially where there is a string of clauses like one another in meaning. Professor Lake aptly refers to two examples in connexion with this same decree. He notes that both Origen and Methodius (though Origen at least was familiar with the ordinary four-clause text) quote it in a three-clause form, omitting "blood" instead of "things strangled." There was nothing deliberate or intentional in this. But, with "things strangled" omitted and the golden rule inserted, and with "blood" an ambiguous term and "fornication" certainly ethical, it was natural that a scribe—especially one of those masterful scribes who are almost as good as "editors" —should consider with himself whether the whole decree ought not to be mainly ethical. He decides that it ought; and then, in order to harmonise all three verses, he strikes out "things strangled," which indeed he only half understood) in xv. 20 and xxi. 25. There must have been deliberate action somewhere, because the three passages have all been brought into agreement; but on this view we should have that combination of accident and design which is so common in human affairs, and especially in the vagaries of textual criticism.

The difficulty on the other view is to account for the insertion of "things strangled." Omissions, as I have said, are easy; but insertions always require an explanation of the special nature of the insertion. Professor Lake's hypothesis is, I think, the best that can be suggested. He thinks that there were two lines of exegesis of the ambiguous "blood," and that those who took the ceremonial side inserted "things strangled" to make the meaning clear. The question is, from what quarter in the Church could an impulse in this

direction come ? There was no longer an interest in these old Jewish scruples. If there had been, as perhaps there was in some Palestinian community on a very small scale, it would never have possessed itself of the great mass of Greek uncial MSS., with the single exception of Cod. Bezae. That is where the explanation seems to me to break down. The four-clause text, with its appurtenances, belongs to the great main stream of Greek tradition ; and to obtain command of this before the time of Clement and Origen, a reading or group of readings must have proceeded from a very central and authoritative quarter indeed. It is much easier to suppose that this particular group of readings was original.

6. *Subsequent History.*—We have hitherto spoken of the "Apostolic Decree," and that is the common designation. But I am by no means sure that "Apostolic Rescript" would not be a better name. No doubt a rescript proceeding from "the apostles and elders with the whole church" of Jerusalem would be as authoritative as if it were called a decree. But the point brought out would be that it was a direct answer to a limited local question arising out of limited local circumstances. The reason why we hear so little of this answer later was because there were so few churches in which the conditions were the same. The apostles and their colleagues evidently knew that they were legislating for a region in which the Jewish and the Gentile elements in the Church were more or less evenly balanced. Their object was to consult as far as possible the susceptibilities of the Jews, sharpened by long ages of exclusive practice. It is a matter of experience that questions affecting social relations of this kind lead to more acute controversy within their range than others of far greater theoretical importance. But when St. Paul carried his missionary labours further westwards, when the Jews definitely rejected his preaching while Gentiles freely joined his newly founded communities, the problem that arose was of a different kind. It was only what was

right and seemly in itself; there was no longer need to provide against Jewish sensitiveness. Hence the so-called "food law" practically reduced itself to the question of meats "offered in sacrifice to an idol." In regard to these St. Paul gave the wise advice, not to ask too many questions, but in case attention were called to the origin of the meat set before you, to abstain in order not to offend tender consciences. The whole atmosphere of this decision is different. It could easily and simply be placed upon a basis of Christian principle. There was no need to invoke the Levitical law. St. Paul had too much insight and tact to do this where it was not necessary. He had more important things to bring home to his converts than to explain to them the Levitical system; and it was probably more prudent, and more likely to keep discussions of this sort in their proper place, if he treated them just by the way and without any appeal to authority at all. When we consider what St. Paul was and what his converts were, I fail to see that there is anything improbable in the treatment of food questions in his Epistles, or anything really inconsistent with the special instructions laid down to meet a special case in Acts xv. It is not likely to have been ever forgotten that in these the Church of Jerusalem was addressing the Churches of Antioch, Syria and Cilicia, and that it had no thought of "binding" or "loosing" the whole Christian Church for all time.

On such a general view, the events of the middle of the first century seem to me to fall into their places, and the evidence of the end of the second century also falls into its place; it also seems that a reasonable bridge of hypothesis has been constructed between them. But in any event I very much hope that we in England shall not be in too great haste to commit ourselves to a theory which as a whole is losing ground in Germany, and which I believe to be fundamentally wrong and misleading. W. SANDAY.

THE FORMS OF HEBREW POETRY.

V. Varieties of Rhythm. The Strophe.

Hebrew rhythms fall into two broad classes according as the second line of the successive distichs is equal in rhythmical quantity to, and therefore balances, the first line, or is less in quantity than, and so forms a kind of rhythmical echo of, the first line. Distichs in which a shorter first line is followed by a longer second line are relatively speaking so rare [1] that in a first broad division they may well be neglected; and we may classify the rhythms not merely as distichs consisting of equal or unequal lines, but, so as to bring out the regular and more striking difference between them, as balancing and echoing rhythms respectively.

But before we can discuss the question of the extent to which, or the sense in which, strophe may be said to be either a regular or an occasional form of Hebrew poetry, it becomes necessary to subdivide these two broad classes of rhythms which have hitherto mainly engaged our attention, and then to consider to what extent different rhythms may enter into one and the same poem. This subdivision must be carried through by applying a measure which, as I pointed out in the last article, is less accurate than we could desire, and leaves us with corresponding uncertainties which must not be forgotten. Even when we may be certain of the general class into which a particular distich may fall we may remain uncertain of its exact measurement; for example—

ישראל לא ידע
עמי לא התבונן

is certainly a distich of equal lines (balancing rhythm): but whether each line contains three or only two stressed words is in some measure uncertain.

[1] Cp. *Isaiah* (International Critical Comm.), p. lxv.

Whether the unit in Hebrew poetry is the line or the distich has been much discussed; regarded from the standpoint of parallelism, it is obviously the distich that is the unit; the single line in this case is nothing; it is incapable of revealing its character as a parallelism. On the other hand it is rhythmically just as easy to measure a single line as to measure a distich; and at times it is necessary so to do: for, as there alternate with distichs that consist of parallel lines distichs that contain no parallelism, so occasionally there alternate with these distichs single lines or monostichs, and also tristichs in which the third line may or may not be parallel to the first two. For these non-parallel isolated stichoi, or the non-parallel third stichoi of tristichs, measurement of the line becomes necessary.

At the same time unless an anapæstic rhythm such as Sievers claims to discover, or other rhythm equally well defined, can be shown to prevail within the lines, these isolated stichoi owe their rhythmical character, so far at least as we can discern or measure it, to the fact that they contain the same number of stressed syllables as the halves of the distichs among which they occur.

Thus in any case the distich remains so characteristic of Hebrew poetry that it is better, so far as possible, even in a rhythmical classification, to measure and classify by distich rather than stichos: though the stichos when isolated will of course call for measurement too.

Distichs consist of (i.) those in which the lines are equal; and (ii.) those in which one line (generally the second) is shorter than the other.

The first class of distichs subdivides into (*a*) distichs with two stresses in each line; (*b*) distichs with three stresses in each line; and (*c*) distichs with four stresses in each line. Of these three types of balanced rhythm the first and third are intimately connected: for four-stress lines are commonly

divided into two equal parts by a cæsura, and the pause at the cæsura is often strong enough to justify, regard being had to rhythmical grounds alone, treating each period of four stresses as a distich of two-stress lines. Any isolated group of two periods of four stresses is best classified as a single distich of four-stress lines, or two distichs of two-stress lines, according as parallelism occurs between the clauses or sentences of two stresses or of four stresses. But in view of this intimate connexion it is not surprising that combinations of two two-stress clauses or sentences, and combinations of two four-stress sentences occur in the same poem. Such a mixture of rhythms, if in such case we are right in speaking of a mixture of *rhythms* at all, exactly corresponds to the fact that, in the same *ḳinah* or elegy, parallelism sometimes occurs between the two unequal sections of three and two stresses respectively, and sometimes does not; in the latter case we may, if we will, speak of a line of five stresses, and in the former of a distich in which a two-stress line follows a three-stress line; but the line in the one case and the distich in the other are *rhythmically* identical, since each contains five stresses; there is no real change in the rhythm, though the change in the parallelism introduces a markedly different effect[1] which it is well to render as manifest as possible.

If, at least where parallelism commonly takes place between sections of three and two stresses respectively, we more properly speak of a *distich* of unequal lines than of a *line* of five stresses, then clear examples of distichs of two-stress lines are those which interchange with the 3 : 2 distichs in Lamentations i., iii., iv.: as, for example, iii. 15 :—

השביעני במרורים
הרוני לענה

[1] Cp., e.g., Isaiah i. 10 f., 18–20, 21–26, and see *Isaiah*, p. lxvi. (Introduction, § 54); see also *ibid.*, pp. 4 f., 26, 31.

However we choose to term them, combinations of parallel clauses of two stresses do, as a matter of fact, interchange within the same poem with distichs of four-stress parallel lines: so, for example, in 2 Samuel i. 22 :—

מדם חללים
מחלב גברים
קשת יהונתן לא־נשוג אחור
וחרב שאול לא־תשוב ריקם

From the blood of the slain,
From the fat of the mighty,
The bow of Jonathan turned not back,
And the sword of Saul returned not empty.

For are we not forced by the parallelism to place a much greater pause between the first two sets of two words than between the next two sets? And are not the two short parallel periods really separated by almost as strong a pause as the two longer ones that follow? If we call the two longer ones a distich of four-stress lines, why not the two shorter ones a distich of two-stress lines? Does not the passage really consist of two distichs rather than of a single tristich (cp. R.V.) of three four-stress lines?

For another example of this combination we may turn to Isaiah xxi. 3 :— [1]

על־כן מלאו מתני חלחלה
צירים אחזוני כצירי יולדה
נעויתי משמע
נבהלתי מראות

Therefore filled are my loins with writhing,
Pangs have seized me as of a woman in travail.
I am bent (with pain) at what I hear,
I am dismayed at what I see.

Here the first two periods must be regarded as a distich of four-stress lines: the lines cannot be subdivided into dis-

[1] Cp. *Isaiah*, pp. 348 f.; also my article *The Strophic Division of Isaiah xxi. 1–10, and xi. 1–8* in the *Zeitschr für die A.T. Wissenschaft*, 1912, pp. 190 ff.

tichs of two-stress lines as which so much of the rest of the poem may be, and, indeed, is best read.

Which is the best way to divide the Hebrew text, or even an English translation, though this at least should as far as possible be divided according to the parallelism, often becomes a delicate question. For example, does

המו גוים מטו ממלכות
נתן בקולו תמוג ארץ (Ps. xlvi. 7)

consist of one distich (R.V., v. 6) of four-stress lines incompletely parallel to one another, or of two distichs of two-stress lines, the lines in the first distich being completely parallel, the lines in the second not parallel at all, thus—

Nations were in tumult,
Kingdoms were moved;
He uttered his voice,
The earth melted.

If Psalm xlvi. 7 be treated as a single distich, then the first line of the distich is marked by an internal and secondary parallelism; and it is to be observed generally that the well-defined cæsura which regularly occurs in four-stress periods renders it particularly easy for the halves to receive such secondary parallelism, and so to assume, when isolated, an appearance of greater independence. Whatever view we take of particular examples, whether we break them up into distichs of two-stress lines or distichs of four-stress lines, the rhythm remains essentially the same, and our only problem is how best to do justice to other formal elements in the poem which differentiate what are, in the last resort, rhythmically identical periods. There is nothing that is peculiar to Hebrew poetry in this particular kind of uncertainty which is produced when, within a rhythm that remains constant, another poetical form is irregularly followed. A popular metre with English poets in the sixteenth century was the "poulter's" measure, in which lines of twelve syllables alternate with lines of a "poulter's"

dozen, i.e., of fourteen syllables; these long but unequal lines rhymed.[1] Divide the twelve-syllable line of the poulter's measure in half, and the fourteen-syllable line into lines of eight and six syllables respectively, supply the four short lines thus produced with two sets of rhymes instead of one so that they rhyme alternately, and the form of the typical short metre of our hymn books is the result. But in some cases the origin of short metre asserts itself, and within the same hymn the first and third lines sometimes rhyme and sometimes do not; as, for example, in these two consecutive verses of Wesley's translation of Gerhardt's hymn :—

Give to the winds thy fears,
  Hope and be undismayed;
God hears thy sighs, and counts thy tears,
  God shall lift up thy head.

Through waves and clouds and storms
  He gently clears thy way:
Wait thou His time; so shall that night
  Soon end in joyous day—

and so throughout the hymn, though in no regular alternation, we may observe rhymed and unrhymed first and third lines. Rhythmically the two long lines of the old poulter's measure and the four short lines of modern short metre are identical: where rhymes regularly mark off the shorter periods, it is obviously convenient to make this prominent by dividing into four lines; but where the first and third sections only occasionally rhyme, either course might be adopted: and so with a Hebrew poem in which parallelism sometimes, but not invariably or even predominantly, exists between the halves of successive periods of four stresses.

[1] Four lines of Grimald in Tottell's *Miscellany* (ed. Arber, p. 110) may serve as an example :—

Of all the heavenly gifts that mortal men commend,
  What trusty treasure in the world can countervail a friend?
Our helth is soon decayed; goods, casual, light and vain;
  Broke have we seen the force of power, and honour suffer pain.

Yet clearly allied as 2 : 2 and 4 : 4 are, at times it makes some difference whether we treat the passage as in the one form or the other; the main difference lies here, that in ambiguous cases we shall naturally give to the separate lines of what we regard as a distich of two-stress lines a greater independence than if we were to regard these two-stress clauses as merely parts of a single four-stress line. I take as an example Psalm xlviii. There are in this Psalm, as is well known, some difficult phrases and some doubtful text, but the presence of several short parallel clauses, enough, I think, to be characteristic of the poem, is certain: on the other hand, in the present text there is no single clear case of parallelism between four-stress periods. This being so, verse 4 (R.V., v. 3) ought, I believe, to be taken not as a single four-stress line (R.V.), but as a distich 2 : 2; it consists of two independent parallel lines :—

אלהים בארמנותיה
נודע למשגב

God is in her palaces.
He hath made himself known as a high retreat.[1]

[1] If, and it surely is, it is a good thing to preserve, when this can be done without detriment to the sense or to the English idiom, as much as may be of the swing and rhythm of the original, the Prayer-Book version of Psalm xlviii. is not happy, and A.V. ruins the first verse by omitting a comma. On the other hand, R.V. in *vv.* 1 2 (Hebrew 2, 3) is very happy, and only goes astray with the crucial verse 3 (Hebrew 4). Its rendering, which does not differ here essentially from P.B.V. and A.V., might pass if the rhythm of the original were 4 : 4, but is improbable if the rhythm in the previous verses is, as taken, and correctly taken, as I believe, by R.V. to be, 2 : 2. Dr. Briggs, on the other hand, by the help of some emendation, reduces the whole of verses 1–3 (2–4) to 4 : 4 and renders as follows :—

Great and highly to be praised in the city is our God.
His Holy Mount is beautiful in elevation, the joy of the whole earth.
Mount Zion on the northern ridge is a royal city.
Yahweh doth strive in her citadels, is known for a high tower.

Apart from the validity of the emendations presupposed, this treatment of the passage seems to me to have against it the fact that it gives an æsthetically inferior result. Some corruption of the text there may be, and in particular the tristich in verse 3 is questionable, but substantially we may, I think, reproduce the sense and rhythm of the original as follows :—

The latter part of verse 3 (2) of the same Psalm offers, if the text is correct, an example of a tristich of two-stress lines. Clearer examples of the way in which the rhythm produced by a succession of two-stress parallel lines or clauses may expand not only into four-stress periods with a cæsura, but also at times into six-stress periods with a double cæsura, may be found in Isaiah iv. and xxi. 1–10: I have already cited two-stress and four-stress distichs from the latter passage: the six-stress passage occurs in verse 8:—

על־מצפה אדני | אנכי עמד | תמיד יומם
ועל משמרתי | אנכי נצב | כל הלילות

Upon a watch tower, O Lord, am I standing continually by day,
And upon my guard-post am I stationed all the nights.

The importance of this expansion of 2 : 2 into 4 : 4 or 6 : 6, as the case may be, will appear later.

Of the balanced rhythm, produced by the union of three-stress lines (3 : 3) it is unnecessary to say much at the present point. These lines *may*, but rarely do, admit a cæsura; and this may occur after the first or the second stress: it may be somewhat strongly marked, as in

וכלביא | מי יקימנו (Num. xxiv. 9)

And as a lioness—who shall rouse him up?

or slighter as in both lines of Psalm li. 9:—

תחטאני באזוב | ואטהר
תכבסני | ומשלג אלבין

While, therefore, 3 : 3 differs from 2 : 2 by its greater fullness, it differs from 4 : 4 not only by its less fullness, but also

Great is Yahweh,
And highly to be praised,
In the city of our God,
The mountain of his holiness.
Fair in elevation,
The joy of the whole earth,
Is the mountain of Sion,
The recesses of the North,
The City of the Great King.
God is in her palaces,
He hath made Himself known as a high retreat.

by this general absence of cæsura, which is almost constantly present in 4 : 4—a difference which commonly gives to the two rhythms a remarkably dissimilar effect.

We come now to consider distichs with unequal lines, or, as we may prefer to regard some examples, lines unequally divided by a cæsura. With reference to the typical echoing rhythm 3 : 2 it is unnecessary to add anything more to what has been previously said. But as legitimate variations of 3 : 2, Budde, we have already seen, admitted in addition to 2 : 2, which by his theory of heavy words he endeavoured to equate with 3 : 2, distichs of the type 4 : 2 or 4 : 3. Whether 4 : 2 and 4 : 3 really produce the characteristic effort of 3 : 2 remains to be seen; and also whether either 4 : 2 or 4 : 3 is actually at all a natural or frequent variant of 3 : 2. It is doubtful whether either of these rhythms really occurs in Lamentations i.–iv.; there is certainly nothing like the evidence for the existence of either of them there that there is for the occurrence of 2 : 2. But unless we correct the text, where nothing but rhythm demands it, Isaiah xiv. 4–21, in which the dominance of the echoing rhythm (3 : 2) is obvious, contains two 4 : 2 distichs (*vv.* 5 and 16 c, d). For Sievers' method of reducing verse 5,

שבר יהוה מטה רשעים | שבט משלים

which to be sure he pronounces a "sehr fragliche Vers," to 3 : 4, by treating מטה־רשעים as one stress and its parallel שבט משלים as two, violates the law discussed at the close of the last article. Still 4 : 2 is not really such a natural variant of the *echoing* rhythm 3 : 2 as it may appear to be, when thus named arithmetically; for the first part of 4 : 2 almost necessarily, and certainly in the example just cited, receives a cæsura, so that the whole closely approximates in *rhythmical* character to a tristich of two-stress lines, i.e. to a *balancing* rhythm.

The occurrence, apparent or real, of distichs 4 : 3 or 4 : 2 as variants in a well-sustained succession of distichs 3 : 2 calls for careful examination ; but the existence certainly of 4 : 2, and probably of 4 : 3, elsewhere is well established. Sievers was, I believe, the first to claim clearly that 4 : 3 was not, or at least was not only, a mere variant of 3 : 2, but, so to speak, a rhythm in its own right ; he thereby made it possible to regard certain poems as more regular than they had previously appeared to be. In his earlier work Sievers himself regarded this rhythm as rare, though in an appendix he briefly stated, what he has since endeavoured to work out, that, though rare in those parts of the Old Testament which have commonly been understood to be poetry, it was the regular rhythm of those Hebrew narratives which, though they have commonly been regarded as prose, are in reality metrical. The one poem among those first studied by Sievers in which 4 : 3 seemed to him to be frequent, was Psalms ix. and x. In some respects this is obviously a bad specimen to be obliged to work from, for the destruction in parts of it of the alphabetic scheme gives us a fair warning that the text is corrupt. Still, making all allowance for this, Sievers seems to me to make out a tolerably safe case for 4 : 3 as an independent rhythm, though, unless he is right in finding it prevalent in narratives commonly regarded as prose, it was nothing like so frequent as 2 : 2, 3 : 3, 4 : 4, and 3 : 2.

Some years ago, before I had familiarised myself with Sievers' work, and I think before I had ever even looked into his book, I attempted a reconstruction of Psalms ix., x.[1] In so doing I remarked : " The lines throughout the poem are of equal or approximately equal length, the normal length being three or four accented words. Of the 83 lines into which the R.V. divides the two Psalms, fifteen are abnorm-

[1] Expositor, Sept., 1906, pp. 233–253.

ally long or short, i.e. they contain more than four or less than three accented words." But as I then proceeded to show, these fifteen exceptionally long or short lines in the R.V. mostly vanish when even the present Hebrew text is correctly divided and punctuated. The poem, then, consisted almost, if not quite, entirely of *lines* of three or four accents. This conclusion was, of course, consistent with some or all of the *distichs* being 4 : 3; but Dr. Cheyne, who had a short time before devoted a careful study to the metre as well as to other aspects of the poem, excluded this possibility, for he found in the fact that the poem was partly trimeters, partly tetrameters, an indication either of the imperfect skill of the Psalmist in the management of his metre, or of the interference of a second writer with the original. Dr. Briggs's view seems to be similar. But if it was the *intention* of the writer to use some 4 : 3 *distichs*, it is that intention and neither lack of skill nor subsequent alteration of the poem that is the real reason why the poem contains both trimeter and tetrameter *lines*. Dr. Cheyne's criticism is tantamount to a denial of the existence of a rhythm 4 : 3, just as it would be tantamount to a denial of 3 : 2 to complain that Lamentations i.–iv. consists partly of trimeters and partly of dimeters.

Of the forty distichs measured by Sievers in Psalms ix., x. he regards twelve as clear examples and twenty-two others as probable examples of 4 : 3; the latter and larger group depend on some textual corruption, and a few, or perhaps even most, of the smaller group are in some degree ambiguous; but, even if we had no other evidence than that of Psalms ix., x., it would seem to me unsafe to deny the probability of the actual existence of 4 : 3 distichs. We shall have to examine some interesting examples of these in the next article; meantime, I give two of the clearest examples in Psalms ix., x., viz., x. 16 and ix. 9 :—

יהוה מלך עולם ועד
אבדו גוים מארצו
והוא ישפט תבל בצדק
ידין לאמים במישרים

There remains for brief consideration the question of 4 : 2 rhythm : this is really only one mode of dividing a complete period of six stresses. Such a period admits of several different modes of division, examples of which actually occur, viz., (1) 2 : 2 : 2, which, if the sections are marked by parallelism, or are otherwise strikingly independent, may be termed a tristich of two-stress lines ; (2) 3 : 3, the commonest of all divisions of the six-stress period[1] ; and finally (3) 4 : 2 and 2 : 4. In these last there may be, and commonly is, a slight pause in the longer part of the period, but it is so much less strong than the pause that divides the entire six-stress period into the two unequal divisions that the difference between 4 : 2 and 2 : 4 on the one hand and 2 : 2 : 2 on the other is clear. The rhythms 4 : 2 and 2 : 4 occur, mainly at all events, as alternatives to 3 : 3. Thus the long poem in Isaiah ix. 7–x. 4, in which 3 : 3 clearly predominates, opens with a 4 : 2 distich :—

דבר שלח אדני ביעקב
ונפל בישראל

And we may probably find an example of 2 : 4 preceding 3 : 3 in Psalm i. 1 :—

אשרי האיש
אשר לא־הלך בעצת רשעים
ובדרך חטאים לא־עמד
ובמושב לצים לא־ישב

The interest of these rhythms, 4 : 2 and 2 : 4, is consider-

[1] Six-stress periods divided now into two equal parts (3 : 3) by a single cæsura, now into three equal parts (2 : 2 : 2) by a double cæsura, may occur in the same poem (e.g., Is. xxvi.) ; Sievers has compared the alternation of hexameters with a single and a double cæsura as in the first two lines of the "Iliad" :

Μῆνιν ἄειδε, θεά || Πηληιάδεω 'Αχιλλῆος
οὐλομένην | ἣ μυρί' 'Αχαιοῖς | ἄλγε ἔθηκαν.

able; though, rhythmically, a distich appears to be the union of two lines, so that the line rather than the distich might be regarded as the rhythmical unit, the practice, which is not, to be sure, very frequent, of equating two periods of six stresses, though in one the two sections produced by the cæsura are equal, in the other unequal, indicates that the unity of the six-stress period was strongly felt—a fact which is further indicated by the occasional parallelism of complete periods of six stresses. Moreover, if we can trust the text in Psalm cxii. 6—

כי־לעולם לא־יכוט
לזכר עולם יהיה צדיק

we have, as Sievers has pointed out, yet another indication that the division of a six-stress period into two unequal sections was considered as legitimate as the division into two (or three) equal sections, and the two unequal parts in the one case were regarded as each possessing the same degree of independence and completeness as each of the equal parts in other cases; for Psalm cxii. is an alphabetic Psalm in which the alphabetic scheme marks off successive sections of six-stress periods.

I have now indicated, and given a few typical or more secure examples of, certain kinds of differences that may occur within the same poem. I will now briefly resume two or three of the more important points: (1) the typical echoing rhythm in 3 : 2; with this 2 : 2 alternates, sometimes occasionally, sometimes, as in Lamentations i., frequently; other distichs of unequal lines, 4 : 3 or 4 : 2, are at best much rarer alternatives; (2) of the fundamental balancing rhythms 2 : 2 and 4 : 4 are closely allied and interchange, and by expansion a further natural and occasional variant is 2 : 2 : 2; (3) but this last-mentioned alternative to 2 : 2 or 4 : 4 constitutes a link with the third fundamental balanced rhythm, viz., 3 : 3; for 3 : 3 and 2 : 2 : 2 are but different

ways of dividing the same higher unity, viz., the six-stress period, which may yet again divide into 4 : 2 or 2 : 4; but (4) in respect of these possible variants poems differ much; some poems contain almost or quite exclusively 3 : 2 distichs, not even admitting the variant 2 : 2, and similarly 3 : 3 is maintained without any break through entire poems or long passages of such a book as Job; in other poems, the alternatives, clear or ambiguous, are so numerous that even what is the basal or dominant rhythm remains doubtful.[1]

I am perhaps leaving too much insecure for it to be wise to advance further; but the question of the strophe towards which I have been working in this article I will briefly discuss—briefly because what can be safely said here does not require many words to state it, and what has been both

[1] In many of these cases where parallelism or other features indicate that we have to do with a poem, but the metrical irregularity or ambiguity is so great that we cannot even determine what is the dominant rhythm, the question of interpolation almost necessarily arises, unless indeed we assume that a Hebrew poet mingled not only distichs of different types, but with these also entirely unrhythmical periods. For this we should find an analogy in Babylonian, if we may accept a recent assertion of Dr. Langdon's that "Babylonian poets felt themselves at liberty to insert prose lines at any juncture" in a poem. This assertion occurs in a note (*Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archæology*, xxxiv. (1912), p. 77, n. 32) on a transcription and translation of a recently published Assyrian text in which some lines are divided into hemistichs by a space in the middle of the line, and others are not. The tablet certainly seems to contain lines that fit with difficulty into the rhythm 2 : 2 (or 4 : 4); but some of the lines without a space in the middle seem as clearly rhythmical as those which have the space. Thus of lines 6 and 7—

Šaru la tâbu it-ta-bak U-ri-e-a
me-ḫu-ûndannu ḳaḳḳadi ut-ti-iḳ.

The former lacks and the latter shows the space, but the former is as clearly a four-stress line as the latter, and they are closely parallel to one another, as we may see from Dr. Langdon's translation :—

An evil wind is blown upon my roof,
A mighty deluge passes over my head.

The use of the space to mark the hemistich is not of course peculiar to this tablet; it is found in some of the texts of the Creation Epic (*See* Zimmern in Gunkel's *Schöpfung u. Chaos*, p. 401 n.; King, *Seven Tablets of Creation*, i.)

unsafely and erroneously asserted has already received perhaps sufficient refutation from other writers.

Variations in rhythm would be very readily explained if it could be shown that the poems in which they are found fall into sections in which the same variations recur regularly and in the same manner. But even the alleged evidence of this is slight. Sievers suggests that originally in Lamentations i. each alphabetic section consisted of one five-stress line (or 3 : 2 distich) followed by two four-stress lines (or 2 : 2 distichs); and that the same rhythmical variation 5 : 4 : 4 was thus repeated originally twenty-two times. Unfortunately, this rhythmical scheme can only be imposed upon the poem by much quite arbitrary textual emendation. Again, in Canticles i. 4 Sievers finds two strophes each containing two distichs 3 : 3 followed by a two-stress monostich. But at best such cases seem too rare to point to any strophic system in Hebrew based on this principle.

There are, however, one or two obvious features of certain Hebrew poems that have frequently been admitted to prove the existence of strophes in Hebrew poetry; and rightly, if we use the term strophe in no too restricted sense. The first of these features is the alphabetic scheme in certain poems. It does not seem to me a sound criticism of the argument from that feature to say that the alphabetic scheme cannot point to a strophic division because in Psalms cxi., cxii. it marks off single stichoi. All that follows is that in this instance the units of which the succession is marked by their initial letters being the successive letters of the alphabet is the stichos; and so in Nahum i. and Psalm xxv. it is the distich. It is perfectly possible that, when the alphabetic sections are more than a distich long, these sections may have something more characteristic of them than that they consist of so many distichs or lines.

And as a matter of fact in Lamentations i., ii. and iv., and very conspicuously in ii., the groups of 3 : 2 (or 2 : 2) distichs form real verse paragraphs, for which we may conveniently use the term strophe ; the clear but slight sense-pause within the distich, and the greater sense-pause at the end of each distich are matched by a regularly recurring still greater sense-division at the end of every third distich in Lamentations i. and ii., of every second in Lamentations iv. ; and for this reason a single use of the alphabetic letter at the beginning of each *group* of distichs suffices, for the sense holds the group together and gives it a unity. On the other hand, in Lamentations iii., and, I think, the same may be said of Psalm cxix., the distichs united under the same letter have no regular close sense-connexion with one another, or sense-separation from the distichs united under the neighbouring letters of the alphabet ; and indeed in Lamentations iii., it will be remembered, the best examples of distichs parallel to one another, and, therefore, closely related to one another in sense, are distichs belonging to *different* alphabetic groups.[1] Now it is remarkable that precisely in this poem, where the successive distichs of an alphabetic section are not welded together by sense-connexion and so form no organic unity, their union is secured by the purely external device of repeating the same initial letter at the beginning of each distich of the alphabetic section ; and so in Psalm cxix. Lamentations i., ii. and iv. each consists of twenty-two equal verse-paragraphs which coincide with the alphabetic sections of the poems : Lamentations iii. consists of sixty-six distichs, three consecutive distichs throughout having the same initial letter, but the poem contains no regular system of verse-paragraphs,[2]

[1] See Expositor, Aug., 1913.

[2] The spaces in the R.V. of Lamentations iii. and the lack of spaces in Lamentations i., ii. and iv. suggest the exact opposite of the actual facts.

and where something approaching a sense-paragraph emerges it, as often as not, does not coincide with an alphabetic section.

The real conclusion suggested by the alphabetic poems of the Old Testament, then, appears to be this : some Hebrew poems were divided into larger sense-divisions consisting of the same number of distichs throughout the poem, and some were not.

The other feature of some Hebrew poems that has often been regarded as pointing to a strophic division is the occurrence of refrains. This, again, does clearly mark off successive sections of a poem from one another, and more directly and naturally than an alphabetic scheme leads to a division of the poem into sections corresponding to the greater sense-divisions of the poems. In some of these poems the refrain occurs at equal, or approximately equal, intervals (e.g., Isa. ix. 7–x. 4, Pss. xlii.–xliii.), in others at irregular intervals (Ps. xlix.). I am, of course, referring to the intervals in the present Hebrew text, or of that text as it may be emended by the help of the ancient versions ; I am not for the moment considering whether the practice of some modern scholars in making conjectural deletions from the text so that the refrain shall always occur at *exactly* equal intervals is sound or not.

Some Hebrew poems consist largely or even entirely of a succession of very loosely connected lines or distichs ; now and again one or two distichs may be more closely connected than the rest, but for the most part we cannot speak of greater sense-divisions in such poems at all ; and then nothing that can with any degree of propriety be termed a strophe disengages itself. But other poems do develop a theme in such a manner that greater sense-divisions necessarily result ; in this case it seems to me convenient in a translation to distinguish the verse-paragraphs resulting

from these greater sense-divisions by spacing between them : otherwise we fail to mark externally, though we should do so in prose, the distinction between paragraph and paragraph. This, however, is merely a question of translation, and has nothing to do with any intention of the writer to give to the expression of his thought any further artistic form beyond the distich with its rhythm and parallelism. But we may fairly detect the intention of the writer to submit to such further artistic form, if we find, though his poem contains no refrain and is fitted to no alphabetic scheme, that the greater sense-divisions occur throughout the poem *at regular intervals.* But this raises the further important question—What are regular intervals ? How ought the paragraphs to be measured ? By lines ? or by distichs ? How are tristichs to be treated if they interchange irregularly with distichs ? In discussions of strophe, Psalm ii. has often been selected as a clear example of regular strophic structure ; and so it is, if we count by Massoretic verses. The articulation of the poem is perfectly clear ; the greater sense-divisions occur, and are correctly indicated in the R.V. by the spacing, at the end of every third verse. But the author of Psalm ii. was certainly innocent of the Massoretic verse-division, and of this mode of counting. Now, if we count by lines the four parts are not equal, for while the first, third and fourth parts contain each seven lines, the second contains only six. If we count by distichs and assume that a tristich was a legitimate substitute for a distich, the poem falls into four well-marked sense-divisions, each containing three distichs (or tristichs).

I cannot here examine this aspect of the question in further detail, and will merely record my opinion that groups of two, three, four, and occasionally, as in Isaiah ix. 7–x. 4, of a larger number of distichs, occur in many poems with

such exact or approximate regularity as to make it probable that the writer deliberately planned and carried out this division into *equal* verse paragraphs or strophes.

But if a writer might deliberately distribute his poem into equal strophes, might he not also distribute it into unequal strophes ? The occurrence in some poems of a refrain at unequal intervals might seem to indicate that he did. Yet even this is doubtful : the regular recurrence of *equal* sections in any considerable poem cannot easily be attributed to accident ; on the other hand, sections of unequal length are precisely what would naturally result from a writer expressing his thought free from any further restraint beyond that imposed by the distich : unless, therefore, we can detect some method in the irregularity, poems in which the greater sense-divisions though well-marked consist of a varying number of distichs must be considered to have been written free from the restraint of any strophic law : in this case, if we use the term strophe, it must mean simply a verse-paragraph of indeterminate length uncontrolled by any artistic scheme.

Attempts have from time to time been made, however, to discover method in the irregularity of poems divided into unequal paragraphs, and so to make good the claim that strophe is as constant as parallelism. Köster, in the year 1831, first offered an elaborate examination of the Hebrew strophe ; [1] he reached the conclusion that parallelism of verses is as regular as parallelism of lines, and consequently that all Hebrew poetry is more or less strophic in nature. The " more or less " is an important saving clause ; but a still more important one follows, and this secures Köster's accuracy of observation at the expense of his theory ; he claims that no one can point to any poetical passage of the

[1] *Die Strophen, oder der Parallelismus der Verse der hebräischen Poesie untersucht* in *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, vol. iv.

Old Testament which does not, *within the same degree of license that is permitted in parallelism within the distich*, follow to some extent a symmetrical plan. But since Köster has previously admitted that the parallelism between verse-groups is generally synthetic, and since, as I have maintained, synthetic parallelism is really not parallelism, all that Köster succeeds in maintaining is that in every Hebrew poem there is between verse-groups a parallelism that is generally of the type that is, strictly speaking, not parallelism at all. And this is only a roundabout way of saying that in Hebrew poems there are greater sense-divisions than those of the successive single distichs; and this, as I have suggested above, though scarcely true of all, is true of very many Hebrew poems.

One other point in Köster's discussion may be briefly indicated: in some of his specimens he claims that the sense-divisions, though not equal, are regularly or symmetrically unequal; he claims, for example, that Psalm xxvii. divided according to the main sense-divisions falls into two groups of three (Massoretic) verses each, followed by two groups of four verses each, the scheme being accordingly 3+3+4+4. This kind of hypothetically intentional scheme was later discovered everywhere by D. H. Müller, who is the author of perhaps the most extensive work on the strophe in Hebrew poetry;[1] Müller also claimed to be able to find not only symmetrical inequality in the verse-groups, but also repetition of the same words in corresponding positions of such verse-groups, as, for example, in the second lines of the first and fourth verse-groups, or in the first and last lines of the same verse-group. Such symmetrical arrangements and correspondences would remain as impressive as are the re-

[1] *Die Propheten in ihrer urspringlichen Form* (1895); *Strophenbau und Responsion* (1898). For a severe criticism of Müller's and kindred theories, see Ed. König, *Stylistik, Rhetorik, Poetik*, pp. 347 ff.

markable arithmetical formulæ by means of which Müller claimed to represent them, if on examination these formulæ proved to rest on any exact and probable basis of calculation. What is all-important for such schemes to be anything more than the self-delusions of a modern student is that the unit of reckoning should be clearly defined and consistently maintained; and this neither with Köster nor Müller is the case. The Massoretic verse not only rests on a division of the text made long subsequent to the composition and writing of the poems, but it is anything but a clear and consistent unit, for it consists sometimes of a single line, oftenest of a single distich or tristich, but not infrequently of two or more distichs. Yet the Massoretic verse is made the basis of Köster's reckoning with the result that the symmetrical formulæ 3+3+4+4 can have no relation to any intention of the author of Psalm xxvii.; and any scheme based either on the line or on the distich as the unit would give a different and much less remarkable result.

Müller avoids the error of making the Massoretic verse the unit of reckoning, but he is not constant to any single real unit. König has sufficiently criticised Müller's strophic division of Amos i. 2–ii. 5.[1] I select here as another example of the arithmetical symmetry of Müller's formulæ and the unreality which they express his treatment of Amos iv. According to Müller this chapter opens and closes with a strophe of 8 lines; between the initial and final strophes are strophes consisting successively of 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 lines, and the arithmetical formula for the whole poem is therefore $8 + (8 \times 2) + 8$. This looks symmetrical enough, but how is it obtained? Müller divides the chapter as follows:—

vv. 1–3 said to contain 8 lines.
4–6 „ „ „ 5 lines and a refrain.
7–8 „ „ „ 4 „ „ „

[1] *Stilistik*, p. 348.

vv. 10 said to contain 3 lines and a refrain.
9 „ „ „ 2 „ „ „
11 „ „ „ 1 „ „ „
12, 13 „ „ „ 8 lines.

It will be observed (1) that *vv.* 10 and 9 are transposed to secure the exact arithmetical progression; (2) that 5 + 4 + 3 + 2 + 1 only amount to 15, while if we add to this all five occurrences of the refrain the sum is 20; but neither 15 nor 20 is a multiple of eight; so the symmetrical figure 16 = 8 × 2 is obtained by reckoning five occurrences of the refrain as one line only! But this is only part of the capriciousness that underlies the formula. When we examine the "lines" we find some to be true lines, while others are a large number of Hebrew words constituting, or consisting of a quantity equivalent to, at least a distich. In verse 9,

הכיתי אתכם בשדפון וירקון

is reckoned a single line, but in verse 11, which the arithmetical progression requires shall contain one line and no more, this *single* "line" consists of הכיתי בכם כמהפכת אלהים את סדם ואת עמרה ותהיו כאיד מוצל משרפה which is somewhat more in quantity than הרגתי בחרב בחורים עם שבי סוסיכם ואעלה כאש מחניכם ובאפכם (v. 10) which counts as *two* lines!

With the breakdown of the arithmetical part of Müller's scheme there breaks down also the significance of the correspondences. In strictly measured sections it might be significant of intention if the same word should occur, say, in the first line and the last of two corresponding sections; but as soon as the measurement ceases to be exact the mere recurrence within a few lines of such frequently recurring words as Yahweh becomes entirely insignificant.

There may be here and there a certain artifice in the repetition at given intervals of particular words, and to such an artifice is probably to be attributed the almost regular recurrence, even in the present text of Psalm cxix., of the

same eight different words for law; but such artifices are scarcely more frequent than the use of alphabetic schemes, and have just as little power to create real strophes or verse-paragraphs. G. Buchanan Gray.

THE SANITY OF THE "ESCHATOLOGICAL" JESUS.[1]

I. Typical Alienist Theories.

A suggestion, first appearing in the works of David Friederich Strauss, has recently been brought forward again by a number of historical and medical writers, to the effect that Jesus, living as He did in the world of ideas characteristic of the Book of Daniel and the late Jewish apocalypses and holding Himself to be the "Son of Man" and "Messiah who was shortly to appear in glory," is to be considered as affected by some form of mental disorder. It is the purpose of the following pages to subject this theory to a thorough examination.

I felt a certain obligation laid upon me to undertake this task for the reason that in my *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung* (*The Quest of the Historical Jesus*) I have insisted more strongly than any other writer in this department, on the apocalyptic and, according to modern ideas, "fantastic" element in the conceptions of Jesus, and have therefore repeatedly had it pointed out to me, by H. J. Holtzmann among others, that I had described a Jesus whose world of thought had rather the air of "systematic delusion," while warning references have not been wanting to medical writers who professed to have proved the "paranoia" of the Jewish Messiah.

[1] In conformity with its scientific spirit, Dr. Schweitzer's monograph bears the title "The Psychiatric Estimate of Jesus." The title given above, however, indicates the aspect of it which is of special interest to theological readers, and its applicability will be evident from the introductory paragraphs.—Translator.

Since to my theological and historical studies I have added that of medicine, I believed myself qualified to make a critical examination of the conjectures, assertions and tractates dealing with the mental condition of Jesus, to this extent at least that it was possible for me to form a judgment both of the results of historical criticism and of the principles of mental pathology which come into question.

That I possessed the open-mindedness necessary for such an undertaking, I believed that I had given proof in my earlier writings on the critical study of the life of Jesus. Should the result be arrived at, that from the medical point of view Jesus' world of thought must be classed as in some sense morbid, this, I felt, must be frankly admitted, in spite of all the deductions that might be drawn from it, and the offence that would be given to many; since reverence for truth must be put before all else. It was with this resolve that I approached the task, suppressing the repugnance aroused in me by the idea of having to examine a great personality from the point of view of the alienist, and reflecting that the greatness and depth of that to which Jesus had given utterance as an ethical teacher, did not lose its significance even if the imaginative element in His world of ideas, together with certain of His actions, had to be pronounced more or less morbid.

In the course of the investigation, however, it has become clear to me that those writers who have asserted the presence of a psychopathic element in the apocalyptic conceptions of Jesus, have simply assumed that what is for us strange and unfamiliar is therefore morbid, without giving any close consideration to the question how far this apparently so natural identification is justified, either in general or in the particular circumstances of the case. If this decisive question is duly considered, it appears that this identification of the unfamiliar with the morbid which we find in the state-

ments of the historical and medical writers here in view, is not legitimate, according to the standards established by modern Psychiatry.[1]

The "pathographic" method, which undertakes the task of investigating the pathological abnormalities of historical personages in relation to their work, has lately fallen into some discredit. That is not the fault of the method itself, which, under proper limitations and in the hands of properly qualified investigators, is capable of yielding valuable results, and has indeed done so, but is due to its mistaken application by unqualified persons. The conditions which are requisite for successful work in this department—accurate knowledge of the sources and adequate medical, more especially psychiatric knowledge, both under the direction of critical ability—are rarely found in combination.

Accordingly, one frequently encounters in this department blunders of the grossest kind, caused by the absence of one or other of these conditions, sometimes, indeed, of them all.

It is always unsatisfactory, and is contrary to all psychiatric usage, to form one's judgment of a personality from documentary evidence alone. If this is true in regard to the present, how much more is caution necessary where we have to deal with individuals belonging to a remote era, and in regard to whom the records are incomplete or uncertain. That is what makes the constantly cited examples of historical epileptics, such as Mohammed, Julius Cæsar, and even Napoleon I, appear so questionable and legendary. Still more insecure is the ground on which we stand when we attempt to examine the mentality of persons who lived

[1] In view of the character of the original, this convenient term for the scientific study of mental diseases may be retained, though its use in English is almost, I think, confined to the strictly professional literature.

A series of acknowledgments to medical and other advisers and helpers is here omitted.—TRANSLATOR.

in long-past ages on the lines of our present day psychiatry.

The psychiatric authorities of the present day therefore take for the most part an unfavourable view of these pathographic studies, partly because they do not hold present-day psychiatry to be so perfect and immutable as to see in it a standard capable of application to the measurement of all human action, partly because they know that every phenomenon of human life is to be understood in relation to its own time.

If, as it thus appears, certain prejudices against pathographic studies are justified even from a general point of view, other reasons for an unfavourable estimate of them may readily arise out of the nature of the problems themselves, and these are felt with unusual strength when it is a question of making a pathographical study of the life of Jesus, as has lately been attempted from various quarters.

In such a case it is especially necessary to examine carefully whether the conditions are fulfilled which were above declared to be requisite.

The purpose of the present work is therefore to subject to a critical examination, from the point of view of the alienist and the historian, the assertions made by the medical authors who have written about Jesus.

The suspicion that the mentality of Jesus might reveal some kind of morbid traits had been expressed by historical criticism long before psychiatry had concerned itself with the person of the Nazarene. When David Friedrich Strauss surrendered himself to the direct impression of the historical material—as he was the first to do—he was obliged to admit that Jesus had lived, as he expressed it, under the influence of the " bizarre " conception that He was destined soon to appear upon the clouds of heaven, bathed in supernatural splendour and surrounded by angels, as the expected Messiah, to judge the world and to set up the heavenly Kingdom which was to follow.

In his first "Life of Jesus,"[1] he admits that Jesus must have been, according to our ideas, an "enthusiast." But at the same time he endeavours to explain how the Nazarene, although He allowed Himself to become possessed by this "bizarre conception," could nevertheless be considered as a "rational man," and points for this purpose to the fact that the basis of His expectation is to be found in the general Messianic conceptions of late Judaism.

When in 1864 he wrote his second "Life of Jesus," he was so strongly impressed with the "bizarre" element in the conception of the Second Coming, that he was inclined to regard it as "bordering on mania," and accordingly doubted whether the sayings to this effect were really uttered by Jesus. He therefore decided to give them a very subordinate place in his representation, a procedure which was blamed by many critics as a declension from his sounder judgment of 1835.[2]

In recent decades, historical criticism has more and more come to recognize that the expectation of His Messianic Return was the central point in the thoughts of Jesus, and dominated all His feeling, will, and action to a much greater extent than had previously been supposed. At the same time the apprehensions expressed by D. F. Strauss have not been silent. It has again and again been made a reproach against those representations of Him which place in the foreground—to use Strauss's language—"the bizarre" and "enthusiastic" elements in Jesus' world of thought, that they depict a personality which clearly exhibits morbid characteristics.[3]

[1] David Friedrich Strauss, *Das Leben Jesu*, 2 vols., Tübingen, 1835, 1,480 pp.

[2] David Friedrich Strauss, *Das Leben Jesu fürs deutsche Volk bearbeitet*, 1864, 631 pp. The statement in his letter to Wilhelm Lang is cited in Theobald Ziegler's *David Friedrich Strauss*, Pt. II. (1908), pp. 608–9.

[3] Opinions to this effect have been expressed by, among others, critics like H. J. Holtzmann and Adolf Jülicher (see H. J. Holtzmann, *Das*

In the latest phase of critical study the discussion has turned almost exclusively on the point, how far conceptions of this kind attributed to Jesus are to be considered authentic. There has been a series of attempts to show that the sayings in which Jesus uttered Messianic claims and the expectation of His Return, are one and all unhistorical. According to these hypotheses the Nazarene was a simple Jewish teacher who was first raised by his followers, after His death, to the dignity of the expected Messiah, and they then proceeded to put into his mouth hints and declarations to this effect.[1]

But a division of this kind between genuine and spurious sayings in the sources cannot in point of fact be carried through. It must therefore be admitted that Jesus held Himself to be the Messiah, and looked forward to His glorious return upon the clouds of Heaven.

The pathographic studies of Jesus with which we have now to deal includes the works of Dr. de Loosten,[2] Dr. William Hirsch [3] and Dr. Binet-Sanglé,[4] in addition to which

messianische Bewusstsein Jesu, 1907, pp. 80, 81). Theobald Ziegler gives still stronger expression to these apprehensions (*David Friedrich Strauss*, vol. ii., p. 609). See also Hermann Werner, "Der historische Jesus der liberalen Theologie, ein Geisteskranker" (*Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, xxii., 1911, pp. 347–390). Among works on the mentality of Jesus not by professional medical writers, there should be mentioned Oskar Holtzmann, *War Jesus Ekstatiker?*, 1903, 143 pp., and Julius Baumann, *Die Gemütsart Jesu*, 1908, 80 pp.

[1] The ablest attempt in this direction was made by William Wrede, in his well-known study *Das Messiasgeheimnis in den Evangelien* (Göttingen, 1901, 286 pp.).

[2] De Loosten (Dr. Georg Lomer), *Jesus Christus vom Standpunkt des Psychiaters*, Bamberg, 1905, 104 pp.

[3] William Hirsch, *Religion und Zivilisation vom Standpunkte des Psychiaters*. Translated from the English. Munich, 652 pp. On Jesus, pp. 87–164.

[4] Binet-Sanglé, *La folie de Jésus*, vol. i., 1911 (3rd ed.), 372 pp.: "Son hérédité, sa constitution, sa physiologie"; vol. ii., 1910 (3rd ed.), 516 pp.: "Ses connaissances, ses idées, son délire, ses hallucinations"; vol. iii., 1912 (1st ed.), 537 pp.: "Ses facultés intellectuelles, ses sentiments, son procès." A fourth volume is promised, containing "La morale et les actes, groupement et comparaison des symptômes."

may be mentioned the study of Emil Rasmussen, who is well informed on the medical side.[1]

Let us begin with a short general description of the essential content of these writings.

De Loosten [2] arrives at the following results. Jesus, so runs his thesis, was probably the offspring of mixed parentage, bearing a hereditary taint, and as a congenital degenerate was remarkable even in early youth for an exaggerated self-consciousness, combined with high intelligence and an inadequately developed family and sexual instinct. His self-consciousness, by a gradual development, became intensified to the point of fixed systematic mania, the elements of which were determined by the intensely religious tendency of the time and his one-sided preoccupation with the writings of the Old Testament. The impulse to the externalisation of his ideas was communicated to Jesus by the appearance of John the Baptist. Advancing step by step [3] He finally arrived at the point of applying to Himself all the promises of the Scriptures, which the national misfortunes had again brought into prominence, and of which the final glorious fulfilment was the hope of all hearts.

Jesus regarded Himself wholly as a superhuman being. For that is the only possible way in which we can understand His arrogating to Himself Divine powers such as that of forgiving sin.[4] The fact that He kept as secret as possible the Messianic dignity which He claimed is psychologically explained by de Loosten from the consideration that Jesus did not at that time believe Himself to possess a sufficient following to make good His claims.[5]

[1] Emil Rasmussen, D.Phil., *Jesus. Eine vergleichende psychologische Studie.* German (the author is a Dane) by Arthur Rothenburg. Leipzig, 1905, 166 pp.

[2] See pp. 90, 91. See p. 34.

[4] De Loosten cites Matt. ix. 2, Mark ii. 5–12, Luke v. 20 and vii. 48. See p. 48.

From the saying addressed to the disciple who wished to go to the burial of his father, "Follow thou me, and let the dead bury their dead" (Matt. viii. 22), as well as from other sayings, de Loosten draws the conclusion that, on the one hand, Jesus supposed the beginning of His ideal dominion to be immediately at hand, and on the other, that He was no longer susceptible to natural human feeling. The journey to Jerusalem is described as a foolhardy project to enforce His long-cherished and often-asserted claims by a kind of *coup de main*.[1]

After the dejection in Gethsemane, when the high-priest's officers were approaching, His "systematic delusion" suddenly came to the front again in all its old power.[2] The same thing happened at the trial before the Council, at which Jesus warned the High-priest that His judges should see Him as the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of God and coming in the clouds of heaven.[3] Finally there is quoted from John vii. 16–20 evidence for a "delusion of persecution."[4]

In regard to His emotional life, de Loosten asserts that Jesus' mood was by no means one of steady calm, and that He was sometimes the subject of strange, apparently groundless, fits of irritation and depression.[5] The evidence is chiefly drawn from the Fourth Gospel.[6]

Before His arrest Jesus was in a highly nervous, over-excited frame of mind. He knew what a desperate game He was playing, and suffered cruelly from fears and terrible anticipations. Only as the outcome of such a mood does the wholly irrational cursing of the fig tree become

[1] See p. 72. [2] See p. 83. [3] See p. 85.

[4] John vii. 16–20. During a discourse at Jerusalem Jesus suddenly reproaches His hearers with plotting against His life. They are astonished, and charge Him with being possessed.

[5] See p. 65.

[6] John xii. 27 is referred to as the principal passage.

intelligible.[1] The way in which, argues de Loosten, Jesus here vents His irritation upon an innocent tree, is, as has been said, only explicable as proceeding from a condition of strained emotion. The expulsion of the money-changers from the fore-court of the Temple is described by de Loosten as a most surprising act of violence.

Among sensory illusions he mentions the phenomena at the baptism by John,[2] a vision which obviously exercised a decisive influence on the further purposes of Jesus. It was a case of combined optical and auditory hallucinations, which doubtless, as often happens, accompanied strong emotional excitation.

With what frequency Jesus suffered from hallucinations we do not, according to de Loosten, know. He regards it as probable that Jesus was influenced by these in His decisions, and that similar visions to those which He experienced at His baptism frequently occurred on later occasions.

In addition to optical illusions, de Loosten assumes that Jesus was also most probably subject to "voices," which seemed to proceed from His own body.[3] For the supposed supernatural spirit (*δαιμόνιον*) which thus dwelt in Him Jesus cherished an exalted reverence. A *daimonion* directed Him to act or to forbear, and He obeyed.[4]

The saying, which he attributes to Jesus in a more extended form than that of the recorded wording—"Some one has touched me, for I feel that a power has gone out from me"[5] —is explained by de Loosten as meaning that Jesus experienced some kind of abnormal peripheral sense-perception somewhere in the sensory region of the skin, and that He sought an explanation of this.

The sexual insensibility which is supposed to be estab-

[1] Pp. 77, 78. [2] P. 36. [3] P. 64. [4] P. 73.

[5] Mark v. 27–34. Jesus stated only that some one had touched His garment. That He did so on the ground of feeling that a power had gone out of Him is a naïve conjecture of the Evangelist.

lished by the saying about the eunuchs (Matt. xix. 12) is adduced along with the absence of family affection already mentioned as a mark *par excellence* of degeneration, for which a place can readily be found in the picture of His personality which has previously been constructed.

William Hirsch commits himself to the diagnosis of a particular form of malady, namely "Paranoia." "All that we know of Him answers so exactly to the clinical conception of paranoia that it is not obvious how any one can even doubt the correctness of this diagnosis." [1] The development of the state of delusion is described by Hirsch as follows.[2] We have here a boy with unusual mental gifts, who is nevertheless predisposed to psychic disturbances, and in whom delusions gradually become established. He spends all his leisure in the study of the "holy" Scriptures, the reading of which certainly contributed to his mental malady. It was at the age of thirty that He first appeared in public, by this time affected by fully developed paranoia. Clearly, Hirsch thinks, it is one of those cases where illusory conceptions are originally present without any external cause and in an undeveloped condition, but where they need an external stimulus and the presence of strong emotion to take definite shape in a typical paranoetic system of delusions.

This impulse was communicated to Christ by another paranoetic subject, namely John the Baptist.[3]

The delusions had in the meantime attained in the mind of Jesus to complete maturity, and when He heard of the "Forerunner of the Messiah" who was baptizing sinful humanity in the river Jordan, He Himself repaired thither in order to receive baptism with the rest. The sensory hallucinations which occurred on this occasion are discussed at a later point.

[1] P. 99. [2] Pp. 125, 100. [3] P. 101 ff.

After His baptism Jesus went for forty days into the wilderness. This sojourn in the wilderness is, our author thinks, of the greatest interest to us, since these forty days come between two completely distinct periods of His life. The delusions which had hitherto been isolated and unconnected now united to form a great systematic structure of delusion. Jesus doubtless at this time carried on continual duologues with God the Father, who had sent Him, and " whose doctrine " it was that He preached. Such a history of this disease, a period of transition intervening between the latent and the active stage of paranoia, is, says the author, thoroughly characteristic of this mental state.

In the great three-year-long drama of the public ministry of Christ, the central point upon which all else is focussed is unbounded, infinitely intensified megalomania.

All His discourses, teachings and preachings culminate in one little word, " I." As evidence for this Hirsch cites a series of passages from John's Gospel.[1] At the close of his account the author ventures on the assertion that no manual on mental diseases can furnish a more typical description of a gradually developing case of megalomania, which finally increases " to infinity," than can be found in the life of Jesus.

Hirsch also finds in Jesus " delusions of relationship,"[2] inasmuch as He applied to Himself all the predictions of the prophets and believed that He was meant by the King who was to rule over the world. In this, Hirsch thinks, the Nazarene displays " one of the most essential characteristics of paranoetic subjects, that of relating to themselves everything which they see or read."

[1] vi. 29, 35, 38, 40, 47–58; vii. 38; viii. 12; xi. 25–26; xiv. 6, 13, etc. Along with these he curiously cites the saying put into the mouth of the risen Christ, "All power is given unto me in heaven and on earth" (Matt. xxviii. 18). He also mentions in this connexion sayings about the Son of Man from the first two Gospels without noticing that Jesus is not there speaking about His "ego," since in these discourses He never actually identified the Son of Man with Himself.

[2] P. 126.

The claim of Jesus to come of the race of David is connected by Hirsch with the well-known tendency of youthful paranoetics to substitute for their real descent another of a more imposing character.

The cursing of the fig tree is described as "the utterance of a paranoetic subject," but Hirsch does not go into particulars about it.

In regard to the sense-illusions at the baptism he remarks: "The delusion by which Jesus had been so long possessed, that He was the Son of God, and that God had appointed Him to be the Redeemer of humanity, now translated itself into visual and auditory hallucinations.[1] With reference to the ensuing forty days of loneliness, he remarks: "During the forty days in the wilderness Jesus must (!) have been continually under the influence of hallucinations. His sojourn there can only have been conditioned by hallucinations." All the statements of Jesus that He had received all His teaching from God—the reference is chiefly to Johannine passages—are considered to have been spoken with reference to previous auditory hallucinations.

Hirsch also proposes to understand the "transfiguration of Jesus upon the mount" (Mark iv. 2–8) as a hallucinatory experience of Jesus. As a typical example of an illusion, the story in John xii. 28–29 is referred to, according to which Jesus heard a voice from heaven which announced to Him His coming glorification, whereas the people heard a peal of thunder.[2]

Binet-Sanglé also offers a diagnosis, namely, that of "religious paranoia." In due academic form he distinguishes three stages:

(1) *Période de conception et de systematisation.*

(2) *Période hallucinatoire.*

[1] P. 101. [2] P. 110.

(3) *Période de transformation de personnalité.* He discusses the formation of delusions and the sense-deceptions so far as possible separately.

According to Binet-Sanglé the primary delusion (*idée fixe primordiale*) arises *ex abrupto* without preceding reflexion.[1] The further development of the delusion is coherent, having a probability of its own, starting no doubt from false premisses but nevertheless thoroughly logical in its consequences. It develops by a progressive extension of the primary idea without its undergoing a transformation or losing its original character.[2]

By the influence of suggestion arising from various events — through John the Baptist, through His own miraculous cures, through the adoration of the sick who had been healed, and the enthusiasm of the disciples, Jesus was brought to the point of holding Himself to be the Messiah, the King of the Jews, the Son of God, His interpreter, His instrument, and finally to identify Himself with God. The threats of the fanatics among the Pharisees and Scribes aroused in Him the conception that He was the sacrificial lamb, and through His death should wipe out the sins of Israel and after the resurrection should ascend into Heaven in order to be there revealed in all His glory.

The hallucination at the baptism in Jordan is, according to him, characterised by the fact that there is an "initial sense-deception" which "comes from above" [literally],[3] and is "of an encouraging character." Along with the visual, there is an auditory element. "The voice said, 'Thou art my beloved son, in whom I am well pleased.'" This was an "auditory verbal hallucination."[4]

The baptism was followed, according to Binet-Sanglé,

[1] Vol. i., p. 269. [2] Vol. ii., 278.

[3] Vol. i., p. 349 ff. "It has been noticed that in religious paranoia as well as in hysteric ecstasy the object of the visual hallucination almost always appears at a certain elevation. [4] Vol. i., 354.

by the "flight into the wilderness." Here,[1] under the influence of protracted abstinence and of the loneliness, silence, and monotony of the desert, which left Him an easy prey to all His obsessions, while weariness and heat probably also played their part, there arose in Him many and various sense-aberrations. Altogether Binet-Sanglé finds mentioned in this narrative seven hallucinations, two purely optical and five which were at once optical and "*auditives verbales.*"[2]

The content of the hallucinations always has reference to religious subjects, especially to the devil. They may be divided into those of an alarming and those of an encouraging nature, appearing antithetically. Those of an encouraging nature are optical: at the baptism there appears the dove, in the wilderness the angels of God come on the scene; and in Gethsemane, according to the text of Luke, Jesus is strengthened by an angel.[3]

As the causes of the hallucinations Binet-Sanglé emphasises excitement combined with the influence of night, loneliness and abstinence.[4]

The recorded hallucinations of Jesus cannot, according to Binet-Sanglé, have been the only ones, since "*les fous mystiques*" almost always suffer from muscular hallucinations also. In the later periods of the disease, he tells us, there appear secondary psychomotor phenomena, "*constituant une sorte de possession théomaniaque.*" As an example of such hallucinations affecting the muscular sense he cites the passages from the Fourth Gospel in which

[1] 356 ff.

[2] On the other hand none of the hallucinations of Jesus is purely verbal. Now, in religious paranoia it is very rare (?) that verbal hallucinations present themselves alone, without being conjoined with visual hallucinations.

[3] Luke xxii. 43.

[4] "To sum up, the nature of the hallucinations of Jesus, such as we find them described in the orthodox Gospels, justify us in concluding that the founder of the Christian religion suffered from religious paranoia."

Jesus says that the Father speaks through Him ; but admits that the nature of the hallucinations cannot be precisely specified.

It should also be mentioned that Binet-Sanglé thinks that he can establish the presence in Jesus of "the dissimulation characteristic of paranoetic subjects." As evidence for this he cites the fact that the Nazarene looked upon His Messiahship and certain parts of His teaching as a secret which was to be jealously guarded, gave elusive answers to questions and only under the influence of strong emotion, as for example at His trial, acknowledged the ideas belonging to the "system of delusions." [1]

ALBERT SCHWEITZER.

(*Translated by W. Montgomery.*)

THE AIM AND SCOPE OF PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.

III. THE CONNOTATION OF 'RELIGION.'

ACCORDING to the definition which was adopted in the preceding article, philosophy of religion is philosophy—and not science as distinguished from philosophy—applied to the whole field of religion or theology, and to all problems directly or indirectly connected with religion, in the widest and most general sense of that word. Such is the scope of philosophy of religion ; while its aims and functions are identical with those of philosophy as a whole, exercised, however, only with regard to the subject-matter of religion, instead of with regard to all objects of human thought. What is meant by 'philosophy,' as the word is used in the phrase 'philosophy of religion,' we have already attempted to determine in a manner which avoids the prejudging of

[1] In the above sketch of the contents of Binet-Sanglé's work a number of more abstruse points raised by the author are passed over.

any question which falls within its province. The goal of philosophy is completely unified knowledge: a view of the world which does justice to all sides of experience, to all the implicates of experience, and to all necessary deductions from experience. Though philosophy of religion is also constrained to study other sides of experience, it is, as the phrase implies, only directly concerned with the kind of experience which is called religious. In order then to complete our determination of the meaning of the title 'philosophy of religion,' it remains to consider more fully than we have as yet had occasion or opportunity to do, what is to be adopted as the connotation of the term 'religion,' and what are to be regarded as the characteristic marks of the type of human experience which we wish to distinguish as 'religious.'

This inquiry forms the subject of the present and concluding article.

In attempting to find an answer to the question: what is religion, we encounter the difficulty which presented itself before—diversity of opinion amongst authorities. The definitions of religion that we meet with are very many and various; for very different opinions are held as to what constitutes its 'essence' or characteristic qualities. And indeed it is not unnatural that such should be the case.

For, in the first place, all theories as to origin and early development of religion are as yet merely provisional hypotheses, on account of the insufficiency, and often the ambiguity, of the data on which they are based; while the classification of religions is still incomplete, and there is no agreement of opinion even as to the features which should be selected for the purpose of classification. Again, when we consider how complex and variable religion is, and how diverse are its manifestations in peoples and in-

dividuals at different levels of culture, we cannot be surprised at finding that great difficulties have been experienced in the endeavour to describe religion by any simple formula acceptable to all. Still, with religion presented to us, as it is, in history and in present experience, it should not remain a permanently hopeless task to discover what quality or qualities are common to religious consciousness in all its admittedly genuine forms; and, having discovered these qualities which would form at least the nucleus of the connotation of 'religion,' the question of the inclusion or exclusion of others, to which doubt attached, would be largely one of logic on the one hand, and of expediency on the other. We might be led to revise and modify our first approximation toward a description of the essence of religion in order to include forms of experience as to the 'religiousness' of whose nature reasonable difference of opinion existed; and such kinds of experience would need to receive very careful scrutiny, in order to ascertain whether they were mere divergences from the type—though still essentially of the same nature, or whether they were not more properly to be regarded as substitutes for religion, completely definable in terms of other concepts, and therefore not needing the special name of 'religions.' In the latter case we might find that our definition of religion, as yet self-consistent and definite, would need to be so greatly stretched, in order to comprise this latter class of experiences, as to lose all the characteristic meaning, and consequently all the terminological value, that it previously had possessed; and that the term 'religion' might therefore be dispensed with and be replaced by several others which would, between them, appropriate the whole of its meaning.

If then there is ever to be agreement as to what religion essentially is, the definition of the religiousness of an experience must express the feature or features in that kind

of experience which distinguish it from other kinds of experience that are already designated by names of definite connotation ; and only so much should be included in the meaning of religion as is not already included in the meaning of other definite terms. Attention to this purely logical requirement for definition in general would do away with at least some of the diversity with which religion has been defined. How great that diversity is can be ascertained by consulting the list of definitions of religion collected in Max Müller's *Gifford Lectures*.

A satisfactory definition of religion should meet the two following requirements : in the first place, it should differentiate religion as clearly as possible from cognate forms of human experience ; and, in the second place, it should be sufficiently wide to embrace all the forms which religion has taken, whether in the form of subjective emotion or in the form of objective and historical manifestation. Probably every one would agree that religion ought to be defined so as to embrace the religion of a savage and that of a highly cultured Christian, respectively. But should it, we may ask, include also the mental habit of a Matthew Arnold or of a Spinoza ? Religion of the normal type is, as we know, not only distinguishable in thought, but also separable in life, from morality and from intellectual satisfaction. Should morality or intellectual satisfaction, whether cold or emotionally warmed, be allowed the name of religion ? Personally, I do not consider that the name of religion should be bestowed upon such kinds of experience ; for I do not see how we can assent to such usage of the term without at once being compelled further to broaden out the connotation of ' religion ' until the term includes every kind and degree of emotional tone accompanying every kind of mental attitude towards any kind of object or principle. If we draw the line so as to include emotional attitudes towards only the good, the

beautiful, and the true, it will still be impossible to find a definition of religion which shall denote anything *sui generis*. It would become a matter merely of subjective taste—about which there can be no profitable disputation—what particular kind of experience should be, or should not be, characterised as religious. And inasmuch as religion would then be identical now with intellectual harmony, now with love, now with heroism or patriotism, and since we do not need two words to designate any of these qualities, the term itself would be rendered useless and superfluous.

It is thus really an important question, from the point of view of philosophy of religion, whether a religious bent of mind, properly so called, can be attributed to a Matthew Arnold or to a Spinoza, save by courtesy. The philosopher is not concerned, *quâ* philosopher, with questions of conventional courtesy: he is concerned, however, with logical consistency and accuracy. To deny the quality of religiousness to the thinkers I have instanced implies, of course, no disparagement of the laudable enthusiasms for which they were eminent and for which, doubtless, they are often accounted to have been pre-eminently religious men: it would simply mean that those enthusiasms should be called by the appropriate name. I would submit, then, that the difficulty of defining the essential nature of religion has been unnecessarily increased by the tendency to include so much in its meaning that it ceases to connote anything definite, anything *sui generis*, at all.

This difficulty has also been intensified in another way. Besides being confused with mental attitudes that share some elements in common with it, religion is also sometimes confounded with the conditions which stimulate, or which once stimulated, its development. This might perhaps be called the anthropologist's fallacy. In this case, again, religion is identified with what it is not, if religion be any-

thing unique. It is difficult, for instance, to see why reverence for ancestors, as ancestors merely, should be regarded as religious, while reverence for living parents is not so regarded; why a dream about a dead human being should be taken for a possible source of religious belief any more than a dream about oneself or one's living neighbour; why animism, in so far as it consists simply in the primitive belief that natural objects are indwelt by souls of some sort, should be looked upon as in itself a religious mode of thought, any more than Leibniz's theory of monads, or Kant's doctrine of the thing-in-itself. Again, that a savage should resort to a magician for protection from the thunderstorm, does not seem in itself any more religious an act than our putting up a lightning-conductor; all the act implies is that the savage is more ignorant than ourselves in his method of seeking to avert physical danger. And so, much of the ethnological detail which abounds in treatises dealing with so-called primitive 'religion,' though it may possibly serve to throw light upon the life whence religion issued, or in which it went through the first stages of its development, does not necessarily concern religion directly, and is certainly irelevant if it be intended to illustrate or explain the ultimate origin or the essential nature and characteristic qualities of the distinctively religious kind of experience. Nothing that lacks the essential marks of religion as we know it should be allowed without challenge to pass for religion, whether met with in the most primitive type of mankind that science may enable us to reconstruct, in the savage of the present day, or in the modern philosopher.

I am aware that one would not be allowed without opposition thus to brush away two large classes of mental attitudes that are frequently identified with the religious, in order to clear the way for an easier approach to the essential characteristics of religion proper. But if the reasons which

have been given for taking this step should appear sound, we can certainly address ourselves to our task with more hope of success. Let us assume then, provisionally and tentatively, that there is something *sui generis* or unique in the great bulk of what has historically been called religion or religious experience, and proceed to ascertain what that something is which, in differentiating religion *par excellence* from all other kinds of experience, constitutes the essence of religion.

Many writers on the subject of religion have been inclined to consider the attitude of mind, and especially the emotional factors therein, to contain the essentially religious element in religious experience, and to regard the object which evokes the attitude of mind as non-essential.

This view, however, would seem to be untenable. It is generally agreed that there is no psychological factor in admittedly religious experience, on its subjective side, which is not known as entering into other types of experience than the religious. Analysis of religious experience as an *attitude* of mind in a religious subject, presents us with no new type of psychic process, as the examination of a new mineral has sometimes led to the discovery of a chemical element previously unknown to science. The elementary types of conscious process into which religious experience is conceptually resolvable—feeling, emotion, cognition, conation, and volition—are the same as those which constitute all complex kinds of experience, and enter into our attitudes of mind when we are contemplating objects belonging to the spheres of morality or science, for instance. It is not in any of the factors, if we may so call them, into which religious consciousness may be analysed, nor in any particular combination of them, that the characteristic of religion is to be found. The subjective side of experience—experience, that is, in so far as it is an attitude or a response evoked or

excited—will therefore be searched in vain for any element capable, in virtue of its own uniqueness, of bestowing uniqueness on religious experience. We must rather examine religious experience on its objective side, and seek for the object or objects which in given cases elicit the religious response, if we would discover any differentiating characteristic.

Now a study of the actual or positive religions of the world, whether more or less primitive or more or less highly developed, leads us without hesitation to the belief that religion such as is indisputably entitled to the name has practically always and everywhere consisted in a sense of relatedness to superhuman beings. This assertion is a generalisation of so large a body of empirical facts that it can safely be regarded as established. We should therefore stand by the definition of religion which it furnishes unless further study of kinds of experience not of this nature, but alleged to be religious, supply very cogent reasons indeed for making indefinite and indeterminate the limits of so very natural and well-marked a genus of human experience. It has been argued recently, indeed, by an American scholar (Ames) that religion does not thus consist in a sense of relation to a personal God or gods ; but his argument appears to assume that if man in his more primitive state possessed no definite conception of personal superhuman beings, religion, as just now described, could play no part in his consciousness ; or, if he possessed religious consciousness, it could not have been of the nature to which this definition of religion would reduce it. This argument is valid, however, only as against the more intellectualistic forms of the view that religion consists in consciousness of relation with a higher power. It is not necessary, in order to hold that this sense of relatedness constitutes the essential mark of religion, to assume that the conception of the personality, with whom religion implies some relation,

must always be clearly and definitely formed. It is sufficient if the idea be crudely fashioned or vaguely apprehended.

If religion be essentially a sense of relation with the supernatural, i.e. with what the religious subject regards as supernatural, the investigation of its origin and development must belong to psychology rather than to history or ethnology. The oldest form of religion is far beyond the reach of history, and 'primitive man' is largely a hypothetical construction. How man became a religious, if he ever was a non-religious, being, is so entirely a question of the pre-historic that if it is to be answered at all it can only be through recourse to psychological analysis. But the problem of the origin of religion, though closely connected with that of the essence of religion, is no part of it; and we can leave it aside as we proceed with our own task.

On analysing religious experience as we have provisionally defined it, we see that it necessarily contains a cognitive or intellectual element. If religion be a mental attitude towards a supposed superhuman object, there must exist a belief in the actuality of that object: and such belief is a cognitive activity. By the 'object' of religious belief, is here meant the object as constructed by the believer—what he takes it to be, what he thinks about it as well as what he feels about it. Religion, in the savage, or in primitive man—whom we reconstruct by means of 'controlled' knowledge of the savage—necessarily implies an idea of a superhuman being, although that idea be represented in the savage's mind by a symbol, such as a fetish. Without this intellectual content, religion would be mere subjectivity: nay, it would be an attitude towards nothing; which is an impossibility. Just as an organ note cannot be apprehended as an *organ* note, though it may be apprehended as a tone, by any mind which is not already familiar with the idea of an organ, so, without possessing the idea of superhuman being,

mankind would not be able to recognise any emotional experience as 'religious' experience, or as consciousness of the 'divine.' There is no apprehension of the divine, as divine, without some idea of divinity: and as such an idea is necessarily the outcome of discursive thought, there can be no 'immediate intuition' of the infinite (as certain writers on religion have maintained) unless by means of 'innate ideas' of the kind which Locke effectually disposed of.

The second factor in religious experience is feeling, or, more correctly, emotion. In so far as religion is feeling or emotion, it may be said to be a complex of feeling-reactions toward the object of religion, as that object is constructed, or at least apprehended, by understanding: of reactions, that is to say, of the nature of emotion called out, in case of primitive or savage man, by what he thinks the object (to him superhuman) is or represents. Religious emotion never can be unmotived or uncaused; the nature of the transient emotion or of the permanent partially emotional attitude of mind that may be called religious, will be determined by the nature of the 'object' of religion believed in. Were there no belief in the existence of the object, no emotional attitude towards it would be possible. As we do not find ourselves loving or hating, reverencing or fearing, the man in the moon, so humanity in the uncivilised state never adopted any emotional attitude towards any being in whose existence it did not believe.

The quality of this emotional response will be determined, then, by the form which the deity takes in the mind of particular individuals and societies. At the lowest stage it will include some kind of respect, wonder, fear, and so forth —the germs of the two main sentiments characteristic of developed religions, the feeling of dependence and the feeling of mystery.

Thirdly, religion is a relation of man to a superhuman

being through his will. Religion has a practical as well as a cognitive and emotional side. Man's reaction to that which stands to him as God takes place partly in his experience as an agent in the world. It is in this capacity, chiefly, that man becomes aware of his helplessness and limited power, and therefore of his dependence on the will which he has learned to regard as divine. It is to these feelings of dependence and respect also that we may attribute the ethical elements in religion. The being or beings which man reverences for power would naturally be regarded as superior in other respects also, and indeed as the worthiest objects within his knowledge. So important is the ethical aspect of religious experience that some writers have considered the whole content of religion to be ethical. This, however, if our account of religion be at all true, must be regarded as a very one-sided or exaggerated statement. Further, there is generally admitted to be an aesthetic root of religious sentiment. God is not only worshipped in the beauty of holiness, but also loved as a Person ; and personality elicits affection in virtue of other of its qualities than that of moral goodness. Emotions not exclusively ethical are connected with the longing of man to be united with his God—a longing which finds expression in the various conceptions of mediation that are common in the different positive religions.

The foregoing account of the psychological roots or factors of normal religious experience has been given because such an analysis seems to be a preliminary essential to the true theory or definition of religion. Such a definition ought not to be a hasty generalisation, nor should it be attempted exclusively from the side of theology or from that of the anthropological study of the institutional expression of religious experience. Past attempts to define religion have frequently failed through lack of psychological insight.

Our discussion of the nature of religion has so far been concerned only with what I have called normal religion, or religion *par excellence*—with what every one, perhaps, would allow to deserve the name of religion. We have seen that it is very generally agreed that throughout the history of mankind religion has consisted essentially in a sense of relation to higher, or superhuman, powers ; and we have analysed this distinctively religious experience and enumerated its subjective factors. It was found necessarily to contain a cognitive or intellectual element—belief in the existence of transcendent or superhuman powers towards which an attitude, at the same time emotional and practical, is evoked. And I submitted that it was in the *kind of object* towards which this psychologically complex attitude of mind is adopted, that we are to see the distinguishing mark of religious experience. Religion is thus a reaction of the whole man, and is not the result of exercise of any one of his " faculties "—i.e. of any one of the kinds of conscious process which psychology distinguishes, in abstraction from others. But the kind of religion we have been considering involves reference to objects of worship ; it is not man's whole bearing towards whatever seems to him to be the best, or towards life, or the universe, as a whole. It is characterised, despite its infinite variety of expression in different races and individuals, by an unity of motive, and expresses an abiding and practically universal propensity, apparently normal to man as man until he becomes sufficiently sophisticated to become sceptical. The religious sentiment, it has been said, is " an emotional disposition arising about the thought of personality " ; it is one of the class of sentiments called personal, another of which class, the ethical, standing in close connexion with it.

This account of the constitution and essential nature of what ' common sense ' regards as religion, or of what we

might call religion in the more restricted sense, would perhaps in the main be acceptable to most students.[1] But, as I have remarked before, the restriction of the term 'religion' to connote this only, will not meet with universal consent. There are numerous writers who would see in religion something more general than sense of relation to personal superhuman beings, and who would maintain that religion exists where there is no sense of such relation. The essentials of religion are found, it is affirmed, in states of mind that bear no explicit reference to God, or gods, or a supernatural realm of any kind. The same part which is played in human experience by ideas of this kind can be played by others, and similar effects on life can be produced by love of a fellow-being or by devotion to an ideal: affections which move to admiration or to fear, and which may dictate to us a law of life overmastering in its power. Religion in this wider sense has been thus described by Dr. Bosanquet. Another living writer has pleaded that religion should be regarded as a "passionate apprehension, from the point of view of ideals, of the general situation in which we find ourselves," a disposition of mind to which belief in God is not essential. Dr. McTaggart would somewhat similarly define religion as an emotional state of mind resting on a conviction of harmony between ourselves and the universe at large. Professor Höffding finds the essence of religion in the faith that the valuable in the universe will be conserved. Thus there is some disposition to allow the name of religion to morality if it be touched with, or at least steeped in, emotion, or to 'vital cosmic emotion.' All such conceptions of religion only become possible at a high level of human culture, and presuppose considerable reflection and abstraction; and we may observe that, as in the instances just now cited, they generally, if not always, eman-

[1] See, e.g., Flint, *Theism*, Lecture i.

ate from minds which doubt or deny the existence of a personal God, and reject religion in the more usual and more retricted sense for intellectual reasons.

With this divergent view of religion in existence, one can only call attention to it and proceed to state the reasons which seem to oneself to justify its rejection.

The first of such reasons is that what I have called religion *par excellence* is a definite mental disposition possessing well-marked characters universally present in the real devotee, of all historical religions at all levels of human development and culture, and that this disposition or attitude of minds involving a particular kind of objective counterpart, deserves a name of its own. If it be objected that Buddhism at least forms an exception to the statement just affirmed, I would reply that we must distinguish between Buddhism as a form of crude idolatry and Buddhism as a philosophical system: Buddhism of the latter kind is not a world-religion, but a widespread philosophy of life. To include it among religions involves the abolition of all distinction between a philosophy and a religion. Again, the name of religion has, as a matter of history, been appropriated exclusively to the definite type of experience to which I am arguing that it should be restricted.

Thirdly, the 'normally religious' person—say the Christian, for example—can feel at least as intensely as an atheist the overmastering power of ennobling human affection—with which some authorities seek to associate religion—though he never dreams of confusing the sentiments thus inspired in his breast with those which he ascribes to his religion; he recognises a great difference, in some respects, between these two types of sentiment, however much they may possess in common. It is surely desirable, then, to distinguish things that thus differ by different names.

On the other hand, in contrast with the definiteness and

relative homogeneity of religion in the restricted sense, the forms of consciousness for which the name 'religion' in its wider sense has been borrowed, are indefinite in content, markedly diverse, and lacking in any common character which marks them off, as a class, from emotional attitudes of other kinds. They are not embodied in positive or historical religions. Religion—in the broader sense—as distinguished from what we have been wont to call religion—is the property of an individual here and there; not of a community: and it possesses the character of a *substitute* for religion rather than kinship with the vast body of religious experience which of itself admits of objective and consistent definition. Lastly, if 'religion' be used to include all forms of consciousness which in various individuals serve particular purposes similar to those of religion proper, the word becomes, so far, superfluous, as well as so indefinite as to be in other respects useless; for it then would appear to become synonymous with each of many words differing widely from each other in connotation. So to use 'religion' is to "cut the moorings of a well-anchored word"—to quote words used by Martineau in another connexion. On the other hand, to use 'religion' exclusively in its usual, narrower, and more definite sense, does not conflict with the fact that some of the functions of religion may in some degree be fulfilled by emotional attitudes towards objects other than those with which religion is primarily concerned. And in what degree this may be the case, is in itself so disputable as to suggest another objection to the notion of 'religion without a personal object.' It would therefore seem that, in the interests of clearness of thought and consistency of language, philosophy of religion should mean by 'religion' only that which I have provisionally called religion, as something *sui generis*, something distinctly characterised, and something which throughout history has received the

name. Just as we may rightly object to philosophy being narrowed down to positive science, in the interests of a particular school of philosophers, so may we with equal justice demur to religion being so widened out in connotation —in the interests of individual thinkers—as to include forms of experience which would never have called for a specific name at all, or have felt the want of one, had not the coveted title been there to excite the unlawful desire. For all these other forms of expreience we may employ some such title as 'cosmic vital feeling,' which Höffding suggests; while religion should be looked upon as a particular form of such emotional disposition, and one which is always accompanied by, and dependent upon, the belief in a superhuman personal Being with whom we stand in relation and in intercommunion.

F. R. Tennant.

THE TEACHING OF JESUS CHRIST UPON SIN, AS SHOWN IN THE FIRST THREE GOSPELS.

It is customary to connect the missions of our Lord and of John the Baptist and to find in the Baptist's preaching either the announcement of his Successor (as used to be said) or (as some now say) the impulse which drove Jesus of Nazareth into His public ministry. Whatever may be the historical connexion between them, it is as important for us at least to realize the broad gulf that separates them. They meet, it is true; both use the phrase "Kingdom of God," and we are apt to assume they mean the same thing.

I propose in this paper to examine in bare outline one phase only of the teaching of Jesus, and whether the conclusions reached prove wrong or right, I hold that it is only by such endeavours in one field or another that progress and unity are possible for the Christian church. What we have

all suffered from in the past is inattention to the meaning of our Lord. We have used His words, but we have given them our own connotation, and called the curious results Christian teaching. And yet how much that has been fundamentally wrong in the churches and the heresies is due to the use of the term "God" (for instance) without the full complement of meaning that it had for Jesus Christ? Attempts, successful or unsuccessful, to find out what Jesus actually did say, and what He meant by what He said, and (if such ventures are possible at all) how He came to mean it, seem to me all of them so far to the good that they at least drive us anew to our Centre and our Source.

With so much prelude I come to the teaching on Sin which we find in the first three Gospels.

John the Baptist, it is obvious to the most careless reader, preached of sin and judgment. The Kingdom of God—his message rings like that of the old prophets—is not to be comfort and prosperity for the seed of Abraham—judgment rather and terror. The day of the Lord will be indeed *dies irae*. "You only have I known . . . therefore upon you will I visit your iniquities." But John is substantially no further on than his predecessors. He comes with a message of axe and fan and fire; he is desperately in earnest; there is none among those born of women greater than John in some ways—"Suppose we grant it," hints Jesus, "yet——." John fails precisely where his strength is greatest and most conspicuous. He is a moral teacher; his theme is sin; and there he fails. He sees what is obvious —poverty above all; "he that hath two coats, let him give to him that hath none"; violence and extortion by publican and soldier; but his psychology of sin is not deep enough. Repentance is his word: let a man bring forth fruits meet for repentance; and the baptism of repentance. But how deep does repentance go? What hold upon the nature

do its roots take ? Will it wither when the sun is up ? will the thorns choke it ? And if it lasts, who can bring forth fruits meet for repentance ? St. Paul, at least, found he could not. John's righteousness, as he preaches it, is too like that of the Pharisees—self-directed and self-dependent. And yet when the Holy Spirit comes, we are told, He will convince the world of precisely the things John preached—sin, righteousness and judgment—the same things, but in a different way and with different outcome. There is permanent value in John's teaching, for John is a witness to man's need of redemption, though he does not indicate how deep the need is, nor how fundamental the redemption must be.

The method of Jesus is quite other. He associated with publican and sinner, even ate with them, and was criticised on that score. It was confusing moral issues. But Jesus saw deeper into the matter than His critics saw—deeper than His friends do. They held that His distinctions in the ethical sphere were badly drawn ; we forget that He drew any at all.

Yet a note like that in Matthew xxiii. 33, with its deliberative subjunctive, is significant—" how *are* you to escape the judgment of Gehenna ? " It is not a threat ; it is a warning. There yawns the chasm—with your driving how *do* you think you can escape disaster ? For with Jesus there is in God an element we have forgotten. When God matters to a man, all life shows the result. Good and bad, right and wrong, stand out clear as the contrast between light and darkness—they are unmistakeable, and they matter—and matter for ever. They are no concern of a moment. Action makes character, and until the action is undone again the effect on character is not undone. Right and wrong are of eternal significance now, in virtue of the reality of God. Buddha, without this consciousness of God, saw a

signficance in good and evil which we can only not call boundless, though it is next thing to it. Heaven and hell of one sort or other are in his teaching, as they are in Plato's. With all the humour and charm there is in Plato, we cannot escape his tremendous teaching on the age-long consequences of good and evil in a cosmos ordered by God. Carlyle in our own days realised the same thing—he learnt it no doubt from his mother; and learnt it again in London. In Mrs. Austin's drawing-room, with "Sydney Smith guffawing" and "other people prating, jargoning," "to me through these thin cobwebs Death and Eternity sate glaring." "How will this look in the Universe," he asks, "and before the Creator of Man?" When some one in his old age challenged him with the question, "Who will be judge?" —(it is curious how every sapient inanity strikes, as on an original idea, on the notion that opinions differ, and therefore —apparently, if their thought *has* any consequence—are as good one as another)—Who will be judge? "Hell fire will be judge," said Carlyle, "God Almighty will be the judge now and always." So it is with Jesus. There is a gulf between good and evil, and each is inexorably fertile of consequence. There is no escaping the issue of moral choice.

Perhaps we may most readily see something of what He means by looking at the four classes with whom He associates the danger of Hell, and then trying to find the common element.

First, then, it is familiar to everybody how He warned the Pharisee class. They played at religion—tithed mint and anise and cummin, and forgot judgment and mercy. In our clumsy polysyllabic language, they lost all sense of perspective. What He said was that the Pharisee was never quite sure whether the creature he was looking at was a camel or a gnat—he got them mixed. Once we realise what

this tremendous irony means, we are better able to grasp His thought. The Pharisee was living in a world that was *not* the real one—it was a highly artificial one, picturesque and charming no doubt, but dangerous. For, after all, we do live in the real world—there *is* only one world, however many we may invent, and to live in any other is danger. Blindness that is partial and uneven lands a man in peril whenever he tries to come downstairs or to cross the street—he steps on the doorstep that is not there and misses the real one. He is involved in false appearances at every turn. And so it is in the moral world—there is one real, however many unreals there are, and to trust to the unreal is to come to grief on the real. "The beginning of a man's doom," wrote Carlyle, "is that vision be withdrawn from him." "Thou blind Pharisee!" The cup is clean enough without; it is septic and poisonous within—and from which side of it do you drink, outside or inside? As we study our Lord's teaching here, we see anew the profundity of the saying attributed to Him in the fourth Gospel, "The truth shall make you free." The man with astigmatism, or myopia, or whatever else it is, must get the glasses that will show him the real steps, and he is safe, and free to go and come as he pleases. See the real in the moral sphere, and the first great peril is gone. Nothing need be said at this point of the Pharisee who used righteousness and long prayers as a screen for villainy. Probably his doom was that in the end he came to think his righteousness and his prayers real and to reckon them as credit with a God, Who did not see through them any more than he did himself. These were men who believed in God—only that with His world, they re-created Him (as we are all apt to do for want of vision or by choice)—but what is atheism, what can it be, but indifference to God's facts and to God's nature? If religion is union with God, in the phrase

we adopt so lightly from St. John, how can a man be in union with God when the God he sees is not there, is a figment of his own mind, something different altogether from GOD ? Or, if we use the older phrase of other New Testament writers and their contemporaries, if religion is Vision of God, what is our religion if after all we are not *seeing* God at all, but something else—a dummy God, like that of the Pharisees, some trifling martinet who can be humbugged —or, to come to ourselves, a majestic bundle of abstract nouns loosely tied up in impersonality ? For all such Jesus has a caution. Indifference to God's facts leads to one end only. We admit it ourselves. There are those who scold Bunyan for sending Ignorance to hell, but we omit to ask where else could Ignorance go, whether Bunyan sent him or not. Ignorance as to germs or precipices or what not leads to destruction *in pari materia* ; in the moral sphere can it be otherwise ?

The twenty-fifth of Matthew, with its judgment scene, gives us the second class whom Jesus warned of hell—the men and women for whom some people did not matter. Those on the right hand had not taken in the full significance of their kind acts—they just did them instinctively and thought no more of them, and they were surprised at the Judge's decision. Could He be making a mistake ? Honesty prevails, and they almost ask Him to rectify it. But it was not a mistake. They had at least grasped the significance of the human fact as God sees it. The group on the left hand had not seen this ; they never supposed that Gentiles, or slaves, or, it might be, women, counted—or negroes, or uneducated persons. The passage is often reduced in meaning through our emphasis on the food and comfort aspect of it. We forget how Carlyle found the men and women of his day " needier than ever of inward sustenance," and how needy men and women still are in this

direction. We forget Christ's identification of Himself with pain of mind—His sympathy for those who are ignorant and out of the way—His death for the heathen world—and we decline on a "social righteousness" that falls short a long way of John the Baptist's fire and moral truth. And yet surely our Lord has a warning for some of us who think the heathen world can do without what He has given us.

The third class warned by our Lord consists of several groups dealt with in the Sermon on the Mount—people whose sin is not murder or adultery, but merely anger and the unclean thought—not the people who actually give themselves away, like the publicans and harlots, but those who would not be sorry to have that ring of Gyges which Plato described, who would like to do certain things if they could. Here St. Paul can supply commentary with his suggestion that one form of God's condemnation is when He gives up a man to his own reprobate mind. (Romans i. 28—the whole passage is worth study in the Greek.) The mind, in Paul's phrases, becomes darkened, stained and cauterised —invalidated for the discharge of its proper functions, as a burnt hand loses the sense of touch, or a stained glass gives the man a blue or red world instead of the real one. Blindness and mutilation are better, Jesus said, than the eye of lust. How different from the moralists for whom sin lies in action and all actions are physical! The idle word is to condemn a man, not because it is idle, but because, being unstudied, it speaks of his heart and reveals, unconsciously but plainly, what he *is* in reality. Thus it is that what comes out of the mouth defiles a man—with the curious suggestion (whether intended or not) that the formulation of a floating thought gives it new power to injure or to help. That is true; impression loose (as it were) in the mind, mere thought-stuff, is one thing; formulated, brought to

phrase and form, it takes on new life and force ; and when it is evil, it does defile, and in a permanent way.

Lastly (not to be too long), " no man, having put his hand to the plough, and looking back, is fit for the Kingdom of God." The word is an interesting one (εὐθέτος). The man is unhandy (like Paul's haven on the north of Crete) or " not easy to place." All that is wrong with him apparently is uncertainty—he cannot make up his mind. Like the man who saves his talent but does not use it, he is not exactly bad, but he is useless. Jesus conceives that the gist of the Kingdom of Heaven is not spectacle but work, that truth is not a curiosity for the cabinet but a tool in the hand, that God's earnest world is no place for nondescripts, and that there is only one region left to which they can drift. What part or place can there be in the Kingdom of Heaven —in a Kingdom won on Calvary—for people who cannot be relied on, who cannot decide whether to plough or not to plough, nor, when they have made up their minds, stick to them ? Jesus cannot see. (What a revelation of the force and power of His own character !)

These then are the four classes we set out to consider. Sin, we find, is tracked right home into the innermost and most essential part of the man. Men set sin down as an external thing that drifted on to one like a floating burr —or like paint perhaps—it could be picked off or burnt off. It was the eating of pork or hare—something technical or accidental ; or it was (many thought) the work of a dæmon from without who could be driven out to whence he came. Love and drunkenness illustrated the thing for them—a change of personality induced by an exterior force or object. But for Jesus, sin is another thing, something inward, and part of us. It is not that evil befals us, but that we *are* evil. (I know this is not fashionable talk, but it seems to me to to be in the Gospels, and it is the gospel idea of sin we are

considering *ex hypothesi*. It is for those who choose to say that I misconstrue—which is one thing, or that the gospel idea is wrong—which is another. The latter assertion will carry serious consequences.) Jesus sees, then, that if sin is of us—or, to use the expression of Dr. Edward Caird, if "the passion that misleads us is a manifestation of the same *ego*, the same self-conscious reason which is misled by it"—then it is a deeply serious matter with implications of the longest range. All four groups considered so far are alike in a rejection of God's facts and laws and appeals—they do not fairly and squarely face up to the sum total of God's dealings with them—and in all the element of choice is involved—in all something is fundamentally wrong.

This handling of sin is at once profounder and truer than John's, as every man knows who has been serious with himself and with God's facts, and it implies a great deal. It involves a far profounder treatment of repentance and forgiveness than John undertook; and if, as we study the work of Christ in history, we find that sin—I mean the real thing as He saw it and as He shows it to us—has been dealt with and "put out of the way," then, I submit, we are challenged to another inquiry, an inquiry of the profoundest seriousness, as to what is the new force, which, in the Christian Church, has prevailed over evil so essential, and so deeply rooted, and, by all other means reached in antiquity or to-day, ineradicable? Conversely, I submit, when we find that the Christian Gospel, as we have it in the New Testament and in the Church, has prevailed in this way, we are in possession of a greater and sounder apologetic than we may have thought.

T. R. Glover.

THE INTEGRITY OF II. CORINTHIANS.

In the April and July issue of the *Irish Church Quarterly* Canon Kennedy, of Dublin, writer of the well-known book on "*Second and Third Corinthians*," states again the view set forth in that book at greater length, which in my recent commentary on Second Corinthians I stated my reasons for declining to adopt. It is a pleasure to me to acknowledge the courteous tone of this as of all the criticisms of my book which I have seen, and if I still hold the view that the Epistle stands in our Bible as Paul wrote it, I am not ungrateful to Professor Kennedy for the careful study he has devoted to the subject, from which I have learned much, and for the opportunity his articles afford me of examining afresh an interesting subject.

Professor Kennedy, the reader will remember, understands by the '*Second Corinthians*' of his title the last four chapters of the Canonical Epistle, and by '*Third Corinthians*' the nine chapters which there stand first. He finds in the chapters x.–xiii., the letter of which Paul speaks in chapters ii. and vii., which he says he wrote with tears, and which he says moved the Corinthians to grief and repentance and the desire to make amends (vii. 8–12). He further considers that of the two pieces which have been joined together to make our Second Corinthians, neither is complete; the beginning of his *Second Corinthians* is wanting, and the conclusion of his *Third Corinthians*. To prove this thesis it is evidently necessary to point out in the first nine chapters references to or echoes of passages in the last four, which are said to have been written earlier. The Apostle must be shown to have in his mind in i.–ix. things which he said in x.–xiii. The instance of this which Professor Kennedy brings forward most prominently in the articles before us is connected with the

Apostle's threat of a disciplinary visit to Corinth. This threat is made in chapter xiii. 1, 2, 10, and is said to be withdrawn in ii. 1–4.

"Let us come back," it is said, p. 129, "to the undisputed historical fact that in these earlier chapters Paul did withdraw the threat which he had previously made at the close of the painful visit, and that he had in the seventh chapter given us a glowing account of a reconciliation which had taken place between the date of the painful visit, and the date of the affectionate assurance given in this letter to the Corinthians, telling them that the threat would not be carried out, and that there would be no more painful visits. If it is possible to suppose that this assurance might be in its turn withdrawn, and the original threat repeated in all its severity, it is still an impossible and inconceivable supposition that the writer can have forgotten that he had cancelled it, and could be oblivious of the fact that he was now about to send this cordial assurance, made on so momentous occasion, in the very same letter of which he was now dictating the closing part to his amanuensis."

Professor Kennedy and the present writer start from the same ground. They agree that Paul paid a visit to Corinth after 1 Corinthians was written, before 2 Corinthians; and they agree that the threat said in II. xiii. 2 to be repeated in writing was originally uttered orally at the close of that visit, which ended painfully for both sides. Their difference is about the letter mentioned ii. 2 sqq. and vii. 12. Professor Kennedy holds that letter to be not lost but in our hands in chapters x.–xiii., and finds proof of this in what he regards as the withdrawal at ii. 1 of the threat made in xiii. 2. But is there, in chapter ii. anything that can be called the withdrawal of a threat, any intimation that there should be no more painful visits? I cannot see that there

is, and I think the words thus construed have an altogether different point. The Apostle says ii. 1, that he had made up his mind that he would not come to Corinth again ἐν λύπῃ. Dr. Kennedy is at pains to show that the words ἐν λύπῃ answer exactly to the words in xiii. 10, ἀποτόμως χρήσωμαι, "use severity," and are to be regarded as a euphemism for severity. This is not at all obvious. The word λύπη and its verb are used eight times in the six verses ii. 2–7, and severity will not translate it in more than two of the eight times. It is contrasted with εὐφραίνων με, that makes me glad, in verse 2, and in verse 3, with χαρά, joy. It is Paul's own feelings that are in question, the alternative for him of a pleasant or an unpleasant visit, of the Corinthians giving him pleasure or distress. And what he says in the first verse of the chapter is that he made up his mind not to pay the Corinthians another visit likely to cause him so much pain as the last had done. The words in the natural sense convey nothing about the withdrawal of a threat. They are spoken to explain why he had not come to Corinth at the time when he led the people there to expect him. He did not come because his last visit had been so unpleasant; the Corinthians will understand this, and will wish that he should be happy, not distressed, when he comes to them. And so he wrote instead of coming. There is no withdrawing of a threat, only an explanation why he had not come himself but sent a letter.

There had been a threat, by the Apostle present, at the end of his painful visit. And it was a threat of such a nature that it could not be withdrawn. It lay with the Corinthians, not with the Apostle, to make the fulfilment of it unnecessary. The threat was an assurance that when he came to Corinth he would exercise strict discipline against those who were evil livers or who were defying the Apostle's authority. They would feel the weight of his hand, they

should be put in their right place. Such a threat could not be withdrawn, any more than a commandment of the decalogue. Until the Apostle despaired of his position, and was ready to part with all his influence, and to be in reality the poor and strengthless creature his adversaries declared him, that threat must stand.

The words, therefore, on which Dr. Kennedy founds this, his principal instance of reference in 2 Corinthians i.–ix. to statements found in x.–xiii. do not bear the meaning he imputes to them. His first paper is mainly devoted to this instance of the relation as he conceives it of the two parts of the Epistle; and if it were thought substantial, his clear and spirited words quoted above would be justified. But the idea of the Apostle's withdrawing his threat is inconceivable, and if we accept the Epistle as it stands it is no more than natural that, finding himself on the eve of landing at Corinth, he should define his position by repeating it. It stands behind all the affectionate pleading of the first nine chapters, and their joyful assurance that the Corinthians are now his friends. His determination is not changed that discipline shall prevail and his principles and doctrine be accepted at Corinth.

The other cases adduced to show the posteriority of the first nine chapters to the last four, are perhaps of less importance. Not much weight can be laid on the fact that the verb θαρρῶ is used in chapter x. 1 to express defiance, θαρρῶ εἰς ὑμᾶς, "I am bold towards, or against you," and in vii. 16 to express complaisance, θαρρῶ ἐν ὑμῖν. "I am bold because of you," or the similar change of meaning of πεποίθησις in x. 2 and i. 15. Every one uses words in different senses, according as he is speaking of different themes and in different moods. That καυχᾶσθαι and its nouns should be used differently in the two parts of the Epistle is also not to be wondered at. In the first nine chapters it is

associated with compliments to the Corinthians, as Dr. Kennedy very justly points out; there the Corinthians are his boast, they are to know it. In the latter part of the Epistle the Apostle is dealing with his own claims, and the word *καυχᾶσθαι* is the natural, almost the technical, term for him to use. In chapter v. 12, 13 it may be remarked it also occurs with reference to the comparison of Paul's claims with those of other missionaries. No argument can justly be based on such observations for inverting the sequence of the Epistle.

As to the spirit and temper of the last four chapters, and the question whether they answer to the description given by Paul of the letter he wrote with tears, and out of great distress and anxiety of heart, my critic and I must, I suppose, continue to differ. There are pathetic touches in these chapters it is true, as there are even in Galatians, but as a whole they are a warpiece, like Galatians, and must have filled the writer with satisfaction at having so completely expressed himself. My view of the relation to each other of the two parts of 2 Corinthians, quoted by Professor Kennedy, is that the same fire burns in both parts of the Epistle, but that in the earlier the fire is kept down, and not allowed to burst into flame, while in the latter part it does so. It was natural, I said, to suppose that the part in which feeling is suppressed, and only betrays itself in a series of hints and quotations of what is said about Paul at Corinth, is anterior to the part in which he allows it free vent. If the two sections of the Epistle are inverted, this must of course be changed, and Professor Kennedy changes it not unskilfully. "There is no lack of fire," he says, "in either section, but it is of a very different kind. In the one section it is the fire of indignation manifesting itself in scorching reproaches; in the other it is the fire of exulting joy and love, fusing the old reproaches in its glowing heat,

and moulding anew the same material into utterances of affection and of cordial praise." I will leave the reader to judge whether the half-spoken complaints of i.–ix, the suppressed sighs at the unjust judgments the Corinthians formed of him and the bitter and merciless way in which they treated him (he is accused of vagueness i. 13, of departing lightly from his engagements i. 17, tyrannical methods i. 24, of changing the message for his own purposes iv. 2, etc.) must be considered to come before or after the direct attack in x.–xiii., on those at Corinth who dealt in such charges against him. It appears to me that when he had once delivered himself fully on the subject he would not return to it again, and exhibit himself as still nursing his grievances. But the question may admit of argument.

Towards the end of his plea for "Second and Third Corinthians" in these articles Professor Kennedy enters on a textual discussion, his aim being to shew that the text of ix. 15–x. 1 is not in order and that a rent must have taken place in the original at this point. No one denies that the transition from the last verse of the ninth chapter to verse 1 of the tenth is awkward. There is no attempt at dovetailing, or mark of transition at all; we pass at once from the subject of the collection, which appears to be dismissed with the doxology, to Paul's declaration of what is to be done to his adversaries when he comes to Corinth, and to his scathing denunciation of them.

The Apostle, it is true, often shows himself careless of the need to explain the sequence of his matter and to point out his transitions. To mention only two out of many instances. There is a sudden break at Romans ix. 1, another at Philippians iii. 1, each of which has occasioned proposals to divide the Epistle at that point into two parts. The Apostle, no doubt, laid down a letter he was writing when a certain subject was concluded; and when he took

it up again to add something on another subject he did not always provide a connecting phrase. Professor Kennedy thinks the Apostle cannot have written the αὐτός x. 1 in which he speaks of himself, so close to the αὐτοῦ ix. 15 which refers to God; that he would have been inexpressibly shocked if he had read the text as it now stands; and he will not have it said that the Apostle may have written the sections without noticing how badly they fitted. This leads him to a discussion, which I frankly confess that I do not understand, of a variant in ix. 15.

In the critical editions the verse reads: χάρις τῷ θεῷ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνεκδιηγήτῳ αὐτοῦ δωρεᾷ. "Thanks be to God for his unspeakable gift." This reading, we are told (p. 209), "makes the sentence appear to have reached its conclusion, though it leaves us without any explanation as to what is the gift of God for which the writer is giving thanks, and leads us to a conclusion which presents a strange contrast to the sentence which follows it. But there is another reading, χάρις δὲ τῷ θεῷ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνεκδιηγήτῳ αὐτοῦ δωρεᾷ, which, if correct, would shew that the sentence must have been torn off in the middle, and which is thus absolutely inconsistent with the present order of the text of the Epistle, yet which has the support of the Syriac and the Ethiopic, and which has also on its side strong evidence from the quotation of this reading by early writers" (Chrysostom and Euthalius). Now is it the ease, as the writer appears to think, that if δὲ is part of the text, the sentence cannot be an ejaculation but must have run on, and that the end of it is lost? What then is to be made of the many ejaculations and doxologies of Paul which give us δὲ at their beginning? In the last two chapters of Romans there are three of them, xv. 13, 33, xvi. 25. In Thessalonians v. 23 we find another. It is habitual with Paul to wind up a discussion with a sentence beginning with δὲ, see 1 Corinthians

passim. The presence or absence of δὲ makes no difference to the sense, as the A.V. translators saw, who had δὲ in their Greek text, yet did not translate it. Lietzmann, who is a good Grecian, translates the δὲ but pays it no further attention, and is one of the strongest upholders of the canonical order of the Epistle. Professor Kennedy certainly owes us some further explanation on this point; if this is all the textual evidence he is able to bring forward he must confess that no objection can be taken to the text as it stands.

The break at x. 1 is not absolute; the story set before us in i.–ix. is carried forward in the last chapters. Chapter ix. tells the Corinthians that the Apostle is coming along with envoys from Macedonia to make the final arrangements about the collection; chapter x. tells what he will think it necessary to do when he arrives; how he will put his adversaries in their place, how he will restore discipline, how the true Jesus the Christ will come to His rights again at Corinth. The whole Epistle is about this visit, promised (i. 15), then delayed (i. 23) and made impossible by the Corinthians themselves, then made possible again (ii. 14, vii.) by their change of mind after receiving the Apostle's letter and the coming to them of Titus, to be prepared for on their part (vi. 14) by moral strenuousness and by having the collection in readiness (viii. ix.) and to be marked, he finally assures them, by a signal judgment of evildoers and restoration of Pauline doctrine (x.–xiii.). In the face of so evident and close a sequence in the Epistle from first to last it is idle to speak of the "many gross improbabilities resulting from the present order of the two sections." They evidently are in the right order, and while there are difficulties arising from our ignorance of the circumstances they refer to, and the circumstances in which the Apostle wrote them, we are bound to think that the facts as we have sketched them are sure and reliable. And to one holding this con-

viction it matters little that documents were written in old times on frail material and were easily torn and rendered imperfect. What Dr. Kennedy says on this point is all true; there are many instances in ancient literature in which fragments of old works have been removed from their original order and combined with pieces with which they had at first nothing to do. But when one sees clear before one's mind the story our Epistle tells, one is sure that 2 Corinthians is not one of these instances, but that the parts of it belong together and, in the order in which they lie before us, tell a consistent tale.

I have been told by several critics that my book underestimates the evidence for the inversion of the two parts of the Epistle and that the problem does not admit of solution. Dr. Moffatt says so in the *Hibbert Journal*, so does a writer in the *Guardian*, who evidently is well acquainted with the subject as hitherto studied in England, and Professor Kirsopp Lake in the *Review of Theology and Philosophy*. The imperfection of our knowledge is patent, there is many a question raised by the Epistle, the answer to which can only be guessed, and there are many verses in it which perhaps we can never understand. But that the first part of it was written before the last there is what appears to be proof positive in what is said about the envoys sent for the collected money in chapter viii. and chapter xii. respectively. In the former chapter they are introduced circumstantially and elaborately, and all the requisite details stated about each of them. In the later, Titus and the brother are mentioned; the Corinthians are taken to be well acquainted with the claims of each to take charge of the business in question. Surely the elaborate introduction came before the briefer one, not after it. But the story told by the Epistle from first to last is the main evidence that we have it as it was written.

The trouble is not thrown away on either side that is bestowed on an Epistle so dear to the heart of Christians.

ALLAN MENZIES.

THE STONING OF ST. PAUL AT LYSTRA, AND THE EPISTLE TO THE GALATIANS.

IN writing to Timothy, St. Paul reminds that Lystrian convert of what had happened when he met him first in his native town. "Thou hast fully known my . . . persecutions, afflictions, which came unto me . . . at Lystra" (2 Tim. iii. 10, 11). It is therefore only to be expected that he would have his sufferings in mind if ever he wrote more generally to the Christians of that district, and St. Luke has plainly recorded that those sufferings took the form of that terrible and unique experience which he still had fresh in his memory when he wrote, "Once was I stoned" (2 Cor. xi. 25). It is now a commonly accepted view that he included the people of Lystra among the recipients of his letter to "the churches of Galatia." Consequently it is quite legitimate to examine that Epistle in order to find language reminiscent of experiences which had befallen him in that neighbourhood. The most familiar passage in this connexion is that in which St. Paul says, "Ye know how through infirmity of the flesh (δι' ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός) I preached the Gospel unto you at the first" (Gal. iv. 13). He adds that his physical condition was such as might have provoked their scorn and nullified his preaching, but, owing to their forbearance, it did not have that effect. He gratefully records that, "if it had been possible, ye would have plucked out your own eyes, and have given them to me" (Gal. iv. 15). The varied nature of the theories which depend largely on this passage for their support shows us how little certainty

can be obtained. One familiar suggestion is that an attack of malaria compelled St. Paul to leave Perga and seek the higher ground of Pisidia. Another is that he was kept in that district instead of journeying further owing to an ophthalmic weakness which made the Galatians desire to give him their own eyes to help him in his preaching. In all such theories, two things are taken for granted: that the infirmity spoken of was part of that recurrent malady which he speaks of elsewhere as his "stake in the flesh" (2 Cor. xii. 7), and that his preaching the Gospel to them "at the first" must necessarily apply to the first moment that he appeared among them, before the stoning at Lystra took place. But can either of these presuppositions be justified? First, it must be remembered that neither malaria nor ophthalmia nor any other complaint guarantees immunity from sickness of other kinds. However tempting it may be to connect the σκόλοψ with the ἀσθένεια in Galatia, their identification remains unproven. Had it been a particular malady of which St. Paul reminds his converts, would he not have prefaced the word ἀσθένεια with an article, instead of the vague and somewhat unusual expression δι' ἀσθένειαν τῆς σαρκός?

Secondly, with regard to the moment of his Galatian preaching to which he refers, there is nothing which demands that we should think of its earliest stage. Had he said that his *coming* among them was due to an infirmity, we should have been obliged to suppose that he would not have come into that locality at all but for its occurrence. If this were so, we must imagine, as Professor Ramsay and many others have done, that his presence in Galatia was due to a previous attack, and that the purpose of his going there was in order to recruit from it. But it is his *preaching*, and not his coming, which he attributes to an infirmity. We may therefore equally well understand him to mean that it was the cause

of his *staying* among them when he might otherwise have passed on more rapidly through their towns. And if we ask at which period of his first visit he "evangelized" (εὐηγγελισάμην) them, is not the answer to be found, not in his curtailed and sadly interrupted efforts to address them as he was being hunted from one town to another on the outward journey, but in his more leisurely and effective return, during which he set up churches in one town after another, beginning with Derbe?

All this suggests that it is perfectly legitimate to seek in the period subsequent to his first entry into Galatia for some cause of infirmity which not only kept him among them, but made the sympathetic Galatians long to give him their own eyes, instead of turning away from him, as might have been the case. Is not the stoning at Lystra in itself a sufficient explanation?

It is probably the general view that he fell stunned by a well-directed stone, and came to himself after his assailants had taken him for dead and flung his body outside the gates. This involves a terrible head-wound, and, amid the onslaught of an infuriated mob, it is highly improbable that it was the only one. He would be a pitiful object indeed when he reached Derbe shortly after. The question why he returned instead of pressing on has long exercised commentators. Had he pursued the route south-east from Derbe, and passed through the Cilician gates, he would have only had to traverse 160 miles to reach his home at Tarsus, and he could thence have easily returned to Antioch. Professor Harnack suggests that he elected to return to Lystra because "he shrank from making his way into the wild territory of Isauria."[1] If he was afraid, there must have been some cause. It can scarcely have been cowardice, in the light of his previous boldness. Could it not have been a physical

[1] Harnack, *Acts of the Apostles*, p. 96.

cause, and may we find the solution of the problem of his itinerary in these words of his to the Galatian churches, " because of an infirmity of the flesh I preached unto you at the first " ?

In this case, Derbe assumes a new importance as the place where a critical decision was made (influenced, perhaps, by the solicitude of the Apostle's friends), on which hung the question of the real Christianising of the district to the West of it. If something had happened to him exactly at that time which made the journey impracticable through the wilds of Isauria and the fastnesses of the Taurus, all is explained. Such an event we find ready to hand in the stoning at Lystra. Crippled and wounded as he was, his indomitable will might help him to limp into Derbe, and his zeal could find vent before long in a slow return by easy stages over the old ground of the Galatian cities. But it would have been madness to attempt the arduous journey through the region of the Taurus.

And when his work of " confirming," " exhorting," and ordaining under these disadvantages was done among the people of that region, they might easily have treated with mockery an evangelist of such sorry appearance, who stood before them disfigured and bandaged. They might naturally have " despised " and " rejected " so unseemly a preacher. There was indeed a " temptation " to them in his flesh to give way to that loathing which the ancient world felt for what was maimed and unsightly. Yet they seemed only to see in him what was beautiful, and received him " as an angel of God, even as Christ Jesus " (Gal. iv. 14). And as they looked upon his poor eyes, blackened and swollen, and perhaps still covered with bandages, they longed to pluck out their own eyes and give them to him.

It is difficult to see how such forbearance was necessary on the part of the Galatians if the infirmity was only caused

by malaria, or ophthalmia, or any such complaint. Nor would the Apostle have had any such special recollection of an indulgent hearing at a particular time and locality, if his complaint were a recurrent one, which would doubtless have often evoked, in the course of his many journeyings, an unexpected kindness on the part of those to whom he taught the love of Christ.

If the above suggestions can be accepted, the stoning at Lystra was of greater permanent importance than has been supposed.

But there is another passage in the Epistle which may contain a reference to the same Galatian experience, namely, the pathetic appeal which he makes at the close of the Epistle (vi. 17): "From henceforth let no man trouble me, for I bear branded in my body the marks of Jesus." These words have already been recognised as possibly referring in part to the same incident. Professor Ramsay, in a comment on "The Stigmata of Jesus," [1] says, "The marks are those cut deep on Paul's body by the lictors' rods at Pisidian Antioch and the stones at Lystra, the scars that mark him as the slave of Jesus. . . . Obviously, it must appeal to something that lay deep in the hearts and memories of the Galatians." But the lictors' rods are after all a matter of surmise, whereas the stones are a certainty. The wounds and scars which he received from the latter would doubtless leave a life-long mark, and nothing could be more natural than that he should identify with the service of his Lord the sufferings which had befallen him, as he addressed a letter to the very district where they had been inflicted.

We come to the interpretation of the passage. "Let no man cause me trouble," he cries, as in some agitation he concludes the Epistle with his own hand. He is thinking of the new trouble that has come upon him in the defection of the

[1] Ramsay, *Historical Commentary on the Galatians*, p. 472.

Galatian churches. But it is impossible for any man to permanently break him down and cripple his activities, for such a claim would ignore the fact that he is already the slave of a Master to Whom he stands or falls. It is useless and impertinent for other men to treat him so, for he bears branded on his body "the marks of Jesus." We here follow the accepted line of explanation, seeing in the *στίγματα* the marks of ownership branded on the slave, with possibly the added suggestion[1] of the *ἱερόδουλος* marked for the service of his temple.

It has been thought that the Apostle means no more than this in connecting his sufferings with "the marks of Jesus." But there is another passage in his Epistles which may be so interpreted as to throw further light on this one. In a letter which some still think to have been written about the same time as that to the Galatians, he describes to the Corinthians the inwardness of apostolic persecution as "always bearing about in the body the dying of Jesus" (2 Cor. iv. 10). Here it is impossible not to see in *νέκρωσις* some reference to the Passion.

Nor is the idea of fellowship in the sufferings of Christ absent from the Apostle's thoughts in his other writings, as when he speaks of his own ideal of knowing "the fellowship of His sufferings, becoming conformed unto His death" (Phil. iii. 10). Such passages suggest that a similar thought is also contained in his words in the passage before us. If men are troubling him, he will identify this new cross with that of his Master, and such a thought must needs transform all his *κόπους*, and indeed remove them. But as he thus identifies the branding of wounds upon his heart with that physical moment of his Lord's sufferings when "He was wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities," he combines the physical experience with the mental,

[1] *See* Lightfoot, *Epistle to the Galatians*, p. 225.

and turns from the recent wounding of his heart and mind to the wounding of his body among them once in time past. The κόποι of that time, which hindered his journey and almost cost him his life, have the same explanation, for "I bear branded in my body the marks of the Lord Jesus."

A further point is suggested by the exact form of his words, though I would carefully limit this part of my inquiry to the region of suggestion. "Marks of Jesus" is a general expression, which would well identify the Apostle's sufferings with the Passion as a whole. But surely, if that were what he meant, he would have said στίγματα Ἰησοῦ. What he does say is τὰ στίγματα τοῦ Ἰησοῦ. Why is the article prefixed? It does not seem to be for the sake of Ἰησοῦ. That name for Christ is, of course, very rare by itself in St. Paul's writings,[1] but its use with the article prefixed is much rarer. We conclude that there is some stress on the τά, which thus particularises the στίγματα. In after time the στίγματα were to be given a special signification as the wounds in the hands and feet of the crucified Saviour. Is it wholly an anachronism to read something of this meaning into the words of the Apostle? Ramsay describes it as an interpretation of the "dark ages." And yet it is at least significant that in the Latin versions "stigmata" remains untranslated. If such a meaning is after all admissible, may there not be a definite sense in which St. Paul bore these marks in his body? Long afterwards, St. Francis of Assisi meditated upon them till they seem to have gradually appeared upon his own hands and feet. If we look for any means whereby the same experience may have befallen St. Paul, we find it in the stoning at Lystra. In the case of St. Stephen, it was a regular Jewish stoning, sufficiently formal for the fatal result not to be

[1] In 16 passages, out of over 200 where Christ is named. Of these only 6 contain the article, and 3 of these are in one paragraph (2 Cor. iv. 10–14), where there seems special reason for the insertion.

in doubt for a moment. Such was not the case at Lystra. It was indeed the Jews who began it, but we are particularly told that "they persuaded the multitudes." They made use of a mob violence somewhat like that of Thessalonica. The circumstances of the moment do not suggest that the Apostle would kneel down like St. Stephen and calmly await death. The impulse which had just made him "leap" among them and disclaim divinity, would be exerted now to check this further misunderstanding. At any moment an explanation might become possible, or at least events might take a new turn. Perhaps the scene may be reproduced thus. St. Paul sets to work to defend himself against this sudden attack. As stone after stone comes through the air, he lifts first one hand and then the other, and receives on his open palms those which threaten his head and body. Of those aimed lower he takes no heed, nor of those which fall short and strike his feet and ankles. The shower soon grows too heavy for such protection, and he falls to the ground stunned by a blow on the temple. They drag him outside the city for dead, but the disciples are left standing round him in a circle, possibly having formed this ring in order to prevent his persecutors from touching his body and making sure of their victim's death. Consciousness soon returns and he quickly recovers from most of his bruises. But there remains the wounded head, which must needs be swathed in bandages. If we are to take literally the words that the Galatians would have plucked out their eyes and given them to him, I have suggested that it was when he preached in the weeks that followed with the stone cuts round his eyes, which perhaps required to be wholly hidden from the light. Add to this his poor crushed, limping feet, and his hands pierced and shattered, and his preaching thus robbed of half its effectiveness before an Eastern audience by the absence of gesticulation, and we can readily understand that, in such an

ἀσθένεια τῆς σαρκὸς, there was to them a πειρασμὸς ἐν τῇ σαρκὶ, which, if yielded to, might have made him ridiculous even to his converts.

And when the years had gone by, and his wounds were healed, there would be still a mark of that unique experience when "once was I stoned." The laceration of his palms would have left great scars, which he might easily connect with the print of the nails in the hands of his Lord, and the very word στίγματα, punctures, would be what they would suggest to him. Perhaps, too, the wounding of his feet may have left marks there also, while the scars above his eyes might suggest the marks of his Master's crown of thorns.

I do not wish these suggestions, which may be somewhat fanciful, to vitiate my main contention, and I return in conclusion to the earlier theme of this article. If it be true that, in writing to the Galatians, St. Paul is able to refer to events which happened at Lystra, it seems to suggest that region as the centre of the Galatian churches. This tends to prove that his Epistle was written to a small community, and was not a manifesto to South Galatia. If this were the case, it would have a considerable bearing on the question of date, as we generally assume that the Judaising mission extended from Perga to Derbe, whereas, if the "Galatians" lived in the district of Lystra, a small and speedy mission of Judaisers might have done all the mischief. An early date would thus be suggested.

And if Lystra were the centre of the churches addressed, a possible objection to the theory I have advanced would fall to the ground. In Acts xiii. 49 we are told that during the first visit to Antioch "the word of the Lord was published throughout all the region." If Antioch be included in the churches to which the Apostle preached "at the first" through an infirmity of the flesh, these words suggest that this was *before* the stoning at Lystra. But in any case, there

is an answer to the objection. For in the first place, the phrase διεφέρετο ὁ λόγος does not necessarily suggest St. Paul's own preaching, and in the second place, we may say that St. Luke has laid most stress on the first dash through the province, either because he wanted to show the obstacles encountered in the spreading of the faith, or, as Professor Harnack suggests, because he possessed no more than "some anecdotes of the mission," which naturally included only its most exciting parts. The verse quoted need not be more than an editorial summary concerning a district which was soon Christianised.

If the theory which I have advanced can be accepted, it gives to the stoning at Lystra a new importance, in its bearing on the problem presented by the Epistle to the Galatians, a problem which has not yet reached its solution.

T. W. Crafer.

PRIMITIVE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT IN THE OLD TESTAMENT

Some twelve years ago the American scholar S. Ives Curtiss published his well-known book *Primitive Semitic Religion To-day*. He drew attention to numerous traces of primitive thought in the religious conceptions of the population of Syria, Palestine and the Sinaitic peninsula. Since the study of folklore and primitive customs has not come to a standstill. It was apparent, from the results of these studies, that we are not able to deal with the questions of the so-called higher criticism, without entering into an inquiry into the origin of many customs and manners of the Israelites. Guided by the light of the study of comparative religion many customs that were formerly supposed to be of late origin proved to contain elements of a very ancient type.

It seems worth while to collect the scattered survivals of primitive religious thought in the Old Testament. They are of importance not only for the Old Testament scholar, but also for the ethnologist, who will easily recognise that the solution of some ethnologic questions may be gathered from the study of old Israelitic customs.

I.

The Israelites once assumed the existence of a mysterious power, that dwelt in all things that lived, and in all things that appeared to contain unseen sources of action. This power was not a separate being, but was an unseen reality consisting of all the scattered parts of it, embodied in

various things and beings. It was found in the streaming water of the river, in the water of the springs and wells, in trees and in rocks, in animals and men, it was everywhere. Though it could not be grasped by the hand, not be seen by the eye, not be tasted by the tongue, nor be smelt by the nostrils, or be heard by the ear, it was a living reality.

The name of this power was Elohim or El, in our versions translated as God. It certainly deserves attention that this translation is quite correct, the word "God" originally being a neuter, like "Regin" the synonym of "God" used in the Edda-songs, as Professor C. C. Uhlenbeck, of Leiden, was kind enough to inform me.

In our Old Testament we can only trace this ancient conception in some expressions and words. "I can" is expressed by the term, "it is for the El of my hand" (Gen. xxxi. 29, Micah ii. 1, Proverbs iii. 27, Deut. xxviii. 32, Nehem. v. 5). The original meaning of this expression can only regard the hand as the seat of an unseen power called "El," by which the actions of the hand are done. We do not find this expression applied to other parts of the body, but other things, that appear to be the seat of great power, are named by words that are etymologically connected with El. In Palestine big trees are rare. The tree is called "Ejil." The same word is used for the strong ram, and a stag is called "Ajjal," this word being another derivation of the same root. In the same way the female animals are often called the "Astart's," the mother-goddesses of the flock, each of these animals being an "Astart" as it possesses the qualities of a mother-goddess and her producing power (Deut. vii. 13, xxviii. 4). The translation of the Revised Version, "the young of thy flock" certainly expresses the general meaning of the verses, but hides the original meaning of the Hebrew text.

In Genesis xxviii. we have an instance of a piece of rock

that appears to Jacob to be the house of a god, a Beth-El. This conclusion is reached by Jacob from the fact that the stone served him as pillow. His head lying on that stone he saw in his dream the heavens opened. This dream proved that the stone was the house of God, a gate of heaven, " and Jacob rose and took the stone that he had put under his head, and set it up as a sacred pillar and poured oil upon the top of it " (*v.* 18.)

We further find that all parts of the human body, that seem to be a seat of vital power, are regarded with certain awe, though they are not called by terms which show that they are supposed to be the seats of El, as in the case of the hand.

In the first place the breath is to be mentioned. The breath seems to be life itself. What does not breathe is dead. Human life existed as God formed man and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (Gen. ii. 7). In case of death the breath seems to leave the body, to escape into some unknown place. Life does not cease but only seems to transplant its essence, the breath, into an unknown abode.

We understand that the Hebrew word for " breath " is the same as the word for " soul " (nefesh). This soul is supposed to live after the death of the body. It has his needs. It does not belong to the human world but to the world of El, it is El. In the well-known story of Saul and the witch of Endor, the woman brings up the spirit of Samuel and calls the apparition a god. " I see Elohim coming up out of the earth " (v. 13). She recognises Samuel by his outward appearance. ' She said, An old man cometh up and he is covered with a robe. And Saul perceived that it was Samuel " (v. 14). Obviously the spirit has the same appearance as the man. Already here we find the same conception we meet also in the New Testament, that everybody

has his "doubleganger," called in later times his "angel" (Acts. xii. 15, Matt. xviii. 10).

This unseen vital power is not to be identified with the human being but seems to excel it. It is a kind of personal "god." The most conspicious place mentioning this "god" is Leviticus xxiv. 15. "Whosoever curseth his 'god' shall bear his sin, but he that blasphemeth the name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death, all the congregation shall certainly stone him." The common explanation identifies "his god" and the Lord, but the Hebrew text shows that in these verses is dealt with two different cases. The term "bear his sin" means "he shall expect the punishment that God will send to him" (cf. Lev. xix. 8, xx. 20, and xx. 21 and 19). In the second case the punishment is to be executed by the Israelites. "His god" corresponds to the "ilu" mentioned in the Assyrian hymns as the personal god, the genius of the worshipper.

Probably this same conception underlies a series of texts in Leviticus xix. and Leviticus xxv., cf. xix. 14, 32, xxv. 17, 36, 43. In all these places we find commandments concerning the behaviour towards fellow-men, supported by the motive "thou shalt fear thy God." In the present text "thy God" certainly is to be explained as Jahve (cf. Lev. xix. 12), but originally "thy God" will have alluded to the "personal God" as may be seen from Leviticus xxv. 17, where we expect "thou shalt fear *me*, for I am the Lord thy God," if "thy God" and the Lord were to be identified. The personal god is the god who represents in the first place humanity, he demands a humane conduct, being something humane himself.

In a later period this personal god became an angel. Ecclesiastes v. 5 (6) warns not to vow and to say afterwards to the angel that it was an error.

In the terms that are used in taking an oath we have an-

other instance of the mysterious power ascribed to human life. It is quite common to invoke the life of a person. " By the life of Pharaoh," " by my life," " by the life of Jahve," " by thy life " are terms used in the same way as the name of a god, who is invoked to protect the oath.

This mysterious vital power is not only connected with the breath but with all things that seem to be a seat of life. Death may be caused by loss of blood. The blood therefore is equal in importance to the breath, and is also " seat of the soul " (Lev. xvii. 11, 14, Gen. ix. 4, Deut. xii. 23). It is not allowed to eat the blood of animals. Blood that is shed, even the blood shed in hunting, must be covered by throwing earth over it. The voice of the blood of Abel cried unto God from the ground (Gen. iv. 10).

Another seat of the vital power is to be found in the hair and the nails. Their continual growth seems to show that they are specially connected with life. It is a well-known fact that the hair and the nails are of the greatest importance in magic all over the world. The story of Samson reminds us that long hair was a proof of great strength. In ordinary life the hair was worn in braids, that were covered by the kerchief, but in times of war the enemy should be impressed by the great strength of its opponents. Then the braids were loosened and the waving hairs were shown (Judges v. 2). It seemed irreligious to cut off the hair and was supposed to be a kind of mutilation. In Leviticus xix. 27 it is forbidden to cut off the points (not the corners as is usually translated) of the hair and of the beard. This is allowed only in special cases. The case of Absalom was an exceptional one. We are told that he pulled his hair at every year's end, because it was heavy on him (2 Sam. xiv. 26). It seems that the hair in ordinary cases was not shortened. It was not possible to leave the nails unpared, but it was usual to bury the paring in order to avoid dangerous influences of it.

The oath mentioned in Genesis xxiv. 2, xlvii. 29 shows that the genitals were also regarded as seats of sacred power.

This personal vital power dwells in men, but is not the necessary condition for their existence as living beings. This power may leave the human body, and can be transplaced by another "spirit" which enters the body after the former vital power has left it.

The most conspicuous instance of this conception is to be found in the ideas connected with sacred and consecrated objects.

The Israelites shared the common opinion that shrines and sacred objects were the dwelling-places of divine beings. They were supposed to be really present in the holy places and objects. But their presence never was thought to be confined to these places. The presence of a god implied that the whole atmosphere surrounding him was filled with an unseen and mysterious holy essence. All things in his neighbourhood were covered by this sacred element. If the gods were of little importance and had not proved to be great and terrible gods the space covered by this element was supposed to be of moderate extent. The influence of great sanctuaries, however, covered miles and miles and reached as far as the sanctuary could be seen. The pilgrims to these sanctuaries marked the spot from which they first discovered the distant sanctuary by heaps of stones. If they are within eyesight of the shrine they are obliged to wear holy clothes and to abstain from all things unclean. Every year the Moslem pilgrims wear the "ihram" (the sacred garments) when they have reached the frontier of the holy territory, that is at a considerable distance from Mekka and Medinah.

The priests, that lived always in close vicinity of their god, were supposed to be filled with his divine presence. They were no longer ordinary men. The high-priest was the

servant of God and consequently had to stay within the precincts of the temple all his life (Lev. xxi. 12). The crown of the anointing oil of his God was upon him, therefore he could not leave the sanctuary without profaning it. He was consecrated by touching his right ear, his right thumb and his right toe with the blood of a sacrifice. We know from present customs (cf. S. I. Curtiss, *Prim. Relig.* p. 152) and from the Zend-Avesta that this is a kind of exorcism, intending to expel evil spirits. The blood of the sacrifice expels the common spirit of life, and the sacred oil with which he is anointed introduces into him another vital element, he is sanctified by the Lord Himself (Lev. xxi. 15).

The other priests too are sacred, but according to their lower position they enjoy more freedom than the high-priest did. Originally they were not anointed. In the older part of the legislation it is only the high-priest that is to be anointed by the sacred oil (Exod. xxix. 5 ff.), but the exorcistic ceremony was also applied on them. They were allowed to leave the precincts of the temple, but it was forbidden to wear the priestly garments in the streets. These garments were to be left in one of the rooms of the inner-gate of the temple (Ezek. xliv. 19). Their holiness was inferior to that of the high priest, as is shown by Ezekiel xliv. 18. They shall have linen dresses, they shall not gird themselves with anything that causeth sweat. This is desired of the common priests, but not of the high-priest. The sweat is supposed to be a seat of the mysterious vital power. The common priests were not anointed in the pre-exilic period. The divine element dwelt not in them like in the high-priest, consequently they must take care not to sweat, their sweat being part of their unsacred elements.

Every priest must avoid such things as appear to contain a powerful spirit if they are serving in the temple. Especially wine and spirits seem to introduce a spirit in the man

who takes them. Wine and strong drink were forbidden to Aaron and his sons when they went into the sacred tent (Lev. x. 8). This has nothing to do with fear that they might infringe the rules of the ritual if they were not perfectly sober. No other spirit was allowed to come in the holy presence of God.

Even in the post-exilic time we find the survival of these conceptions in the prescript for the hallowing of the Levites (Num. viii. 5 ff.). Moses shall take the Levites and cleanse them by sprinkling water of expiation upon them and by shaving "all their flesh." All the hair that is connected with their natural vital element is to be removed.

The people of Israel was holy as well. Already in the old legislation of the Book of the Covenant the holiness of the people is mentioned. "Ye shall be holy men unto me, therefore ye shall not eat any flesh that is torn of beast in the field" (Exod. xxii. 31). It is forbidden to eat the blood of animals, for the soul of the animal is in the blood, and in eating it this soul would enter into their bodies. Their holiness is inferior to that of the priests. It is not strong enough to consecrate the things that are touched by them, as would have been the case with the priests if they had walked in their holy garments in the streets, but it demands that the Israelites regard their body as sacred to God and do not mutilate it. Holy things must be perfect. No man that had a blemish was allowed to act as priest. The holy people of Jahve was not allowed to cut itself, nor to make any baldness between the eyes for the dead (Deut. xiv. 1 ff.), nor to print any marks on them (Lev. xix. 28) by tattooing. They should bind the protecting knots and signs on their hands and between their eyes (Deut. vi. 8) without mutilating their flesh.

For the same reason it is forbidden to inquire of the dead. The soul of the dead was supposed to enter into the sorcerer

and to reveal itself by using his speech (Lev. xx. 27). The Israelite would become the bearer of a spirit alien to his own. This can be permitted only in one case, if it is the spirit of God Himself that chooses to enter into him and to use him for revealing the commandments of the Lord.

The prophets were men seized by the spirit of God. They did not speak themselves, the Spirit of God spoke by means of their tongue. So we understand that the prophet becomes another man, though his outward appearance remains the same. 1 Sam. x. 6 it is foretold by Samuel that Saul shall prophesy and shall be turned into another man. The prophet is to the spirit of God what the garments are for a man. The Spirit of God used Gideon as a garment (Judges vi. 34), dressed in Amasai (1 Chron. xii. 18, 2 Chron. xxiv. 20). The hand of the Lord came upon them (2 Kings iii. 15), they were therefore holy men, men of Elohim. The story of Elisha shows that the prophet had shaved his head (2 Kings ii. 23). Probably this is to be explained in the same way as the ceremony of the cleansing of the Levites. All that is connected with the old vital power is to be removed if a new vital element is to enter the body. In such cases the head was shaved and the nails were pared (Deut. xxi. 12). The baldness of the head mentioned in 2 Kings ii. 23 shows that Elisha was not long ago initiated as a prophet.

Even those prophets who seem to us to write down the results of their own meditations and expectations emphasise that they do not bring their own messages but the words of God, sent by God unto them. The prophecies of Ezekiel were spoken after eating the divine book-roll that was sweet as honey (Ezek. iii. 1 ff.). God Himself placed His words into the mouth of Jeremiah (Jer. i. 7 ; cf. also Isa. vi.). The spirit of God within the prophet is no symbol of an exalted human mind, a deep religious feeling or severe morality, or of anything of pure human origin, but of the revelation of

God Himself unto mankind. It was a divine reality living and acting among men.

II.

It is important to realise the ancient conceptions of soul and vital elements. In the history of the religion of Israel many things have been explained as non-Israelitic elements which are perfectly understood in the light of primitive religious thought.

Here, in the first place, the laws on the Nazarite are to be mentioned (Num. vi. 1–22). The Nazarite makes a special vow not to drink wine and strong drink, nor anything that is made of wine, strong drink and grapes. All the days of his vow he shall not shave his head nor come near to a dead body, even of his father, his mother, his brother or his sister, because his separation unto God is upon his head. This is supposed to be the later development of an original Nazariteship lasting the whole lifetime. The framers of the legal ordinance of Numbers vi. are said to have had no comprehension of the original Nazarite vow; that would have been in ancient time much less strict than afterwards (*Enc. Bibl.* 3363). By the sixth century B.C. the Nazarite vow would have lost its old simplicity. The abstention from wine is explained by the theory that the Nazarite represents the old Israelitish ideal of nomadic life. The Nazariteship assumed for a limited period as supposed in Numbers vi. is ascribed to the post-exilic legislators.

The whole theory of the development of this vow from a natural and simple one into an artificial one, that became connected with the temple in Jerusalem, is highly improbable.

The abstention from wine cannot be explained by the old Israelitish ideal of life, as the Hebrews never were nomads, who did not know the culture of the vine (cf. Gen. xxvii. 25). It follows by no means from Judges xiii. and 1 Samuel i.

that the original form of the Nazariteship is a vow for the whole lifetime, as it is expressly emphasised that Samson shall be a Nazarite from the womb to the day of his death (Judg. xiii. 7.) and that Samuel shall be given to the Lord "all the days of his life." It is not justifiable to conclude from this that *every* vow as Nazarite was a vow for the whole lifetime. The abstention from wine is easily understood by the view that the wine contained a spiritual power that should not enter the body of a person that had separated himself unto God. The Rechabites are very often quoted as an instance of original nomadic life in old Israel, but the Rechabites are descendants of the Kenites, the travelling blacksmiths of the desert, and have nothing to do with the vow of the Nazarites (cf. EXPOSITOR for August, 1908, p. 129).

The rules for the vow of the Nazarite are not only important for the history of Israel, but also for ethnology, as the so-called hair-offering is placed here in the right light. Many travellers have noticed that it is a custom with numerous tribes in all parts of the world to cut off the hair at various occasions and to burn it or to deposit it in some holy place. It is generally accepted that the hair is offered to some divine power. Robertson Smith holds the opinion that this offering served the purpose of binding together in close union the worshipper and his God, or (in other cases) to create a bond of consecration between the dead and the living.

Another explanation assumes that the offering of the hair is a *pars pro toto* and is a substitute for the offering of a man or woman. The legislation of Numbers vi. makes it very probable that this so-called hair-offering was no offering at all, but simply a ceremony connected with the view that various vital elements may enter into man in different periods of his life. If a new period begins all that is connected is to be renewed. Therefore the hair is cut off in all these cases that a person passes from a period of holiness,

or from a period of mourning, into common life, or was initiated into a new period of life.

When the days of the vow are fulfilled the Nazarite has to bring three offerings, a burnt-offering, a sin-offering and a " sacrifice of peace " (shelem). He shall shave his head and put the hair on the fire which is under the sacrifice of peace-offerings (v. 18). In the articles dealing with the Nazarite this is usually explained as putting the hair on the altar, and is said to be an offering of the hair. (*Encyc. Bibl.* 3363). The meat of a peace-offering was cooked in a pot in the court of the temple. According to the Hebrew text the hair was to be put on this fire. The fire of the altar did not burn " under the sacrifice of peace." The fat of this sacrifice was burned on the altar-fire, and the fire of the altar is never said " to burn under" the parts that are offered. This implies that the hair is simply burned and not offered. The hair was sacred because the Nazarite was a sacred person during the time of his vow. He cannot return into common life without leaving his hair in the temple.

In the same way we find that in other religions the hair is cut off if a new period of life begins. Robertson Smith was perfectly right in saying " the hair offering of youths and maidens (in Syria) was a ceremony of religious initiation." The hair was allowed to grow unshaven from birth to adolescence. Entering into the status of social maturity they had to shave their heads, like the foreign woman that enters into an Israelitish family had to shave her head and to pare her nails. This custom is parallel to the supposed hair-offerings of the pilgrims who have finished their pilgrimage to Mekka or in ancient times to the sanctuaries of Byblus and Bambyce (cf. Robertson Smith, *Religion of the Semites*, p. 313). There is nothing artificial or heathenish in the regulations of the vow of the Nazarite.

Another kind of offering that has been no offering at all

are the so-called Building-offerings (Bau-opfer), i.e. human sacrifices that were brought when a new building was erected. An instance of this " offering " is mentioned 1 Kings. xvi. 34. Hiel rebuilt Jericho. He laid the foundation thereof with Abiram his firstborn, and set up the gates thereof with his youngest son Segub. Of these foundation sacrifices many examples were found during the excavations of the last years in Palestine (cf. Driver, *Schweich lectures*, 1908, p. 71). The term " offering " and " sacrifice " implies that these children and adults, of which the bones were found under the foundation, are supposed to be offered to some divine power. But this was not the case. The spirit of the deceased was supposed to protect the foundations and to ensure their stability. Its mere existence was sufficient for this purpose. They were not offered as a gift to a god in order to persuade him to protect the house, but protected it themselves. The death of the children and men was the only possible way of creating the protecting power that was needed. The belief still exists to-day in southern China and elsewhere. It was a mistake to call all cases in which men were killed for religious purposes " offerings."

The study of primitive thought is of great importance for the so-called worship of the dead. The theory has been defended that the cult of the dead is the base of the worship of the gods. The mourning customs were explained as ritual ceremonies connected with the cult of the dead. Even they who feel inclined to deny that religion is based on this cult are ready to assume that the mourning customs owe their origin to some form of worship of the dead. (cf. *Enc. Bibl.* 3222; R. Smith, *Rel. of the Sem.* 306).

A thorough investigation into the meaning of all the customs is not in favour of this theory, as it is only possible to explain some of the customs by it but not all. Some customs even point in the opposite direction. If we study

these customs in the light of primitive religious thought we find that scholars wrongly have explained many things that intend to protect men against the spirits of the dead as elements of a kind of religious worship. It is true that everywhere the mourners provide for the need of the dead, but this is not to be mistaken for a general worship of the dead. Only the spirits of those, who were of great importance and extraordinary power, were venerated and worshipped after their death. The ordinary man, however, was no god. His relations placed food on his tomb but did not expect that his spirit would be able to do what they suppose may be done by the spirit of a prophet or some holy man.

The mourners rent their garments, covered their head, or at least their mouth, they sat in the dust of the floor and sprinkled ashes on their heads. They fasted, and dressed in a simple shirt, called "saq" and went barefoot. They shaved the head and the beard, made incisions in the hand or other places of the skin. The first food they took after fasting was offered to them by their neighbours. They never took food from their own house.

All these customs have been explained as parts of the cult of the dead. The garments were rent as a preparation to the mourning dress. The saq is supposed to be the garment that was usual in ancient times and that survived only in the old religious customs of the cult of the dead. The head was shaved in order to be able to give the hair as an offering to the dead, the incisions in the skin were made because the blood was also to be offered to him. Fasting was practised and no shoes were put on because the worshipper that shall appear before his god goes barefoot and fasts. Some customs, however, could not be explained in this way. The mouth was covered, the mourner sat in the dust, he took the bread of mourning from his friends. These customs

were not easily understood as ceremonies occurring in the worship of heathen gods or spirits. Moreover this theory does not correspond to the legislation about clean and unclean.

The mourner was unclean and could not be purified until seven days after the case of death. This was also interpreted as a proof of the original religious character of these customs. What was clean in the cult of a god was said to be unclean in the cult of another god. We cannot enter here into an exhaustive treatment of the original meaning of the terms clean and unclean, which is not sufficiently explained by this theory, but draw here only attention to the fact that the legislation in Leviticus xxi. disagrees with it.

It is forbidden that the high-priest shall go in to any dead body even of his father and mother. The ordinary priest shall not defile himself for the dead among his people, except for his kin that is near unto him, for his mother and for his father, for his son, his daughter, his brother and for his sister if she is a virgin. In the worship of the dead the nearest relations are of great importance. The ancestor is the real family-god. Now it is highly improbable that the Jahvistic legislators, who wished to abolish the heathenish rites of the worship of the dead would have forbidden that the ordinary priest should mourn for his relations, but would have made an exception for those cases which were the very base of the heathenish customs and worship.

Numbers xix. 15 contains the key to the solution of this question. "Every open vessel (in a room in which a man died) which has no covering bound upon it is unclean." This implies that something must enter into the vessel that causeth the uncleanness. This can only be something that is connected with the dead. If we examine other burial customs it appears that it is dreaded that the soul of the

deceased will hide itself somewhere. It remains with the corpse and likes to stay with the living relations. This is to be prevented. The soul of the dead no longer belongs to the realm of the living. If the spirit of the deceased succeeded in penetrating into some body of the mourners, this could only endanger the personal vital power of this person. Therefore the openings of the head are covered and sheltered against this spirit by a cover that is wrapped round the head. For the same reason the mourner used to sit in the dust on the floor. We possess some Roman figures which show very clearly that all the openings of the body were supposed to be possible entrances for unseen spiritual beings. Every open vessel might become the seat of the soul of the deceased. No food that was in the house was to be taken by the mourners, they might consume the "soul" with it. So the food is brought from outside by friends when the period of fasting is finished.

It was believed that the spiritual fluid, of which the soul was supposed to consist, could not attach itself to anything broken or rent. This is the reason of the rending of the garments. According to the rabbinical regulations the garments must be rent in the very moment that the last breath leaves the corpse. Then the simplest kind of garment, the saq, is worn. In order to prevent the spirit from hiding somewhere to-day the saq very often is seamed with white tape, white being the colour that keeps off the spirits.

Notwithstanding all these mourning customs, that intended to prevent the soul of the deceased from entering into the mourner himself or into something belonging to him, they felt not sure about the success of their measures. The burial usually takes place on the same day, but the mourner was supposed to be unclean during seven days. "On the third and seventh days a clean person shall sprinkle "water

of separation" (holy-water) upon him and on the seventh day he shall wash his clothes and take a bath. After that he shall be clean at even" (Num. xix. 19). It was also a custom to cut off the hair with the view of removing every part of the spirit that might have succeeded in entering into them. For the same reason it was usual to shed some blood for removing the spirit if it had penetrated into the blood. Neither the cutting of the hair nor the bloodshed were offerings; and with a cult of the dead these customs have nothing to do.

We find in the Old Testament numerous places in which the mourning customs are mentioned without any objection being made against them. It is not forbidden to rend the garments, nor to cover the head or to go barefoot, to fast, etc. The only customs that are forbidden are those that mutilate the body. "Ye shall not cut yourselves, nor make any baldness between your eyes for the dead, for thou art an holy people" (Deut. xiv. 1 ff., Lev. xix. 28). From these last words interpreters have drawn the conclusion that these customs occurred in the worship of the dead. We fail to understand why only these customs would have been forbidden and why many other customs, that (according to the theories of Schwally, Stade, etc.) also were connected with the cult of the dead met no objection from the side of the legislators. The primitive conceptions are sufficient to explain all the mourning customs and the theory that the cult of the dead is the oldest form of religion in Israel as elsewhere is entirely in the air.

J. Benzinger, the writer of the article on mourning customs in the *Encyc. Bibl.*, combats the view of Professor J. G. Frazer, who explained a large proportion of the mourning customs of various peoples as typifying a complete renunciation of the spirit of the departed and pretended that such an explanation of mourning customs is impossible

where Semitic peoples are concerned. The aim of the mourner was, according to Benzinger, to maintain his connexion with the dead.

I suppose that Frazer was perfectly right. There is no reason to separate the customs of the Semites from those of other nations. We find the most striking uniformity of mourning customs all over the world because they are all based on the same conception of life.

I will not deny that in many cases the spirits of the departed were objects of a religious cult, that prayers were and are addressed to numerous saints, that many a tomb is a place of pilgrimage. But we should notice that these men were already extraordinary men when living. The man who was a holy man, a man of God, as he lived among his contemporaries, is supposed to be able to bless and to give prosperity after his death. The spirits of other men may become dangerous if their relations do not provide for proper food and drink on their graves, but they never become powerful gods by the mere fact of their death. The theory that the worship of the dead is the base of religion is not sufficiently supported by an investigation into the original meaning of the mourning customs.

In the EXPOSITOR for November 1909, p. 459 ff., I have drawn attention to some other instances of primitive conceptions in the Old Testament. The days of the unleavened bread appeared to be connected with the conceptions of primitive mankind about the growth of the crops. Every plant is supposed to contain a part of the general vital power and is regarded as the seat of a living soul. I argued from parallels in India that in the days of the harvest no leaven was used for fear of chasing the soul of the plant by the proximity of the unclean leaven, the leavening of the meal being a kind of putrefaction.

In Leviticus xix. we find other instances of the influence of

these old views on Israelitish customs. It is to be noted that they are mentioned together with commandments of a purely ethical nature (Lev. xix. 17 ff.): "Thou shalt not hate thy brother," " thou shalt not take vengeance " precedes " thou shalt not let thy cattle gender with a diverse kind; thou shalt not sow thy field with two kinds of seed, neither shall there come upon thee a garment of two kinds of stuff mingled together.

If two kinds of seed were sown the whole crop would be " hallowed," i.e. it would not be allowed to consume the crops of this field (Deut. xxii. 9). Every plant has its own vital element; to bring two different elements together into one field would endanger the existence of the plants. The life of animals seems to prove that the power of procreation is killed when cattle of different kinds gender. The young that are born in this case cannot multiply. The growth of plants was supposed to be of the same kind and nature as the procreation of animals. The field that was sown became fertile when the field spirits and demons, the fauns (seirim) passed through it. All over the world many symbolic actions were practised with the view to promote the fertility of the field. Deuteronomy xxii. 10 forbids to plow with cattle and with asses together, for the fertility of the field might be damaged by it. Even the products of plants and of the hair of animals were seats of special vital elements on which their strength and solidity depended, and it was considered unwise to make garments of mingled stuff.

It is not easy for us to transplant ourselves into this primitive atmosphere. Many of these customs are no longer understood by later generations. In some instances this has been the cause of great trouble for millions of believers, as the scholars who explained the sacred customs have been induced to conclude from these customs things that have nothing to do with the original meaning of the

customs, but became nevertheless a great burden on the succeeding generations who trusted their conclusions.

An instance of this we find in the old commandment "Thou shalt not seethe a kid in its mother's milk" (Exod. xxiii. 19, xxxiv. 26, Deut. xiv. 21). Professor Frazer has noticed that many African tribes believe that the fertility of the mother may be injured by what is done to the milk, the milk being the seat of the vital power that lives also in the animal. We understand that it must have seemed exceedingly dangerous for the fertility of the mother to seethe a young kid in the milk of the mother, i.e. to use the milk of the mother that is seat of the vital element to prepare the kid. We are therefore not astonished to find this commandment already in the oldest legislation, in the Book of the Covenant.

Later generations only knew the commandment, but the primitive ideas from which it originated had become unknown and had died out. Then the theologians had to explain it, for it was part of the sacred thora. The Mishna (Chullin 8) interpreted it as a commandment not to seethe any meat in milk. This is only allowed in cooking fowls that come from the egg. The milk of the mother was replaced by all milk and the kid by meat. From the milk was concluded that the products of milk, the cheese and the butter were also included. No Jew is allowed to place cheese and meat or butter and meat in one dish, or to consume a dish made from meat and butter. This has led again to numerous other questions. Is it allowed for people staying in an hotel to eat meat when at the same time another man sitting at the same table eats cheese? The answer to this question is that it is permitted if each man has spread before him a separate table cloth and both seem to be dining at separate tables. Hundreds of questions have sprung up from this rabbinical interpretation of the old

commandment. The primitive religious ideas are not only interesting for scholars, but might have even importance for present religious life.

B. D. Eerdmans.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT AND EXPERIENCE.

I propose to arrange this paper under three main heads :—

I. The Psychology of Beginnings—a discussion of the origins of religion and its most primitive forms.

II. The Psychology of Re-Beginnings, under which fall the phenomena of Conversion and its related movements.

III. The Psychology of Growth, dealing with the relation of religion or faith to other activities of the soul, and its expansion into ethics, conduct, or character.

These divisions are not mutually exclusive, as no part of a living organism is absolutely exclusive of the conditions or activity of the other parts—the root is present and active in the topmost leaf of the tree, and the leaf is necessary on its part to the root.

I. *The Psychology of Beginnings in Religion.*

In order to state the principle which gives continuity to this paper—as it were, the backbone and spinal cord of the anatomy of the subject—I must trench a little on the ground of the Philosophy of Religion. One's theory of the origin as well as the development of religion, whether in the race or in the individual, depends very greatly on one's theory of the origin and development of the world itself. There is, for example, a theory from which I wish to distinguish my own, that usually known as the materialistic. Roughly speaking, it explains or seeks to explain the whole scheme of things and the course of evolution by its beginnings. It returns to the shapeless mass of the nebulae, and says that

there, and in the forces inherent in it, is the origin, and therefore the explanation, of the whole process of evolution and its results. Again, it leads us back to the nebulous mass of fears and hopes and crude imaginings of primitive man, and declares that there is the first impulse and the origin, and not only so, but the essence, of religion. It is a hypothesis which commands respect, for it has subtle ways in the hands of its masters of accommodating itself to the facts. Whether it succeeds as a philosophy, whether as a hypothesis it accounts by these simple elements for the complex order of things and for the moral and spiritual life of man, which is its " roof and crown," is a question which it is beside the point to argue here and now. I state the theory simply as a background for that upon which this paper is based, the Idealistic Theory or Hypothesis.

It is common ground for both these theories that the universe is a growing thing, that it evolves, develops, or grows from simpler or lower to more complex or higher forms. The two hypotheses differ in that the one explains the process and its highest forms by the beginnings, while the other explains the process and the beginnings by the highest forms. The latter is the theory of idealists and advocates of religion ; and I have simply space to affirm without argument that the idealistic hypothesis more fully and clearly interprets the facts of existence than the materialistic. The position is that in order to understand anything that lives and grows the best way is to look at its most perfect form. To one who has never seen an oak, an acorn has little or no significance ; and it is the fine blossom of the rose which makes its seed something more than a mere atom of vegetable matter. In like manner we interpret the universe and its formless beginnings by its supreme product, the flower of its growth, the mental, moral, and spiritual life of man. There is mind at the beginning because there is

mind at the end, and the ideal towards which it has all along been tending gives continuity to the process, accounts for there being any process of growth or development at all. As Christians we go further, and maintain that the order of things is best explained by the fact that at its highest conceivable summit, as the perfect blossom of humanity, there is the spiritual life of Jesus Christ. We affirm with Professor Iverach that "The Christian view of the world is the only view which does justice to all the factors of evolution, and recognises all its complexity." That Christian view, in my understanding of it, implies that the world in its beginnings, and its development, is best interpreted by the truth, the righteousness, and the love in Jesus Christ, which are the ideal towards which throughout it has been tending. He is the Alpha and Omega, the First because He is the Last. The ideal which governs all exists for and in the mind of God. And the Apostle has provided a perfect formula for the world-process when he says that, "Of Him (as origin), through Him (as ever-present power), and to Him (as end, fulfilment and ideal), all things are." Regarding man again as the flower of the growing world, and especially Christ and Christlike men as the crown of humanity, St. Paul's words are a fine anticipation of a Christian theory of evolution, when he says that the whole creation has been waiting, and not merely waiting but struggling, groaning and travailing, up towards the manifestation of the sons of God.

In examining certain seeds or saplings of trees it would be possible for one who knew their complete history and final forms to say that one had a tendency towards size, bulk, and usefulness, another to grace and ornament, another to beauty of flower, and another to fruitfulness; and of some it would be right to say that there were in the young form *several* tendencies, as, to usefulness, beauty, and fruit-bearing. In primitive man as a developing being, looked at

from the point of view oî what he has become, there are certain tendencies. There are the tendencies towards knowledge or truth, towards beauty or art, towards a moral order or goodness, towards love or altruism, and towards worship or religion. We know a little about the art of neolithic man, and can gather from it that he had some desire for knowledge and regard for truth ; and from these seeds all later Science and Art have grown ; but there is nothing quite so certain about the most primitive man as that he had a dim faith in a future life which even men of science recognise as a rudimentary form of religion. The existing savage races, who are, with more or less justice, considered to be typical of primitive man, show the same instinct in many different forms. It is not necessary to maintain that one form or another is alone the root-form of earliest religion, fetichism, animism, ancestor-worship, or the like ; every nation or tribe, and even every individual, may arrive at the sense of the unseen in its or his own way. Whether it be through the fear which makes man ascribe the inexplicable sounds of the night and of the forest to evil powers, or through the dream which brings back his dead, or through mere inability to understand death, in whatever manner the first vague conceptions of religion arrive, they are all reducible to this fundamental fact of a tendency in man to be religious, which is as natural and inevitable in him as the impulse to know, which creates Science, or to portray, which creates Art—a tendency which, be it observed, is continuous with and ends in the highest forms of religion. The supreme significance of this truth is that the religious ideal is the final cause of the tendency, the tendency is the "urge of the ideal" in man, or better, it is the pull upwards of the spiritual, drawing the soul of man towards itself. The plant grows and strives upwards because the perfect form of it, its full-blossomed ideal, is drawing it through every

imperfect stage towards itself. The spirit of man feels after God if haply it may find Him, because the ideal of its growth and the full realisation of its being are in the knowledge and the love of Him.

There are many definitions of what is fundamental and universal in religion. There are those of the psychological school whose progenitor is Schleiermacher's "feeling of dependence," to which this definition of the essence of religion by Sabatier belongs, "it is an intercourse, a conscious and willed relation into which the soul in its distress enters with the mysterious power on which it feels that it and its destiny depend. This intercourse with God is realised by prayer. Prayer is religion in act, that is to say, real religion." Then there is the school, not very prominent at present, by which the intellectual element is emphasised, represented by Edward Caird's conception that religion is "the consciousness of the ultimate unity (that is, God) transcending the opposition of subject and object." It is not necessary to oppose these and other definitions of what is essential in religion to each other. In all religion and at every stage there is an element of thought, feeling, and also of will; for it is only the highest abstraction that can separate them. But I find the essence and the fundamental right of religion in the human soul become most clear to me, when I turn to what is more certainly universal and primitive, namely, the tendency in mankind towards religion, always remembering that that tendency is only explicable by that towards which it tends, by the moral and spiritual perfection which is the consummate flower and ideal of human life.

Amongst all growing things in this developing world there is one characteristic which alone distinguishes man. All living beings obey the law of their growth and are governed by their ideal or perfect form; only man can *recognise* the

ideal of his life and make it his own. The plant is drawn blindly and unconsciously up to the next stage on the way to its blossoming ; but man can *see* the higher form of truth and choose it for himself. This is the secret of religious progress. Each new departure is generally the work of a religious genius, and then the nation or the race is gradually drawn up to his level. Such a man as Abraham, or Moses, or Buddha, or Mahomet, by a leap of the imagination of genius grasps a loftier and purer idea of God than his people knows ; and after him the race one by one recognise that his vision is truer and better than their old forms, and they accept it for their own. " We needs must love the highest when we see it " is the law of progress in religion. It is most wonderfully exemplified in the advance of Christianity Why is it that the Gospel of Jesus Christ commends itself to people of every race and stage of culture, even the most primitive ? It is because it coincides with the stream of tendency in the race, and meets the upward surge of the ideal in humanity. No matter what may have been the forms of their worship, as soon as men have a true sight of Christianity, they say ' this is the God I have been feeling after,' and they say of Christ, ' this is the ideal of my soul, in likeness to whom I shall be perfect and find peace.' That is what Conversion in the broad sense means when applied to the abandonment by a people or a man of its or his lower forms of belief, and to the first beginning of what may be called true religion. There is, in the first place, the universal human tendency, the impulse to grow, the urge of the moral and religious ideal in man, which is described by religious psychologists under various terms for the *need* of God. The next element is the power in man to recognise the higher form of the religious ideal, the nobler conception of religion when it is presented to him, and so to undergo conversion to the higher faith. Finally, there is the adaptability of the

Christian religion to all forms of the religious tendency in men, which makes possible the Conversion of humanity. And the source of the impulse or tendency which makes man 'incurably religious' is to be found in the final ideal form of religion. It is of God, and through God, and to God that all things and all men are.

> "Christ is the end, for Christ was the Beginning;
> Christ the Beginning, for the end is Christ."

II. *The Psychology of Re-Beginnings.*

I believe I have not dwelt too long upon the first section of my subject, for the organic principle which I have stated there, is that which we shall see active, and taking similar forms to those which I have described, in the other religious states and processes with which we have to deal. Under Re-Beginnings I intend to consider the psychology of souls to which religion in its higher forms, especially the Christian religion, is not absolutely new, and particularly cases in which the religious ideal has been lost, and has been or may be restored. This makes Conversion, in its more restricted sense, as a turning back to something which has been deserted, a change from the neglect to the pursuit of the religious ideal, the main subject of the present section.

Starbuck has an illuminating remark when he says that "Conversion is a process of realising the possibilities of growth," and Professor James apparently agrees with him when he says that Starbuck's results tend to "assimilate conversion to ordinary spiritual growth." As I have already described it, the spiritual evolution of man in general is a "process of realising the possibilities of growth," that is, in my view, the fulfilment in ever higher forms of the tendency in man to grow up towards the religious ideal. Now, the human child recapitulates the experience of the race, lives through the earlier stages of the evolution of humanity, not merely before but after birth. The child of civilisation,

therefore, unlike primitive man, enters into an inheritance not merely of knowledge and of the arts of life, but also of religion ; and he enters into it with that tendency towards religion, the urge of the religious ideal in him, which we found in all men. The growth of the Christian child into religion ought accordingly to be a *normal* process. There are, of course, in Christian civilisation children without knowledge, without a sight of beauty, and pagans in religion, as there are children the conditions of whose life are those of the savage ; but these are like plants denied proper food, air, and sunshine ; their growth or degeneration is abnormal. Up to a certain point of growth the soul of the child is chiefly assimilative, and given the right support and influences will be naturally Christian. We may agree with the Anglican Church that the children of Christian parents and sponsors ought normally to be Christian ; not on the ground of any magical influence like regeneration by baptism, but because the child, with his innate tendency towards religion as a normal potentiality of his growth, and with the means of growth supplied by his Christian environment in the influence of parents and the Church, ought to be, and, as a matter of common experience is, normally a Christian child. It is out of this class of child that the large numbers come into the membership of the Church who have not had any striking experience which they could call conversion. What happens is that as the mind passes from the unself-conscious and receptive stage into the self-conscious, reflective, and self-determinative, what was taken in religion on authority is accepted on its own appeal to the mind, what was customary becomes reasoned, and the religious ideal, placidly accepted on advice and example, is recognised, and earnestly felt, and perhaps passionately loved.

Before this stage is reached, however, the soul must pass through the critical period of Adolescence. Dr. Newton

Marshall speaks of this as the " Conversion age " ; and says that " the forces working during the ' Conversion age ' urge the soul towards the highest that he knows—they urge towards all the ideals—the good, the beautiful, the true, and God Himself." The same writer, following Starbuck, distinguishes three chief conversional ages, " the first about the tenth year, the second about the sixteenth, and the third about the eighteenth." With the first stage he identifies the rise of the flood-tide of emotional life, with the second, from twelve onwards to sixteen, a development of the intellectual, and with the third age, from sixteen on to twenty, the emergence of the ethical elements of the mind. There is, as Dr. Marshall shows, no absolute division between these stages ; they merge into each other ; and it is obvious that religious education and influence should be guided by consideration of them. Whatever may be said of this analysis (of the conversional ages), it is certain that about the period of puberty there is a movement of the whole life towards its blossoming. The urge of the ideal presses towards the realisation of the physical, mental, emotional, moral, and spiritual tendencies of the individual. And now that movement has become self-conscious ; the soul is searching for its ideal in all these aspects ; and it can recognise it when it comes. There is *then* a Sir Galahad in every man, a readiness to admire, a longing to be loyal to the highest that he knows with a passion and abandon which rarely return in after life. *And the ideal exists.* In Christ is embodied a revelation of the Divine and of ideal manhood which answers, as deep calls to deep, to the urge of the ideal in the soul. This is the crucial moment in life ; and there is no more necessary task for the Church than to bring these together, the passion of the youth for the ideal, and the ideal in Christ which meets it. The most serious loss to religion occurs just at this point, and there are many for whom re-beginning and conversion

from a wayward or a broken life have been necessary simply because the Christ-ideal has not been presented to them at this time, when the ideal in them has been most passionately seeking realisation. The soul at this period is like a climbing plant, and throws out its swaying tendrils to grasp at the satisfaction of its mental, emotional, and spiritual nature ; and if they grasp the Christian ideal they twine round it, and rise upright and strong into the sun ; and this represents the many who, almost as a matter of normal growth, pass from adolescent into adult Christianity. If, on the other hand, those tendrils of the soul's seeking miss their due support in the faith of Christ, they are liable to fall trailing in the dust or to twine like serpents into secret places away from the sun, and to wreathe themselves about false ideals and satisfactions which can only make them fruitless and degenerate. It is these who constitute the lost sheep of the house of Israel, these who present the Church with her problems of sin, and come under the necessity of repentance and re-birth into the Kingdom.

This leads us now to consider the psychology of Sin. I have stated that man alone of all creatures has the power to recognise the ideal of his growth and to make it the law of his life. But he is different from other beings also in that the ideal in him is complex ; it has several forms ; and he has the power to see both the higher and lower forms of the ideal, and has the obligation to choose between them. There may thus be conflict between a desire of the body seeking its full realisation and the moral ideal of self-control, or between the rest of the mind in what satisfies its curiosity and the effort which a spiritual ideal, such as worship demands. The forces of the lower and the higher may be regarded after St. Paul's wonderful psychology as consolidated into the flesh and the spirit respectively, between which a perpetual antagonism exists. The animal in man is

capable of pursuing its ideal to an enormous excess, of which the lower creation are incapable ; for the animal in man may bring imagination with its pictures, reason with its subtleties, and passion with its force to serve its aims. In such ways does sin, and the degradation of the whole man, come to pass. Sin is the soul preferring the lower to the higher, and so going downwards towards the brute instead of upwards towards the Divine. The deliverance from sin comes through *Repentance.* Repentance could not be more finely illustrated than by the parable of the Lost Son. He comes *to* himself, that is, stands apart from himself and looks at his misery, and the perception of the evil results of sin is generally the first 'moment' in repentance. Then he comes to the point of saying, "I am not worthy to be called thy son." He has a re-vision of the ideal of what a son should be, and begins to long for it and to pursue it as the ideal of his future life ; and this brings him back to his father, to forgiveness, and to a full, rich, and joyous sonship. That is repentance, the re-perception and the re-acceptance of the ideal as the goal of life and turning from all else to seek it.

This involves *faith* in the ideal. And this is the essence of the Faith which is operative in Conversion. It is belief in the moral and spiritual ideal of the soul as the supreme goal of life, and trust in it as the surest means of peace and happiness. Taking faith in this broad sense, it is possible to speak of crises and turnings in lives outside of Christianity as Conversions. Thus we may speak of the call of Isaiah or the change in the life of Buddha as conversion, because they and their like consist essentially in a new apprehension of the ideal, and a willing acceptance of it as the governing principle in life. The supremacy of Christian Conversion arises from the absolute adaptation of Christ to every aspect of the soul's quest for the ideal. The ideal perfection of

humanity is so clearly and simply revealed in Jesus that the sinful soul to whom He is made known has immediately that vision or apprehension of the ideal, which, by contrast, induces repentance. He is so humbly and naturally human that His victory over sin leads the sinner to hope that the ideal may conquer sin in *him*. He is so lovable that love of Him becomes insensibly love of the ideal, and self-surrender to that love of Him gives His spirit power to work its will in the soul and to new-create the ideal there.

Having this conception of Conversion, the question of sudden or gradual Conversion seems to us capable of a comparatively simple answer. It is not at all necessary on this view to find that answer, with Professor James and his school, in the mystery of the subliminal consciousness. All that needs to be subliminal is that tendency towards the ideal, or " urge " of the ideal in the soul, which, as we have pointed out, is the normal impulse of growth in man, and which is indeed below the line or level of ordinary consciousness. Sudden conversion has its parallels in other spheres of mind, and that *above* the line of consciousness. The fall of the apple threw a swift light for Newton upon the law of gravitation ; and many a great scientific discovery, like many another great idea, comes in a flash and with a certain surprise to the thinker. What happens is that the mind is endeavouring to form a general law from a mass of particulars, to make of them an ordered whole, to fill out certain sketchy lines, whose tendency it dimly sees, into a picture of reality ; and, suddenly, as the fall of the apple at once suggested to Newton that all these motions in the universe were simply forms of falling, a particular occurs which completes the general law, fills out so much of the whole that the rest can be easily supplied, a line is seen which is the one needed to present to the imagination a coherent picture of reality. In like manner there is never a sudden conversion

without the soul concerned having a certain conception of the scheme of salvation, and what happens is that some particular, some thought, word, or text throws the needed flashlight upon the scheme, and shows the soul itself as already in it. Thus with Tolstoi, for example, there was the three years "quest for God," and then, "'Why do I look farther ?' a voice within me asked. He is there, he without whom one cannot live. To acknowledge God and to live are one and the same thing. God is what life is. Well, then, live, seek God, and there will be no life without Him. After this, things cleared up within me . . . and the light has never wholly died away." Thus also with St. Augustine, Bunyan, and a host of others who found peace through the flashing light of a single text or idea, and the more ordinary multitudes to whom such a thought as, "the finished work," or "Jesus paid it all," or "Christ died for me," is the illuminating factor. There is a pre-conception of salvation not quite complete, in which the soul has not yet seen itself included; and then the imagination, just exactly as in the poet or the man of science, according to its nature, leaps at the thought which completes the scheme, illumines the whole, and shows the soul with joy its place within redemption.

I do not agree at all with Dr. Warschauer when he says, "I certainly do not think it reasonable to expect a man to become a saint of God by quick-change methods. Instead of appealing for Conversion, we must be content to take the slower, more toilsome road of working upon and influencing men's characters—steadily, quietly, persistently—and not grow weary in well-doing; evolution, not revolution, is the normal method in the life of the spirit, as in the life of physical nature." It appears to me that Dr. Warschauer here ignores or has forgotten two facts kindred to each other, of evolution, and of the human mind. One is that evolution

proceeds, at times, by leaps, and that the soul may, like the embryo, rush at lightning speed, under certain conditions, through what would otherwise take a long period to develop. The other factor is, what I have just described, that power of the mind which leaps from incomplete data to a complete conclusion, and sometimes needs only one small element or idea to fill out and reveal as in a flash an ordered scheme of thought.

Thus in our preaching and teaching we have got to keep in view both forms of evolution, and while we adapt our effort to assisting the process by which the " once-born " souls continue their progress, or the Christian child passes from the unconscious to the self-conscious and self-determined Christian life, we must also have before us the fact that there are some waiting for the kindling word or illuminating thought which shows them to the threshold or to the altar-fire of the kingdom. And what is just as important, it is our task as Christian teachers to supply such a clear and ordered conception of the scheme of redemption or such a vision of the adaptation of Christ to the need and tendencies of the soul that, for those who possess it, the transition to a personal realisation and a deep or passionate acceptance of it may be swift and natural.

III I now come to the third division of my subject, the Psychology of Growth, which is concerned with the relation of religion and particularly of Christian faith to the other activities of the soul. This, of course, treated in full, would cover the whole field of Christian Ethics ; but all that is necessary here is to indicate a few of the lines along which faith expands into other forms of the mental, moral, and spiritual life. The principle and potentiality of growth, as I have held throughout, is the tendency in the growing thing towards its ideal, the urge or pressure of that ideal in it. In man that tendency becomes self-conscious, and he is able

to recognise the ideal of his life and to pursue it. Christian faith is the recognition of Christ as the ideal of the soul, and finds in Him the goal of every side of life, bodily, mental, moral, and spiritual. The objective world, the environment, is for man, as for all developing beings, the material for growth; but the Spirit of Christ is more than an environment and a means of development. He personally aids the progress of the soul. Added to that natural impulse in man to grow towards his ideal there is given through faith the direct help of the Master of the soul, to intensify its upward strivings towards the perfection which is in Him.

In pursuing the activity of faith into the other spheres of the mind we come to its three main relations, to thought, feeling, and will.

1. Under the first the old critical question of the relations of faith and reason arises; and we cannot pursue it at length. Professor Jones puts it well when he says, "There is a long and difficult way to travel from the inspired insight of religion and poetry to the reasoned conviction of philosophy and science. The former gain the highest by first leap, the latter move painfully along the links of intermediate causes, testing each fact as they go, as a blind man feels his way with his staff." It cannot be too strongly asserted that faith in religion is exactly of the same nature as belief in ordinary matters, and that there is no difference psychologically between the faith of religion and the faith of science. The scientific man or the philosopher must begin with one faith at least, or rather with two. He must believe in his own thought, that he *can* know things, and he must believe that the world is intelligible, that it *can* be known. Without such faith he would never begin to think at all. And every theory or hypothesis of science is simply a faith until it is verified. Darwin's theory of evolution was a gigantic faith which is being accepted because it is seen to explain more

and more of the facts to which reason is patiently applying it. Ordinary belief, scientific faith, and religious faith are all alike in this, that the mind in all begins with certain fragments of the known, and has an idea that, with other fragments yet unknown or only guessed at, they may make a whole, or it has certain sketchy lines of known truth, and, as in a vision, the picture of a whole which would complete the sketch flashes upon the mind. Faith has the vision and sees the whole, bringing parts out of the unknown to complete it. It is then the work of the mind in reason to see if the fragments agree together and if the old and new elements united make a picture of reality. The faith of Columbus in a new world, which was first the vision of but one man, then a scientific faith, and now an ordinary belief, illustrates the true nature of faith, whether scientific or religious. He stood on the Old World which was common ground to him and all men, but he had a vision of the earth as a round whole, and his thought reached out by sketchy lines across the sea, and his faith saw the world completed by another hemisphere. He sailed at last and reached the Western World, and confirmed his faith by experience ; and since then, ship after ship and fleet after fleet and letters and cables and all the other connecting links of knowledge have made that faith a certainty of reason even for those who have never seen that other world. Thus Christian faith stands upon the firm ground of the seen and known world, but feels that it is incomplete, and has a vision of another world, yet unseen, which would make a complete whole and harmony of things. One may say that one man, Jesus Christ, alone had the vision of that unseen world, and He Himself crossed to it through a communion with the Divine which was only increased by His ascension ; and since then, following His track, myriads have crossed and repeated His experience, and more and more it is plain to the *reason* of

mankind that that unseen and eternal world explains and completes the seen and felt world, and, solving the problems even of its practical life, makes a reasonable whole and a harmony of it.

2. The relation of Christian faith to the heart and feeling leads it still further into the realm of ethics. The secret of the whole matter, to put it briefly, is that Christian faith is essentially faith in love. It is apparent from the Gospels that the faith which Jesus looks for in His disciples, which He teaches, and which He exemplifies in Himself, is faith in love. This is the secret of its wonderful productiveness, of the progress in individual character and in the church of which faith is the seed and the beginning, that in Christ, as St. Paul says, nothing is of any consequence but "faith which worketh by love."

This faith in love has two great branches. The first is faith in the Fatherhood of God, faith that love is on the throne of the universe, that love is at the heart of things, that the increasing "purpose" which runs through the ages is a purpose of love, that love even on the Cross is mighty to save. The essence of Christian faith is that here, in spite of the difficulties which meet every theory, is the solution of every riddle of the universe.

The second branch of faith in love is faith in love towards man. This is the supreme principle of all practical Christian ethics; and it is just here that the saying of Lessing is justified that Christianity as a moral ideal has yet to be tried. There are innumerable ways, in international relations, in commerce, in social life, in the relations of master and servant, in the differences and quarrels of ordinary people, in which faith in love can scarcely be said to have yet had a chance. And yet Christ trusted in love and love alone even to death; and *there* was His power.

> "Not in soft speech is told the earthly story,
> Love of all loves! that showed thee for an hour;
> Shame was thy kingdom, and reproach thy glory,
> Death thine eternity, the Cross thy power."

Faith in Christ, then, ought to mean trusting as He trusted, and loving as He loved; and a profession of faith in Him is a mere saying of "Lord, Lord" to Him, if it does not amount to a willingness to stake all, honour, safety, existence itself, upon the love of God and upon love to man.

3. This leads me to a final word on Faith and the Will or Faith and Practice. In all faith there is an element of will. The Pragmatists, as we all know, make the will everything in faith, and say that the will to believe anything depends not upon its abstract truth essentially, but upon its practical value to the religious and moral life. I do not propose to enter upon a criticism of the school. It is enough that it emphasises the element of will in all faith. In the Gospels, and in the New Testament generally, there is proclaimed, from the very beginning of faith to its fullest consummation, a blessing upon the will to think and to know. And I have already said something about the place of the will in relation to feeling in speaking about faith in love. The supreme practical necessity of to-day, as at all times, is the will to believe in love, in the love of God and the love of man as able to be applied to every circumstance, situation, and problem in human life. To realise that the love of Christ, the love of Him, and the love of all He loves, is always and immediately practicable, to sweep aside all timidities, reservations, and self-interests which deny or resist this, would be, for Christian men and nations, the bringing near of the moral, social, and spiritual salvation of humanity. What Emerson says of ordinary love is fully applicable to the love which is spiritual:—

"Give all to love,
Obey thy heart;
Friends, kindred, days,
Estate, good fame—
Plans, credit, and the muse—
Nothing refuse.

'Tis a brave master;
Let it have scope,
Follow it utterly,
Hope beyond hope."

JOHN MURPHY.

THE PASTORAL EPISTLES.

To Timothy, (Letter) I.

[Prefatory Note.—The translation which follows was written out in August, 1911, as part of a new English version of the New Testament, designed to show to English readers what differences our better knowledge of ancient Greek necessitates in the rendering of it. This newer knowledge has, as is now well known, come to us mainly from the study of the Egyptian papyri. It is unfortunate that the Pastoral Epistles, by their special characteristics, offer less opportunity for illustration from this source than perhaps any other part of the New Testament. The translator, therefore, hopes that no one will estimate the advantage thence accruing to the English Bible in general, from the slight benefit that may appear in the following rendering. Nor is he under any illusion as to the translation itself. It partakes largely of the characteristics of its original, and is to a great extent a mere "crib." But at the same time the translator trusts that the precise meaning of certain passages is now made clearer than has hitherto been the case in an English rendering.—Alex. Souter.]

Chapter I.

(1) Paul, envoy of (the) Messiah Jesus by order of (the) god our preserver and (the) Messiah Jesus, the ground of our hope, (2) to Timothy my own (begotten) child in faith: (be) grace, pitiful love (and) peace from (the) god (the) father and (the) Messiah Jesus our lord.

(3) Even as I warned you to prolong your stay at Ephesus, when I was travelling to Macedonia, that you might inform certain people not to teach other matters (4) nor to direct their attention to tales and to endless genealogies, inasmuch as they give rise to searching questions rather than (the) god's household arrangement, which exists in faith: (5) but the goal of exhortation is love (which springs) from a clean mind and a good consciousness and an unfeigned faith, (6) (things) which some have missed and have (been)

turned aside to vanity of speech, (7) desiring to be teachers of the law, although they fail to understand either what they are saying or the subjects on which they are making emphatic assertions. (8) We know that the law is really valuable, but only if one deal with it in the proper spirit of law, (9) knowing this, that law has not been passed for a righteous man, but for lawless and insubordinate people, those who fear not (the) god and do not his will, those to whom naught is holy and those who are profane in mind, patricides and matricides, murderers, (10) fornicators, paederasts, enslavers by force, liars, perjurers, and all other sins that are set in opposition to the healthy teaching, (11) in accordance with the gospel (telling) of the glory of the happy god, with which I have been entrusted. (12) Gratitude is what I feel towards him who has filled me with power, (the) Messiah Jesus, our lord, because he considered me faithful putting me into service, (13) although I was formerly given to evil-speaking, persecution and insult: but I was mercifully treated, because I did it ignorantly in unbelief, (14) and there copiously abounded the grace of our Lord with faith and the love that is in (the) Messiah Jesus. (15) Reliable is the word and worthy of all (possible) acceptance, that (the) Messiah Jesus came into the (earthly) world to save sinful persons: of whom I am the most distinguished: but for this object was I pitied, namely that in me chiefly should Jesus (the) Messiah display his complete longsuffering, for a figurative representation to those who would (thereafter) reach everlasting life through their trust in him. (17) To the ruler of the ages (of the world), who is immortal, unseen, the only god, (be) honour and glory for all ages to come. So be it.

(18) This is the exhortation that I entrust as a deposit with you, (my) child Timothy, in accordance with the predictions leading forward to you, that you may serve with

a noble service grounded in them, as you possess faith and a good consciousness, which (consciousness) some have thrust aside (from themselves) and have been shipwrecked in their faith: (20) amongst these are Hymenaeus and Alexander, whom I have resigned to Satan, that they may be schooled not to speak falsely (of any one).

Chapter II.

(1) I give warning therefore first of all that there be made requests, prayers, supplications, and thanksgivings on behalf of all mankind: (2) on behalf of emperors and all those who are in high position, that we may pass an undisturbed and quiet life in all piety and worthy behaviour. (3) This is noble and sure of a good reception in the presence of our preserver (the) god, (4) who desires that all men should be saved and should come into a knowledge of the true way (of salvation). (5) One indeed is God, one also is intermediary between (the) god and men, (namely) a man (the) Messiah Jesus, (6) since he gave himself as a ransom on behalf of all; (this is) the witness (reserved) for its own occasion, (7) to bear which (witness) I was appointed herald and envoy—I am speaking truth, and not lying,—teacher of nations in faith and truth. (8) I would therefore that men (*masc.*) should pray in every place raising holy hands apart from wrath and disputing. (9) Similarly that (married) women should use decorous garb in adorning themselves, with modesty and propriety, not with plaits or a gold ornament or pearls or costly clothing, (10) but—as is becoming to (married) women professing reverence for the god—through good actions. (11) Let a (married) woman learn in silence in entire subordination: (12) teaching I do not entrust to a (married) woman, nor to lord it over (her) husband, but (I would have her) continue in silence. (13) For Adam was first moulded, then Heva: (14) and it was

not Adam who was deceived, but his wife having been completely deceived fell into transgression: (15) but her salvation will come in the bearing of children, if they should remain in faith and love and purification accompanied by self-control: reliable is the word.

Chapter III.

(1) If a man is eager for oversight (of a church), it is a noble occupation he is longing for. (2) The overseer must therefore be irreproachable, faithful to one woman, sober, prudent, modest, a lover of strangers, qualified to teach: (3) not a toper, not a brawler, but mild and reasonable, peaceable, no lover of money: (4) a good leader of his own household, while he has (his) children in subjection, preserving all (his) dignity: (5)—for if a man cannot lead his own household, how shall he attend to a church of (the) god?—(6) not a recent convert, that he may not be beclouded (by pride) and (so) meet with an (evil) judgment by the slanderous person. (7) He must also be well-reported of among the non-Christians, that he may not fall into abuse (of men) and the slanderer's noose. (8) Deacons (must be) similarly worthy (men), not double-tongued, not given to much wine, not avaricious, while they possess the secret of the faith in a clean consciousness. (10) These also however should first be tested, and then only let them serve, if they are irreproachable. (11) (Their) wives should be similarly worthy, not slanderous, (but) sober, faithful in all things. (12) Let deacons be faithful to one woman, good leaders of their children and their own households. (13) Those who have done the duty of deacons well acquire for themselves an honourable position, and much confidence in utterance in (the sphere of) the faith (that is grounded) in (the) Messiah Jesus. (14) This I write to you though I hope to come to you speedily: but, if I am slow to come, in order that you

may know in what way one ought to conduct one's self in (the) household of (the) god, inasmuch as it is (the) assembly of (the) living god, being pillar and foundation of the truth. (16) And admittedly the secret of piety is of great importance:

who was made visible in human nature,
was justified by (his) spirit,
was seen by angels,
was proclaimed among (the) peoples (of the earth),
was believed in the world (of men),
was taken up (and is thus) in (a state of) glory.

Chapter IV.

(1) But the (holy) spirit expressly says, that in the last times some will revolt from the faith, while they give themselves up to misleading spirits and teachings of demons, (2) playing the part of those that speak false things, branded in their own consciousness, (3) seeking to prevent marriage, and counselling abstinence from (certain) foods, which the god created to be partaken of with thanksgiving by those who are faithful having learnt the truth. (4) Because every creation of (the) god is good, and naught to be cast aside, if it be received with thanksgiving: (5) for it is sanctified by a divine word and prayer. (6) If these are the suggestions that you make to the members of the church you will show yourself a good servant of (the) Messiah Jesus, because you nourish yourself on the words in which faith and the good teaching, to which you have attached yourself, express themselves: (7) but shun unspiritual and worthless tales. Exercise yourself with a view to piety: (8) for physical exercise is helpful to a slight extent: but piety is helpful for everything, as it has a promise that belongs to the life that is now and that which will be. (9) Reliable is the word and worthy of entire acceptance: (10) for thus do we toil

and struggle, because we have grounded our hopes in (the) living god, who is preserver of all men, particularly of the faithful. (11) Exhort and teach thus. (12) Let no one think lightly of you because you are young, but show yourself a model to believers in word, in manner of life, in love, in faith, in purity. (13) While I am on my way, attend to the (public) reading (of the scriptures), to exhortation, to teaching. (14) Neglect not the gift in you, which was given you through (solemn repetition of) prophecy with laying on of the hands of the college of presbyters. (15) These things practise, let these things be your sphere, that your advance may be clear to all. (16) Give heed to yourself and the teaching, continue to devote yourself to them : for in doing this you will save both yourself and those who hear you.

Chapter V.

(1) Do not reprove an older man, but exhort (him) as (you would) a father, (and) the younger men as (you would your) brothers, (2) the older women as (you would) mothers, the younger women as (you would) sisters in all chastity. (3) Widows pay honour to, (I mean) those that are really widows. (4) And such as are children or descendants of widows, let them learn first (of all) to teach their own households to live piously and to render the rightful duty to their elder relations : for this is acceptable in (the) god's eyes. (5) But the real widow, who has been left alone, has grounded her hope in the god and keeps to her prayers and supplications night and day : (6) but she that lives wantonly, though she be alive, is (yet) dead. (7) Give this advice, too, that they be irreproachable. (8) But if a man exercises no care for his connexions and especially the members of his own family, he has repudiated the faith and is worse than an unbeliever. (9) Let a widow

be entered in the list (of church widows), if she be not less than sixty years old, faithful to one husband, (10) who has a reputation for good works, if she have reared her children, if she have entertained foreigners, if she have washed (fellow-) Christians' feet, if she have done service to the oppressed, if she have promoted every good work. (11) But younger widows rule out: for when they have exercised all their youthful power against the Messiah, they desire to marry (again), (12) bringing judgment upon themselves, because they have broken their first troth: (13) but besides they are idle and learn (things) by going about (people's) houses, and not only are they idle but they are both gossips and busy-bodies, saying things they ought not. (14) I want, therefore, the younger women to marry, to bear children, to rule (their) households, to give no handle to the opponent (of Christianity) to encourage evil-speaking: (15) for already some have turned aside to follow Satan. (16) Christian women who have widows (in their families) should render them (adequate) help, and let not the church be burdened, so that it may (be free to) give (the required) help to widows who are really solitary. (17) The Elders who govern nobly should be deemed worthy of double honour, especially those who toil in speaking and teaching. (18) For the (passage of) scripture says: *the ox that treads the corn thou shalt not muzzle*, and: worthy is the workman of his pay. (19) Do not admit an accusation against an Elder, unless it be *in presence of two or three witnesses.* (20) [But] those (Elders) who sin reprove before all (the Elders), that the rest too may be afraid. (21) I warn you (solemnly) before the god and (the) Messiah Jesus and the selected angels that you observe this rule without prejudgment, (at the same time) doing nothing according to inclination. (22) Do not hastily lay hands on any man, nor take any share in the sins that belong to another: keep yourself pure. (23) Give up con-

fining your drink to water, and use a little wine by reason of your stomach and your frequent illnesses. (24) Some men's sins unmistakeably lead forward to judgment, but other men are actually dogged by them : (25) similarly both works that are noble are evident, and those that are different cannot be concealed.

Chapter VI.

(1) All that are in subjection, slaves, should regard their own masters as worthy of every kind of honour, that the name of the god and the teaching may not be spoken against. (2) Those who have Christians for masters must cease slighting them, because they are fellow-Christians, and serve them the more, because they that devote themselves to well-doing are Christians and beloved (as such).

This is what you ought to teach, such is the exhortation you ought to give. (3) If a man teaches differently and does not link himself with healthy words, those of our lord Jesus (the) Messiah, and the teaching which is in accord with piety, (4) he has become befogged with pride, although he understands nothing, but is really diseased in his interest in questionings and battles of words, from which spring envy, strife, evil-speakings, evil suspicions, (5) perpetual wranglings of men corrupted in (natural) reason and (in consequence) bereft of (the power of apprehending) the truth, since they regard piety as a means of earning a livelihood. (6) In truth piety, if it be combined with self-sufficiency, is a great means of earning a livelihood : (7) for we have carried nothing into the world, because we cannot carry anything out either : (8) but if we have nourishment and coverings, with these we shall content ourselves. (9) Those who want to be wealthy fall into testing and a snare and many senseless and injurious desires, which drown men in (everlasting) destruction and ruin. (10) For love

of money is a root of all (moral) evils : some in their eagerness for it have wandered away from the faith and have pierced themselves with many pains. (11) But as for you, (the) god's man that you are, flee these things : pursue righteousness, piety, loyalty, love, endurance, meekness. (12) Strive in the noble contest, which is the faith, lay hold of everlasting life, to which you were called and made the noble confession before many witnesses. (13) I command you in the presence of the god who brings all things to life, and of (the) Messiah Jesus who attested the noble confession before Pontius Pilate, (14) that you observe the command, being (yourself) stainless and irreproachable till the appearance of our lord Jesus (the) Messiah, (15) which will at its own season be shown by the happy and only potentate, the king of them that reign and the lord of them that exercise lordship, (16) the only imperishable one, inhabiting unapproachable light, whom no one of men has seen or even can see : to whom be honour and everlasting power : so be it. (17) Command the wealthy—as this world counts wealth—not to be uplifted in mind, nor to fix their hopes on wealth that disappears, but on (the) god who provides for us all things richly for enjoyment, (18) to work what is good, to be wealthy in good works, to be willing to share good things, communicative, (19) storing away for themselves a noble foundation for the future, that they may be able to get hold of the real life. (20) O Timothy, guard the deposit, removing from yourself the irreligious worthless utterances and contradictions of the knowledge falsely-so-called, which some people profess and so far as the faith is concerned have missed the mark.

Grace be with you.

To Timothy, (Letter) II.

Chapter I.

(1) Paul, envoy of (the) Messiah Jesus by will of (the) god in conformity with (the) promise of the life that is (grounded) in (the) Messiah Jesus, (2) to Timothy (my) beloved child: grace, pitiful love, peace from (the) god (the) father and (the) Messiah Jesus our lord.

(3) I feel gratitude to the god, whom I have served from (the days of) my ancestors with undivided consciousness (even) as I keep my memory about you unbroken in my prayers, by night and day (4) longing eagerly to see you,—for I remember your tears,—that I may be filled with joy, —(5) having become reminded of the unfeigned faith that is in you, such as dwelt first within your grandmother Lois and your mother Eunice, and I am quite sure that (it dwells) in you too. (6) For this cause I remind you to fan into flame again the gift (of grace) of the god, which is in you through the laying on of my hands. (7) For it was not a spirit of cowardice that the god gave us, but (a spirit) of power and of love and of self-discipline. (8) Do not therefore be ashamed of the testimony about our lord nor (even) of me his captive, but join with me in being ill-treated for the good news in the power of (the) god, (9) who rescued us and called (us) with a holy calling, not in accordance with our deeds but according to his own plan and favour, which was offered to us in (the) Messiah Jesus before age-long times (began), (10) but was (only) recently made evident through the appearance (on the earth) of our saviour (the) Messiah Jesus, who made death ineffective and shed light upon life and incorruption through the good news, (11) with a view to which I was appointed herald and envoy and teacher: (12) for which cause also I have these experiences but I

am not discomfited, for I know whom it is I have believed, and I am sure that he is able to guard my deposit for that day. (13) See that you possess an outline of the healthy words which you have heard from me in faith and the love that is in (the) Messiah Jesus : (14) guard the noble deposit through (the) holy spirit that dwells within us. (15) You are aware of the fact that all those in Asia have turned away from me, among them Phygelus and Hermogenes. (16) May the lord give mercy to the household of Onesiphorus, for they have often refreshed me and have not been ashamed of my chain, (17) but when they came to Rome they eagerly sought me out and found me :—(18) may the lord grant them to find mercy from (the) lord in that day :—and how great services they rendered to me in Ephesus, you know best.

Chapter II.

(1) As for yourself, however, my child, be strengthened within in the grace that is in (the) Messiah Jesus, (2) and what you have heard from me through many witnesses, these (teachings) deposit with true men, such as will be fit to teach others too. (3) Bear evil treatment along with (others) as becomes a noble soldier of (the) Messiah Jesus. (4) No one on military service allows himself to get entangled in the affairs of ordinary life, (for his object is) to serve him who has enrolled the army. (5) If one, again, contend in the sports, he is not crowned with the garland (of victory) unless he have obeyed the rules of the contest. (6) The husbandman that toils must be the first to receive a share of the produce. (7) Consider (always) what I am saying : the lord will give you understanding in all things. (8) Be mindful of Jesus (the) Messiah raised from among the dead, descended from David, according to my evangel : (9) in (the proclamation of) which I am suffering ill-treatment to the extent of imprisonment as if I were a malefactor.

But the word of the god is not fettered : (10) for this reason I endure anything on account of the selected ones, that they too may attain the salvation that is (grounded) in (the) Messiah Jesus as well as everlasting glory. (11) Reliable is the word : if we have died with him, we shall also live with him : (12) if we endure, we shall also reign with him : if we shall repudiate (him), he also will repudiate us : (even) if we are untrue, He remains true, for he cannot repudiate himself. (14) These truths you must keep in their minds, solemnly protesting in the presence of the god against their battling with words, to no useful end, (but only) to the upsetting of their hearers. (15) Be eager to present yourself to the god (as one) approved, a workman not ashamed (of his work), since he cuts according to the rule the word which tells of the truth (of the gospel). (16) But steer clear of the irreligious vain utterances : for the people who use them will advance most in impiety, (17) and their utterance will eat in like a cancerous sore : among them are Hymenaeus and Philetus, (18) (belonging to the class of men) who in the sphere of the (gospel) truth have missed the goal, saying (as they do) that a rising has taken place already, and they overturn the faith of some. (19) However, the firm foundation (stone) of the god stands fast, having this seal : (*the*) *lord knows them that belong to him*, and 'Let every one who *names the name of the lord* depart from unrighteousness." (20) In a large house there are vessels not only of gold and of silver, but also of wood and of earthenware, and some of them are destined for honourable use, but others for dishonourable : (21) if, therefore, one cleanse himself thoroughly from these (stains), he shall be a vessel destined for honour, set apart for sacred use, serviceble to its owner, prepared for every good work. (22) Shun youthful appetites, and pursue righteousness, faith, love and peace, along with them that call upon the lord with single mind. (23) Foolish and

puerile questionings shun, as you know that they bring about fights : (24) and a slave of the lord should not fight, but be gentle to all, with the power to teach (them), patient under evil, (25) in meekness training those that range themselves against him, lest perchance the god should give them a change of mind that will lead them to a knowledge of (gospel) truth, (26) and they should become sober again (escaping) from the devil's snare, after having been captured alive by him, to work his will.

Chapter III.

(1) And of this you must take knowledge, that in (the) last days hard seasons will come on : (2) for men will be lovers of self, lovers of money, braggarts, haughty, vilifiers, disobedient to parents, ungrateful, unholy, (3) unloving, untrue to their promises, slanderers, incontinent, unbridled, with no love for what is good, (4) traitors, rash, beclouded with passion, lovers of pleasure more than of (the) god, (5) possessing the outward appearance of piety but having repudiated its (real) force : avoid also that sort. (6) For to this class belong the men who enter people's households and take captive weak women loaded with sins, led on by various passions, (7) always learning and yet never able to come to a knowledge of (gospel) truth. (8) And in the same way as Jannes and Jambres opposed Moses, so these also oppose the truth, fellows corrupt in understanding, counterfeit in their faith. (9) But they will not advance farthest : for their lack of understanding will be quite evident to all, just as that of the others also became. (10) But as for you, you were in close touch with my teaching, my manner of life, my plan, my faith, my longsuffering, my love, my endurance, (11) my persecutions, my experiences, such as happened to me in Antioch, in Iconium, in Lystra : such persecutions I endured, and the lord rescued me from

them all! (12) And indeed all who seek to live piously in (the) Messiah Jesus will be persecuted. (13) But wicked men and tricky deceivers will proceed to the limit of evil, leading astray and being led astray. (14) But you must abide in what you have learnt and had full assurance of, as you know from whom you learned, (15) and that from infancy you have known sacred literature, which is able to make you wise for salvation through the faith that is in (the) Messiah Jesus. (16) Every writing inspired by (the) god is also helpful for teaching, for reproof, for setting right again, for training in righteousness, (17) that the man who belongs to the god may be entire, completely prepared for any good work.

Chapter IV.

(1) I solemnly declare in the presence of the god and of (the) Messiah Jesus, who is to judge living and dead, both his appearance and his kingdom: (2) proclaim the word, press forward in season and out of season, reprove, rebuke, warn, with every manifestation of longsuffering and teaching. (3) For a season will come when men will not endure the healthy teaching, but will heap up for themselves teachers in accordance with their own passions, being all agog to hear (new things), (4) and will turn away their hearing from the truth, and will turn aside to the fables. (5) But for yourself, be sober in every relation, endure evil treatment, do the work of a missionary, perform your service completely. (6) For I am already being poured out as a drink-offering, and the season of my dissolution has begun. (7) I have fought in the noble contest, I have completed the course, I have kept loyal: (8) furthermore there is stored for me the garland of righteousness, which the lord will give over to me in that day, the just judge, and not only to me but also to all that have loved his appearing.

(9) Make an effort to come to me speedily: (10) for Demas has abandoned me because he has taken a fancy to the present age, and he has travelled to Thessalonica: Crescens (has gone) to Galatia, Titus to Dalmatia: (11) Luke is the only one with me. Pick up Mark and bring him with you: for he is very useful to me for service. (12) Tychicus I sent away to Ephesus. (13) The cloak I left behind at Troas in Carpus' house, bring when you come, and the papyrus rolls, but especially the parchments. (14) Alexander, I mean the armourer, has meted out much ill-treatment to me: *the lord will render* to him *according to his doings*: (15) you beware of him too: for he has been greatly opposed to our words. (16) At my first defence no one stood by my side, but all abandoned me: may it not be reckoned up against them: (17) but the lord came and stood by me and put power into me, that through me the proclamation should be fully made, and that all the nations should hear, and I was rescued *from a lion's mouth*. (18) The lord will rescue me from every evil deed and will save me for his heavenly kingdom: to him be glory for ages upon ages, so may it be.

(19) Greet Prisca and Aquila and the household of Onesiphorus. (20) Erastus remained in Corinth, but Trophimus I left behind in Miletus ill. (21) Exert yourself to come before winter. Eubulus greets you, and so do Pudens and Linus and Claudia and in fact [all] the Christians.

(22) The lord be with thy spirit. Grace be with you (all).

Translated by Alex. Souter.

THE SANITY OF THE "ESCHATOLOGICAL" JESUS.

II. The Alienists and the Sources.

De Loosten, Hirsch and Binet-Sanglé undertake to deal with the pathography of Jesus without ever putting themselves in touch with the critical study of His life from the point of view of the historian. Alike in their choice of sources and in the use which they make of them they are completely uncritical. It is therefore necessary, before entering upon a psychiatric discussion of their works, to supply that which they have omitted. We shall therefore give a brief account of the results of the criticism of the sources and of the critical study of the life of Jesus.

As regards the sources, the first thing to be remarked is that the Talmud and the non-canonical Gospels—the latter mainly concerned with the elaboration of the stories of the Infancy—have simply to be eliminated.[1]

The Fourth Gospel too must be left out of account. The Jesus there depicted is, as criticism since Strauss has more and more clearly recognised, in the main a freely created figure, intended to supplement, or to supersede, the portrait of the first three Gospels, in the sense that, in contradistinction to these, the Fourth Gospel attributes to Him a way of thought and manner of teaching adapted to Greek taste and understanding.[2] The Jesus of the Fourth Gospel is con-

[1] De Loosten gives credence to the legendary statement, resting on Talmudic and heathen sources—Celsus in the second century—that Jesus was an illegitimate child, the son of the Roman legionary Panthera, and concludes therefrom that we have to do with "The offspring of mixed races, bearing a hereditary taint, a congenital degenerate" (pp. 16–21, 90). Binet-Sanglé is in the choice of sources still less critical than De Loosten. He treats long-exploded forgeries like the so-called "Acts of Pilate" as entitled to belief.

[2] That the historicity of the Fourth Gospel still finds defenders proves nothing, in face of the facts which lie clearly before the eyes of every critical investigator.

scious of being, in accordance with Greek doctrines, the Incarnation of the eternal Spirit of God (Logos), and expresses this by hints and allusions which must have appeared, and are intended by the Fourth Evangelist to appear, pure enigmas to His Jewish hearers. Further, He deals, in long discourses, with the Sacraments—Baptism and the Eucharist —which were only to become real, charged with energy by the Spirit, after His death. In the conduct and utterances of a personality created by literary invention on these principles there naturally appears much that is peculiar, unnatural, artificial, which consequently attracts the attention of the pathographers and is interpreted from their point of view as morbid.

Three-quarters of the material used in the studies of De Loosten, Binet-Sanglé and Hirsch are drawn from the Fourth Gospel.[1]

The Gospel of Luke is in the main in accord with those of Mark and Matthew. Where it goes beyond them the material is dubious, and as it is moreover of little significance for an estimate of the personality of Jesus it may be left out of account. In particular it should be mentioned that the story—peculiar to Luke—of the twelve-year-old Jesus in the Temple (ii. 41–52) cannot, for a variety of reasons, be historical.

The stories of the Birth and Infancy in Matthew (i. and ii.) also belong to legend, not to history.

There remain, therefore, as sources which can be used, the Gospel of Matthew—with the exception of the first two chapters—and that of Mark. In their main outlines they agree with one another. Matthew is fuller than Mark by virtue of very valuable discourses which he alone has preserved.[2] Both Gospels doubtless came into being between

[1] The discourses in Matthew xxiv. and Mark xiii. do not belong to the original elements of the Gospels. [2] See previous note.

70 and 90 A.D. But they are based, it may be safely assumed, upon earlier materials. Their narratives are in general trustworthy, though here and there later misunderstandings and obscurations of the tradition are to be observed. The exactness of certain details is astonishing.

About Jesus' earlier life we know very little. He sprang from a carpenter's family in Nazareth and had Himself worked as a craftsman. He does not seem to have studied specially with a view to becoming a teacher. When later He came forward as a prophet in the town where His family lived, the inhabitants wondered at the wisdom of one whom they had known only as a carpenter (Mark vi. 1–5). It is, however, possible that prior to His public appearance He had resided elsewhere for a time. His knowledge of the Scriptures may have been acquired from the lessons read on the Sabbath.

Four brothers are mentioned and several sisters (Mark vi. 3, iii. 31). What was His place in order of age, we are not told.

That on the father's side Jesus' family traced its descent to David may be taken as established, and is in no way surprising. There were members of the royal house among those who in the time of Cyrus returned from the Babylonian captivity. The earliest party of returning exiles was led by Zerubbabel, a descendant of David, who in the earlier days of the return played an important political rôle (Ez. iii. 8, Zech. iv. 6–7, Hag. i. 12–15). When the blind man in the streets of Jericho hails Jesus as the "Son of David" (Mark x. 47, 48), and the people, at the Entry into Jerusalem, cry "Hosanna to the Son of David" (Matt. xxi. 9), this agrees with the evidence of Paul, who in the Epistle to the Romans (i. 3), perhaps three decades after the death of Jesus, takes for granted His descent from the royal house as a thing well known.

In regard to the outward appearance and physique of Jesus we know nothing.

The first two Gospels do not offer a complete account of the Life of Jesus, but simply give narratives of His public ministry. This lasted at most one year. It concludes with a journey up to Jerusalem, to the Passover. Had another Passover fallen within the public ministry of Jesus, He must needs have made the pilgrimage to the capital in fulfilment of His religious duties as required by the Law (Deut. xvi. 16). Had He failed to do this, His opponents would have been justified in charging Him with laxity in the observance of the ordinances of the law, and they would certainly not have forborne to do so, since it was their endeavour to undermine His authority by every means in their power. Since the two earliest Gospels say nothing either of a journey to the Passover during Jesus' public ministry or of any controversy about Jesus' neglect of this ordinance, it is to be assumed that no Passover took place within this period.

How long Jesus remained among the followers of John the Baptist we do not know. When the latter was thrown into prison, He came into Galilee, preaching the same message as the prophet had proclaimed at Jordan, "The Kingdom of God is at hand." To this declaration was added a call to repentance (Mark i. 14–15).

This message remained the same from the first to the last day of His ministry. The "Kingdom of God," which is also called the "Kingdom of the Heavens," is synonymous with the "Messianic Kingdom." The announcement of its nearness implies that the end of the world is at hand. The Kingdom of God is thought of as a supernatural Age which was to begin after the close of the natural one. This present Age is characterised by the fact that the evil angels have usurped the rulership of the world. That is the explana-

tion of the evil and the imperfection of the present state of things. Sickness and death are also consequences of it. In the moment when God makes an end of this usurped authority, imperfection shall give place to perfection and evil to good. The earth also will undergo a glorious change, and a new fruitfulness will replace the old. In the same moment, death will lose its dominion. The generations which rest in the grave shall arise, and, with the living, shall be brought before the throne of God. Then the wicked and non-elect shall be given over to eternal torment, while the elect shall enter upon a condition of angelic existence, shall begin a blessed life of endless duration, and shall be gathered together to the Messianic feast. According to most representations, the Messiah will preside at this judgment.

There was no need for Jesus to describe these future events more particularly. His hearers knew what was meant the moment the words "The Kingdom of God is at hand" were uttered. The particulars were known from the prophets and the "Apocalypses" (revelations). Of the latter, the most important is that ascribed, by a literary fiction, to Enoch, which in its main portions dates from the beginning of the first century B.C. This exercised a very strong influence upon the conceptions of Jesus. Along with it, the Book of Daniel, dating from 165 B.C., and already clearly manifesting an apocalyptic character, calls for special notice.

Another point which was fully determined for the hearers of Jesus by the existing literature was that the final period of the present Age should be filled with terrible wars and unheard of tribulations for mankind. The Rabbis called this period the "Woes of the Messiah."

This gives us the content of the preaching of Jesus. He proclaims the nearness of the Kingdom and the Judgment.

At the same time He explains the nature of the repentance and the ethic which are necessary to secure justification at the Judgment, and reminds His hearers of the tribulations which still await them. Those who are elected to the Kingdom of God must prove themselves in this tribulation. He who under stress of persecution apostatises, is lost ; he who will save his earthly life shall lose the eternal life. For Himself, Jesus looks forward to suffering, in this tribulation, much ignominy and persecution, and adjures His followers not to doubt Him, and in spite of all to avow their allegiance to Him (Mark viii. 34–ix. 1).

Incidentally it is to be remarked that in the late Jewish expectations, an earlier, prophetic, and a later, apocalyptic, mode of thought go side by side. According to the former there is a distinction between the Messianic Kingdom and the glorious final condition of the world which follows later ; according to the apocalyptic view, which Jesus shares, the two coincide.

Some importance attaches to the differences in the conception held, in the one case and in the other, of the Ruler of the Future Age. According to the prophetic view, he is to be a scion of the House of David, who at that time shall be endowed by God with supernatural power and wisdom and anointed King of Glory. Hence he is called the Messiah (Anointed). In the Book of Daniel the view is taken that there is no longer a ruling Davidic family, from which a ruler could be raised up to be Messiah. The author therefore expects that God will confer the supreme power in the coming world-age on an angelic Being who possesses human form and has the appearance of a " son of man " (Dan. viii. 13–14).

In the later Apocalypses, even in the Apocalypse of Enoch, the " Son of Man " is identified with the Messiah, although originally the two had nothing to do with one another. Out

of this identification arises a very curious problem. The Son of Man is an Angelic Being who has no human ancestry. How then can he be at the same time the " Messiah " who must be sprung, by natural birth, from David's line ? The contemporary Rabbinic scholarship did not, so far as we know, pronounce upon this question, doubtless because to do so would have been to reveal the inner cleavage in the expectations of the future. Jesus, on the other hand, did deal with it. His solution of it is important because it gives us a clue to the train of thought out of which the belief that He was the appointed Messiah arose.

To forestall a misunderstanding which might readily arise, it should be remarked that Jesus did not hold that He, as a natural man, in His own lifetime, was the Messiah or Son of Man. His conviction is that He is destined to this office, and will be manifested therein at the end of the world. This is the meaning of His assertion before His judges. After assenting to the High Priest's question whether He held Himself to be the Messiah, He adds, " Ye shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of Power (= God) and coming with the clouds of heaven " (Mark xiv. 62). So long as the natural course of the world continues, the Messiah can no more be present than can the Kingdom of God.

Jesus did not allow the conviction that He was destined to be the Messiah who was to come to enter into the substance of His preaching. This is one of the most assured results of modern critical investigation. He points to the imminent coming of the Son of Man, but always speaks of Him in the third person, so that none of His hearers would be likely to think that He Himself expected to fill this office. For the people, He remained to the very last the Prophet of Nazareth. It was as such, not as the Messiah, that He received the ovation at His entry into Jerusalem. Even the Pharisees and scribes who disputed with Him during the

last days had no suspicion of His claims ; otherwise they would certainly have referred to them. It is to be noted that at His trial the High Priest can summon no witnesses who can testify to Messianic claims on the part of Jesus.

Only the disciples have any knowledge of His secret. And even they are only made acquainted with it a few weeks before His death. He reveals it to them at the time when He is preparing to go up to Jerusalem (Mark viii. 27–30). One of them, Judas, betrayed it to the Sanhedrin. In consequence of this information Jesus was arrested on the evening of the day before the Paschal Lamb was eaten, or perhaps on the evening of the Passover itself, and on the same night, in defiance of the regulations for trials on capital charges, He was condemned, and was at once crucified. As the High Priest had only one witness to support this accusation,[1] and as, according to Jewish law, at least two witnesses were necessary to secure a conviction, everything depended on whether Jesus would admit the charge or no. He could have saved Himself by silence. But He would not do so, since He had come to Jerusalem with the fixed intention of dying, and had even revealed this to His disciples (Mark viii. 31, ix. 31).

He holds the conviction that His death has the significance of an expiation (Mark x. 45), in consequence of which God will spare men the universal tribulation which was to precede the Messianic Kingdom, and He expects that He, whether in the moment of His death or on the third day after, will enter on a supernatural mode of existence, receive the Messianic dignity, and bring in the end of the world, the judgment and the Messianic Kingdom. It is in this sense that the disciples understand His hints, and they quarrel on the way to Jerusalem as to which of them is destined to the highest office under Him (Mark iv. 33–44, x. 35–45).

[1] Judas is meant—Translator.

It is further to be remarked that Jesus was not working publicly during the whole of the period of months between His first appearance and His death. After He had been proclaiming for a time the nearness of the Kingdom of God, He believed, probably about harvest time, that the expected moment was come, and sent out His disciples two and two to bear the news to the various districts of Israel. In sending them forth He declares to them in a discourse of deep significance (Matt. x.) that the great tribulation will immediately begin. At the same time He holds out to them the prospect that the appearance of the Son of Man will take place before they have even had time to carry out His commission (Matt. x. 23). He expects, therefore, in the course of the tribulation, while they are away from Him, that He will be transformed into the Messiah.

When they returned to Him without His expectations having been fulfilled, he retired with them to heathen territory. In the flood-tide of success He left the multitudes who had gathered round Him in order to await along with Him the dawning of the Kingdom of God, and passed the remainder of the period before His departure for Jerusalem—that is autumn and winter—in heathen territory, in the districts of Tyre and Sidon and of Caesarea Philippi, without preaching, and only concerned to remain unrecognised. During this time He explained to Himself the delay of the tribulation and of the Kingdom of God as meaning that He, as the Messiah who was to come, was destined to suffer and die for others. The factors which determined the shaping of this thought were probably the death of John the Baptist, which falls in the time after the sending out of the disciples—Jesus recognising in him the Elias who was prophesied as coming in the last days (Mal. iv. 5, 6, Matt. xi. 13–15, Mark ix. 11–13)—and the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah which tells of the Servant of the Lord who suffers for the sins of His people.

Does the sketch which has just been given—with the numerous details which could not here find place—give ground for the conclusions which De Loosten, Hirsch and Binet-Sanglé have brought forward ?

In our introductory remarks we have already explained the reasons which must here make us extremely sceptical. We shall nevertheless consider carefully the essential points in these writings, in order that the matter may be made quite clear.

Even from the above brief account of the sources of the preaching of Jesus and the course of the public ministry, it may be inferred how much of the material used by De Loosten, Hirsch and Binet-Sanglé disappears when we subtract what Historical Criticism pronounces unsound.

All that they tell us about the childhood and youth of Jesus, about His disposition and development, is without claim to validity. The Lucan story of the twelve-year-old Jesus remaining behind in the Temple which has given the pathographers so much concern, and in which Binet-Sanglé indeed proposes to see the report of a " hebephrenic crisis " [mental disturbance connected with the period of pubescence], must be left out of account. The exclusion of the Fourth Gospel is of great moment. It was this source alone which allowed the pathographers to assume that we could trace the development of the mental condition of Jesus throughout a period of three years ; it alone enabled them to depict Him as one who is constantly preoccupied with His own ego, who places it in the forefront of His discourses, asserts His Divine origin and demands a corresponding faith from His hearers.[1]

[1] Moreover, what De Loosten and Binet-Sanglé allege with reference to " delusions of persecution " and causeless fits of irritation is taken from the Fourth Gospel only. In the same way what Hirsch, depending on John xii. 28, 29, cites as an illusion of Jesus, is explained by an understanding of the nature of the source. The ornate and unnatural mode of speech to which Binet-Sanglé refers is only found in the Fourth Gospel.

In consequence of the fact that these three pathographers fuse together the Johannine account with that of the earlier Gospels—in which Jesus does not speak about Himself and His office—they arrive at the view that He sometimes gave Himself out to be the Messiah, sometimes showed reserve in His utterances ; and they consequently explain this concealment on the analogy of similar conduct which may be observed in paranoiic subjects.

On the numerous and in some cases gross misunderstandings which result from De Loosten's, Hirsch's and Binet-Sanglé's unfamiliarity with the world of late Jewish apocalyptic ideas, and with the results of criticism, it is impossible to enter at length.

In attempting to estimate from a psychiatric point of view the value of the writings of these authors, we must once more insist upon the peculiar difficulties which any attempt at a " diagnosis " has here to encounter.[1]

Since the form and manner in which a delusion manifests itself is for purposes of diagnosis much more important than its content, it is at once apparent that biographical material can only be used with very great caution. The majority of the accompanying " symptoms " are, as a rule, not recorded ; only the actual utterances are likely to be so. If, therefore, conclusions of the nature of a diagnosis are drawn from such

[1] It is to be noticed that De Loosten and Binet-Sanglé attach great importance to contemporary statements with regard to the mental condition of Jesus. They appeal to the fact that His Pharisaic opponents asserted that He was " possessed " (Mark iii. 22), and that His family wished to take Him home from Capernaum to Nazareth as being " beside Himself " (Mark iii. 21). That only means, however, that the former wished at all costs to discredit Him with the people, and that His relatives noticed a change in Him, and could not understand how He could come forward as a teacher and prophet. For modern psychiatry, these lay judgments out of the past are of no importance. Moreover, it must be clearly kept in view that the Pharisees, and the family of Jesus, did not in any case assert that He was beside Himself because He claimed to be the Messiah, since they knew nothing of any such claim.

material, they are necessarily in most cases of a very hypothetical character.

When, for example, Binet-Sanglé, Hirsch and De Loosten assert that Jesus, during the forty days in the wilderness, was the subject of numerous hallucinations, this is merely—assuming in the first place that this sojourn in the wilderness is historical—a quite vague hypothesis, which nevertheless is used to enable them to establish a hallucinatory phase in the development of the mental state.

And even in the interpretation of actual historical utterances the explanation easily becomes arbitrary. Thus, for example, the psychological explanation which Binet-Sanglé gives of the genesis of the hallucinations of Jesus which he alleges, has a thoroughly artificial air. To assign with certainty the mode of origin of sense-illusions even in the case of a living patient would require repeated and prolonged personal examination.

The circumstances in the case with which we have to do are further complicated by the fact that in the opinion of the three writers the "clinical picture"[1] is of a paranoid character.

Now the "paranoia question" is admittedly one of the most difficult problems of modern psychiatry, and it is still far from being solved. It may, however, here be emphasised that the controversy about the nature of paranoia is to no small extent at the present time a dispute about words. A great number of forms of paranoid diseases are sufficiently known as regards the course which they run to enable those whose concern is with the thing, not with the name, to discuss usefully the diagnosis of a particular form.[2]

[1] *Krankheitsbild*, a technicality for the phenomena on which a diagnosis is founded.

[2] R. Defendorf, in his *Clinical Psychiatry* (New York, 1902), which is adapted from Kraepelin's *Lehrbuch der Psychiatrie*, writes, "The pro-

Binet-Sanglé gives the diagnosis: religious paranoia. From the general discussions, resembling fragments of a psychiatric manual, which he has incorporated in his pathographic study, it may be gathered that he distinguishes three phases, as Magnan does in his *délire chronique à évolution systématique.*

Hirsch seems to have in view a similar form. He dispenses himself, however, from giving a detailed characterisation, and takes for granted, without more ado, " the well-known paranoia."

De Loosten lays less emphasis on the sensory illusions and gives more weight to the physiologically conditioned element of genius in Jesus than do the other authors.

It is not the purpose of the present study to pronounce for or against the existence of a particular form of mental disease in Jesus—to discuss, that is, a clinical diagnosis. Our task is simply to take the main symptoms which the three authors use as the basis of their diagnosis and examine them in respect of their historical authenticity; and supposing them to be authentic, to determine their clinical importance. We shall therefore discuss separately the various alleged symptoms: (1) delusional ideas; (2) sensory illusions; (3) emotional attitude; (4) other characteristics.[1]

Before we enter upon the discussion of the gradual formation of delusions which the three authors assume in the case of Jesus, it should be clearly stated that the supposition

gressive and uniform systematisation of the delusions without marked mental deterioration constitutes *paranoia* in the strict sense of the word " (p. 39). For a brief discussion of the usage of the term see M. Craig's *Psychological Medicine* (Lond., 1912), p. 142 f.—TRANSLATOR.

[1] De Loosten's views are attacked by Dr. H. Schäfer, *Jesus in Psychiatrischer Beleuchtung*, Berlin, 1910, 178 pp. His command of the historical material is no better than that of his opponent.

For the sake of completeness we may cite the refutations written by non-medical authors: Philipp Kneib, *Moderne Leben-Jesu-Forschung unter dem Einflusse der Psychiatrie* (Mainz, 1908, 76 pp.); Hermann Werner, *Die Psychische Gesundheit Jesu* (Gross-Lichterfelde, 1908, 64 pp.).

that it was a case of acquired mental disease has *a priori* little probability in its favour.

Binet-Sanglé cites a whole series of clinical observations of patients suffering from religious paranoia accompanied by hallucinations falling within the sphere of all the different senses, and refers to the frequency of these cases, which are familiar to every alienist. He forgets, however, that the cases of *délire chronique à évolution systématique* which resemble the *dementia praecox* of Kraepelin are usually placed in confinement soon after the appearance of the malady; and that these forms of the disease are precisely not those found in subjects who gain adherents and disciples and become founders of sects. In the former the frequency of hallucinations, the catatonic symptoms [1] in the widest sense of the word (autism), the influence of " dissociation," [2] make these patients incapable of coherent action. If motor self-expressional activity takes place it does not usually correspond to the content of the delusion-ridden consciousness. It is a well-known fact that patients suffering from " delusion of persecution," and more particularly from the delusion of physical persecution, discharge the duties of their ordinary occupation for years together and only in the rarest cases draw the practical inference from their hallucinations and delusions in the sense of attempting to defend themselves—whether by legal or illegal means—against their supposed persecutors. If they momentarily do so,

[1] Absence of voluntative control of motor activities seems to be the chief characteristic of catatonic states. Kraepelin recognises two forms, " catatonic excitement," with spasmodic movement, and " catatonic stupor," with contra-voluntary inhibition of movement. The term which Schweitzer adds in brackets, *Autismus*, is not recognised by any of the authorities that I have been able to consult. As the work appeared after the author's departure, it is just possible there is a misprint (? Mutism, ? Automatism).—TRANSLATOR.

[2] Solution of continuity of consciousness. An extreme form is " multiple personality."—TRANSLATOR.

it is in consequence of a condition of excitement, and therefore not in virtue of a conscious train of logical reasoning. Those sufferers from this delusion who actually and permanently defend themselves—the *persécutés persécuteurs* of the French alienists—belong to the group of congenital psychopaths and are not sufferers from an acquired mental disease.

In examining what these authors have to say about the formation of delusions in Jesus, the origin of the delusion is to be separated from its further development.

De Loosten assumes a slow development. " Jesus' self-consciousness," he writes, " became intensified, by a gradual development, till it grew into a fixed system of delusions."

The first impulse to the externalisation of His ideas was communicated to Him by the appearing of John the Baptist.

Hirsch takes the view that it was a case in which the delusions were present at first without external stimulus in an undeveloped form, and that it needed an impulse from without, accompanied by strong emotion, to cause them to crystallise into a system of delusion having the character of paranoia.

Binet-Sanglé maintains that the primary delusion *idée fixe primordiale*) arose *ex abrupto* without preceding reflexion.

What the content of this primary delusion was, none of our three authors definitely informs us. From what they say elsewhere it may be inferred that the belief of Jesus that He Himself was the Messiah constituted the primary delusion.

As regards the manner of its arising, to which reference has been made, it cannot be proved with any cogency, since we have no information about the period preceding the public appearance of Jesus. As, moreover, De Loosten and Hirsch do not further define the form of paranoia which they have in view, it is impossible to discuss the manner in which they hold it to have arisen.

Binet-Sanglé, by assuming that the primary delusion arose

ex abrupto, asserts a genesis which is not usual in the form of disease which he diagnoses. Usually in the first period, which Binet-Sanglé frequently confuses with the second period—that marked by hallucinations—there arises a strong "delusion of reference" (*délire d'interprétation*). The delusion at first develops gradually and always bears the charater of a "delusion of persecution"; which is absolutely incompatible with the Messianic idea.

In another passage, again, Binet-Sanglé insists that it was by the suggestive influence of various events, through John the Baptist, through His own miraculous cures, through the admiration of those whom he had healed, and through the enthusiasm of His disciples that Jesus was led to hold Himself to be the Messiah. Here, therefore, he attempts a psychological explanation.[1]

As regards the further progress of the formation of the delusions, the so-called "systematisation," all these authors assert a development of the delusion characterised by an "expansive" tendency.[2] Binet-Sanglé gives to the chapters referring to this point titles conveying an ascending order of dignity: "Le Messie Roi"; "Le fils de Dieu"; "Confident, Interprète, Agent de Dieu"; "Jésus Dieu."

De Loosten emphatically asserts that Jesus, advancing step by step, ended by bringing into relation with His own Person all the promises of Scripture and their final glorious fulfilment.

[1] In exactly the same way he seeks to explain the hallucinations also by a whole series of physiological and psychological motives, whereas according to his own diagnosis these ought surely to be considered as primary phenomena of self-stimulation arising in the course of the *délire chronique*, and therefore having their origin in the progress of the disease.

[2] Hirsch and De Loosten speak of a "delusion of reference" which here comes into play, in the sense that Jesus refers the Messianic passages in the Prophets to Himself. But a sound historical estimate of His point of view makes this interpretation of the Old Testament passages, so far as it can be established in the case of Jesus, a thoroughly normal psychological product which gives no justification for speaking of "delusion of reference."

Hirsch writes that after the forty days in the wilderness the delusions, which had hitherto been isolated and unconnected, united to form a great systematic structure of delusion, and holds that at this period, to the accompaniment of numerous and constant sensory hallucinations, Jesus passed from the latent to the active stage of paranoia. In another passage he speaks of megalomania, gradually developing and finally becoming intensified to an infinite degree.

Now with reference to this development, which the three authors assume to have taken place, it should be noted that De Loosten represents it as advancing at a uniform rate of progression, whereas Binet-Sanglé and Hirsch regard the forty days in the wilderness as a latent stage, and assume that the later development takes its start from this. Of a stage marked by the delusion of being subjected to detraction and persecution, which experience shows to be characteristic of the earliest phase, neither of these authors has anything to tell us. Binet-Sanglé is alone in mentioning the hallucinations of appearances of the Devil in the wilderness, which are not exclusively of an " expansive " character.

Supposing the assertions made by the three authors to be tenable, we should have here a case of the rare phenomenon of a one-sided development of megalomania. It is, of course, well known that sufferers from mental diseases can be the subjects for long periods of delusions of an expansive character,[1] but in this case progressivity is absent, and, in particular there is then no question of that *évolution systématique* which the three authors seem to have in view.

ALBERT SCHWEITZER.

Translated by W. Montgomery.

[1] Cf., for the expansive form of paraphrenia, E. Kraepelin's " Zur Paranoiafrage " in the *Zeitschrift für die gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie* for September, 1912.

SOME NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF THE SYRIAC NEW TESTAMENT.

It is well known to scholars that the history of the versions of the New Testament is beset with obscurities of all kinds: it is rare, in the case of the greater versions, to find either geographical or historical landmarks; to this day we are not able to say positively in what century the Latin Bible was first produced, nor in what part of the Roman Empire the New Testament found its first Latin readers: nor can we say what books of the New Testament had precedence in translation, nor whether the Old Testament had precedence of the New. In the same way we meet with perplexity with regard to the Syriac Bible: one venerable and beautiful version of the New Testament has been commonly supposed to belong to the second century, and upon this unverified (and probably unverifiable) supposition much incorrect reasoning has been based, with regard to the original form and development of the text itself. Examination shows that the text in question is not the translation of a single hand, and that behind the so-called Peshito (or Vulgate) version there loom up the spectral forms of earlier versions, or at least of variant versions which are claimed as prior; in particular, one sees for the Gospels the towering figure of the lost Harmony or Diatessaron of Tatian, which is regarded in some quarters as the *fons et origo* of all the Syriac gospels. It will be seen that with all this variety of form, and uncertainty as to the times of production, the Syriac version presents problems to the scholar of unusual intricacy and obscurity. There is, however, no reason to regard these questions as insoluble and intractable. They are already beginning to yield to treatment; fresh documentary evidence on the one hand,

and further acquaintance with the Syriac language and literature, point to conclusions which, if not as yet absolutely certain, are in the region of the larger probabilities.

We may, for instance, regard it as highly probable that the Syriac Church was cradled under Jewish influences, and it is possible to demonstrate that the Old Testament was prior, in translation, to the New, by the simple method of showing the traces of the language of the Syriac Old Testament in the text of the New. It is an interesting study, and one which has not been adequately treated in England, nor perhaps in Germany; probably a re-statement of the matter might be made with advantage before long.

The question of the chronological position of the Peshito, for long the battleground of opposing schools in textual criticism, has been greatly advanced in recent years by Professor Burkitt's investigations, which have rendered it highly probable, on the one hand, that St. Ephrem, the great Syrian father, who died in 373, was unacquainted with the Peshito version, and, on the other hand, have brought to light the fact that a version of the New Testament was made by the Syrian father, Rabbula, in the early part of the fifth century, according to the biography of that father preserved in the Syrian Church. It stands to reason that if Ephrem never certainly quotes the Peshito in his voluminous writings, the Peshito did not exist in his day; and if one of the leading ecclesiastics in the period immediately following St. Ephrem's death is credited with a Syriac version of the New Testament, we must admit the probability that the Peshito, which even in MS. form goes back nearly to the time of Rabbula, was actually the result of that father's energy or origination. It is, therefore, commonly held that we should refer the Peshito to the beginning of the fifth century: this means that there were early versions which preceded it, known comprehensively

under the title of Old Syriac, according to the nomenclature of Hort, whose insight would be, in this regard, abundantly justified. What is not clear is the period to which these first versions (or this prior version) should be referred. The question whether it belongs to the second century is not finally closed, nor the connected question, whether it should be regarded as subsequent to the Diatessaron of Tatian (say 165 A.D.), or anterior to it. On these points further investigation is much to be desired.

In the present paper, I desire to point out one or two directions in which the desired inquiry can be pressed forward, and fresh facts can be brought out as the fuel for the flame of fresh inquiry.

In the commentary of the Syrian father, Isho'dad, upon the Pauline Epistles, I find at the close of the epistle to the Romans the following subscription:

"Mar Koumi translated this epistle from Greek into Syriac, for Mari the presbyter, with the help of Daniel the Presbyter, the Indian. Here end the Commentaries on the Epistle to the Romans." It is clear that Mar Koumi was attached in some way to Mari and worked with or for him.

It is evident that this note has been taken by Isho'dad from the text upon which he is commenting, and it becomes at once an important question as to the character of the text commented upon, and as to the personality to whom the translation is referred.

An examination of the quoted part of the text in Isho'dad will, I think, show that the text is, with hardly any sensible variation, the Peshito. In the first eight chapters of Romans, the only important variant was in Romans v. 20, where Isho'dad's text has—

"The law entered into the midst" (παρεισῆλθεν), where the Peshita has—

"The entrance which occurred to the law."

Setting this aside as a possible variant, and neglecting one or two microscopic changes, we are entitled to say that the text is that of the Peshito.

Who then is Mar Koumi who is credited with the translation? Can we identify him, locate him, determine his date?

The first thing that we find out is that Mar Koumi is one of a celebrated group of scholars and translators in the Syrian Church.

In Duval's *Littérature Syriaque* (p. 87) we are told that the works of Theodore of Mopsuestia were translated in the fifth century, soon after his death, at the School of Edessa, by Ibas and his disciples—Koumi, Probus and Mana. On referring to p. 254 we find that Duval is deriving his information in part from Ebedjesu's Catalogue of Syriac writers, for he, Ebedjesu, tells us that at the celebrated School of the Persians, at Edessa, the Syrians began in the fifth century to teach the Peripatetic philosophy. It was here that Ibas, Koumi and Probus translated the writings of Theodore and the works of Aristotle.

Bar Hebraeus says that the translation of Aristotle was due to Mana, whom he calls Magna : [1] and it is quite likely that he is correct in the reference. However that may be, it is clear that the Koumi, who is referred to in the commentary of Isho'dad, is to be found in the Persian School at Edessa, in the fifth century, at the time when that school was in its greatest splendour and activity, and when the work of translation of the most admired Greek writers was being carried on with surprising zeal and fidelity. Somewhere in this period there occurred the translation of the Epistle to the Romans into what we call the Peshito version, and it remains to be seen whether we can define the time of the translation more exactly. The only alternative

[1] Bar Hebraeus, *Chron.*, ii 55.

for this reference of the Peshito text of Romans to Koumi would appear to be the supposition that Koumi translated, not the Epistle to the Romans itself, but the Commentary of Theodore upon the Epistle to the Romans, including such parts of the text as were embedded in the Commentary. The alternative needs to be carefully examined, in view of the facts that we trace Koumi to the Persian School of Edessa at a time when the translation of the works of Theodore was being undertaken, and that Isho'dad undoubtedly draws heavily on that translation. We have in fact to decide between two conclusions :

(1) That Koumi was the original translator of the Epistle to the Romans as we find it in the Peshito version : or

(2) that Koumi translated the Commentary of Theodore of Mopsuestia upon the Romans, in the course of which he replaced the involved text by the equivalent from the (already existing) Peshito version. This translation fell into the hands of Isho'dad.

Now let us see whether we can get any further light on Koumi, the supposed translator of the epistle. From Isho'dad we learn that he had relations with Mari : apparently it was for Mari, and under his direction, that he translated the epistle. When we ask who Mari was, the answer is that he is well known in Syriac tradition, as Mari of Ardashir. That is, he is a well-known Syrian bishop of the fifth century. At the time when Koumi is translating for him, he is a presbyter, so that we place the translation before the episcopate of Mari at Ardashir. He is best known as a correspondent of Ibas, doctor of the Persian School at Edessa, at a critical moment in the development of the strife between the Monophysite and Nestorian parties in the Syrian Church. In a letter from Ibas to Mari, in which he describes the persecution which he, as a Nestorian, had suffered at the hands of his fanatic opponent, Rabbula,

there was said to have been contained a compromising statement in which Ibas had gone far beyond the Nestorian objection to calling the Virgin Mary by the name of Mother of God, and had said that he would not object to calling Christ God, since he could himself adopt a similar title. Whatever Ibas said, or meant, the perverse quotation stuck to him ; he tried to maintain that the letter had been interpolated ; in so doing he admitted the authorship and did not convince his enemies of the interpolation.[1]

It will be seen that our friend Koumi, into whose history we are examining, was a member of the circle of scholars at Edessa, and in close touch with the Nestorian movement. This seems to throw him out of sympathy with Rabbula, to whom Professor Burkitt refers the translation and official revision, which we call the Peshito. Perhaps, however, the gulf was not yet so wide, nor so finally bridgeless, that Koumi could not have been one of the translators of the Peshito. Even in the heat of the great controversy which split the Eastern Church, there were moments of peace and intervals of reconciliation. If it had not been so, it would be almost an impossibility that the Peshito should have become the accepted Biblical tradition in both wings of the Church : indeed the strongest objection to Professor Burkitt's argument for placing the Peshito later than Ephrem, and for referring it to Rabbula, lies precisely at this point : the Nestorians would not easily have accepted a New Testament from the hands of those who were the authors of their excommunication ; still less would they have done so if the revision had emanated from their chief opponent, who was a fanatic of the first order. Hence it is important to remark the existence of breathing-spells in the great struggle ; and it is interesting that Ibas actually reports to Mari that the disputes are at an end, and that a formula of concord

[1] See Labourt, *Le Christianisme dans l'Empire Perse*, p. 254.

has been reached. It is possible that in some such period of reconciliation, the revision might have been planned, just in the same way as the Authorised English Bible of 1611 was the result of conference between the Puritan and Anglican parties at a time immediately preceding their final elongation. When Rabbula died in 435, Ibas actually succeeded him, and for a time at least, occupied the episcopal chair of Edessa. This is the period immediately succeeding the condemnation of Nestorius by the Council of Ephesus in 431. It seems that the assumption of a comparative peace in the Edessan Church, as the condition for a Biblical Revision, which should be generally accepted, requires that such a revision should be made some years before the death of Rabbula. We are accordingly led to this conclusion, that the conditions of a revision are best met by placing it under the auspices of Rabbula in the hands of a body of translators, already operating in the Persian School at Edessa, most of whom appear to have been Nestorian in sympathy ; and of this group of translators Mar Koumi was one, who is credited with the Peshito version of the Epistle to the Romans. We make the hypothesis in the interests of progress, and without any idea that we have finally disposed of the problem. Before leaving this point, it should be noticed that in his work on the Romans, Mar Koumi had the co-operation of an Indian Presbyter, named Daniel. The reference is important ; first, it is a definite landmark in the history of the Church in India, which must have been organised before the time at which Koumi was making his translations ; second, this Indian Church was in close connexion with Edessa, as we should have expected on other grounds ; third, the Indian Church was a Syrian Church, for Daniel the Presbyter not only has a western name, but he is a scholar in Greek and in Syriac, and there is no reason for supposing that the Indian Church to which he belonged

was a Greek-speaking Church. These considerations are of importance for the much-disputed question of the history and origins of the Church of St. Thomas in India.

We now pass on to a second field of inquiry, from which we may before long expect some important accretions to our knowledge of the textual history of the New Testament in the East.

The great test for the existence of types of transmission in the New Testament lies in the confirmation of the suggested types by actual quotations in the Fathers. Every student knows the stress which is laid on the coincidence between the quotations of Chrysostom and the supposed Antiochian revision of the New Testament; and it is clear that it is to Patristic quotations that we must look for the justification of theories which assign special types of New Testament text to particular places and periods. We have already alluded to this test, in discussing the history of the Peshito version: as far as manuscript evidence goes, there is no type so early attested nor so well preserved: but, the critic inquires, is it, as a translation, earlier or later than St. Ephrem? If it is earlier, and if it is an official text, we may expect to find citations from it in the writings of Ephrem. The fact that we have not as yet succeeded in making the verification required is the best proof that the Peshito version is later than Ephrem.

In the Syrian Church, when we come to discuss our textual hypotheses in the light of Patristic quotations, in order to find out what fathers used the Diatessaron or the Old Syriac, or the Peshito, we find ourselves in great straits for want of a sufficient body of early Syriac Christian literature. We have nothing till the fourth century, and in the fourth century we have only the Persian father Aphrahat, and the before-mentioned Ephrem. Aphrahat is Ephrem's senior; he was writing his book of Demonstrations or Homi-

lies between 337 and 345. These Homilies are full of Scripture references and constitute an important textual landmark. Every one who studies the textual problem in Syriac knows the important place occupied by Aphrahat in the criticism of the text. It is clear that we want more literature of this kind, belonging to periods of time that can be defined with sufficient nearness, and emanating from persons who can be historically recognised. The evidence, for example, of the work *De fato*, which is assigned to Bardesanes, is weakened for practical purposes by the fact that it comes from the hand of one of Bardesanes' disciples; the reduced date means lower usefulness, even if the book had been filled with Scriptural references, which it unfortunately is not. In the same way the *Acts of Thomas*, which, like the Bardesanian writings, come to us from Edessa, and perhaps from the very school of Bardesanes, have no definite mark of authorship, and no certain indication of date: and their value, to the textual critic, is reduced accordingly.

Is there any prospect of any fresh accession of evidence on the side of Syriac Patristic literature? May we hope for any important additions to our Patrology for the first four centuries?

In Duval's *Syriac Literature* we find (p. 231) an account of a lost Syriac writer, named Gregory. He is said to have been of Persian origin, to have embraced the monastic life, in consequence of visions which he had, to have studied at Edessa, after which he became a hermit, or at all events a member of a community of solitaries on Mount Izla; later on, he came westward, visited Cyprus, became intimate with St. Epiphanius, whose instructor he is said to have been, and with a monk named Theodore, to whom he addresses his writings and epistles. Of these presumably monastic writings, Duval says that nothing has come down to us.

On p. 338, however, he says that some fragments of his writing have been published by Assemani in the *Biblioteca Orientalis*. This appears to be an exaggeration on the part of Duval.

It is important to record that the missing book has come to light, and I have had the opportunity of examining the transcript of it made by one of my learned friends now residing with us at Woodbrooke. As the work belongs to the latter part of the fourth century, near to the middle of the century, and so occupies a place between the writings of Aphrahat and those of Ephrem, it will be seen at once that we have a large block of the fresh material that we are craving for. The work is monastic in character, and is fairly well sprinkled with Biblical quotations, sometimes in the form of allusions, but more often in direct reference to the books from which they are taken, or to their authors. The writer knows his New Testament well. The proof of this will be forthcoming presently, but it would be outside the limits of this article to enter into a detailed discussion of the citations of Gregory of Cyprus, as we may call him. Up to the present I have succeeded in finding one microscopic coincidence with the Old Syriac, and none with the Diatessaron. It remains to be seen whether the general body of the quotations conforms to the Peshito to such a degree as to identify that as the version employed by Gregory. If it should do so, then we may have to revise our theory of a fifth century Peshito, and of its translation, in part, by Mar Koumi. Having said thus much, it is clear that we have justified the expectation of fresh critical materials, and that we must set to work, ourselves and our friends, on the publication and interpretation of the long-lost, but now recovered, treatises of Gregory of Cyprus.

RENDEL HARRIS.

THE STONING OF ST. STEPHEN.

The episode of the stoning of St. Stephen is narrated in Acts vii. 58–60 as follows: "And they cast him out of the city, and stoned him: and the witnesses laid down their garments at the feet of a young man named Saul. And they stoned Stephen, calling upon (the Lord), and saying, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit. And he kneeled down, and cried with a loud voice, Lord, lay not this sin to their charge. And when he had said this, he fell asleep. And Saul was consenting unto his death."

What is the meaning of the words: *the witnesses laid down their garments at the feet of a young man named Saul*? οἱ μάρτυρες ἀπέθεντο τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτῶν παρὰ τοὺς πόδας νεανίου καλουμένου Σαύλου. Theophylactus explains the action of the witnesses as prompted by a desire to be more agile in their task, as athletes strip for a foot race or other gymnastic contest, and writes: ὥστε εἶναι κοῦφοι καὶ ἀπαραπόδιστοι εἰς τὸ λιθοβολεῖν.

This seems a somewhat trivial act for the writer to have recorded with such evident care. During a football match the combatants no doubt may commit their overcoats to the care of a small boy, but what the author of Acts desired to record in this passage was surely part of what one may call the rite of stoning a blasphemer to death. He implies that Saul or Paul discharged an official rôle on this occasion. I venture to suggest that it was Stephen's garments which were ceremonially laid at the feet of Paul, and that the true reading in ver. 58 is αὐτοῦ, and not αὐτῶν. This correction is suggested by the account of this form of punishment given in the Talmudic Codex Sanhedrin as edited by Joannes Coch of Bremen, and printed at Amsterdam in 1629. From this forgotten scholar's rendering of the

Gemarist I cite those portions of the text which illustrate the martyrdom of Stephen. John Lightfoot afterwards used the same tract in his *Horæ Hebraicæ*, and the substantial agreement of his independent translation of it with that of Coch is proof of the accuracy of the latter's Hebrew scholarship :

Caput vi. § 1. Confecto iudicio damnatum educunt v. g. ut lapidibus obruatur. Locus lapidationis extra locum iudicii fuit. Nam dicitur : Educ blasphemum. Unus officialium stat ad ostium curiae, tenens manu sudarium : unus item, equo insidens, tantum inter ipsum et se intervalli relinquit, ut commodé videre eum possit. Tum si quis se offerat, qui, damnatum insontem esse, doceat ; iste sudarium quatit : eques, concitato cursu, damnatum retrahit. Quinetiam si ipse quid pro sua innocentia ostendenda se habere asserat, quater quinquiesvè reducitur : dummodò in verbis eius sit solidi quippiam. Si hoc modo innocentia eius comprobetur, liberum dimittunt : Sin minùs, prodit lapidandus, antecedente praecone atque in haec verba conclamante : *Vir iste N.N. filius N.N. prodit lapidandus, ob culpam hanc.* (Nam illa quoque exprimitur) *suntque eius facti testes N.N. et N.N. Quicunque ipsum insontem docere potest, accedens rationes suas exponat.*

§ 2. Quando decem cubita abest a loco lapidationis, iubetur confiteri. Nam in omnibus, qui neci dantur, observatur, ut confiteantur. Quisquis enim confitetur, illi in futuro seculo sors erit. . . .

Si sciat, se testium mendacio gravatum, sic dicet : *Sit mors mea expiationi pro omnibus peccatis meis, hoc uno excepto crimine.* At enim id si admittatur, quilibet, ut se purget, similiter faciat.

§ 3. Quando a loco lapidationis abest quatuor cubita, vestes ei detrahuntur. Maris anteriora velantur ; mulieris et posteriora. . . .

§ 4. Locus lapidationis altus erat geminam hominis

longitudinem. Testium alter inde reum detrudebat, ut in lumbos caderet. Si conversus in pectus foret, in lumbos convertebatur. Hoc casu mortuus si esset, satisfactum legi: sin; alter lapidem sublatum in pectus immittebat. Si hoc ictu moreretur, satisfactum: sin; a toto Israële lapidibus cædebatur. Q.D. (Deut. xvii. 7) *Manus testium primo in illum sit, et manus totius populi deinceps.*

Lapidati omnes suspenduntur. . . . Quomodo sit suspendium? Trabs in terram depangitur, ex qua lignum exstet: dein revinctis manibus suspenditur. . . . Si pernoctet, interdicti violatio est. Q.D. (Deut. xxi. 23). *Ne sinas pernoctare cadaver eius in ligno, sed omnino sepelias eum eodem die. Nam execratio Dei est suspensus, etc.*

§ 5. Lapidatus non sepelitur in sepulcris maiorum suorum. Duo autem sepulcreta a senatu constituta fuerunt; unum lapidatis et ustis: alterum gladio et laqueo interemptis.

§ 6. Quando absumta caro est, ossa conservata in privata sepulcra inferuntur. . . .

These extracts assist us to picture vividly the tragedy of Stephen's death, for we are able, as John Lightfoot remarks in his commentary, to compare it with the pattern and regular procedure (ut conferat lector praesentem actionem cum hac norma et more usitato). Stephen is tried before the Sanhedrin where the high priest presides and cross-questions him. The witnesses against him before the council accompany him to the place of stoning outside the city, there they strip him and lay his clothes at the feet of Saul, who seems to have discharged the office of Herald or *praeco*, and the words: ἦν συνευδοκῶν τῇ ἀναιρέσει αὐτοῦ, rendered "was consenting unto his death," but indicating an act of formal approval, refer to his recital in that capacity of the Council's sentence: "This man (Stephanus), son of N.N. cometh forth to be stoned, for the following offence, and these men here present have borne witness against

him." Later on in Acts xxvi. 10 Paul is represented as avowing before Agrippa that he had given his vote against the saints when they were being put to death (*ἀναιρουμένων τε αὐτῶν κατήνεγκα ψῆφον*). He was not a member of the Sanhedrin, and therefore cannot have given his vote for the executions; but the phrase might quite well refer to his recital of the sentences against the already condemned saints at the place of execution. The words *θεὶς δὲ τὰ γόνατα* no doubt denote the attitude normally assumed in prayer, but it was at the same time very nearly the attitude that the victim was by the witnesses forced to assume.

In Lightfoot's translation of the Hebrew the rôle of the witnesses stripping the victim is made more apparent than in Coch's, for he renders: Cum iam intra quatuor cubitos à loco lapidationis perventum est, detrahunt vestes ejus, atque eum denudant, "As soon as they are within four cubits of the place of stoning, they (the witnesses) take off his clothes and strip him." A loin cloth alone was left.

Erwin Preuschen in his commentary on Acts (Tübingen, J. C. B. Mohr, 1912) remarks that "the graphic touch of the garments being laid down on the ground is only introduced in order to bring in Saul as one indirectly concerned in the execution." [1]

On the contrary, the narrator seems to indicate that Saul took a very direct part, was a prime agent in the tragedy. He is not introduced by accident, nor can this touch have been added to the narrative merely to bring him in. Nor can I agree with Lightfoot's view that Stephen was snatched off and massacred by the tumultuous violence of the crowd, and not condemned by a formal verdict of the Sanhedrin.[2]

[1] Der veranschaulichende Zug von Ablegen der Kleider is wohl nur beigefügt, um Saul einzuführen als mittelbar an der Hinrichtung beteiligt.

[2] Quaeri etiam potest, an formali aliqua sententia Synhedrii damnatus sit . . . an tumultuariâ turbae violentiâ abreptus et trucidatus? Quod videtur.

There is no reason for taking this view. The members of the Sanhedrim themselves burst out into a riot, lashed to fury by Stephen's words, and hurried him out of the city to execution. *Die Tumultuirenden*, writes Preuschen, *die Mitglieder des Synedriums selbst sind*, "The rioters were the members of the Sanhedrim itself." But that does not, as he supposes, exclude the idea that they had conducted the trial in due form according to the scheme laid down in the Sanhedrim tract of the Talmud. They probably passed sentence on Stephen in an access of far from judicial fury, and then flocked out of the city along with the condemned man to witness his execution. If Stephen survived the first attentions of the witnesses transformed into executioners, then the elders must have intervened "as all Israel," and have finished their victim off; and perhaps that is what the author of Acts wishes us to gather from his highly compressed and terse narrative.

It is likely that αὐτῶν is the correction of a scribe who failed to grasp the fact that the victim was formally denuded of his clothes by the witnesses on these occasions. The author himself seems to have been more familiar with the sort of scene he is describing than to have made the mistake of attributing to the witnesses garments that were really the victim's. Moreover the change of αὐτοῦ into αὐτῶν is very slight, and in the early MSS. of Acts the two terminations -οῦ -ῶν were very likely written in compendia which readily lent themselves to confusion.

F. C. Conybeare.

THE ALTAR OF UNHEWN STONE.

"If thou make me an altar of stone,
thou shalt not build it of hewn stones."
—*Exod.* xx. 22.

VERY old-world sounds this sentence from the Book of Exodus. Very quaint is the precept which it voices. Altar-building is not, any more than Sacrifice, for us an every-day activity. Stones utterly unhewn, innocent of the mason's chisel and even of the quarryman's wedge and hammer, we seldom use for serious building. Yet things which are primitive, in religion as in social life, lie close to the elemental realities. To analyse them in their prose or poetry is to get at the very heart of the faith and piety by which we live. Their simplicity opens up to view the foundations of our more complex experience, and teaches at a glance what a lifetime of research might not discover about religion.

That is one reason why the healthy religious soul takes such pleasure and finds such invigoration in the Old and New Testament Scriptures. It is not simply that those Books contain the classical and authoritative exposition of our holy Religion, and come to us from the very presence of our Lord, almost from His blessed hand, but as we read them we seem to enter a region in which religious truth is far less encumbered by convention and far less complicated and involved than the unresting centuries have since caused it to become. To the Christian brought up on mediaeval or even modern dogma the New Testament can appeal with the freshness and freedom of green fields or fragrant woodland. And if we venture in our reading into the records and literature of primitive paganism, our excursion into that remoter past brings us a similar reward. Few minds endowed with reverence and intelligence can return from such a pilgrimage without having experienced a surprising enlightenment con-

cerning the true meaning of many a familiar feature of present-day religion. Not only are we enabled to measure and appreciate the spiritual progress of the world, but we are also made aware of much that is valuable in our religious inheritance which would otherwise escape our notice altogether. It is more than an antiquarian instinct that prompts us to explain the Christian Easter in the light both of the Hebrew Passover and of the yet more ancient pagan spring festivals of Nature's recurring death and resurrection. And similarly there is profit alike to the Christian scholar and to the Christian worshipper in contemplating the ordinances of the Synagogue and Temple from which the Church is descended, and the yet older institution of the wayside or the hill-top Altar with its transitory flame and smoke of sacrifice.

"*If thou make me an altar of stone, thou shalt not make it of hewn stones.*" Thus spake Moses to Israel at the foot of Sinai in the name of his austere Lord. The words of the Ten Commandments have scarcely been proclaimed to the trembling people when the dread formula *Thou shalt not* which rang through them is taken up again, this time to forbid a humble detail of altar-building. In such a context it looks like employing a thunderbolt to break road-metal. What, we are inclined to ask, did it matter to Moses and his Lord what substance altars were built of? Was a command so trivial worthy of a prophet's ascent of the arduous and terror-circled Mount? What is the Legislator's meaning? What is it that is in his mind?

"*An altar of earth thou shalt make unto me,*" so runs the preceding verse, "*and if thou make me an altar of stone, thou shalt not make it of hewn stones.*" Wherever His people call upon Him, wherever His holy name is invoked, wherever an altar is erected, God will be present and will bless. But the altar is to be of the simplest. A little mound of earth, large enough to carry the fire of faggots with the victim laid

upon it, that is enough. Better earth than stone. If it be stone, however, let it be stone unworked by human hand or tool. Thus saith the Lord.

Upon this simple rule a singular variety of thoughts and principles converge. Let me allude to two, by way of explanation.

First. One may say it is an example of that blind, unreasoning, unwavering conservatism which religion so conspicuously manifests in every land, in every civilisation, and in every age. For the religious man, as for the antiquary, age and sanctity are apt to be synonymous terms. The old paths, the old customs, the old notions are the best and therefore must be the truest. The new is dreaded. Because unfamiliar it is suspect. But the old is familiar and welcome to the heart. There is an instinct in human nature which says : Better an old superstition that our fathers cherished than a new truth. How easily experience forgets its kinship with experiment ! So religion seems in every age to lag behind the times. Hugging the treasures of the past it is apt to be found among the camp-following instead of in the vanguard of the host, its symbol a slow-moving waggon bearing the Ark of the Lord with its precious relics and utensils, attended by Levites whose pace is suited to their flowing robes. This preference of the earthen altar to the rough stone, and of the rough stone to the hewn, is but an illustration, it may be said, of the same instinct in religion which retained the flint knife in the hand of the sacrificing priest long ages after bronze and steel came into common use, and which would not permit the priest to rekindle the sacred fire or relight the sacred lamps by new-fangled means, jealously preferring the friction-stick to the burning-glass, the burning-glass to the flint and tinder, the flint and tinder to the lucifer match,—and preferring similarly for holy use still the candle to the lamp, the lamp to gas-light, and, for that matter,

I suppose, even gas-light to electricity. Reverence to age is a principle as much of religious as of social life, wrapped about with much of life's poetry and finer feeling, if also sometimes passing into the morbid and the absurd. The every-day apparel of one age is discarded by the next, is the court-dress of the age which follows, and ends by becoming the religious vestment of posterity. So with the Hebrew altar. The earliest fashion of it, the only kind of altar, after all, which any man, rich or poor, might anywhere make for himself, the simple heap of earth, was the most sacred, the most poetic, the most touching and symbolically significant. From that point of view there is meaning in the words which follow the text-passage :—"*for if thou lift up thy tool upon it, thou hast polluted it.*"

A *second* explanation links the commandment with the forbidding of idols and images which immediately precedes it. An obvious way to protect a people against idolatry is to restrain its plastic and pictorial art. That was the simple policy of Moses and of Mohammed. The earthen altar calls for no help from the artist, whereas the altar of stone invites the hand and the fancy of the sculptor-mason to adorn it. In religious ornament the geometrical motive leads in succession to the plant or flower and to the animal form and to the human figure, and insensibly the artist and the worshipper are led to the impiety of figuring the Divine in material human form, and the sanctities and reserves of religious mystery are invaded and profaned. History and experience show how well founded were the fears of the old puritan prophet who gave the Ten Commandments to Israel, and raised one nation at least above the level of polytheism, and so made it possible for Christ to come. If Art can be a noble handmaid to Religion she can also corrupt and betray it. By her genius she may exalt the Divine and dignify the human, but she may also open the doors of the sanctuary of

faith and worship to vulgar ostentation, to luxury and vain-glory, and admit into the house of God a thousand vanities and distractions. One generation is miserable because the windows of its churches are not filled with coloured glass, and is restive at worship within walls that are bare : it finds untinted sunlight crude and matter-of-fact, is certain that light to be religious must be dim, and is convinced that non-church-going is mainly due to the simplicity of its services and the plainness of its shrines : Gothic, it is sure, is good to look at, even if it be bad to hear in, and, after all, the sacraments, which need no acoustics, are in its judgment more important than sermons. Another generation, by and by, groans under the legacy of motley stained glass, of memorial tablets and sculptures, and of religious apparatus costly to erect and costly to keep up, which with every variety of taste, good, bad and indifferent, its forerunners have bequeathed to it : it feels that undiluted daylight would be welcome at any price, that churches were not intended to be dark as cellars for the mysteries they house, that a cathedral in which the Word of God competently read or preached cannot be heard with ease throughout the congregation, and the sound of the liturgy is but an inarticulate murmur beneath the high-flung vault, is something less than a true Church : it pines for the robust arm of a reformer to let in light and air and reality, at whatever cost of shattered glass and broken splendour. Artistic fashion is of course unstable, and taste proverbially varies, but something between the puritan fanatic and the riotous art-maniac is clearly the ideal. If religious appointments are to stand the test of time, restraint and refinement at least are a religious as well as an aesthetic duty. If luxury is sinful in the home, and extravagance, however fashionable and popular, a crime in the state, elaboration and costliness in the fabric and ritual of the church are an offence to God so long as the social and

missionary vocation of the Church is unfulfilled. Not even clerical poverty and ascetic vows will atone for extravagance in stone and lime and ornaments and vestments in the eyes of the struggling masses who stand apart from the Church and view too often her ministrations with well-founded suspicion. History has yet to do full justice to the extent to which the Reformation was precipitated throughout Europe not only by the gross lives of the clergy and the shameful ignorance and superstition in their teaching, but by the spectacle of the opulence and costly splendour of those ecclesiastical institutions and edifices built for the sham poverty of monks and nuns and priests out of the real poverty of ignorant and degraded peasants, those buildings over whose ruin the children of an easy-going and complacent age shed tears of comfortable regret.

The principle of the Altar of Unhewn Stone may be illustrated by two or three practical considerations drawn from present-day religious life and especially worship.

It is a great phrase of the day that in giving to God men should give of their best. They certainly ought. But there are countless ways of giving, and there is an ascending scale of urgency in the world's need. Is it only what they give to the sanctuary that God receives ? Is there not, indeed, something incongruous between a gorgeous church and the memory of the Son of Man who had not where to lay His head, whose teaching was principally out of doors or in rustic synagogues, whose baptism was in a river, and whose Supper of Communion was instituted in a simple Jewish upper-room ? Bisho Westcott, though Durham with its magnificent Norman Cathedral was his see, has left it on record as his mature conviction based on history that the great church-building eras were seldom if ever times of spiritual purity and power. The Basilica of St. Peter in Rome, the greatest and most costly church in Christendom, was erected, let it be remem-

bered, with the same ill-gotten indulgence-money whose raising drove Martin Luther into rebellion. If it be said that the House of God ought to be the most beautiful and the best furnished in a parish, there is a mood and type of serious reflection which answers gravely that so long as honest men and women and children are in need, so long as great causes at home and abroad are struggling for lack of material support, it may not be amiss or to the disadvantage of religion that the House of God should set the houses of men an example of chaste and even unadorned simplicity. It may be that He to whose glory we solemnly dedicate our monuments and ornaments and edifices takes much less pleasure in our tribute than its costliness might suggest. Has the Christian world to-day no need for a revival of the true spirit of the puritan, not the canting hypocrite who starved the sanctuary only to enrich his pocket and indulge his table, any more than his counterpart within the opposite camp who dedicated to the glory of God what was intended to glorify only himself or his family, but the spirit of the Christian who, however cultivated and refined his tastes, sets his face against luxury whether in his home or in his church, and places his substance at the service of the most clamant necessities of the day in which his lot is cast?

In Britain at the present time under the influence of alien systems men are in danger of forgetting the genius of the religious life which has fostered our national strength and developed our national character. Is there any need to be ashamed of its evangelical simplicity, as upstarts sometimes are ashamed of the humble parents who gave them life and gave them any shreds of character they may possess? Revised and recast it may be: perhaps it must. It has to be accommodated on every aspect to changed times and altered circumstances. But the ideals it enshrined ought to be cherished, and its native genius preserved. The crude,

the ugly, the coarse, the careless, the mean, the narrow, the sordid, the unrefined,—away with them, by all means, from buildings, doctrines, forms of worship, and ministry, if they are to be found in them. But the Reformed Churches need not ape the manners of the Unreformed. There is a clear call that they should keep to their own appointed way, be true to the high place and work assigned to them in Christendom, contribute their own distinctive element to the sum of Catholic faith and piety and work and worship. For them, at least, it ought not to be difficult to recognise and reverence the principle suggested by this old-time precept: "*If thou make me an altar of stone, thou shalt not make it of hewn stones.*"

A final application concerns public worship, and it applies to every part of it, common praise, anthems sung by choirs, reading of Holy Writ, prayer, and preaching. There is art in doing each of these, in doing each of them acceptably and well. Even the altar of earth has to be put together by the worshipper's hands, the faggots made into the fire, and the offering laid upon it. And even the altar of rough stones has to be set up by human piety, and made as seemly and as suitable as may be. But God, whose glory is the end of worship, if He accepts Art, will not tolerate Artifice. Worship must be natural, unpretentious, sincere, the spontaneous devotion to Him of instincts and feelings and desires and thoughts which spring from faculties within the soul which His own holy hand has planted and His own Holy Spirit has fostered. Let any note of the conventional or the formal, any touch of artificiality make its presence felt, and the altar is marred, its consecration is impaired, its sacrifice is blemished. How offensive is the soulless singing of a hymn with eyes adrift upon the congregation, the undevotional rendering of an anthem when the singers regard it simply as a piece of music to be performed, the glib utterance

of prayers which are mere forms of words, read, memorized, or said extempore, the delivery of a sermon which has cost the preacher nothing, and does not speak his innermost convictions, and cannot be expressed in natural tones of voice because it does not move him! There is profit in trying to imagine what worship must seem like to the All-seeing Eye and the All-hearing Ear. He does not value it by its artistic merits primarily. There is something more urgent than doing these things "*decently and in order.*" He that dwelleth not in temples made with hands needs not that men should build Him a house, nor does He live upon their offerings. The earth is His, and the fulness thereof. There is nothing that can be rendered unto Him that has not come from His own bounty. The sacrifice, in truth, be it what it may. He always, as in Abraham's story, has to provide. It is more to Him that our altar be natural than that it be adorned, more that our service be sincere than that it be artistic, more that our hearts be broken and contrite than that our words be choice and our music faultless. Slovenliness in our approach *is* an affront to Him. But so is affectation. Familiarity *is* an offence to Him. But so is distance and unconcern. If only men thought as earnestly about their sincerity as they do about the housing and the phrasing and the setting of their worship, if only they forgot themselves and their art in remembering Him with whom they have to do, if only they kept in mind continually that daily character and conduct in the home and in the world are the highest sphere and opportunity of worship to Almighty God and to His blessed Son who gave His life for them, then it would not be said of them on high :—"*This people draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips do honour me, but have removed their heart far from me, and their fear toward me is taught by the precept of men.*" Rather would their lot be among those "*sons of the stranger*" to whom the

ancient promise was held out :—"*Even them will I bring to my holy mountain, and make them joyful in my house of prayer ; their burnt-offerings and their sacrifices shall be accepted upon mine altar : for mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all people.*" As it is written : —"*Thus saith the Lord : The heaven is my throne and the earth is my footstool : what manner of house will ye build unto me ? and what place shall be my rest ? For all those things hath mine hand made, and so came all those things to be, saith the Lord. But to this man will I look, even to him that is poor and of a contrite spirit and that trembleth at my word.*"

William A. Curtis.

DIVINE APPELLATIONS, TEXTUAL CRITICISM AND DOCUMENTARY THEORY.

My Reply to Dr. Skinner.

There has come about what nobody expected, even at the most recent date, and we have once again a Problem of the Pentateuch: there is no more talk of the assured results of Pentateuchal Criticism: again we have to say *adhuc sub judice lis est.* The most widely different Universities of Germany teach nowadays that the solution of the Pentateuchal problem hitherto in vogue has its own serious difficulties and is not entirely satisfactory. Dr. Löhr, at Königsberg, Dr. Staerk at Jena, Lic. Volz at Tübingen, teach that the names of God provide no certain clue for the division into sources; the late Lic. Westphal, of Marburg, repeatedly asserted in the *Theol. Jahresbericht* that Klostermann's and Eerdmans' researches contain noteworthy features: Dr. Kittel writes in the second edition of his *Geschichte Israels*, 1912 (vol. i. p. 255): "Dahse is quite right in complaining that too little attention has been paid, on the part of the commentators and documentary school, to the state of the text." Dr. Gressmann says in the *Deutsche Lit. Zeitung*, 1913 (No. 20, Column 1225): "Even within the limits of Genesis the alterations of the names of God were, I am convinced, more widespread than anyone has hitherto been willing to concede, and perhaps it would be better altogether to avoid the names Jahwist and Elohist if a better and simpler designation of the sources can be found."

Remembering all this, we are in the highest degree amazed at the views to which Dr. Skinner has given utterance, in the April to September numbers of this periodical, on the importance of these Divine Appellations. Very few German scholars, I feel sure, will still defend such views at the present day. Has not Julius Wellhausen himself mentioned the textual uncertainty of the Divine Appellations as a " sore point " of his documentary hypothesis ? Has not Dr. Köberle repeatedly pointed to the importance of textual criticism in reference to the Names of God ? Dr. Sellin quite recently (*Neue Kirchl. Zeitschrift*, 1913, p. 129) has admitted openly that it has been " proved in the most brilliant manner that the Names of God are variable elements of the text." Yet Dr. Skinner holds different views, and he certainly must be given the credit of having collected with great care and put forward skilfully all that can be said in defence of the general use of the Divine Appellations as a means for separating the sources. In the following pages I do not propose to offer a complete answer to Dr. Skinner's criticism, but merely to try and set out the results which follow on Dr. Skinner's own admissions on the subject of the transmission of the Names of God, and to show why we must object to his treatment of the LXX and what bearing the present discussion has on the development of Pentateuchal criticism.

At the beginning of his investigations (April, p. 290) Dr. Skinner states it as his conviction that in regard to the Divine Names " the Hebrew text possesses credentials to which no version, and perhaps the LXX least of all, can pretend " ; in his last article (September, p. 267) he expresses the hope that he has proved that MT " is a solid and sufficient working basis for the literary analysis of the Pentateuch," and he expects (September, p. 287) that nobody " will endorse the confidently reiterated assertion of Dahse

that the names of God in Genesis have nothing whatever to do with the variety of documents of which the book is composed." I do not know what impression Dr. Skinner's articles have made on their readers, but of this I feel sure, that many will have observed that in the course of his investigations Dr. Skinner has admitted uncertainty in the transmission of the Divine Appellations in a great number of passages. Now suppose we collect those passages. According to Dr. Skinner, the MT use of the Divine Names is most strongly supported by *Aquila and the Vulgate*. In that case, however, *their* differences from MT will receive special weight, particularly when they have the support of other good witnesses; this happens in Genesis xxx. 24, where LXX, the Peschitto, and Symmachus agree with Aquila, and vii. 9, where the Vulgate is supported by the Samaritan and K 155. Dr. Skinner attributes even more importance to the *Peschitto* than to Aquila and the Vulgate. We will take some of the Peschitto variations too, and only such as possess an additional confirmation from other sources: we thus obtain for our list the two passages vii. 1 (Hebrew and Greek MSS. and perhaps Sam.) and xv. 6 (LXX and Vulg.). Skinner himself asserts (July, p. 34) that according to de Rossi's estimate of the MSS. the Hebrew variations in the names of God in vii. 1, viii. 15, xvi. 11, xviii. 27, 31, and xx. 4, are worthy of attention; we must therefore incorporate the last five also in our list. Thus we have nine passages where Eastern witnesses (for so we will describe Hebr., Sam., Aqu., Pesch. and Vulg.) show important variations from MT. Now let us turn further to the LXX, where we will only take notice of those passages in which no "internal variations" are found in the Septuagintal MSS., and which in addition receive confirmation from Eastern witnesses. By this means we obtain further as probable Hebrew variants xiii. 10*a*, 10*b*, and xxx. 27,

where Pesch. agrees with the LXX. Then (April, p. 302) Dr. Skinner makes the further general concession (with Dr. Buchanan Gray) that where (ὁ) κύριος corresponds to Elohim the reading of the LXX "deserves attention as a possible indication of the original text," and admits specially (May, p. 408) in xxviii. 20, that I "made out a good case for Jahweh as the original text." Dr. Skinner will also be willing to allow the antiquity of the LXX reading in xix. 29*a*, where the κύριος of the LXX is supported by K 199. Finally Skinner believes with me that in xiv. 22, and xxxii. 9 (May, p. 405, and in an unprinted part of his last article), the Divine Appellations in MT are not original. Moreover, as far as Genesis, chs. i.–x. are concerned, Dr. Skinner is now of the same opinion as Dr. Kittel (*Gesch. Isr.*, 1^2, p. 256) that particularly in the case of these chapters the names of God in MT are of little importance for the separation into sources. This pronouncement of Dr. Skinner's is not to be found in any of his printed articles, but in the just mentioned portion which he was so very kind as to place at my disposal.

If we now recapitulate the passages conceded, our result is that, apart from Genesis i.–x., we have sixteen of them, and that they are to be found in chs. xiii., xiv., xv., xvi., xviii., xix., xx., xxviii., xxx., and xxxii. Now except those in chs. xiv., xviii., xxxii., all these variants, which, even according to Dr. Skinner, perhaps show the original text, prove exactly as many exceptions to the general use of the Divine Names in the documentary sources. Let us further remember that the usual division into sources has to reckon on its own account and within itself with exceptions in chs. xvii. and xxi. (Jahweh in P), and so we obtain the result that not merely in chs. i.–x., but in chs. i.–xxi. the use of the Divine Names in MT can be of little importance for the division into sources, since exceptions to the rule or uncer-

tainties in the tradition are to be found in nearly every chapter.

But furthermore, Dr. Skinner willingly admits (July, p. 24) that no certainty exists "in regard to each particular name," but maintains that we have them "in a sufficient number." And these are to be found in the parallel narratives. For, he says (September, p. 287), "the important point is that the book of Genesis contains examples of dual narration and that the names J and E closely follow the line of cleavage marked out by the parallelism." In this connexion it was a German adherent of the documentary theory who drew my attention to chs. i. ‖ ii., and chs. xvi. ‖ xxi.; and Dr. Skinner mentions as such parallel narratives (September, p. 286): (1) xii. 10–20 ‖ xx. and xxvi. 7–11; secondly xvi. ‖ xxi. 8–21; thirdly xxi. 22–31 ‖ xxvi. 26–33. Now the extraordinary thing is that precisely these chapters of Genesis are among those in which we find Hebrew variants or uncertainties admitted by Skinner and other representatives of the documentary theory, as to the original text of the Divine Appellations. Here Kittel observes (*op. cit.*, p. 256): "In Genesis ii. Elohim seems to have been entirely or partly the prevailing name." But in that case it is impossible to speak here of a "Jahwistic account of the creation" different from the "Elohistic" chapter i. Ilgen, as is well known, apportioned the second "account of the creation" to his second Elohist (= E). Besides, it is surely very hazardous to oppose ch. xii. 10–20 to ch. xx. in respect of the use of the Divine Names, when in the latter Elohistic chapter itself we find the Hebrew variant Jahweh (xx. 4), and when in the former Jahwistic section the reading of the original LXX (xii. 17) was ὁ θεός according to the testimony of the Hexapla. Everybody knows that Wellhausen originally attributed xii. 10–20 to E! Then there is the fact that in the Jahwistic ch. xvi. the etymology proves

Jahweh in verse 11 to have been impossible originally; this is admitted in Germany by Dr. Procksch himself, an enthusiastic adherent of the documentary theory, since he writes in his new commentary (p. 109): "We must read El for Jahweh with LXX: fir. bw and Lat. since the name Ishmael is to be explained." The same scholar remarks on the *Analogon*, xxxii. 31, "J cannot use Jahweh here since above all things the etymology demands Elohim" (p. 187).[1] And if Dr. Sellin has asserted (*Neue Kirchl. Zeitschrift*, 1913, p. 125) that in the LXX in ch. xvi. passim ἄγγελος κυρίου is found, but in ch. xxi. 17 ἄγγελος θεοῦ (and Dr. Skinner also lays stress on the occurrence of the Angel of *God* in this place) (May, p. 418), and that this corroborates the accepted division into sources here, I would point out that it is precisely in xxi. 17 that κυρίου is found in the Septuagintal MSS. bw fr mc, which Lagarde, Nestle, Procksch, and many others pronounce to be important. But, finally, it is surely better not to rely, with Dr. Skinner, on the difference in the Names of God for the parallelism of xxi. 22–31 and xxvi. 26–33, when the reading θεοῦ (xxvi. 29) in the Jahwistic portion is well attested and is in any case no scribal error (recension egj, cf. also fir and the marginal note of s). So that it is just in the vaunted parallel narratives that the use of the Divine Appellations fails to act as a guide for attaching the narratives in question to supposed sources. Of course there are passages which have exactly the same Divine Names

[1] As to the verse which Dr. Skinner puts forward (July, 41, 42), viz. 1 Sam. i. 20, Budde in his Commentary (pp. 10–11) accepts it as probable that the LXX with its σαβαωθ (or παντοκρατορος δυναμεων) has kept the original reading, so that the Jahweh, standing alone, of the MT is not original. And Caspari's interesting article in the *Neue Kirchl. Zeitschrift*, 1910, pp. 378–418) shows to what revisions the Divine Appellations have been subjected in the books of Samuel. As regards Ishmael, the reader will have observed that Dr. Procksch's words support H. M Wiener's suggestion. By the way, I do not know any passage in Wiener's writings, in which he expresses the opinion, "that Ishmael is a fictitious name" (July, p. 40).

in MT and LXX, where the names are certain from the point of view of textual criticism, e.g. ch. xxiv. ; but it is just in these that only one appellation of God occurs.

But Dr. Skinner grants us more : he admits that there were periods when little care was taken in the transmission of the Divine Names (May, p. 406, and September, passim). But, he says (in the unprinted part of the September article), " it is clear that the indiscriminate use of the Divine Names in the third century B.C. (sc. by Chronicles) has had no effect on the text of the Pentateuch." And, stronger still (August, p. 114) : " It remains certain that the names for God as they stand in MT (neglecting the nine variants of the Sam.) were found in authoritative Hebrew MSS. of the fourth century B.C." Owing to the canonisation of the Pentateuch, which must have taken place about then, before the separation of the Samaritans from Jerusalem, any alteration in the use of Names of God was precluded in the text which was used for divine service. The danger-zone for the Pentateuch was only " from the seventh to the fifth century, when the oldest Jahwistic and Elohistic documents had been amalgamated, but were not (as far as we know) under ecclesiastical control " (September, p. 279). But we have already seen from the variants we adduced from Eastern witnesses that the Hebrew testimony has not transmitted the names as certainly as Dr. Skinner supposes. And who knows what the state of things is even to-day as regards the Hebrew MSS. ? We can learn from Dr. Skinner (July, p. 35) that of Kennicott's nearly 320 MSS. of Genesis in whole or in part only " little more than one third had been *completely* collated." And Dr. Nestle laid emphasis (*ZAW*, 1913, pp. 73–74) on the uncertainties in printed texts and on the fluctuations of MS. testimony, particularly as regards the Tetragrammaton. And what of an examination of the Halachic Midrashim from the point of view of our quest ?

On this subject there have been no investigations whatever. And therefore we had rather not follow Dr. Skinner's counsel (May, p. 420) : " Let us only conceive (what the solid agreement of the Hebrew and Samaritan, differing, it will be remembered, only in some eight or nine cases, fully justifies us in assuming) that the MT has preserved the original names with substantial fidelity, and that the LXX is dependent upon it." We shall be all the less prepared to do so, inasmuch as the last words (" that the LXX is dependent upon " the MT) can easily be proved wrong. For even as early as 1903 I pointed, in the *Archiv für Rel.-Wissenschaft*, p. 312, to the fact that in the primeval history MT cannot be the original which was altered by the Septuagint. For in the LXX, in Genesis i.–ix. 26, the simple ο κυριος only occurs three times (iv. 3, 13 ; viii. 20) ; and in each of these it is in a religious connexion : in all other cases ο θεος and κυριος ο θεος interchange. And one cannot help at once conjecturing that the absence of κυριος—apart from the three passages mentioned—is explained by the fact that in the κυριος ο θεος passages Jahweh was the original reading which subsequently was eliminated through the addition of Elohim ; it was not intended to appear in the primeval history before the blessing ix. 26, except for the three above passages. This theory, which I put forward as long ago as 1903 and later again in 1912 in my *Textkritische Materialien* (pp. 38 f.), Dr. Skinner calls " an echo of Eerdmans' theory of a polytheistic phase of the Genesis legends " (July, p. 514). I never knew before that an echo could be heard as much as five years before the actual sound ! Possibly some one may explain otherwise the Septuagintal use of the Divine Names in the early history, but in any case the MT cannot there be the basis of LXX, and at least the occurrence of ὁ κυριος in the three passages implies an intentional and systematic revision of the Divine Names. That such a

revision took place in the Old Testament Dr. Skinner will not wish to deny, and various examples will soon prove it for us. As for the date of it, de Lagarde seems to us to have been correct when he wrote in his *Mitteilungen* (i. p. 97), "*That* part of the Jewish theology which was occupied with the names of God must have evolved between 444 and the death of Jesus." Moreover, this is not a twentieth century theory: Origen in his *Ep. ad Afr.* expressed the view that there are intentional alterations in MT, and as for the exactness of the transmission of the text let us here call to mind only two pronouncements. Dr. Kuenen says in his *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* (German edition, p. 83): "If such uninterrupted and scrupulous care was bestowed on the preservation and transmission of the text, whence came the errors, the gross and numerous errors, which disfigure, for instance, the Books of Samuel, the prophecy of Ezekiel, and the Psalms?" No doubt Dr. Skinner will reply as against this that Kuenen here speaks only of books that had not been canonised; but this restriction does not hold in the case of the following words of Dr. Kittel's, where he says quite generally (*Über die Notwendigkeit*, etc., p. 161), "As early as the end of the fourth and beginning of the third century B.C., there were not merely single MSS. of the existing Old Testament, but already there were groups of such, families, each of which provides an independent and characteristic presentment of the MS. tradition. We learn to recognise two of these families in the MT and LXX. Their difference may partly coincide with the difference between the Palestinian and Egyptian tradition, but partly also it may have a totally different basis. But in any case the LXX presents an independent recension of the Hebrew text, and must therefore be valued to a corresponding degree." But all this is opposed to a dependence of the LXX on the MT, and to what was said in the June number,

p. 494. A few words about the relations of MT and LXX to the Samaritan, see on the last page.

We have now to deal with Dr. Skinner's conception of scribal errors which are given so large a part in all his articles, as much in the Hebrew as in the Greek MSS. Even when the same variants occur in the former as in the latter they are still scribal errors, since (April, p. 302) "there are such things as chance coincidences." Since chance plays so great a part according to Dr. Skinner, he denies that "LXX editors and copyists would have made systematic alterations." Se we read in Dr. Skinner's second article, p. 406. In his last, however (September, p. 280), he himself has to refer to the remarkable variations of the LXX in respect of the names of God in Job (in the dialogues, regularly κυριος for El, Eloah and Schaddai). But we find similar things in a large number of other books; in the Septuagintal Daniel (though not according to Theodotion), in 3 Ezra, and in Sirach a similar preference for κυριος is seen, and this most strongly refutes Dr. Skinner's assertion (May, 407) "that ο θεος came more readily to the pen of a Greek scribe than the Hebraic κυριος." Further, as is well known, the last three books in their Greek form are thought to stand in close connexion with each other. Does this not show a "systematic alteration" on the part of the translator? And that systematic alterations of the Divine Appellations did occur is proved by the following conspectus: according to Hatch and Redpath's Concordance we have, in round numbers, 100 cases of ὁ θεος for Jahweh and 15 of κυριος for Elohim, from Genesis to Joshua; but from Judges to Chronicles, on the other hand, 20 cases of ὁ θεος for Jahweh, and 75 of κυριος for Elohim. Consequently in the Hexateuch ὁ θεος is used for Jahweh five times as often as in the historical books, and in the latter κυριος is used for Elohim five times as often as in the Hexateuch.

Incidentally I should mention that Proverbs groups itself with the Hexateuch. In later parts of my *Textkr. Mat.* I shall treat of this subject more in detail, and publish the materials I have collected for ten years. I see from the *Theol. Jahresbericht*, 1907, p. 99, that also Dr. Redpath in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, vii. pp. 605–615, has called attention to the fact that the alterations of LXX are systematical. I have not read Dr. Redpath's article hitherto. That the variations in the LXX *MSS.* are also not always fortuitous is shown by the following conspectus of 181 passages in Ezekiel where we have in—

	κυριος	κυριος κυριος	αδωναι κυριος
Cod. A .	37	19	83
„ B .	142	37	2
„ Q .	6	81	94

So that B prefers κυριος, Q κυριος κυριος, and A αδωναι κυριος (and other double names that I have not enumerated). Are these all copyists' mistakes, as Dr. Skinner would have us believe all variants in Genesis to be? And finally, Skinner himself quotes from Herrmann that in Ezekiel Adonai Jahweh occurs 217 times and Jahweh 218. Is this fortuitous? And if not, did Ezekiel intend this equality? In fact, did he count the number of Names of God that he was going to use in the book, or is this a later alteration (juggling with figures)? And what relation has it to the fact that in Genesis Jahweh and Elohim occur 165 times each, in the story of Abraham and in the story of Jacob 108 times each, and in the two sections of the history of the sons of Jacob (which are divided by the death of Isaac) 42 times each (see according to the *Theol. Jahresbericht*, 1911, p. 155; Hontheim, "Die Gottesnamen in der Genesis," *Zeitschr. f. kath. Theologie*, 34, pp. 625–640)? Is this chance or intentional symmetry? "There are more things in

heaven and earth, Horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy."

Now my whole endeavour is to obtain for the readings of the Greek cursives their due valuation. But against this Dr. Skinner objects (June, 496), that in these one is dealing with none but merely accidental readings, and he even suggests that possibly Origen's Hebrew text was a carelessly written MS. of the MT (June, 500). In particular it is questionable, he says, whether *f i r egj dnpt* are Greek recensions of any importance, whether they take us back to a Hebrew original, and whether their variations in the Names of God are of a systematic kind.

That the characteristic readings of the groups f i r egj dnpt are no scribal errors, but tokens of recensions, the following table will show :—

1, Gen. xxvii. 6.	τον νεωτερον	bw dpd$_2$ s^{txt}v fi*m.
	τον ἐλασσω	egj and others.
	————————	aoxc$_2$.
2, Gen. xl. 3.	ἀρχιμαγειρος.	Δ_5 acoxc$_2$ dnp (m).
	ἀρχιδεσμοφυλαξ.	f i^a r hlt Ay E (cp. 41$_{10}$ f i r Ay).
	δεσμοφυλαξ.	egj ksv D M.
3, Gen. xl. 15.	οἰκον του λακκου τουτου.	bw dnpt v^{txt} fi*k.
	τοπον τοῦ λακκου τουτου.	i^{a}r.
	λακκον τουτον.	egj and others.
4, Gen. xli. 30.	+της γενομενης.	dnp h.
	της ἐσομενης.	f i r ltqu v^{mg} E.
	της μετα ταυτα ἐσομενης.	egj.
5. Gen. xlix. 25.	οὐρανου.	the most.
	οὐρανιον.	fi^{a}r.
	ἀπ' οὐρανου.	egj.

By means of such a table of separate characteristic readings we can certainly discover recensions. That is what I

did in the *ZAW*, 1908, in the article "Textkrit. Studien," the results of which Dr. Skinner disputes (June, p. 497), but concerning which Dr. Nestle expresses the following opinion in the *American Journal of Theology*, 1909, p. 497: "One way in which the new edition (sc. Brooke-McLean) must be used has been shown by Johannes Dahse in two Textkr. Stud. The manuscripts must be classified so as to ascertain the origins of the texts. Their most important use is their help in the restoration of the Hebrew text." Now the variants I have just cited also show clearly and unmistakably that each of the groups I have named has its own special peculiarities. And if Dr. Skinner allows the group ackmosxc$_2$ the title of a recension (June, 499) he must do the same with the other groups. All who have made a closer study of the groups *dnpt f i r egj* allow that they are *recensions* even though they differ as to attributing the individual groups to one of the known revisers.[1] But more, they are *important* recensions, since their readings are often quoted in the margin by MSS. of other recensions.

M (margin), for example, does this in the case of f i r xlv. 9, dnpt xlv. 4, ackmxc$_2$ xxxi. 18, egj xxxi. 24 ($\sigma\kappa\lambda\eta\rho\alpha$). F^{b} is acquainted with the readings of f i^{a} r xlviii. 1, dnp xliv. 3, acmoxc$_2$ xxxi. 20, egj xlv. 15; j^{m}s^{m}v^{m} know, apart from the Hexapla (vi. 6, vii. 11, ix. 7), the reading of e vii. 17. And Holmes *ad loc.* shows that this is no mere MS. variant, but the reading of a whole group. j^{m}v^{m} quote the reading of f i r xli. 1, dpt xlvii. 1, c$_2$ xli. 35; in j^{m}s^{m} we find the readings of f i^{a} r xi. 4, xxxi. 10, xxxi. 41, those of dp xiv. 2, xxvii. 41, those of acmoxc$_2$ xxvi. 8, xxiv. 18, and finally s^{m}v^{m} (of which v belongs to the group dnp, s to the group acmoxc$_2$) are acquainted with the readings of f i r xix. 2, egj xviii. 30,

[1] Prof. Moore's note, to which Dr. Skinner refers June, 497, shows that he did not consider that the value and the grouping of the MSS. in Genesis is totally different from that in Judges.

xxiv. 38, 43, xxv. 16. Is it possible that all these marginal comments can have been intended to perpetuate scribal or accidental errors ?

If now Dr. Skinner seeks to set aside egj (June, 509) by pointing to the fact that the oldest of the MSS. which offer this text dates from the tenth century, he is forgetting that Procopius' Eclogues are based on the egj text of the Bible ; and Procopius lived at the beginning of the sixth century, in Gaza. So that egj gives us the text of the Bible which was then in use on the borders of Egypt. It is, then, wholly improbable that egj gives us Lucian's text, as Procksch thinks (Genesis, p. 14), or, as Wiener suggests (*Bibl. Sacra*, 1913, p. 525), " a subrecension on a basis of a late Lucianic text." The territory over which the Lucianic text was diffused (from Syria to Constantinople) was separated from Gaza by the whole of Palestine, where the Hexaplar recension was in vogue. So that we are dealing in egj with an Egyptian text. And if Dr. Skinner says of f i^{a} r that it can be neither Hesychius (as Procksch thinks) or Lucian, but something different from both and much less important than either (June, 497), his words show that he has not studied the readings of f i^{a} r closely enough. Even the list above shows that its readings are equally important with those of the other recensions : compare also the following sixteen readings : xxvi. 34 (xxviii. 9), xxx. 13, xxxv. 24 ff. ; xxxv. 16, xlvi. 21 ; xxvi. 25, xxix. 6, xxxiii. 1, xxxviii. 11, L. 5 ; xxxiii. 13, xxxiv. 7 ; xxxvii. 10 ; xlv. 9 ; xxxi. 25 (xli. 24) ; xxxvii. 25 ; and I do not think any one will speak any more of the inferiority of f i^{a} r.

Next, Dr. Skinner particularly objects to my speaking of Hebrew bases for the readings of *egj dnpt* and *f i r*. One of these groups certainly gives us Lucian in Genesis, since *bw* after the investigations of Hautsch and myself can no longer be regarded as doing so, and there are no other *important*

groups in Genesis beyond those I have pointed out. Lucian however, according to the ancient authorities, consulted the Hebrew: *αυτος απασας αναλαβων εκ της Εβραιδος επανενεωσατο γλωσσης* (Suidas), and *ταις προγεγραμμεναις εκδοσεσι και τοις Εβραικοις εντυχων* (Ps. Athanasius). Hoberg in Wetzer-Welte's *Lexicon*[2], vol. xii. p. 155, goes so far as to take the view that Lucian may even have consulted the Targum of Onkelos (see PRE, vol. 23, p. 209). Consequently my conception of separate Hebrew originals is not a too facile or improbable assumption. Let us hear what Kittel has to say (*op. cit.*, p. 256): "Even within the Septuagint itself, particularly in Genesis ii. 10, remarkable variations occur in respect of the Divine Appellations, evidently not as a result of bad copying, but because the assimilation had been differently carried out in different Hebrew originals, or was carried out differently by the Greek copyists." And Dr. Procksch says in his *Studien zur Geschichte der Septuaginta, die Propheten*, 1910, p. 77, "This leads us to expect that Lucian's recension came into existence in close connexion with the Hexapla, and at the same time with the Hebrew text." Now particularly as to the Hebrew basis of egj, Dr. Skinner cannot deny that the Greek readings of egj are older, and considerably older, than the extant Hebrew MSS. with which egj at times agree. Are these concurrences once again fortuitous, or is it that these Hebrew MSS. have adopted Greek readings? Now Dr. Skinner himself (June, 508, note) allows that egj in xx. 18 agrees with Sam. I have maintained that the Hebrew MSS., with single members of which egj often agrees, particularly 9, 81, 132, 150, 152, 199, 227, 239, 601, stand in close connexion with each other. Is not my interpretation supported when we see that Sam., with which in xx. 18 egj agrees, also has connexions of its own with the individual members comprised in this group; for instance, with K9 II_{12} (with Vulg.),

V_{32} (with Vulg. Saadja); with K150 $XXVI_{22}$ (with Syr Saadja) and $XXVII_{24}$ and with K601 (with 686 and Syr) VII_1. The importance of K150 Skinner himself recognises (July, 36), and if he seems anxious to challenge the testimony of K9 in view of de Rossi's verdict (mendis et rasuris scatet, July, 35), is it not important that K9 has connexion with the Vulgate,[1] and can we not say also of the famous LXX codex A "scatet rasuris?" As to f i^{a} r Dr. Skinner seems anxious to regard my view, that important readings of f i^{a} r had a Hebrew basis, as depending on only one passage (June, 512). This does not represent the facts. Dr. Skinner has overlooked the fact that in *ZAW* for 1908, p. 166, I drew attention to the fact that in XXIV 45 f i r (with bw dpt) gives the reading of Sam. and Syr. And f i r shows other agreements with Eastern witnesses in $XVIII_{19}$. $XXIX_3$. Besides it should not be altogether without its bearing that f i r so often agrees with Philo and Josephus. Thus in Genesis there arises the same problem about *f i r* as we have in the books of Kings about 19, 82, 93, 108: How does it happen that Lucianic readings are found even before Lucian? Instead of being very late, as Skinner supposes, f i r positively has very old readings.

And lastly, as to the use of the Divine Appellations in the recensions egj and f i r, in spite of all his polemics Dr. Skinner cannot help admitting that I have hit upon the truth in both cases in my characterisation. For in the case of egj he acknowledges the symmetry in the use of the Divine Appellations which I have maintained (June, 506) generally, and specially in reference to κυριος ο θεος (503) and to κυριος and ο θεος (504), and has also to admit the truth of my assertion of the Elohistic tendency of f i r (p.

[1] See my *Wie erklärt sich der gegenwärtige Zustand der Genesis*, Giessen, 1913, p. 9.

511). I have already maintained (*ZAW*, 1908, p. 19) that the chief characteristic of fir is κυριος ο θεος.

I still support the view that this κυριος ο θεος arose through the addition of ο θεος to an original Jahweh exactly like the κυριος ο θεος in the original LXX of Genesis i.–ix. 26 In reply to this Dr. Skinner asks (p. 511) how it happens that in this recension ο θεος stands for κυριος nine times and why we do not find κυριος ο θεος in these instances too. The explanation is very simple. In three of these ο θεος passages, iv. 3, x. 9*b*, xv. 4, Philo agrees with our recension; consequently it has preserved old Septuagintal readings; and the case will be similar in xv. 18, where D and y (A's cognate) agree with fir. In the other passages ο θεος will go back to the abbreviation 'א, which was meant to represent אדני but was understood as אלהים: this is the case in xviii. 27 (see *Textkr. Mat.*, p. 110), and, as is shown by the ο κυριος, which is regarded by Skinner too (p. 514) as equivalent to אדני, in xviii. 17, xvi. 2 (ο κυριος in M d^a p st Chr $\frac{1}{3}$) and xxvi. 24*a* (ο κυριος in p).[1] This leaves xxx. 30 as the sole exception, and this passage occurs in a context where there have admittedly been alterations in the Divine Names. But further, it is necessary to explain, as Dr. Skinner rightly demands, how on my hypothesis κυριος ο θεος could occur in fir for ο θεος in the ordinary LXX. The following passages require to be considered: vi. 11, vii. 9, ix. 1, ix. 8, ix. 17, xvi. 11, xx. 13, xxi. 4, xxviii. 4. As regards ix. 1 I must admit that I was wrong in including it in our recension (only on the strength of the testimony of the MSS. ht): for the other passages we must observe that several of them exactly corroborate the rule I have laid down as to the Hebrew basis of fir; for (1) we have the remarkable phenomenon that in vii. 9 and xxviii. 4 Sam.

[1] On the importance of these cursives see below, and also the last paragraphs about the cursives in this article.

has יהוה. Consequently here too f i r can go back to a Jahweh reading; (2) in xx. 13 d Chr ⅓ and in xxi. 4 bwds* v Chr have κυριος. Note that here, as in a former case, there is an explanation for the reading of f i r if the readings of d and p are taken into account; (3) vi. 11, ix. 8, and ix. 17 occur in the second Parasha, which now has an Elohistic character in the Massoretic text, but for which I have already in *A.R.*, 1903, p. 313 assumed an original Jahweh in vi. 12, 13, 22, viii. 15, ix. 12, and where I have endeavoured to prove an Elohistic redaction. In view of this I take Jahweh to be original also in the three passages vi. 11, ix. 8, ix. 17; (4) there remains only xvi. 11, where Lucian will have known the reading of MT as well and have paid regard to it by writing κυριος ο θεος.

This explains the chief exceptions to the rule κυριος ο θεος = original Jahweh + redactional אלהים. But even if a passage here and there is incapable of explanation, yet Dr. Skinner himself admits that my rule is true in twenty-eight cases. I hope that readers will have gathered from the above discussion that Dr. Skinner is wrong in saying (p. 511) "that no principle is consistently followed by the author of the recension in his use of the Divine Names, or if there be that Dahse has not detected it." The principle is there, and as far back as 1908 I pointed to it. Further, the above discussion has furnished us with new reasons for believing in a Hebrew basis for f i r and confirmed former pronouncements.

But Dr. Skinner does not confine himself to minimising the value of the Greek recensions; in substance he denies, in many passages of his articles in this Review, that the original Septuagint has any value at all for the restoration of the original text.

It is incomprehensible to me how anybody can write of the LXX "the assumed Hebrew basis of the LXX whose

existence I have shown to be highly problematical" (p. 494), and "that the LXX is dependent on the MT" (pp. 414, 420). If Dr. Skinner wishes to maintain that these expressions only refer to the transmission of the Divine Names we have on pp. 272–3 under a and b similar assertions in quite general terms, and it is only under c that he proceeds to speak of the Divine Names. He says there, amongst other things, with regard to MT and LXX, "The LXX represents at best an Alexandrian recension whose text was certainly not transmitted with the same scrupulous fidelity as that of Palestine." And he writes earlier, "The MT has substantial claims to be preferred to a variant of the LXX in all doubtful cases." What, then, in Dr. Skinner's own words, are the characteristics of the sole copy of the Palestinian recension which was rescued from the stormy period of the Roman wars? It "contains (p. 29) stereotyped errors and defects," it contains "eccentricities which, though not exactly errors, are purely accidental and have no value in themselves apart from some traditional prejudice." Granted, now, that the way in which this text has been preserved shows that it was almost superstitiously revered, do not those very peculiarities prove that even before the Roman period this text was not preserved in its purity either? Does not Dr. Kennedy, in the very same number in which Dr. Skinner exerts himself to depreciate the LXX, enter a plea for fuller criticism of the MT? He writes (p. 379) "that the Massoretic text itself when patiently and carefully studied gives . . . help for its own correction," and thereby admits that the present MT is not pure. In his Expositor articles Dr. Skinner still defends the principle of the Hebraica veritas, but it is otherwise in his commentary on Genesis. In that he makes the most extensive use of the readings of the LXX. Why? Is it to perpetuate "scribal and accidental errors"? When he wrote his

Expositor articles, all that he approved and signed in the *Times*, 1912 (October 2) must have escaped Dr. Skinner's mind. Only on the last page of the last article did it suddenly occur to him again. For he writes (p. 288), "I am far from thinking that the last word has been said about the problem of the LXX and its bearing on the history of the Hebrew text." Well, I think that the last word has not yet been said about the problem of the Divine Appellations of the Pentateuch either, even after Dr. Skinner's articles and my *Textkritische Materialien*. And my reason for so thinking is that, as already indicated, the redaction of the Divine Names is not limited to Genesis or the Pentateuch, but is to be seen throughout the Old Testament. *Not merely single books, but the whole collections of books* have been systematically worked over by redactors in the matter of the Divine Names. Let me give only one example. At present Jahweh Elohe Zebaoth does not appear in the Hebrew text before 1 Samuel i. 3. But in the original text it was otherwise. This expression is already to be found in certain passages in the LXX = Octateuch. And now I am happy to be able to add that I no longer stand alone in the opinion that in such a redaction in the Divine Names regard has been paid to the lessons for public reading. Independently of me, Lic. Dr. Caspari has reached the result, in his article "Über Verse, Kapitel, und letzte Redaktion in den Samuelbüchern" (*ZAW.*, 1913, pp. 47–72, 116–137), that the regulation of the Divine Names stands in relation to the division into lessons and that the latest Jahwistic redaction, more especially, takes account of it (p. 129), as I have maintained in Genesis, particularly with respect to the 3rd and 9th Parashiyoth. And as against the death sentence that Dr. Skinner pronounces on my Perikope-hypothesis in his second article, I need only point out that he has simply neglected to mention *those* chapters

in which a relation of the Divine Names and the Sedarim is particularly obvious (Gen. i.–xi.) in his examination, and writes (p. 419): "It is besides quite unnecessary to do so; for if the theory breaks down (as I believe I have proved that it does) as regards chs. xii.–l., it fails entirely." I draw the attention of readers of the EXPOSITOR to the fact that Dr. Sellin in his thirty-page review of my "Textkr. Materialien" (*N.K.Z.*, 1913, p. 127) says with regard to chs. i.–xi., "It is patent that the division into Sedarim here coincides frequently, as also in xii.–l., with the alternation of the Divine Names." For the moment, I limit my defence of my Perikope-hypothesis, so far as this concerns the Divine Names, to the sentence I have just quoted.[1] For in a few months, as Prof. Freiherr von Gall writes me, his Samaritan Pentateuch will appear, and presumably in this connexion too we shall learn much from it. But as concerns the redaction of the Divine Names throughout the Old Testament many years will elapse before the whole material is collected and worked out. This much, however, is already certain, that not only in the Greek transmission, but generally, the Divine Names are variable elements and consequently totally unreliable guides for any sort of division into sources. Before, however, I deal with the effects which this has on the criticism of the Pentateuch, I must say a word as to Dr. Skinner's use of the Septuagintal witnesses.

At this time of day it ought to be impossible for anybody to refer to the *text* of the Cambridge Septuagint as the standard text, as Dr. Skinner repeatedly does (e.g., pp. 500–501). In the first place it is incorrect to say that the Sixtina (in passing it may be observed that in Genesis up to xlvi. 28

[1] The view taken of the Divine Names is only *one* portion of my perikope-hypothesis; its main content deals with an entirely different subject, of which Dr. Skinner breathes not a word in the 128 pages covered by his articles.

this gives us a text compiled by the editors from only a few MSS.) and the Cambridge Septuagint "*seldom* differ" (p. 272). In respect of the Divine Names they do so in about thirty passages of Genesis, i.e. in half as many passages as those in which, according to Dr. Skinner, the Cambridge LXX differs at all from MT. Further, as everybody knows, the value of the Cambridge LXX lies in its apparatus and not in its text. As early as 1882 De Lagarde expressed his opinion as to the customary valuation of the uncials, and on the other hand how much may be won from the cursives is shown especially by Dr. Procksch's new Commentary on Genesis in addition to the researches of Wiener and myself. After all, the age of a MS. does not in *every* case prove the excellence of its reading. Thus, for instance, in Sirach Dr. Eb. Nestle has proved in respect of the common type of B𝔖 that it is younger and obviously much younger than the source of the Latin translation. And in the Peschitto, according to G. Diettrich, we have the interesting spectacle of a ninth century MS. offering a tradition that is frequently older than those in sixth century MSS. The same applies in the case of the MS. tradition of the LXX: the cursives have exactly the same claim to be heard as have the Uncials. Let me take an example. It is well known that in the Hebrew Bibles the Nun inversum shows that a passage is not in order; such a Nun we have, e.g., in Numbers x. 35, 36, while in the LXX these verses do in fact stand before 34. We have a similar Nun in Genesis xi. 32 in the Massora Parva to the *Bibl. Ven.*, 1524–5; and there in the Septuagintal MSS. dn the words θαρα εν χαρραν are wanting; so that here the Hebrew Nun inversum seems to point to the original text that lies at the basis of these Septuagintal MSS. Even in my *Textkr. Mat.*, p. 160, I had already adduced an important example to show that the present Hebrew form of the text often bears witness to the correct-

ness of the LXX reading. The MT of Genesis xlviii. 6 presupposes the contents of LXX Genesis xlvi. 27. For the Hebrew of xlviii. 6 speaks of more than two sons of Joseph, but in the Hebrew of xlvi. 27 only two are mentioned, while the LXX has *υιοι δε Ιωσηφ οι γενομενοι αυτω εν γη Αιγυωτω ψυχαι εννια.*

Finally as regards the great importance of the cursives dnpt, I would refer to what I said in my articles in the *ZAW.*, 1908 and 1910, and to what H. M. Wiener (not with "hastily improvised scholarship" and not with "transparent incompetence," but in a manner which thoroughly deserves attention) has repeatedly written, particularly in *Bibliotheca Sacra* for April, 1913.

It follows from what I have said in this article about the cursives that it is a totally untenable position to maintain that their variants are always internal to the Greek tradition; and Dr. Skinner himself does not believe it, for in his Commentary he quotes readings of the cursives, e.g., on Genesis xvii. 19.

I now come to the last portion of my answer to Dr. Skinner, namely, to the effect of my work on Pentateuchal criticism. Here Dr. Skinner himself makes the admission "that if, as regards the names for God, the text with which critics have operated could be shown to be either demonstrably wrong or hopelessly uncertain, the evidence for the documentary theory would at some points (at least in the analysis of J and E) be sensibly weakened" (Sep. 266; cf. April 295–6). Well, as far as the names of God go, the MT is in fact, as we have shown above, partly wrong, partly uncertain, so that even those of my critics who reject my new theory must concede this much, that certainly the use made at present of the names of God can by no means be defended. And I may be allowed to refer, in addition to the opinion of Hugo Gressmann, which I quoted above at the beginning of this

article, to Dr. Sellin's words, in the *N.K.Z.*, 1913, p. 131. "Dahse," he writes, "has gone far beyond Klostermann, Lepsius and Eerdmans, and has justly proved how uncertain in many particular instances we ought to be in assigning the sources on this basis, on the ground of the MT tradition alone, and how in this text itself later Jahwistic and Elohistic alterations have here and there taken place. Nay, he has perhaps even established definitely in a very few instances that the later public reading of the Pentateuch in divine service caused such an alteration. And consequently in the future we shall have to take into account more seriously than hitherto the points of difference between MT and LXX; for instance, not merely in the primeval history, but also in chaps. 13, 15, 16, 21, 38 we shall have to distinguish these much more thoroughly than is the case in present day commentaries." In brief, the names of God in the MT are not reliable.

But the same applies to the names Jacob and Israel. I would refer in this connexion to pp. 15–17 of "Is a Revolution in Pentateuchal Criticism at hand," to *Textkr. Mat.*, pp. 122–134, and to Wiener's *Pentateuchal Studies*, pp. 29–48. What I have written has induced Dr. Sellin to say (*loc. cit.*), "In fact we are here dealing with a point concerning which, not only is there much difference of opinion amongst critics themselves, but without further ado the admission must be made that both in MT and LXX there have been divergences from the original text, of such a nature that on this argument alone we have absolutely no right to form any inferences. In this matter we cannot go beyond the cautious opinion of Kuenen's which Dahse has quoted." And one of Germany's leading Higher Critics wrote personally to me (cf. my treatise *Wie erklärt sich der gegenwärtige Zustand der Genesis?* Giessen, 1913, p. 7 n.): "We can willingly surrender Jacob and Israel too, and the

important thing is not the separation of J and E, but that of P and JE." But if Jahweh and Elohim, Jacob and Israel, fail as criteria, then both of those Ariadne's clues to which one could cling in assigning individual passages to J and E are cut asunder. The rest of the argument from Style is not strong enough for this assignment. The case of Genesis is just what Dr. Gressmann describes it as being in Exodus to Numbers, in his *Moses*, p. 368: "There is substantial agreement on the line of demarcation of PK; but on the other hand the separation of J from E can seldom be carried through with anything like such certainty, since the criterion of the names of God, which was found useful in Genesis,[1] fails almost entirely in the middle books of the Pentateuch, and since the demonstrative force of the style is very small in view of the poverty of the Hebrew. In many cases J E are nothing more than labels which one can change round at will." But if these labels can be changed round at will, how many different J's and E's can come to life? J and E are no longer fixed quantities. Further, we should observe how, quite oppositely to Dr. Gressmann in this passage, Dr. Skinner seeks to minimise the value of the Divine Appellations for the division of Genesis (Apr. 293, Sept. 266). Why so? In order to escape the consequences of the uncertainty of the text! But although in his 128 pages Dr. Skinner is constantly reiterating the assurance that in spite of everything there is no occasion to give up the documentary theory, yet he must willy nilly rejoice us with these words (Sept. 267): "I apprehend, in short, that the real effect of Dahse's work will be . . . the diffusion of a vague uncertainty as regards the Hebrew text in general." And such, in fact, is the case, particularly if one takes into consideration *all* that I have said, and not merely the first

[1] See, however, Dr. Gressmann's most recent admission quoted above at the beginning of the article.

part of my *Textkr. Mat.* I. For, just like B. Eerdmans and H. M. Wiener, I do not only lay stress on the definite discovery of the original text of the Divine Appellations, as one might suppose from Dr. Skinner's remarks (cf. especially the passage, Sept. 282, "What is the use of a pericope theory which deals only with a single feature of the text, and leaves so many other characteristics unexplained?"—in writing which Dr. Skinner must have forgotten entirely that *Textkr. Mat.*, pp. 144–174 also deals with the pericope-hypothes's); I lay stress on testing the certainty of the tradition in reference to *all the other* criteria also. For as a matter of fact the practice hitherto in this has been just as unsatisfactory as in the case of the names of God, as hundreds of examples show. I shall take some future occasion of dealing with this later on. In the *Deutsche Literatur Zeitung*, 1913, No. 20, col. 1224–5 Dr. Gressmann says, "Certainly the text is unreliable in many ways, and our thanks are due whenever our attention is directed to it afresh, but really the whole Pentateuch must be corrected throughout word for word by any one who desires to cut the ground from beneath the documentary hypothesis." Such is indeed the fact. So long as each verse has not been accurately ascertained by textual criticism, every detailed division into sources rests on an uncertain basis. And in this connexion I must protest against Dr. Skinner's attempt to create the impression that I suppose "that apart from the criterion of the Divine Names there would be no evidence of diversity of authorship in the Pentateuch at all" (Apr. 294). From my publications up to now (*Textkr. Mat.*, I., pp. 143, 144–174; *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1912, pp. 661–663; *Evang. Kirchl. Anz. von Berlin*, 1913, No. 9, pp. 88, 89; *Wie erklärt sich der gegenwärtige Zustand der Genesis?* 1913, pp. 15–20) it is perfectly and unmistakably clear that though I deny the correctness of the hypothesis of parallel documents as sources of the Pentateuch, yet I

believe in different strata in it. As for what Dr. Skinner cites (Apr. 294), " numerous differences in subject matter," " distinguishable varieties of religious and historical points of view " to which as far back as 1900 my friendly correspondent had drawn my attention (cf. exactly the same objections by Dr. Sellin in the *N.K.Z.*, 1913, p. 138), in my opinion this offers no proof of formerly independent sources, but only furnishes evidence for my conception that different hands have successively worked on the Pentateuch. For my conception is that from Israel's earliest times there existed a holy book which later has undergone revisions in the time of the Prophets, in the time of the introduction of lessons into public service, and finally in the time of the Sopherim to adapt it to the changed circumstances. In the next few years I hope to be able to put forward the evidence for my view *as a whole* in a collected form : the evidence for the revision of that old writing for purposes of reading in public service may be found in my *Textkr. Mat.*, 144–174, cf. also *Bib. Sac.*, 1912, pp. 661–663, and *Wie erklärt sich*, pp. 15–20. And this brings me to my explanation of Exodus vi. 2–3, on which Dr. Skinner pronounces the opinion that it is produced " by a textual criticism which is divorced alike from exegetical intelligence and historical and religious insight." In those pages of my *Textkr. Mat.* I have explained that much of the matter in Genesis which is at present called P stands at the beginning or end of the old Sedarim, the pericopes into which, for the purpose of public reading in the service, the old book was divided up, and that the repetitions, recapitulations, etc., in these passages are explained by the fact that they are the chapter headings of the old Sedarim like those that are to be found in German and English Bibles. I have called this " Liturgical Addition," and attribute it to Ezra. That is my pericope-hypothesis proper, and my conception of the use of the Divine Names only

forms a part of it (cf. especially *Wie erklärt sich*, p. 18). This pericope-hypothesis of mine has been championed by Dr. Sellin in the *N.K.Z.*, 1913, pp. 134–148, and the *Theologie der Gegenwart*, 1913, pp. 124, 125. He has furnished an additional new proof of it by saying in the latter place, "I would here cite an almost staggering argument for the correctness of Dahse's conception of this latter source (sc. P), which he himself has overlooked although he cites the passage, but translates it incorrectly (p. 161). I mean Nehemiah viii. 8: "And they read out of the book of the Law of God *in sections*, and with explanations, so that they understood what was read." Or, according to the LXX even: "And Ezra made sections and explained." In the מְפֹרָשׁ, i.e. in Parashiyoth, we have in my opinion original documentary testimony for the correctness of Dahse's view."

The character of these P passages as chapter headings involves their having originally contained nothing new. But later when they themselves were incorporated in the holy text the Sopherim, in order to make the resulting repetitions less sensible, selected precisely these pieces for revision with smaller additions and alterations (cf. thereon *Wie erklärt sich*, pp. 19–20). Now Exodus vi. 2 ff. belongs to these P passages. It is the beginning of the 50th Seder of the Pentateuch, and contains a recapitulation of what is narrated in Exodus iii. Originally it ran thus: "I appeared to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob as their God, but My name I did not reveal to them." If this is treated as an independent narrative it is certainly meaningless; but regarded as a recapitulation it is in place. How Exodus vi. 3, and with that as a starting point much that concerns the Divine Names, was subsequently worked over may be seen in my *Wie erklärt sich*, pp. 18, 19, and in the *Textkr. Mat.* Here I would confine myself to answering two questions by Dr. Skinner and other critics. First, why do I so often prefer

the LXX to the consentient testimony of MT and Sam. ? Because it has preserved the original character of these P passages as the superscriptions of chapters in greater purity than MT and Sam. It often shows in these passages repetitions as compared with the context, where MT and Sam. show a slight differentiation from it, it has remained free from the revision of the Sopherim in these passages, it stands nearer to Ezra than MT and Sam. But if these P passages present an older character in the LXX than in MT and Sam. that is strong support for my conception that the use of the Divine Names in LXX is also older than that of MT and Sam. If, as I have shown, the P passages stand in relation to the division into lessons, may not the same hold good of the Divine Names ? It is not at present opportune to investigate in detail the mutual relations of LXX, MT and Sam. ; for that we must await the appearance of the new edition of Sam. by Freiherr von Gall. The second point I desire to answer here is that treated by Dr. Skinner in the April number, at the top of p. 300, and used against me by Dr. Sellin in the *N.K.Z.*, 1913, p. 131, viz., the statement of Genesis iv. 26. Higher Critics say that it is there distinctly stated that the name Jahweh was already in use from the time of Enosh ; this is contradicted by the statements in Exodus, consequently Genesis iv. 26 testifies to the ordinary documentary division. And here I must reproach all my critics with having overlooked *one* sentence in my *Textkr. Mat.* which robs the documentary theory of this its last *point d'appui* for the use of the Divine Names as a clue to documents. On p. 98 of my book I conclude from certain phenomena that *Genesis iv. 26b relates to Cain*, and not to iv. 26a Enosh. Cain, the representative of the Kenites, begins the invocation of Jahweh, but that is in entire harmony with the statement, Exodus iii., according to which Moses learnt to know Jahweh when in the service of Jethro

the Kenite. And so Genesis. iv. 26b ceases to be a *point d'appui* of the *documentary* theory, but becomes one for the *Kenite* hypothesis. Between Genesis iv. and Exodus iii. there is no contradiction ; that Exodus vi. 3 is not an independent narrative has been stated above.

Let this be the end of my reply. I refrain from treating of every detail brought against me by Dr. Skinner. In many cases he has misunderstood me, but in many he has made observations that I shall thankfully use. I have regretted what he writes at the bottom of p. 275, but Dr. Skinner's situation makes his action comprehensible. The position, however, is that in substance Harold M. Wiener is right, for it is, as I hope I have shown, demonstrably true and not false that the Divine Appellations are variable elements even of MT, and regarding myself it is fact and no fiction that the state of the text has been influenced by the Sedarim.

Johannes Dahse.

THE PATIENCE OF JOB (ST. JAMES V. 11).

"THE patience of Job" has become proverbial. But when we turn to the story, and read the Book as a whole, we may well ask, is that the picture of a patient man who accepts without murmuring or complaint all the evils that befall him? On the contrary, as one of the best commentators on this passage remarks, "Job is not an example of what we should call patience except in his first acceptance of calamity. We should rather say that his complaint in chapter iii., when he curses the day on which he was born, his indignation against his friends for their want of faith in him, his agony at the thought that God had forsaken him, were symptoms of an extremely sensitive, vehement and impatient character which had little of Christian gentleness in it, but excites our admiration by its passionate outbursts of exalted feeling."[1]

These remarks are quite true, and they may be illustrated by many passages from the words of Job. In the 9th chapter, for instance, he accuses God of injustice: "He destroyeth the perfect and the wicked, if the scourge slay suddenly, he will mock at the trial of the innocent. The earth is given into the hand of the wicked: he covereth the faces of the judges hereof; if it be not he who then is it?" (*vv.* 23, 24). Again: "My soul is weary of my life; I will give free course to my complaint, I will speak in the bitterness of my soul" (x. 1). It is clear then from these and other passages, which might be cited, that Job as presented to us in these dialogues is not an example of patience in the accepted sense of the word. Nor indeed is it in this sense that St. James offers the example of Job for our imitation. He is thinking of something higher

[1] The Rev. J. B. Mayor *ad loc.*

than meek and uncomplaining submission to suffering and evil. That is indeed a characteristic Christian excellence which is recognised and illustrated in the context of the passage in St. James, and designated by its appropriate name; but it is not the quality attributed here to Job.

1. A reference to the context in the Epistle will show that St. James is careful to make a distinction betwen *μακροθυμία*, or longsuffering, and *ὑπομονή*, endurance or fortitude. And it is the latter and not the first which is attributed to Job.

In the preceding verses (8–10 incl.) St. James exhorts his readers to be patient until the coming of the Lord, as the husbandman waiteth for the precious fruit of the earth (*μακροθυμήσατε οὖν, ἀδελφοί, ἕως τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ κυρίου*), and also cites the prophets as an example of suffering and of patience (*κακοπαθίας καὶ μακροθυμίας*). In verse 11 the form of expression changes. In place of *μακροθυμεῖν* and *μακροθυμία* we have *ὑπομένειν* and *ὑπομονή*. "We call them blessed which endured (*τοὺς ὑπομείναντας*)"; "ye have heard of the patience (marg. endurance) of Job (*τὴν ὑπομονὴν Ἰώβ*), and have seen the end of the Lord, how that the Lord is full of pity, and merciful." It is strange that in face of such a marked and undoubtedly intentional change of expression the Revisers should have retained the A.V. rendering of "the patience" of Job, especially as the distinction is observed both in the Vulgate: "Ecce beatificamus qui sustinuerunt; sufferentiam Job audistis"; and in the Corbey MS. quoted by Mayor: "Ecce beatos dicimus qui sustinuerunt. Sufferentiam Job audistis."

The Book of Job and the Epistle of St. James may both be regarded as inspired utterances on the subject of temptation and trial, and in each patience is distinguished from fortitude. In the case of Job the two words are characteristic of the two divisions of the Book—the Prologue and the

dramatic Dialogues. In the Prologue—the simple, primitive tradition—Job is represented as a man suffering great and unexpected and undeserved calamity, and meekly submitting to the divine will. In other words, he is an example of patience or μακροθυμία. In the dramatic Dialogues—the questionings of a later age on the mystery of Divine Providence—Job, as we have seen, exhibits anything but a patient demeanour. Apart from the loss of material possessions, and the physical suffering or disease he has now to endure the false and mistaken arguments of his friends and their suggestions of his wickedness. He is tortured by his search after truth. He even accuses God Himself of injustice and cruelty. But in his heart he knows that the God whom he defies and accuses is not the real God, the God whom his inmost consciousness knew to be absolutely true and loving and just. And the grandeur of the Book consists in the story of Job's persistent search after truth, in his determination to "endure" until he discover for himself the end of the Lord, the final revelation of the Divine character, and his justification by Jehovah. This came in an unexpected way. No precise answer was given to Job's questionings. No explanation even of his sufferings —the sufferings of an innocent and righteous man. No definite solution of the problem of sin and suffering which so profoundly exercised the minds of religious people in old days. But nevertheless it was an answer that satisfied Job. The voice out of the whirlwind (cf. xxxviii. 1) proclaimed that "the Lord was full of pity and merciful." The rebuke falls upon Eliphaz and his companions, not upon Job: "Ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right as my servant Job hath" (ch. xlii. 7).

In this narrative two characteristics of ὑπομονή emerge, which distinguish it from μακροθυμία, namely, voluntary suffering, and suffering endured for the sake of an end to

be accomplished. Job might have quietly acquiesced in his friends' arguments, accepted their conclusions, and received their commendations on his acknowledgment of sin and of the justice of its chastisement. Instead of that he endures their contempt, and brushing aside their arguments goes on until he discovers the truth revealed in the voice of the Lord in the thunderstorm and receives the commendation of the Almighty.

2. This sense of active resistance in *ὑπομονή* (endurance or fortitude) is inherent in the Greek word. It is used, for instance, of the capacity of a sword to resist blows (Polyb. xv. 15, 8), or of a man to resist pain (Plato 62 ff., 412 c). Canon T. Evans in his scholarly edition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians (1 Cor. xiii. 7) paraphrases *ὑπομονή* as: "Vanquishing all assaults of ghostly enemies by a steady front of determined resistance, and invincible courage." [1]

3. Although the thought of *ὑπομονή* was from the first a note of Christianity, its place in the Christian vocabulary is chiefly due to St. Paul. The noun occurs in St. Luke alone of the Gospels. But St. Matthew and St. Mark both record the great saying of our Lord, *ὁ ὑπομείνας εἰς τέλος οὗτος σωθήσεται* (Matt. xxiv. 13. See Mark xiii. 13), "He that endureth to the end, the same shall be saved." A thought which St. Luke expresses by the parallel saying: *ἐν τῇ ὑπομονῇ ὑμῶν κτήσεσθε τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν* (xxi. 19), "In your patience ye shall win your souls (*marg.* lives)." Here the conception of voluntary suffering for an end is predominant. With this significance it is a quality ascribed to Christ Himself, who "had power to lay his life down and power to take it again" (see 2 Thess. iii. 5, Rev.

[1] *ὑπό* in composition has often the force of action in an opposite direction as *ὑπολογίζεσθαι*, "to reckon on the opposite side" (*per contra*), *ὑποστρέφειν*, "to turn in an opposite direction, to turn back." See Riddell, Plato, *Apol. Socr. Digest.*, 131.

i. 9, and cf. John x. 18) ; and in Hebrew xii. 2 the innermost teaching of *ὑπομονή* and its supreme importance in the Christian life appear in the same connexion : *ὃς αντὶ τὴς προκειμένης αὐτῷ χαρᾶς ὑπέμεινε σταυρὸν αἰσχύνης καταφρονήσας*, " who for the joy that was set before him endured the cross (or a cross), despising the shame." It is the end in view, the joyous hope that inspires Christian fortitude.

The use of the word in Colossians i. 11, again in combination with *μακροθυμία* or longsuffering, points to its pre-eminence in Christian character as viewed by St. Paul. The passage forms part of the Apostles' prayer for the converts at Colossæ that they may " walk worthily of the Lord unto all pleasing, bearing fruit in every good work and increasing in the knowledge of God ; strengthened with all power according to the might of his glory unto all patience and longsuffering with joy (*ἐν πάσῃ δυνάμει δυναμούμενοι κατὰ τὸ κράτος τῆς δόξης αὐτοῦ εἰς πᾶσαν ὑπομονὴν καὶ μακροθυμίαν*). Here the Apostle teaches that the end of strengthening through divine power, the purpose for which that divine power is given (all expressed by the preposition *εἰς*), is endurance and longsuffering. Moreover that the line on which this divine strengthening should proceed (*κατὰ*) is " the might of the glory of God." That is the might of the glory of God in Christ. For it is quite possible to refer *αὐτοῦ* to the preceding *τοῦ κυρίου* rather than to the preceding *τοῦ θεοῦ*. For Christ is all through, the theme of this outburst of prayer and praise. In that case " the glory " (*δόξα*) may well bear the same meaning which it has in John i. 14, that is " glory as of the only begotten of the Father " or God, as He was manifested to the Apostle in the person of Christ. Thus interpreted St. Paul's teaching is that to obtain the high quality of Christian fortitude nothing less is needed than the might of the glory of God as manifested to His disciples in Jesus Christ

4. This was recognised from the first. It was in this spirit that St. Paul undertook his great and perilous task of carrying the mystery of the Gospel to the Gentiles. Like Wordsworth's "Happy Warrior," who,

> . . . . . "If called upon to face
> Some awful moment to which heaven has joined
> Great issues, ...
> He through the heat of conflict keeps the law
> In calmness made and sees what he foresaw."

And so when St. Paul takes leave of his beloved Ephesian elders at Miletus he has to tell them that they would see his face no more, that in every city the Holy Ghost testified that bonds and imprisonment awaited him. But, he added, "I hold not my life of any account as dear unto myself so that I may accomplish my course, and the ministry I have received from the Lord Jesus, to testify the Gospel of the grace of God" (Acts xx. 22 foll.). A noble example of what St. Paul himself would call ὑπομονὴ μετὰ χαρᾶς (Col. i. 11). And all through the Christian centuries men have, with St. James, "called them blessed that endured" (τοὺς ὑπομείναντας), as England and all the civilised world called Captain Scott and his heroic companions blessed when they undertook a noble enterprise and perished in carrying out their purpose. That last message from the Antarctic breathes the very spirit of ὑπομονή at its best: "We took risks," wrote Captain Scott, "and we know we took them. Things have come out against us, and therefore we have no cause for complaint, and bow to the will of Providence, determined to do our best to the last." It is this sense of purpose and pertinacity in spite of suffering that makes ὑπομονή, or fortitude, a higher and more inspiring quality than μακροθυμία, or longsuffering. It contains the secret of success in every endeavour. It is the note of strenuous lives, the characteristic of all who, with some

great purpose in view, have nobly endeavoured as pioneers of great causes, such as the abolition of slavery, the amelioration of prison life, the advocacy of temperance, and all those who, like Job, have discovered truth and upheld it at the price of suffering:

"Strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield." [1]

ARTHUR CARR.

[1] So completely had *ὑπομονή* been identified with Christian character that it gave point to the Emperor Julian's sneer when the Christians complained of their treatment by pagan governors: "Bear it patiently," he said, "as your God commands you." Socr. *H.E.*, III. 14.

THE PRESENT POSITION OF OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM.[1]

During recent years there has appeared in Old Testament criticism a change of attitude which may yet produce large results. To speak broadly, men are not merely questioning some of the results arrived at, but revising certain of the canons set up, by the school which passes under the name of Wellhausen. That school, which has been so long dominant that it has passed into the accepted position, is now being subjected to keen criticism. And the criticism is no longer confined to insistence on the dangerous tendencies of the hypothesis or on the disturbing character of its results; it has taken for its arms the weapons used by the school in its days of unquestioned triumph—the weapons of scientific accuracy and loyalty to facts.

It would, however, be unwise to conclude that the hypothesis is exploded and that it is possible to return to the earlier positions with the placid confidence that such a return is supported by modern scholarship. The theory in its broad lines was too firmly based on, and is still too securely supported by, the evidence of facts to be lightly brushed aside. And some who write unguardedly on the subject would be wise, if they noted two things.

One is that some of the strongest assailants of the school do so in the interests of a view which conflicts more radically than that of Wellhausen with what used to be the traditional position. Eerdmans in Holland, e.g., represents a reconstruction which ought to warn any who claim his support, timere Danaos dona ferentes.

The other thing it is wise to remember is that the majority of those who at present question the theory quietly accept

[1] Inaugural Lecture at New College, Edinburgh.

its well-assured results. There is, e.g., no serious effort to go back to the position that Deuteronomy in its present form is Mosaic in the sense of dating from the age of the Exodus. Now that, as was recognised long ago in the Robertson Smith controversy, is the crux of the position, for to put Deuteronomy late is to recognise that the law, in the form in which we have the law, comes after instead of before the writing prophets. That broad change in the whole method of approach to the study of the Old Testament is not seriously questioned in the many criticisms which are being urged to-day.

The Wellhausen theory had two sides. It was a criticism and, as such, it rejected the traditional view on the ground that that view was not true to the facts of history. But it was more than a criticism, and its dramatic and signal triumph was due to its being so much more. In the light of the facts which had been previously ignored and of its reading of these facts, it offered its own view of the course of Hebrew history and the development of Hebrew religion.

But behind the reconstruction and governing all the interpretation of the facts were certain opinions as to the methods of divine revelation and as to evolution. These views deeply and subtly influenced the theory, and helped towards its success. For the underlying presuppositions were common property of that time: and, because they were common, a theory which implicitly accepted them commended itself much more readily to men's minds. As time has gone on, these underlying opinions have worked themselves out, as such opinions sooner or later do, with a curiously remorseless logic, and have carried later men on to positions which were not previously clear.

Now the new criticism is being urged along both lines. Every fresh theory begins by grasping clearly certain facts which have not found adequate recognition or which are

in contradiction to the accepted view. Finding room for these, in its own reconstruction, it has its rightful place. But then there accumulates the evidence of other facts which it in turn has ignored. New light is thrown on old questions. New factors in the history or religion that is dealt with emerge. New emphasis is laid on old factors which have held a place, but not an adequate place. For a time the theory was able to keep front against these, to explain, sometimes to explain away, objections urged against its validity. But gradually the facts have increased, their force is felt more and more, as men free themselves from the power of prejudice, and it is becoming clearer that the theory must be widened to meet the new position.

The most important has been the light which has come from excavation in the East. The results have not yet been carefully sifted, nor even collected into accessible form. Few things are more needed at present than the patient work of some student who would gather the results of excavation in Palestine, e.g., during the past few years. The time of course has not yet come for bringing these matters into their final shape, for the excavations are still proceeding. But even a collection of the material to serve a temporary purpose would be greatly useful. It is only possible to select here one such find. If that seems, as it must, a slim basis on which to build very much, it must be recognised that its isolated character is not in the reality of things but in the exigencies of an opening lecture. Its evidence is really supported by much more with which time will not suffer me to deal. The law, then, of Hammurapi, an early king of Babylonia, has been discovered on a stele which dates long before any of the written documents in the Old Testament. The law has given an interesting light into a civilisation which has passed away, for the code

is so general in its scope that it offers a glimpse of a very direct kind into the life of a community which, be it remembered, belonged to the same stock as the Hebrews. But, besides this, no sooner was the code examined than it was found to agree in many respects with the first code which we possess in the Old Testament, the so-called book of the covenant in Exodus. The similarity, not merely in the regulations, but even in the language, is very great: yet the differences which exist are sufficient to make it clear that the Hebrew was not borrowed directly from the Babylonian. Both codes seem rather to have had a common origin and to have made their way into the two kindred communities.

But what is of more significance is that we find the patriarchs represented in certain matters as following similar prescriptions to those which appear in the Code of Hammurapi but which do not appear in the Book of the Covenant. Thus Abraham, in his attitude towards Sarah's claim as to Ishmael, is acting along the line of what we now know was laid down to define the rights of the principal wife in that earliest of all codes.

The discovery raises a great many interesting questions, as to the historical background in the patriarchal narratives, as to the early relations between the Hebrews and Babylonia: but in particular it urges one matter of fundamental importance.

We have been told that the Hebrews, even so late as the period when they conquered Palestine, came, not only as aliens to Palestine, but strangers to the settled life which was practised in Palestine. The influence, therefore, of the new land and of all for which it stood on the new settlers had to be set very high, when the Hebrews were thought of as entering the country with nothing more to guide them than the broken and uncertain customs which suffice for

nomads. They must have learned all the arts of civilisation, husbandry, law, from their Canaanite neighbours, since they had nothing out of their own past which could guide them in such wholly changed circumstances. Along with that, they must have been peculiarly exposed to the influence of Canaanite religion, since their God, a God of the desert, could not help them to settle in their new homes.

Because of this, every part of the Hebrew law which implied a settled habitation, and the practices which arise from a settled habitation, had to be put later than the period of the transference of the people to Canaan. Hence the theory proceeded to date the documents of the history. Phenomena in the legislation, statements in the history, because they implied a settled population, could not be accepted as belonging to the period to which Scripture assigned them : for the Hebrews were mere nomads when they reached Palestine without the needs which such law was framed to meet, and without the capacity even to understand it.

All that position must be reconsidered. There must be room in history for such figures as the patriarchs, since they show so singular an agreement with the customs of the period to which they have been assigned. The Hebrews must also be recognised as not, up till the date of the conquest, mere desert tribes, without sanctuary or legislation or civilisation. Instead they were men who settled wherever it was practicable, who had their faces turned from the desert and to the settled land. And that implies how they went into Palestine with a past behind them which brought a positive contribution to the life of the new country into which they came. They entered Canaan with institutions and traditions which were peculiarly their own and which brought it about that, while they borrowed much and learned much, they moulded everything which they

thus took over. If such is the case, it becomes impossible to relegate at once to a date after the conquest any code which implies settled habits of agricultural life, or any festival which has for its background the practice of agriculture.

The Wellhausen hypothesis thrust all law, civil and ceremonial, much too late, because it posited for the beginning of Israel's settled life in Canaan a community which had no knowledge of or need for law. But we have come to see that the men came to their land with a national character already formed and a national life already shaped.

The result is double. On the one hand, it becomes impossible to suppose that it is enough to say that here the Hebrew borrowed from the Canaanite and there he was influenced by the Babylonian, here he took his law from Canaan and there he accepted his cosmogony from Babylonia. That attitude towards the most self-consistent and most enduring national life the world has ever seen was always more than a little unsatisfactory. It was enormously difficult to understand how a faith and a national character, which were a patchwork from all the faiths of the East, could have outlived all those from which it borrowed and created the most self-sufficing and enduring of all the religious types. But it was difficult to find any firm ground until it was at least possible to suppose that the Hebrew faith began with something which was distinctively its own. We see that now, and with it we can see how, though it borrowed and, until it shut itself within the walls of the later law, was open to all influences from without, it took nothing which was not in fundamental agreement with its intimate principles and which it could not mould into conformity with its own temper.

The other result, which is closely allied with what has already been said, is that new weight must be given to the

traditions of Israel itself. Such an attitude is, of course, in agreement, singular agreement, with what is taking place in other fields where similar inquiries are prosecuted: we know how the Greek stories are being treated in a new spirit. And so we are coming to listen in a new temper of humility to what Israel has to say about the origin of its own faith and life. We may need, we do need, to examine into the history of these traditions and to test them by every test, literary and historical, which we can bring to bear. But, finally, the ultimate thing we know about this faith is what the Hebrews themselves said about it. It is no longer legitimate, in the light of analogies brought from every quarter, from the practices of Australian aborigines and habits of Syrian worshippers, to reconstruct the course of development in a religion which in itself and in its outcome is so different from anything that is seen outside. The faith, in its influence both on the people and on the world is so different from all the rest that it becomes us as scientific students to hear first what it has to say about its own origin and its own development. And hence it is no exaggeration to say that the old phrase Moses and the Prophets is coming back again, though with very different views as to what is meant both by Moses and by the prophets.

I have said that the Wellhausen theory was framed under the influence of certain dominant conceptions as to the origin and growth of religion which were then current. In part it owed its success to the simple fact, that it thus fell in with the Zeitgeist. Evolution was in the air, and the theory seemed to apply evolution to the development of the Hebrew religion. But evolution with laws borrowed from the physical order is apt to blunder badly when it is applied to religion at all, and especially to blunder when it is applied to the Hebrew religion which gives so large

a space to prophecy. For the prophets claimed and exercised the right to stand out from the natural course of development, and they did so in the name of a God with whom they claimed to hold a direct and immediate communion. They believed in One who controlled the order of the world, and in that faith they themselves sought to control the course of human development in their own nation.

But the theory submitted the prophets to a scheme of evolution which had not been patient enough to learn the laws of development of religion from religion itself. As a result, certain elements in their teaching were ignored, other elements were ruled out.

Thus all the prophets claimed the power to foresee the future, and unquestionably they received a certain part of their influence among the people through their claim to foresee the future. The belief formed a part of their theology and sprang from deep elements in their faith. God, they said, had a purpose, and, when He willed and as He willed, He could and did make it known. God, they said, had the control of the future, as He had the control of all things in His own power, and, because He was the Master, He could say what He meant to do. The Hebrew prophet naturally believed that God did reveal what He was about to do.

But the theory could find no room in its view of how religion develops for such a factor, and so, sometimes with an uneasy conscience, that factor in the Hebrew faith was ignored. When the prophets foretold what was to come, they were merely exercising a shrewder political insight into the conditions of the time than was granted to ordinary men. They saw how, in the divided world of the East, a world-power like Assyria must arise and prove itself invincible. Winckler could even suggest that they were the

emissaries of Assyria to weaken the hands of the little powers of the West and to sow division among their councils.

And, when the prophets declared, as they do with one voice, that they said these things in virtue of a deeper knowledge of God and His will, their testimony was ignored. They were either deceiving themselves or saying things which they really did not quite mean.

Again, there were passages in the prophets in which these spoke of the day of the Lord as implying an intervention direct and immediate to set up a new order in the world which was under their God's power. These also were inconvenient to the theory. On the one side they offended, because they implied that God had a relation to the world. Now the theory taught that Israel learned to believe in the world and in a God who ruled the world, from seeing a world-empire. Israel at first could only conceive of a God who had a relation to itself. All such sayings which implied a relation between God and a world must be late. But the passages also offended because men had formed the prophets in their own likeness. Believing themselves in a long slow process, at the end of which God should bring in His new order, they believed that the prophets must have held the same thing. That God should intervene directly meant a break in the chain of evolution : and the prophets must have believed, as their interpreters believed, that there were no breaks in the chain.

Hence the passages which implied a different view were watered down or explained away. Sometimes they were violently cut out and relegated to the time of the exile. The exile became a great heap into which anything could be flung : but no effort was made to show how a people, whose chief business must have been to make their living in the new conditions of Babylonia, could have flung up the motley conceptions for which they were made responsible.

At first the work was confined to removing some of the verses which closed a prophetic book. It was said that a later age, preferring that a prophet should not end with woe, had patched his prophecy with a happier conclusion. But little by little it came to be seen that the conception was not confined to a few verses at the close of a book. It was woven into the prophets: it cropped out in unexpected places: it was here and there and there again. So there came to be common a violent and often painfully arbitrary treatment of the text of the prophets. They were cut to pieces and assigned to many dates. I think it is no exaggeration to say that the result has been to cast very strong suspicion, in calmer minds, on the worth of the whole critical movement.

But now it has come to be seen that an eschatological scheme lies fundamentally embedded in the prophetic way of thinking. It has also come in part to be seen why. We all know how common and how early is the birth of cosmogonies, how native it seems to be to the religious mind to conceive the world as one, born out of the will of God, or at least brought to order by the power of God. To such a cosmogony Hebrew faith brings its strong sense of the divine purpose, of how God has an end. The inevitable outcome of that union, the union of cosmogony with teleology, is eschatology. Conceive the world as one, as owing, if not its being, at least its ordered form, to a purpose in God's mind: and you cannot but go on sooner or later to recognise that it must have an end, and that the end must correspond with the purpose which brought it into being. Conceive God as the God, not only of almighty power, but of good will to men and to Israel: and you see how natural it is for men who are in communion with His mind and His will to believe they see what He is about to do in order to bring in His end. The foretelling which the prophets

claim to exercise is no necromancy : it is the knowledge of the character of that day of the Lord which shall wind up the long course of human things and which shall usher in the Kingdom. And then the prophets are not there to guess as to what, in the weakness of the little kingdoms of the West, Assyria will do. They are there to tell what, in a nation and in a world which has forgotten His purpose, Jahweh must do. They speak from Him and they prophesy as to what is His will.

That means how the prophets are being recognised, not merely as social reformers or good politicians, but primarily as what they claimed to be, teachers of religion. Their polemic against certain practices which existed in Israel was carried on primarily in the interests of religion. In their eschatology they were working out the question as to the relation of God to the world. They believed in the divine personality with a simple directness which catches the breath at times : they believed themselves in direct communion with a God who was personal. Coming from that with the Lord's burden they saw every question in a way which it is wholesome to recognise.

Perhaps one may say that the trend of modern work on the Old Testament is to put the age of the Hebrew thought and civilisation much earlier and so to leave room for a longer growth. It is also to emphasise the distinctive character of Israel's religion. Israel brings something very significant and very much its own. Through the later work of the Wellhausen school of criticism the distinctive character of the Hebrew religion seemed to be in danger of disappearing altogether. The Hebrews appeared so late in the field of history and of thought, and were so insignificant when they did appear, that their religion became a series of borrowings from one side and from another. And, when Smend spoke once about " der kleine Gott von Jerusalem,"

he was summing up the impression which was apt to be left on the mind by the whole movement.

That, I think, is changed or is on the point of being changed. We are seeing the Hebrew faith as a much greater thing and, above all, with its own definite character and its own word to say, its own contribution to make. And even when it borrows, as it frequently does, when it is influenced, as it is in its great and creative period, by the surroundings in which it is placed, it borrows to set its own stamp on everything which it has borrowed. It may take the brass of its neighbours : but it gives them back gold.

Again, it may be necessary to emphasise how all this does not mean, what some one has said, that the Wellhausen theory is so thoroughly exploded that there is nothing left to do except to cart away the fragments to the rubbish-heap. The scheme in its broad features still holds the field, and even many of its detailed results are proved. But what happens to every theory has happened to this one : it must modify itself and remain supple enough to make room for the new facts and the new light on old facts which are being thrust upon our notice.

A. C. Welch.

THE FORMS OF HEBREW POETRY.

VI. The Bearing of Certain Metrical Theories on Criticism and Interpretation.

Hitherto throughout this series of articles I have confined my attention to the forms of parallelistic poetry. I have endeavoured to keep, as they should be kept, distinct, the two forms, parallelism and rhythm, while pointing out the intimate connexion that often exists between them. Yet that connexion is not so intimate but that either form *may*

exist apart, even in literatures that employ both. Arabic "rhymed prose," which is not bound by the strict laws of Arabic metre, often employs parallelism as freely as any Hebrew poem [1]; on the other hand much of the strictly metrical Arabic poetry is totally lacking or exceedingly deficient in parallelism,[1] and few Hebrew poems maintain complete parallelism throughout.[2] If it is customary, as it certainly seems to be, for non-parallel couplets in a Hebrew poem to fall into the same rhythm as the parallel couplets, can a Hebrew poem entirely dispense with strict parallelism? We cannot rule this out as impossible, nor should we be wise to treat it as very improbable; but, even if parallelism were entirely absent, a very essential characteristic of the poetry would still remain, if it continued to be parallelistic throughout, in spite of the total absence of parallelism of terms.

But the question has recently been forced to the front: is there a Hebrew rhythmical poetry that dispenses not only with parallelism, but also with the parallelistic structure that is an essential characteristic of all the Hebrew poetry of which we have yet taken account?

Lowth, by his analysis of parallelism, brought to light the fact that this parallelism was as conspicuous in much of the prophetic writings as in Psalms or Job: he thus extended the then recognised boundaries of what is poetry in the Old Testament. By his analysis of rhythm Sievers claims to have carried this extension of the still generally recognised boundaries of Old Testament poetry very much further: what, till the publication of his first work on Hebrew metre,[3] had been universally regarded as prose has

[1] Expositor, May, 1913, pp. 555 ff.

[2] Expositor, July, 1913, pp. 45 ff.

[3] E. Sievers, *Metrische Studien*, i. *Studien zur hebräischen Metrik* in the *Abhandlungen der phil. hist. Classe der königlichen sächsischen Gesellschaften der Wissenschaften*, xxi. (1903). See especially ch. x., pp. 371 ff.

under his hands come to wear the appearance of regular metrical composition; he has detected in it some of the same types of rhythm (yet with a difference) that occur in books or passages of the Old Testament generally recognised to be poetry, and also some types or rather some combinations of types of rhythm that are not found there, but are yet no less strictly rhythmical than the rest.

Lowth's discovery that the prophetic writings were in large part poems could not but have had, and has actually had, a very considerable effect on the criticism, in the broadest sense of that term, of those writings, on our conceptions of their inspiration, origin, composition and interpretation. Just as little, if they succeed in establishing themselves, can Sievers' theories of the rhythmical forms of the books of Genesis and Samuel, two books which he has subjected to an exhaustive metrical analysis,[1] fail to affect the criticism of these books and others of the same general character. For this reason I propose to give some account of Sievers' theory of the metres of Genesis, to suggest certain objections, and to indicate one possible result that follows. After that I will return to the consideration of the parallelistic poetry and consider the legitimacy of certain theories of its rhythm. I refer more particularly to Duhm's theories, which have exercised very considerable influence not only in Germany but also in this country, where the results of the theories are beginning to be presented uncriticised even in books intended for popular use.[2] Sievers' developed theory of the metrical character of the texts commonly supposed to be prose has not, I think, yet commanded much

[1] E. Sievers, *Metrische Studien*, ii. *Die hebräishe Genesis*; iii. *Samuel* (*Abhandlungen . . .*, xxiii.).

[2] See e.g. Glazebrook, *Studies in the Book of Isaiah*; B. Duhm, *The Minor Prophets translated in the rhythms of the original* (English translation by A. Duff).

assent,[1] but this working out of his theory must obviously affect in some measure any judgment as to the soundness of its fundamental principles. With some examination of these two influential, or potentially influential, theories, I hope to round off and review my own present discussion of the forms of Hebrew poetry in relation to interpretation and criticism.

In his first volume (pp. 397 ff.) Sievers, in order to test the rhythmical character of simple narrative style, examined the inscription of Mesha, selecting this as an ancient text that had not been subjected to accidents of transcription. He analysed it into 37 rhythmical periods, claiming that "the metrical structure" of this poem was all the easier to seize, and the better secured, by the fact that the ends of the verses were marked by a vertical line, which was but rarely used to indicate a more pause within the verse. If it were certain that the vertical line used in Mesha's inscription was really intended to mark off *metrical* periods, the fact would be of the utmost importance; for, if the Moabite king recorded his exploits in metre, and used this line to make the metre clear, the strongest possible presumption would be created that much of Judges, Samuel and Kings, which closely resemble the Moabite inscription in style, were also originally metrical; and the use of this line might be expected to cast even more direct light on Hebrew than the marking of the scansion in the Assyrian inscription to which I have previously referred.[2] But that the vertical line in Mesha's inscription has any metrical significance is anything but clear: what is certain is that it occurs at places where *punctuation* is required, generally a full stop, more rarely a semi-colon, or a comma. Thus

[1] Proksch, however, in his recently published commentary on Genesis gives a general adherence to Sievers' theory, though frequently and greatly differing from him in the detailed application of it.

[2] Expositor, Sept. 1913, pp. 234–237.

the line occurs twenty-five times at points where Dr. Cooke[1] in his translation punctuates with a full stop, five times where he punctuates with a semi-colon, three times where he punctuates with a comma: in three other places the line occurs where the inscription cannot be clearly read. Even in the three cases where the line corresponds to a comma, the pause is considerable: e.g. in line 7, "I saw my desire upon him and upon his house, and all Israel perished utterly for ever." We may compare with this the relation of the line to Sievers' metrical periods: it occurs at the end of twenty-eight out of thirty-seven of these, and thrice in the middle of one of them. Inasmuch as Sievers' periods are made to end with a real pause in the sense and are not "run on" lines, it would be inevitable that a mark of punctuation should generally stand at the end of them; but the absence of the mark at the end of nine of his periods is much more unfavourable to the theory that the mark has a metrical significance than its presence at the end of twenty-eight is favourable; for there may well have been difference of opinion among Moabite, as there notoriously is among English, writers as to the frequency with which punctuation should be expressed; there could have been none as to the point at which a metrical period ended. It is also to be observed that according to Sievers' metrical analysis, the metrical periods in the inscription are of five different lengths—of three, four, five, six and seven stresses; and that more than two successive periods of the same length never occur, and often immediately contiguous periods are of different lengths.

We pass now to the consideration of the "Hebrew Genesis rhythmically arranged" (1904, 5). As compared with his analysis, contained in the first volume of his metrical studies, of Mesha's inscription and a few specimens of

[1] G. A. Cooke, *A Text-book of North Semitic Inscriptions*, pp. 2–4.

Hebrew narratives, viz. Genesis ii., xli., Judges ix., Ruth i., Job i., ii, Sievers' treatment of Genesis shows two prominent differences: (1) he has abandoned the attempt to make the metrical periods and the sense-periods coincide: if he is correct in regarding Genesis as metrical, then the distinguishing feature of this narrative poetry is that it largely consists of "run-on" lines; (2) the same metre is discovered running uninterruptedly through long consecutive passages.

The rhythms alleged to be of most frequent occurrence are (1) the six-stress period; (2) the seven-stress period—the rhythm which, as we have seen (pp. 315 f.), probably occurs in Psalms ix., x., but is rare in what have commonly been regarded as the poetical parts of the Old Testament. With these two simple rhythms, as we may call them, though the term is not employed by Sievers himself, there alternate the more complex rhythms produced by the *constant* alternation with one of these of a shorter period, viz. (3) sevens alternating with a short verse of three or four stresses: e.g. Genesis ix. 1–4 (P), xxvi. 1–13; (4) sixes alternating with a short verse of three or four stresses: e.g. Genesis xxvi. 14, 15.

Of these rhythms the simple sevens is by far the most frequent: long passages in which Sievers discovers it are, for example, Genesis i., i.e. P's account of creation; xi. 1–9, J's account of the building of the tower of Babel; xxiv., J's account of Eliezer's mission to find Isaac a wife.

The same rhythm, it will be seen, occurs in more than one of the main sources discovered by literary criticism. This is not regarded by Sievers as an argument against the general validity of that criticism; quite the reverse: he finds his metrical analysis constantly confirming it, and also furnishing a clue through a labyrinth that criticism has seen but failed to find its way through. The composite-ness of J, E and P has been very commonly admitted,

but the attempt to analyse these sources into yet earlier sources has hitherto led to but relatively meagre or insecure results. Sievers claims through metre to lead us to a detailed and secure analysis of these sources of J, E and P. As this promise of valuable assistance in the analysis of sources is made not by some amateur in the study of metre, but by a great and recognised master of the subject, Sievers' *Genesis*, if for no other reason, might well claim the attention of critical students of the Old Testament.

Briefly stated Sievers' conclusions with reference to the sources are these: J, E and P were not derived direct from free oral tradition, but one and all from *earlier literary sources which were metrical*. These earlier sources can be recovered by observing the changes of metre within the present text. J rests on four principal sources, a source written in seven-stress periods, another in six-stress periods, another in seven-stress periods alternating with a short verse, and a fourth in six-stress periods alternating with a short verse. J also contains fragments of a source written in four-stress periods. E rests on three main sources, one written in sevens, one in sixes, and one in sixes alternating with a short verse. P is analysed into six sources; the main source is written in sevens; the other sources include one written in sixes, one in sevens alternating with a short verse, and another in which every two seven-stress periods are followed by a short verse. The main source in simple sevens admitted of an *occasional* short verse.

It is difficult to judge of this complicated theory from passages where there is much mixture of J, E and P, or of Sievers' sources of these sources. It is better to take what appears even to Sievers to be a long continuous passage from a single source, and to see by what means and with what results the theory is carried through. Genesis xxiii., which Sievers with every one else refers to P, and

he in particular to his "sevens" source of P, may serve as the first illustration.

In this chapter Sievers discovers twenty-eight periods of seven stresses and three short verses of three stresses. The three latter are obtained without any textual change from the present Hebrew text; of the twenty-eight longer periods, sixteen are obtained from the present text, the remaining twelve rest on alterations of the Hebrew text which, it is claimed, remove transcriptional error and the results of the more frequent disturbing activity of editors who both changed and added words. In three of these twelve cases the LXX more or less clearly supports the change; in another Sievers makes both an addition and an omission which metrically cancel one another. More or less can doubtless be said for several of the alterations [1] requisite to reduce the remaining eight lines to regularity; but that all the changes are required by anything but the exigences of the metrical theory will seem to most who examine them improbable.

In Genesis xxiv. 1–52 (J) Sievers finds eighty seven-stress periods interrupted by eight glosses of from three to nine words, and another line of different rhythm. Of the eighty seven-stress lines, twenty-two depend on departures from the present text; but several consecutive seven-stress lines [2] are discovered without any alteration of the Hebrew text.

As a last example of Sievers' metrical analysis I select Genesis i. on account of the peculiar interest of the recon-

[1] In v. 6 Sievers omits אלהים, regarding נשיא אלהים as an editorial amplification of נשיא: at the end of v. 7 he omits לבני חת, and in v. 8 מקפני; in v. 9 he substitutes המערה for משרת המכפלה אשר לו; in v. 15 he omits ארץ (with LXX) and שקל; in v. 16 שקל and לסחר; in v. 17 the clause שדה עפרון אשר במכפלה אשר לפני ממרא is omitted; in v. 19 he omits אברהם, inserts עפרון אשר, and alters המכפלה to במכפלה.

[2] E.g., eight such lines occur in v. 42 (from אם ישך) to v. 46 (to שתה); seven such lines in v. 47 (from בת־מי) to v. 51.

struction of the text involved in it: at the same time it is right to add that Sievers expressly states that his analysis of this particular chapter is one of the most uncertain and tentative of his results. According to the analysis the chapter contained forty-nine seven-stress periods interrupted by one line (in v. 20) of three stresses and by what is regarded as a gloss of two lines in v. 16. Of the forty-nine seven-stress periods no fewer than thirty-two rest on textual alteration—a far larger proportion than in either of the previous examples that have been given here. But a large number of the textual changes are of one type: in order to obtain rhythmical regularity Sievers found that, in every case where אלהים occurred, rhythm required either one word less or one word more: in the former case he omits אלהים, in the latter he prefixes יהוה; so that in respect of the use of the divine names, Genesis i. would agree with the present text of Genesis ii., iii., though not, according to Sievers, with the original text of all the sources incorporated in ii. and iii.

It would be unwise to condemn the whole of Sievers' analysis of Genesis on account of the improbably large amount of conjectural emendation needed to carry through the rhythmical reconstruction in Genesis i. and some other passages: the strength of his case is seen rather in such facts as that, for example, in chapter xxiv. eight *consecutive* similar rhythmical periods may be found *in the present text.*

Nevertheless Sievers' results in general seem to me insecure, and their insecurity due to these considerations: (1) the vocalisation on which they depend is, as I have pointed out in a previous article,[1] hypothetical, some elements in it being probable, others most uncertain; (2) the number of conjectural emendations required solely in the interests of the theory is very large; (3) the analysis of narratives in

[1] Expositor, Sept., pp. 238–240.

Genesis and Samuel requires a constant recurrence of "non-stop" lines and enjambed clauses. Not only are the lines "non-stopped," so that, e.g., a verb may stand at the end of one, its accusative at the beginning of the next line, but the well-marked cæsuras within the lines, so prominent in the parallelistic poetry, frequently disappear, while in others a full-stop may appear at the cæsura and virtually no stop at all at the end of the line. Sievers, it is true, still points his "sevens" with spaces for the two cæsuras, but the space frequently divides construct and genitive, or other words as closely connected with one another. Two lines at the beginning of Genesis xxiii. may serve as examples of the points just referred to :—

ויהיו שני חיי שרה מאה ועשרים שנה
ושבע שנים ותמת שרה בקרית ארבע היא חברון

And in the following lines from Genesis i. a full-stop occurs in the middle of the first line, though the same line ends with a verb the accusative to which begins the second line :—

יהי אור ויהי אור וירא יהוה אלהים
את־האור כי־טוב ויבדל יהוה אלהים בין־האור ובין־החשך

Now no doubt there can be found analogies to most of these phenomena in English blank verse : but there remains this surely relevant and fundamental difference between English and Hebrew poetry : the foot in Hebrew, according to Sievers' theory, is much more elastic than the foot in English blank verse : the Hebrew foot, it will be remembered, consists, according to the theory, of a stressed syllable either by itself, or preceded by one to three unstressed syllables, and in certain cases followed by one but not more than one unstressed syllable ; briefly, whereas the foot in English blank verse is dissyllabic, or by resolution trisyllabic, the foot in Hebrew may consist of one, two, three, four or five syllables. There is a further point : Hebrew, as con-

trasted with English, has far fewer prepositions, conjunctions and other short independent words unlikely to be stressed: the consequence is that any passage in Hebrew must consist most largely of words that can quite appropriately receive a stress: if then a rhythmical line consists of so many stressed syllables combined with a very elastic number of unstressed syllables, and is subject to no other law such as that of the stopped lines and the distich, it becomes almost impossible for any passage not to be rhythmical. For the number of the words in any or almost any passage will divide either by 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7 with, if necessary, a few words at the end, to appear as a broken line. To what other law, then, does Sievers conceive his lines to be subjected? It is difficult to discover any, though it is obvious that he still *prefers* that his cæsuras and line-ends should coincide with some sense pause if possible, and this apparently is why he distributes his texts among several metres, though if we utterly disregard sense-pauses, and allow ourselves an equal liberty of textual emendation, most of the lines could be redivided into blocks of a different number of feet. It appears to me, therefore, that the analogy of English blank verse with its freedom from line-bondage is a bad ground for assuming a similar free epic or narrative verse in Hebrew: the analogy of Semitic poetry is against the assumption: and we seem driven back on to the stopped line and the distich as the normal basis of Hebrew poetry of all kinds.

There remains one further consideration: it is brought forward by Sievers himself, and he attempts to turn the force of it: the redactors and interpolators who often, by their additions, destroyed the metre of their sources, themselves wrote in metre; the glosses attributed to them are for the most part "metrical." "I cannot," writes Sievers,[1]

[1] *Die hebräische Genesis*, p. 216.

" otherwise account for this than by the supposition that in a period not yet accustomed to free prose the tendency to bring everything that had to be said into verse form may have been so strong that such redactors involuntarily composed verses when the extent and substance of what they wanted to say in any way permitted of this. At the same time they had so little artistic intelligence or experience that they thrust their own products of a moment unconcerned into the older texts without troubling much about the mess (*Unheil*) they thus made of them."

In view of the various considerations which I have now brought forward I am not prepared, on the one hand, to admit the metrical analysis of Genesis as confirming the analysis into J, E and P, nor, on the other hand, out of regard for hypothetical metrical requirements, to insert Yahweh in Genesis i., and thereby abandon the well-grounded conclusion that P made no use of the divine name Yahweh in his narrative, till he reached the point at which he records the revelation of the name to Moses.

But though the theory that the *whole* of Genesis is derived from metrical sources must be dismissed as unproved, the question yet remains whether *any* metrical sources lie behind any of the narratives proper of Genesis. Here and there in the narratives, passages, other than such obvious poems as Lamech's Song and Jacob's Blessing, occur which have been regarded by some scholars as poetical in form; such a passage is the altercation between Jacob and Laban in Genesis xxxi., or the curse on the serpent in Genesis iii. 14, 15. These particular examples might be merely instances of the same writer passing from the prose of narrative to poetical form in the speeches of the persons of his story—a transition which is clearly marked and obvious in the book of Job, unless prologue and speeches are there attributed to different writers. But a more interesting question arises

with regard to the narratives of Creation : are these in their present form, and do they rest on sources that were, entirely prose ? If so, while the Hebrew *story* would show the well-known resemblances to the Babylonian *story*, it was cast in an entirely different form—in prose, whereas the Babylonian story is a poem. Even if Sievers were right and the whole of the Creation narratives in Genesis were metrical, there would still be a difference ; the Babylonian poems are cast in the old parallelistic 4 : 4 rhythm, the Hebrew narratives, according to the hypothesis, mainly in Sievers' non-parallelistic "sevens." But Sievers has also drawn attention, and this time I think rightly, to the appearance in small quantity of the 4 : 4 rhythm in Genesis ii. : he recognised more of it in the first volume of his metrical studies than in the Hebrew Genesis, and his earlier is perhaps preferable to his later view. Delete the superfluous אלהים after יהוה in Genesis ii. 4b, and it is a fact that ii. 4b–6 can easily, and most of it must, be read as periods of four stresses equally divided by a slight cæsura, as follows :—

ביום עשות־יהוה	ארץ ושמים
וכל שיח־השדה	טרם יהיה־בארץ
וכל עשב־חשדה	טרם יצמח
כי־לא המטיר	יהוה על־הארץ
ואדם אין	לעבד את־האדמה

In the day when Yahweh made	heaven and earth,
No plant of the field	was yet in the earth,
And no herb of the field	had yet sprung up ;
For Yahweh had not sent	rain upon the earth,
And man there was none	to till the ground.

Not only is this *possibly* metrical, but (1) the second and third, and in some measure the fourth and fifth lines, are certainly parallels ; (2) the hypothetically metrical periods are certainly sense-periods ; (3) the anarthrous ארץ ושמים without את stands in striking contrast to the את השמים

ואת הארץ of Genesis i. 1. Not only, then, have the lines of the Hebrew—

> No plant of the field was yet in the earth,
> And no herb of the field had yet sprung up,

a close material parallel in the Babylonian—

> No reed had sprung up, no tree had been created,

but the rhythm of the Hebrew, if correctly seized as 4 : 4 (= 2 + 2 : 2 + 2) is identical with the rhythm of the Babylonian.

I cannot here pursue the remaining traces, for the most part less clear, of the same rhythm in subsequent parts of the chapter, and still less the various interesting questions which are raised by this apparent formal as well as material resemblance of some of the Hebrew with some of the Babylonian stories of Creation ; but the probability that behind Genesis ii. lay at least one metrical story of Creation seems to me sufficiently strong to be worth consideration.

If Genesis ii. 4b–6 is metrical, it is an example not of the hypothetical non-parallelistic metrical poetry which Sievers finds everywhere in Genesis and Samuel, but of that same parallelistic poetry which has so long been recognised in Psalms and Job and much of the prophetical books. But if Sievers' theory that the narratives of Genesis are metrical is rightly judged to be unproven and improbable, ought we at this end of our discussion to question the *metrical* character even of parallelistic poetry ; was Hebrew poetry of any kind subject to metrical laws ? Have we a right to adopt such a system as Sievers' to explain the metre of parallelistic poetry, and then to deny the soundness of his application of his system to Hebrew narratives ?

It must suffice at this point to recall some positions previously reached : in parallelistic poetry the lines are in general well defined, and where there is much parallelism of terms the limits of the lines are certain ; to secure a

rhythmical balance, or other relation, which would be immediately perceived between these parallel lines a far greater elasticity could safely be given to the rhythmical foot than if a really perceptible rhythm were to be imparted to a long passage in which there were no regularly recurring pauses. Even after an examination of Sievers' attempt to extend so greatly the amount of metrical composition in the Old Testament, it seems to me possible and useful to return to parallelistic poetry and to insist (1) that this consists primarily of distichs ; (2) that these distichs fall into two broad classes according as the second line balances or echoes the first ; and (3) that the lines of these distichs can also be more accurately classified according to the number of the stressed words that they contain.

The uncertainties in dealing with parallelistic poetry arise rather when we raise these questions : Must a single type of distich be maintained throughout the same poem ? if not, what types and what extent of variation are permitted ? Again, are all poems strophically arranged, and are all strophes of equal length ? I have already given my reasons for answering these questions in the sense that the laws of Hebrew poetry did not require either that a single type of distich must be used throughout the same poem, or that all poems must be divided into equal strophes : and that as a matter of fact some Hebrew poems are perfectly, or nearly, consistent in the use of a single type of distich and strophes of the same length, and that others are not. But the contrary opinion is held and enforced with far-reaching critical results : single words are rejected from lines in order to reduce all the distichs to a single type, and whole distichs in order to reduce all the strophes to the same length. More rarely equality is restored or invented by addition of words or distichs. Dr. Briggs in his commentary on the Psalms so emended the text that most of the Psalms divide

into exactly equal strophes, strophes that each contain exactly the same number of lines, distichs or tristichs as the case may be. Duhm has done much the same for Isaiah, Jeremiah and the Twelve Prophets, not to speak of his work on Psalms and Job. I am, of course, far from maintaining that either these scholars, or others with the same devotion to regularity, have failed to put forward many valuable suggestions: if some poems, though not all, were regular, a scholar who attempts to make all regular may succeed in divining the real regularity of those that were regular at the same time that he is imposing an unreal regularity on a poem that never was actually regular.

In illustration of the far-reaching effects of the determination to impose regularity at all hazards on all poems, I will now confine myself to some examples of Duhm's methods and results. I premise that there is a far stronger *prima facie* case for questioning the originality of the text of the books with which Duhm deals than that of the book of Genesis; and that there is far more reason in the case of these books than in Samuel for suspecting that even the LXX fails as a sufficient corrective of the Hebrew text; so far then an editor of the prophets or of Job or of many of the Psalms ought to suspect more corruption which must be treated, if treated at all, by conjecture, than an editor of Genesis or Samuel. But there is need for the greatest possible caution in using a metrical theory as the sole reason for emendation; for one Hebrew metre can be changed into another with fatal ease; drop the verb, or some other parallel term that the sense will spare from the second line of a 3 : 3 distich, and the result is the very dissimilar 3 : 2; and, conversely, in a 3 : 2 distich prefix an infinitive absolute to the verb of the second line, and a distich 3 : 3 is the result.

If the ease with which every Hebrew text can in some manner be adapted to Sievers' anapæstic system should

make us slow to accept such applications of it as his metrical analysis of Genesis, the ease with which, if we treat the rhythm merely as so many stresses to a line, one metre can be converted to another should warn us against the seductive regularity which Duhm places, for example, upon Isaiah xiii. This chapter, says Mr. Box, who, in common with some other English scholars, reproduces Duhm's assertions, consists of seven-lined strophes in the rhythm of the Hebrew Dirge; and in this resembles the poem in chap. xiv. Yet it is really difficult to believe that any one could have reached this conclusion except under the dominance of a theory of regularity or the spell of a great master; and the false conclusion here happens to be of some critical significance, for if Isaiah xiii. consists of six seven-lined strophes in *ḳinah* rhythm, and chapter xiv. contains a poem consisting of five exactly similar strophes confidence in the unity of xiii., xiv. may receive an utterly untrustworthy support. The actual fact with regard to Isaiah xiii., as I have shown elsewhere,[1] is that the *ḳinah* rhythm is all but confined to the first eight verses of the chapter, and in the remaining fourteen verses, which contain twenty-five distichs, there are but three or four distichs at most of the *ḳinah* type: the rest are 3 : 3; Duhm reduces these 3 : 3 distichs to 3 : 2 by two exceedingly simple devices; either a word is arbitrarily dropped from the second line of the distich, or, if this is not convenient, it is *assumed* that the second and shorter line of a 3 : 2 distich has dropped out. Corruptions of both kinds certainly occur; but it is exceedingly improbable that the same kind of accidents happened several times over within a few verses and yet so as to leave excellent 3 : 3 rhythm.

Another passage where difficult critical questions arise has been similarly treated by Duhm. He asserts that in

[1] *Isaiah*, pp. 234 ff.

Isaiah xxxiv., xxxv. the same metre is maintained throughout, and he represents the whole as disposed in four-lined strophes; but he also makes this significant remark: "The text has suffered a remarkable number of mutilations, especially at the ends of the *stichoi*." Yet as a matter of fact the metre is not the same throughout: some of the distichs are certainly 3 : 2, most are certainly 3 : 3, but, just as in xiii., xiv., the 3 : 2 distichs are massed together; they are almost confined to xxxiv. 1–10. A difference between the rhythm of xxxiv. 1–10 and 11–17 is, I believe, certain: and, if so, it is critically important; for the arguments which have led many scholars to abandon the earlier view that Isaiah xxxiv. and xxxv. were written in the exilic period in favour of the view that they are a late post-exilic prophecy rest mainly on xxxiv. 11–17—which is metrically different from xxxiv. 1–10. The critical questions are complicated and difficult, and cannot be discussed here: but Duhm's judgment on these chapters seems to me to illustrate a second unfortunate result of the theory that Hebrew poetry was absolutely regular: on the one hand it leads to much unnecessary correction of the text; and, on the other, to a certain obtuseness to real difference of rhythm. The 3 : 2 distich is something really different from a 3 : 3 distich, even though both occur in the same poem: and if one type of distich is exclusively used or dominant in one part of a passage, and another in another, a question may always arise whether the two parts are of the same origin: that even such a change as this *necessarily* implies difference of origin in all cases I am not prepared to assert: as a matter of fact, though I pointed out the difference of rhythm between Isaiah xiii. 1–8 and 9–22, which Duhm and others had attempted to conceal by groundless emendations, I refrained from asserting that the two parts in question were of different origin.

But it is in his criticism of the Book of Jeremiah that Duhm's rhythmical principles have proved most dangerous; here, as is well known, he works with the principle not only of regularity of distich and strophe, but also of one man, one metre. Though we owe to Duhm himself one of the warmest appreciations of Jeremiah as prophet and poet, we are yet asked to believe that this great prophet and poet confined himself throughout his long career to one metre! Working on this principle Duhm not only rejects the larger part of the poems attributed to Jeremiah, but he violates parallelism and shows obtuseness to rhythmical differences in order to retain much even of what he does retain, but which, if his critical theory that Jeremiah wrote only in "*kinah*" rhythm were correct, ought to be rejected. I have shown elsewhere [1] with what violence, and even with what ridiculous results at times, as in his strophic division of Isaiah xi. 1–8, Duhm tears asunder the things that parallelism most evidently intended to be kept together. I must here confine myself to two examples of Duhm's treatment of the text of Jeremiah. The first example is Jeremiah iv. 3, 4: the present Hebrew text reads, and may be divided, as follows:—

כי־כה אמר יהוה | לאיש יהודה ולירושלם
נירו לכם ניר | ואל תזרעו אל־קצים
המלו ליהוה | והסירו ערלת לבבכם
איש יהודה | וישבי ירושלם
פן־תצא כאש חמתי | ובערה ואין מכבה

If we approach this passage without a theoretical prejudice, is it not obvious that the marked tendency of the clauses is to balance one another, not to echo one another, as, according to Duhm, if genuine, they should do? A further feature of the passage is the prominence of parallelism:—

[1] *Isaiah*, pp. 211 ff., and *Zeitschrift für die A.T. Wissenschaft*, 1912, pp. 193–198.

For thus saith Yahweh
To the men of Judah and Jerusalem,
Break up your fallow ground,
And sow not among thorns;
Circumcise yourselves to Yahweh,
And take away the foreskin of your heart,
Men of Judah,
And inhabitants of Jerusalem;
Lest my fury go forth like fire,
And burn with none to quench it.

The rhythm for the most part is actually 3 : 3; I will not stay to inquire how strong are the grounds for believing that that rhythm was originally maintained throughout: what I have to do is note how Duhm turns it into 3 : 2 and with what results :—

(1) He rejects the words " to the men of Judah and Jerusalem " in v. 3 (line 2 of the above translation) and also the similar words (lines 7 and 8 above) of v. 4; the latter omission is, perhaps, right.

(2) Having rejected line 2 above, he has to tear asunder lines 3 and 4 which are most obviously parallel to one another: line 3 is tacked on to line 1 to form a distich, and it is then assumed that the first line of the distich, of which line 4 above is the second line, has disappeared.

(3) Very interesting and specious is the treatment of the first part of v. 4: Duhm divides as follows :—

המלו ליהוה והסירו | ערלת לבבכם

Now there is no doubt that the object of a verb may form the second part of a 3 : 2 line (or distich): I recall as examples two lines in Lamentations ii. 6 :—

שכח יהוה ביציון | מועד ושבת
וינאץ בזעם אפו | מלך וכהן

Judge the line from a grammatical point of view only, and Duhm's division of Jeremiah iv. 4 seems to be at least a legitimate alternative to the division of the line after יהוה; but once the sense and parallelism are considered, how im-

probable does such a division appear. המלו and הסרו ערלת together are parallel terms, a clause of two terms being parallel to a single term, according to a practice which I have abundantly illustrated in a previous article [1]: what Duhm does is to chop this second parallel into two, giving one half to the line that has already expressed the whole idea, and leaving to the second line a mere lifeless fragment.

My other example of Duhm's methods is taken from the fine apocalyptic vision in Jeremiah iv. 23–26. I give it first exactly as it stands in the Hebrew text, the divisions of the text being of course my own :—

23 ראיתי את הארץ | והנה תהו ובהו ; ואל השמים ואין אורם
24 ראיתי ההרים | והנה רעשים | וכל הגבעות התקלקלו
25 ראיתי והנה ; אין האדם | וכל עוף השמים נדדו
26 ראיתי והנה | הכרמל המדבר | וכל עריו נתצו מפני יהוה

Two emendations suggested by Duhm and essential to his rhythmical scheme, though they are not *essential* to what I believe to be the correct view of the rhythm of the passage, seem to me probable : he reads האדמה after ראיתי in v. 25, and transposes והנה and הכרמל in v. 27 : this gives an exact similarity of structure to all four verses.

Once again, if any one will read these verses, whether emended as just suggested or not, without any prepossession as to what metre Jeremiah must have used, or as to the general desirability of attaching the term *ḳinah* to as much prophetic poetry as possible, he cannot, I believe, feel that they have any real rhythmical resemblance to the prevailing rhythm in Lamentations i.–iv. : these four similar periods are neither *four ḳinah*-like lines as Cornill [2] describes them ; nor *eight* lines of alternately three and two stresses, i.e. strict *ḳinah* lines, as Duhm will have it : they are four periods of the rarer rhythm 4 : 3. What Cornill says is

[1] Expositor, July, 1913, pp. 50 ff.
[2] Cf. the note in *The Century Commentary* (A. S. Peake) on Jeremiah.

worth quoting: "The metre here assumes a somewhat different form. The characteristic of the *ḳinah* strophe, the short second member, to be sure remains; but the whole is weightier and tends more towards the gigantic: the first members have mostly four, the second three full stresses." The last remark is correct so far as it goes, but omits the very important additional fact that the first members are equally divided by a strongly marked cæsura: this cæsura gives to the entire period the rhythmical value 2 : 2 : 3 rather than 4 : 3, and *an effect which is the very opposite of the ḳinah*: there is no rhythmical echo, but two short balanced clauses are rounded off with a longer clause; the period swells out to its close instead of echoing off.

Thus Cornill's remarks seem to me an apt illustration of the disadvantages and the risk of confusion involved in working with too restricted a rhythmical nomenclature.

Instead of trying to compress the four periods into four *ḳinah* lines or distichs, Duhm goes to the opposite extreme and endeavours to squeeze *eight ḳinah* lines (or distichs) out of the present text amplified by a few additions which are really far too slight for the purpose. It is a question whether here the textual changes, or the rhythmical results, due to the necessity of making everything attributed to Jeremiah *ḳinah* rhythm are the more improbable; of the *ḳinah* (!) lines that result this is one—

ואת כל הגבעות | התקלקלו

and the additions to the text, besides that already mentioned (האדמה in v. 25), are these: four times over, in order to convert two stresses into three, Duhm inserts את! and that in a poetical passage! and in another place (v. 25) he resorts to the favourite device of inserting an infinitive absolute—נדוד. These five changes represent a hypothetical loss of eleven letters: how often does the text of a short passage accidentally lose in transcription eleven letters dis-

tributed over five places without the sense being in the slightest degree affected ?

It is by such methods as these, which could be illustrated by an abundance of other examples, that Duhm succeeds in imposing regularity of line and strophe on Old Testament poetry. And it is on results so obtained that Duhm and others build up far-reaching critical and exegetical conclusions.

I will in conclusion briefly summarise some of the facts and inferences drawn from them to which I have endeavoured to draw attention in this series of articles, and briefly refer to one or two points which I have found no opportunity for discussing more fully.

The main forms of Hebrew poetry are two—parallelism and rhythm, to which, as a third and occasional form, we may add strophe. Rhyme, so common in many languages, and a constant and necessary form of all strictly metrical poetry in Arabic, as well as a characteristic of that other type of composition in Arabic known as *saj'* (" rhymed prose "), is in Hebrew, as in Assyrian, merely occasional. Curiously enough it is conspicuous in one of the earliest existing fragments of Hebrew poetry, the song of Lamech (Gen. iv.), and yet it never developed into a form of Hebrew poetry till poetry of the Old Testament, or parallelistic, type had long become extinct, and there came, under the influence of the Moslem culture and Arabic poetry, a renascence of Hebrew poetry in the Middle Ages.

Of the two main forms of Hebrew poetry, parallelism and rhythm, parallelism is most intimately associated with the sense and can and should be represented in translation. In its broader aspects and general differences of types it was analysed once for all by Lowth : but a more accurate and detailed measurement of parallelism is required. Such

a more exact measurement of parallelism enables us more readily to classify actual differences in different poems and different writers; and in particular to disentangle the very different types of incomplete parallelisms and merely parallelistic distichs grouped by Lowth under the single term "synthetic parallelism." A study, more especially of the different incomplete parallelisms, also affords an opportunity of watching the intimate connexion between parallelism and at least a certain approximation to rhythm.

Merely judged from the standpoint of parallelism rhythms fall into the two broad classes of balanced and echoing rhythms. Further metrical analysis is in detail frequently most uncertain: but while recognising this uncertainty, it is important, in order to avoid confusion, to adopt a method of measurement that is capable of giving us a clear and sufficient nomenclature. This is to be found in defining lines or distichs by the number of the stressed syllables in them. The exact number of unstressed syllables that may accompany a stressed syllable may be uncertain, but is certainly not unlimited.

A single rhythm need not be maintained throughout a poem, though there were probably limits to the degree of mixture that was tolerated. But in particular the elegy, though it commonly consisted of 3 : 2 distichs, was not limited to these: it certainly admitted along with these in the same poem 2 : 2. Mere change from a longer to a shorter distich of the same class, or even occasionally from a balanced to an echoing rhythm, is no conclusive evidence, and in many poems (for poems differ in the degree to which they are regular) is scarcely even a ground for suspecting corruption of text or change of source. On the other hand, a change in the dominant rhythm should raise a question whether or not a new poem has begun.

Finally the question remains whether, though parallelism

in Hebrew seems commonly to have concurred with certain rhythmical forms, it may not in some cases, as in the Arabic *saj'*, have been used in a freer style more closely allied to ordinary prose.

Of the history of parallelism and rhythm I have been able to say little. Did parallelism in Hebrew create rhythm, or was it added to an existing type of rhythm? This is an interesting if an obscure question of origins. As to the lifetime of parallelism, we saw that it runs back to the earliest poetry preserved in the Old Testament, and that it was still a form of Hebrew poetry in the second century A.D., but was not to be clearly traced later: nor did it wake to new life with the revival of Hebrew poetry in the Middle Ages. An interesting episode is the transference of Hebrew parallelism to poetry composed by Jews in Greek, as e.g. in the Book of Wisdom.

If we speculate as to the historical development of rhythms, we shall perhaps most safely select as the earliest the 4 : 4 (or 2 : 2) rhythm, which Hebrew has in common with Assyrian, but which at a later time in Hebrew was outstripped by 3 : 3 and 3 : 2.

The best service to the future of Old Testament studies, so far as these can be affected by the study of those formal elements with which alone these articles have attempted to deal will be rendered, I believe, by those who combine with a study of rhythm an unswerving loyalty to the demands of parallelism.

G. Buchanan Gray.

THE SANITY OF THE "ESCHATOLOGICAL" JESUS

III. Further Criticism of Alienist Theories. Conclusion.

Having shown that the development of the delusion which these authors assume to have taken place has, from the general clinical point of view, no probability in its favour, we have now to discuss the question whether those utterances and actions of Jesus which historical criticism holds to be well established give us reason to think of a morbid falsification of the content of consciousness. In this connexion the first point to be noted is that the religious conceptions which Jesus shared with His contemporaries and received as traditional ought not to be described as morbid, even when they appear from a modern point of view utterly strange and inconceivable. This elementary rule is constantly transgressed by all three authors.

To these traditional conceptions belong: the view that the present world is delivered over to evil spirits, who can take possession of a man and speak through him; the expectation that the good angels, along with the Messiah, are to take over the rule of the world; the belief in the coming of the Messianic Kingdom, with all the allied conceptions which are found in the prophetic books and the apocalypses—the tribulation preceding the Messiah's coming; the Judgment; the destruction of the wicked; the resurrection and "transformation" of the righteous and elect; the transfiguration of physical nature, which is to take on a supernatural fertility.

The Messianic expectations formed an integral part of late Jewish dogma. But not all Jews believed that these events were close at hand. That conviction was current among the adherents of a movement of considerable extent

and specifically Jewish character which took its rise from John the Baptist.

As regards the details of the Messianic conceptions there still prevailed at that time a number of different views which were current alongside of one another.[1] That the Messiah was to suffer is not clearly established for the time of Jesus by the Apocalyptic and Rabbinic passages. On the other hand this conception was likely to suggest itself as soon as the Messiah was believed to pass through an earthly, unrecognised phase of existence prior to His appearance in glory, since in that case He must necessarily pass through the pre-Messianic tribulation; and the Messianic interpretation of Isaiah liii.—the suffering Servant of the Lord—might also give rise to the conception of the suffering Messiah.

The possibility that He who was to appear as the Messiah in glory should first l ve unrecognised as an earthly man in the natural world was not provided for in the conceptions of the Jewish religion, so far as the material which has come down to us enables us to form a conclusion. It was indeed precisely over the fundamental questions regarding the personality and the appearing of the Messiah that extensive uncertainty and unreconciled contradictions prevailed.[2]

In the moment, however—the recognition of this is of great importance for the understanding of Jesus' world of thought—when a thinker of late Jewish times endeavoured to grasp fully and work out clearly the Messianic doctrine, while determined at the same time to hold firmly to the Davidic descent of the Messiah, as required by prophecy, the only solution which remained open was to think of Him as being born in this present natural age, of David's line,

[1] See p. 444 *sup.*

[2] According to the earliest prophetic view, the Messiah was to be born as a natural man of David's race and subsequently endowed by God with supernatural gifts.

and then afterwards, at the transformation which was to take place at the end of the world in the case of all the elect, as being raised to the supernatural glory of the Son-of-Man -Messiah. If the thinker in question was convinced that the expected events were close at hand, he must necessarily seek the future Messiah among the then living descendants of David.

It is to be added that when the Jewish Messiah is also called Son of God, that has nothing to do with derivation from God in the metaphysical sense. Son of God is simply a title implying that His appointment to the office of Messiah is from God. In this sense the Jewish kings were also sons of God.

If after this rapid survey of the late Jewish world of thought we are required to determine what attitude Jesus Himself took up towards this set of conceptions, we ought, from the psychiatric point of view, first to discuss His original attitude, especially towards the Messianic idea, and then the further development of His personal view.

The fact that Jesus regarded Himself as the Coming Messiah inevitably evokes surprise, and has doubtless been the principal point which has aroused suspicion of permanent mental disorder. De Loosten, Hirsch and Binet-Sanglé have not failed to give all due emphasis to the startling contrast between the position of the carpenter's son and that of the Son-of-Man—Messiah.

This contrast, however, is not so irrational as it might appear on a hasty view which fails to take account of the presuppositions arising out of history and the late Jewish conception. In the first place, according to the oldest tradition, Jesus actually was of the race of David; it is therefore not permissible to explain—as Hirsch, for example, does—the references to this fact as implying that Jesus, in conformity with a tendency of youthful paranoiics,

had under the influence of delusion altered His genealogy in an "expansive" [1] sense.

In the second place, as has been mentioned, it was included in the apocalyptic expectations that all the elect should, at the coming end of the world, be transformed into supernatural beings, and in such a way that a "transvaluation of values" should take place. Those who in this world were humble and despised, oppressed and persecuted, should there attain to honour, whereas those who were here honoured, occupied high position, exercised power and authority, should be delivered over to judgment. This conception of the late Jewish Apocalyptic was shared by Jesus in all points, as is evident from a number of His sayings. It was therefore absolutely necessary that He who in the world to come was to occupy the highest office, should belong here, in the natural dispensation, to the humble and despised. Thus it was really only a descendant of David living in lowliness and poverty who could come into consideration as the future Messiah. If the end of the world were looked for as close at hand, He must have been already born, and was to be sought among the existing generation, which was to survive till the end of the age.

By the considerations which have just been adduced, and which from the late Jewish point of view must naturally arise, the attitude of Jesus is to a certain extent psychologically explained. But the fact that He regarded Himself as the particular person who was to enter on the supernatural heritage of the Davidic race still remains surprising.

A psychological analysis of this fact is, on grounds which have already been explained, impossible. So much, however, may be said, that the "over-weighting" of a conception does not in itself justify us in regarding it as the expression of an abnormal mental state.

[1] Grandiose, or self-exalting.

In the present case, the only possible proof that the Messianic claim of Jesus implies a morbid content of consciousness, would be in connexion with the further progress of this idea ; in other words, by showing evidence of a system of delusion arising out of it.

Here the question has to be asked whether the change which can be shown to have taken place in the conceptions of Jesus during the year which is open to observation shows any characteristics which remind us of the evolution of a systematic delusion. We need not here repeat the facts which have been mentioned in the course of our survey of the public ministry and the world of thought of Jesus. This fact alone may be emphasised, that ideas of detraction and persecution were never present, and in particular did not, as would be required by the present view of the *évolution systématique*, appear in the earlier part of the period during which we know something of Jesus.

Similarly, nothing can be shown regarding a " transformation of the delusion " arising, as the theory requires, from inner causes. The changes in the mental attitude of Jesus are in every case conditioned by outer events, and represent perfectly logical conclusions which are in harmony with His general conceptions. The non-occurrence of the expected Messianic tribulations, and of the coming of the Kingdom, after the sending forth of the disciples, in conjunction with the death of John the Baptist, which falls at this time, bring about a change in Jesus' thoughts about the future sufferings. He no longer assumes that He will suffer along with the elect in the Woes of the Messiah—which have themselves a supernatural character—but, setting aside this conception, looks forward to His own suffering and death as a historical event in the present natural world, and believes that in consequence of this others will be spared the sufferings

which it would otherwise have been necessary for them to undergo.

This modification of His conceptions implies an amenability to outward influences not characteristic of the systematic delusions of paranoia, which develop according to a fixed type.

Further—as we have already indicated in discussing the one-sided expansive development of the delusion which these writers assume—the phase of imagined antagonism is lacking. Jesus had, as a matter of fact, enemies and opponents, because He protested against the narrow-minded external piety of the Pharisees. Towards these, not delusional but real antagonists, His conduct is the diametrical opposite of that of a sufferer from the delusion of persecution. He does not remain inactive or confine Himself to the defensive, as do so many of the "persecuted," but endeavours by actions which have a provocative character—driving out of the traffickers from the Temple, discourses against the Pharisees (Matt. xxiii.)—to bring on a conflict with the authorities and compel them to take action against Him, until He finally forces upon the Council the resolution to get rid of Him before the Feast.

This conscious working for His death is by no means to be described, as Binet-Sanglé seems inclined to describe it, as morbid self-devotion, and brought into line with similar acts of insane patients, for which the French author can of course quote a large number of examples. As has been already said, this sacrificial death forms a necessary element in the Messianic thought and action of Jesus.

As regards the question of sense-deceptions, it is to be remarked at the outset that De Loosten, Hirsch and Binet-Sanglé here go far beyond the recorded facts. They assume that Jesus frequently, or even constantly, suffered from hallucinations, and support this view by sayings of Jesus

from the Fourth Gospel, which they, in many cases, moreover, very arbitrarily, interpret in this sense. With the recognition of the unhistorical character of this source, all that has been supposed to be found in it regarding sense-deceptions on the part of Jesus falls to the ground. Nor can the " hallucinations " in Gethsemane, which Binet-Sanglé discusses in detail—the statement that an angel appeared to Jesus from heaven (Luke xxii. 43)—be taken into account. This is, as appears from a comparison of the Gospel of Luke with the two earlier ones, a legendary elaboration of the scene preceding the arrest.

That the assumption of the three authors that the forty days' retirement of Jesus to the wilderness was filled with a multitude of sense-deceptions lacks any confirmation in the text, has already been mentioned. Again, the three temptations which Matthew (iv. 1–11) recounts, are not historical; they belong to the legendary prelude to the history, as David Friedrich Strauss long ago remarked. In fact the whole episode of the retirement to the wilderness is to be regarded as a purely literary product, resting on the basis of Old Testament suggestions. As Moses before the giving of the Law spent forty days in solitude (Exod. xxiv. 18), so Jesus is represented to have done before entering upon His office. And since the wilderness is thought of as the habitat of the evil spirits, He must necessarily be tempted by them there.[1]

In the story of the Transfiguration, it is not a case of sense-deceptions on the part of Jesus, but of the three favourite disciples who are with Him, as appears clearly from the narrative in Mark ix. 2–8.

[1] The process which led to the production of these narratives admits of being clearly traced. Mark simply reports in general terms that Jesus passed forty days in the wilderness, tempted by the devil and ministered to by angels (i. 12, 13), Matthew fills in this framework with definite narratives.

While they were in His presence, He was, it is narrated, " transfigured " before them ; His garments seemed to them glistening white, and they saw Moses and Elias approach Him and converse with Him. Afterwards they heard a voice from the clouds. " This is my beloved son, hear ye Him," and, suddenly, as they looked about them, they saw no longer any one except Jesus with them.[1]

Whether the hallucinations at the Baptism are historical is also doubtful. It must always be kept clearly in mind that it is only on the day when He appears in Galilee preaching that the Nazarene comes into the light of history ; all that falls before that belongs to obscure and uncertain tradition. It is possible that the origin of the story of the Baptism is to be explained from Old Testament suggestions. The voice from Heaven is remarkably reminiscent of the seventh verse of the second Psalm, to which a Messianic interpretation was generally given. It is noteworthy also that Jesus, when He makes known His Messiahship to His disciples (Mark viii. 27–30), does not make any allusion to His having been called to this office at His baptism, and that Paul never makes any mention of the baptism of Jesus.

Assuming that the sense-deceptions at the Jordan are historical, what has to be said from the psychiatric point of view is that it is a case of simultaneous coherent sense-deceptions affecting the optical and auditory fields, that the content of the hallucinatory condition is of an expansive character, and that its form is reminiscent of a saying from a Psalm which was generally interpreted Messianically. Sense-deceptions with an emotional colouring—this is admitted by Binet-Sanglé—are not found exclusively in the

[1] Probably in the original tradition of this scene there was reference only to sense-deceptions on the part of Peter, which, since the two others were also present, were in later narratives ascribed to them also. It may be recalled that it was also Peter who experienced the first visions of Jesus after His death.

mentally diseased. They occur also in persons of emotionally excitable temperament who nevertheless fall well within the limits of mental health. Moreover we have to remember how greatly the reading of the prophetic visions described in the Old Testament, the late Jewish conceptions in general, and the powerful excitement connected with the expectation of the immediate nearness of the end of the world, facilitated the occurrence of sense-deceptions in persons who had any predisposition thereto. In any case the occurrence of this one instance of hallucination, if it is to be regarded as historical, does not warrant the inference of the existence of mental disease.

As regards His emotional attitude, De Loosten and Binet-Sanglé assert that Jesus exhibits morbid oscillations of feeling. It should, however, first be inquired whether it is possible to establish the existence of oscillations of feeling at all. It may certainly be shown that in Jesus periods of intense energy alternate with others in which He seeks to avoid the people and withdraw into solitude. He does not display a continuous and ordered activity. His public life is broken up into a rather unregulated succession of crossings to and fro, now appearing on the eastern shores of the Lake, now re-crossing to the western, until at length He withdraws into solitude in the north.

This alternation of public activity with the seeking of privacy is at first so inexplicable that there is some temptation to connect it with oscillations of feeling. In this connexion the narrative of the first appearance of Jesus in Capernaum (Mark i. 21–39) offers special attractions to the pathographer. It is there narrated that after He had during the day spoken in the synagogue and in the evening had done many cures, at night he " withdrew," and in the morning was found by Peter and his companions in a lonely place, and would not be persuaded to return, for the present,

to the town, though all were eagerly expecting Him there.

But this " withdrawal," and similar attempts at a later period, have nothing to do with oscillations of feeling. It is simply that Jesus, for definite reasons, which in part are still recognisable, seeks to avoid the multitudes. One of the principal reasons was that He wished to prevent people bringing the sick and possessed to Him from all sides to demand cures from Him. He especially desired, as appears from the significant particulars in Mark (i. 34, iii. 12), to avoid contact with the latter.

Binet-Sanglé and De Loosten are not able to cite much else in the way of indications of disease. They make a main point of the absence of family affection which they think they discover in the conduct of Jesus towards His kinsfolk and in a number of sayings, and of the sexual insensibility of which they find evidence in the saying about the eunuchs in Matthew xix. 10–12.

Towards His family Jesus takes up an attitude of reserve because His relatives seek to remove Him to His home and put a stop to His public activity (Mark iii. 21). Again, when He declares the bond by which a common faith in the nearness of the Kingdom of God unites men to be closer and more sacred than that of blood (Mark iii. 31–35), and demands that in the coming persecution men are not to be moved to apostasy by consideration for relatives, this is not due to an insensibility to family affection deserving of pathographic record, but to a special point of view which is to be explained by particular presuppositions having their grounds in the historical conditions of the time. Indeed all that is regarded by the pathographers, on the basis of modern conceptions, as morally defective in the ethical attitude and preaching of Jesus is to be explained from these premises.

The saying about eunuchs and those who have made

themselves so for the sake of the Kingdom of God is no doubt startling. The pathographers who propose to read into it a morbid sexual insensibility are nevertheless in error. They fail to notice that Jesus had expressed Himself in regard to marriage shortly before (Matt. xix. 3–9) in a quite natural and approving way.

The key to this much-discussed and often misinterpreted passage is to be found in passages from Old Testament and late Jewish writings. In Deuteronomy xxiii. 1 it is ordained that eunuchs are to be excluded from religious fellowship. In a later post-exilic writing which was attached to the Book of Isaiah, and which is characteristic of the liberal standpoint of that period, the promise is given to them that if they keep the Law and the Sabbath they shall receive a glorious reward from the Lord, and in compensation for the lack of posterity shall in the expected future be not merely made equal to others but even superior to them (Isa. lvi. 3–5). We find similar expressions in the book of the Wisdom of Solomon, which came into being in the first century B.C (iii. 13, 14).

The saying of Jesus moves on the same lines. He sees in the eunuchs the despised, who, like the "little ones," are destined to honour in the Kingdom of God because they previously belonged to those who were looked down upon. On this basis He declares, as a mysterious supposition, that some men, in order to become partakers of peculiar honour in the future, have voluntarily placed themselves in the class of the despised. This can have no reference to Himself, since in virtue of His Davidic descent He possesses a peculiar claim to a high position in the Kingdom of God. The saying has therefore nothing to do with sexual insensibility, but is to be explained on the basis of existing late Jewish conceptions.

There remains for explanation the seemingly irrational

act of cursing the fig tree (Mark. xi. 12–14). The narrative has come down to us in a secondary version, as appears from the remark that the fig-tree was already withered on the following day.[1] As the historical kernel we have doubtless to retain the fact that Jesus pronounced over a fig-tree on which he had sought sustenance in vain the curse that in eternity no one should any more find fruit thereon. He condemns it therefore, not to wither, but to be unfruitful " in eternity."

From His presuppositions the action is not, strange as it may seem to us, meaningless. Late Jewish Apocalyptic expected that nature, as well as man, would share in the transformation, and would be made capable of a marvellous fertility. We have an instance of this in the Apocalypse of Baruch, in the description of the future yield of a single vine (Apoc. Baruch xxix.). As Jesus expected the immediate advent of the Messianic Kingdom, the saying refers to the fate of the fig-tree in the New Age. Whereas all other growing things will attain a marvellous fertility, this tree, because it deceived the future Messiah, when in His earthly humiliation He was suffering hunger, by its show of leaves, was to remain unfruitful. As, from the moment of the end of the world onwards, the Messiah was to be the ruler of the whole world, Jesus here only announces a judgment, the execution of which He believed to lie within His future powers. It is therefore not a case of irrational anger against the order of nature, but of a kind of anticipation of future prerogatives, which we find Him making use of elsewhere. Thus he appoints beforehand that at the Last Judgment the twelve disciples should judge the twelve tribes of Israel (Matt. xix. 28) ; thus, too, He announces the curse

[1] The narrative of the adjuration of the Storm on the Lake (Mark iv. 35–41) may be left out of account, since it has already been elaborated into a great nature-miracle, and the historical kernel is no longer recognisable.

which shall come upon the Galilaean towns which remain impenitent (Matt. xi. 20–24) ; thus He condemns Jerusalem to be laid waste (Matt. xxiii. 37–38).

In these and similar sayings we have to do with promises and judgments which He purposes to carry out as soon as He is invested with His Messianic powers. The saying about the fig-tree is thus one of a whole series of similar utterances. Strange as is the impression which they make on us, they are perfectly intelligible on the basis of the late Jewish presuppositions of Jesus. Because they do not realise these presuppositions, Binet-Sanglé and De Loosten are led here and elsewhere to discover symptoms of mental disorder where these are not present.

Our criticism of these pathographic studies brings us therefore to the following results:—

1. That the materials made use of in these studies are to a large extent unhistorical.

2. In the materials which are historical a large number of actions and sayings of Jesus impresses these authors as being pathological because they have too little acquaintance with contemporary points of view to be able to do them justice. A number of false conceptions also arise from the fact that they have no understanding of the peculiar problems presented by the course of Jesus' public ministry.

3. On the basis of these false presuppositions, and with the aid of entirely hypothetical symptoms, they construct clinical pictures which are themselves artificial products, and even so do not exactly correspond to the clinical types to which the authors' diagnosis refers them.

4. The only characteristics which, while historically admissible, conceivably call for psychiatric discussion—Jesus' lofty conception of Himself, and perhaps also hallucinations at the Baptism—are very far from being sufficient to prove the existence of mental disease.

Emil Rasmussen [1] knows the historical material much better than the authors hitherto mentioned, as at once appears from the fact that he makes no use of the Fourth Gospel.

He proposes to provide us with a " Study in Comparative Psychopathology " and to gain an insight into the psychology of Jesus by drawing a parallel between Him and other Prophets and " Men of God." Those cited for comparison are : the Jewish Prophets, Buddha (550 ?–480 B.C.), Paul († 64 ?), Mohammed (570 ?–632), Luther (1483–1546), Sabbatai Zevi, from Asia Minor (1626–1676), Swedenborg (1688–1772), the Mahdi († 1885), the Saint of the Abruzzi, Orestes de Amicio (1824–1889), David Lazzaretti, to whom he devotes a special study,[2] the founders of Bahaism, Mirza Ali Mohammed († 1852), and Mirza Mussein Ali (1817–1892), and the Dane, Sören Kierkegaard (1813–1855).

Rasmussen is of opinion that these " Prophets " and " Men of God " present a clinical picture which the alienist can diagnose with precision as epileptic insanity.

The Danish author thinks that he finds in Jesus all the symptoms observed in these prophets, ancient and modern. He is supposed to show an extreme " experience of apprehension," to fall into " frenzy " at the expulsion of the traffickers from the Temple, to suffer from hallucinations, to display in His self-contradictory character unmeasured self-esteem and an abnormal life of the senses, to cherish the illusion that He was able to die for mankind and make atonement for them.

Since Rasmussen does not discuss the particular symptoms in Jesus from a psychiatric point of view, but simply subsumes the Nazarene under the category of prophet which he constructs, it is only permissible to discuss his

[1] *Jesus. Eine vergleichende psychopathologische Studie.* Leipzig, 1905.
[2] *Ein Christus aus unseren Tagen.* Leipzig, 1906.

diagnosis generally. Why he decides in favour of epilepsy is not quite clear. The author is psychiatrically ill-advised [1] in identifying the epileptic type—as typical examples certain historical personages are cited whose epilepsy is not yet proved—with isolated psychopathic traits of which he thinks he can show the existence in Jesus. Traits of this kind are, however, found in all temperaments which depart from the average. They include indeed epileptiform conditions. But their occurrence—even assuming that their presence can be proved in the case of Jesus—is far from justifying us in setting up the diagnosis "Epilepsy."

That Rasmussen himself does not regard his diagnosis as beyond all doubt is proved by a footnote in which he is prepared to leave open the possibility that we may have to do in Jesus with a case of " paranoia." The general psychological remarks of which he delivers himself in this connexion show that psychiatry as pictured in his mind is a chaotic formation. The statement " We must not exclude *a priori* the possibility that not only epilepsy, but also paranoia, *dementia paralytica*, and possibly mental disease of a hysterical character, may have produced the prophetic and Christ figures" makes any detailed discussion of Rasmussen's psychiatric view appear out of the question. The medical value of a comparative study in the form in which he attempts it, may at once be pronounced *nil*.

ALBERT SCHWEITZER.

Translated by W Montgomery.

[1] The translator regrets that, in an earlier allusion to Rasmussen, overlooking the *position* of the word " wohl " he rendered " who is well-informed on the medical side " instead of " who has *doubtless* had advice from the medical side " (i.e. has consulted alienists).

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